How the World Works_The Story of Human Labor from Prehistory to the Modern Day.Cockshott2019

我之所以写这本书，是因为据我所知，最近缺少对唯物主义历史理论的介绍。虽然这不是一本历史书，但它讲述了我们的历史发生的连续的经济和社会形式。我遵循亚当·斯密和卡尔·马克思开创的方法，认为历史是由人们为生存而工作的连续经济形式构成的。我借鉴了一代又一代为这种唯物主义历史观做出贡献的历史学家、经济学家和社会理论家的工作，并试图为非专业读者总结他们的成果。

I wrote it because there is a lack, as far as I am aware, of a recent introduction to the materialist theory of history. Although it is not a history book, it is about the successive economic and social forms within which our history has taken place. I follow the approach pioneered by Adam Smith and Karl Marx of seeing history as being structured by the successive forms of economy within which people have worked to win their survival. I draw on the work of generations of historians, economists, and social theorists who have contributed to this materialist view of history, and I attempt to summarize their results for the non-specialist reader.

我的叙述中有一些广泛的主题：人类繁衍与技术、社会统治和劳动分工之间的相互作用。在第二章中，我探讨了人类社会从狩猎者发展成为农民所经历的最大变化。根据现代研究，我们将看到这种转变既不容易，也不会立即产生效益，因此问题在于理解它为什么会发生。但是，一旦转变发生，可用的额外食物资源就使人口密度急剧上升，并引发了移民和殖民过程，这些都在我们仍在使用的语言中留下了印记。

There are certain broad themes in my account: the interaction of human reproduction with technology, social domination, and the division of labor. In chapter 2 I look at the biggest change human society ever went through as we developed from being hunters to becoming farmers. We will see how, according to modern research, this transition was neither easy nor immediately beneficial, so the problem is to understand why it took place at all. But, once the transition took place, the additional food resources that became available allowed a dramatic rise in population density and to a process of migration and colonization that have left their marks in the languages we still speak.

虽然考古学表明，最初的农业社会保留了平等结构，但到了古典文明时代，这种结构已经彻底瓦解。在一个又一个地区，自由让位于奴隶制。奴隶被迫生产剩余商品出售，从而引发了国际贸易，货币和银行业。我将在第 3 章中解释奴隶经济的内部结构、其市场和再生产过程，以及其有限的市场和人力资源的浪费如何导致其停滞不前。

While archaeology shows that the first agricultural societies retained an egalitarian structure, this had by the era of classical civilization thoroughly broken down. In area after area, freedom gave way to slavery. Slaves were forced to produce surplus goods for sale giving rise to international trade, money, and banking. I explain in chapter 3 the internal structure of slave economies, their markets and processes of reproduction and how their limited markets and their squandering of human resources led them to stagnate.

由于奴隶经济发明了货币，因此第 3 章解释了古典价格理论，根据该理论，商品的价格往往与制造商品所耗费的劳动量成正比。在此过程中，我解释了古典理论如何比大多数社会科学学生所学的供求理论更科学。

Since it was slave economies that invented money chapter 3 explains the classical theory of price, according to which the prices of commodities tend to be proportional to the amount of labor expended making them. In the process I explain how the classical theory is more scientific than the supply and demand theory that most social science students have been taught.

奴隶经济在世界各地不同时期兴起，但最终让位于农民经济。在这些经济中，相对自给自足的家庭农场受到地主或军人的剥削。在第 4 章中，我研究了此类经济的基本再生产过程、农民遭受的剥削程度以及整个经济模式的效率。我特别关注的是反驳现代偏见，即认为封建社会与现代资本主义相比效率低下且不合理。

Slave economies have arisen at different times in various parts of the world, but in the end they have given way to peasant economies. In these, relatively self-sufficient family farms are subject to the exploitation a landlord or military class. In chapter 4 I look at the basic reproduction process of such economies, the degree of exploitation to which the peasants were subjected, and the efficiency of the overall economic model. In particular I am concerned to counter the modern prejudice that assumes feudal society to have been inefficient and irrational compared to modern capitalism.

当今世界，大多数人生活在资本主义经济体系中。本书最长的第五章解释了资本主义是如何运作的。我指出，古典价格理论在资本主义制度下仍然适用，再加上私营企业的存在，必然意味着商品的加价或利润将超过其生产工资成本。我指出，最终是技术的发展，特别是动力机械的发展，使得这些机器的所有者成为新的统治阶级。本章的很大一部分内容致力于技术、利润和实际工资之间的相互作用。我指出，更自由、薪酬更高的劳动力带来了更快的技术进步速度。

Most of the world now lives in the capitalist economic system. Chapter 5, the longest in the book, explains how capitalism works. I show that the classical theory of price still applies under capitalism, and that this, combined with the existence of private firms, necessarily implies that goods will be sold at a markup or profit over the wage cost of their production. I show that it was ultimately the development of technology, particularly powered machinery, that enabled the owners of such machines to become the new dominant class. A large part of the chapter is devoted to the interaction between technology, profits, and real wages. I show that a freer and better paid workforce led to a more rapid rate of technical progress.

第 5 章的下一个大主题是资本主义如何与人口增长和家庭结构相互作用。早期和晚期资本主义社会的人口结构截然不同。19 世纪人口激增助长了欧洲殖民者的殖民主义。相比之下，现在发达资本主义国家几乎无法再生产劳动力。这种转变导致利润率长期低迷和投资水平停滞。它预示着资本主义的生存危机。

The next big theme of chapter 5 is how capitalism has interacted with population growth and family structure. Early and late capitalist societies have radically different demographics. An exploding population in the nineteenth century fueled European settler colonialism. Now, in contrast, developed capitalist states are scarcely able to reproduce their workforces. This shift has led to chronically depressed profit rates and stagnant levels of investment. It presages an existential crisis for capitalism.

我提出的一个比较有争议的观点是，21 世纪初期并非技术变革非常迅速的时期，但现在这种进步比 20 世纪要慢得多。技术进步的放缓是资本主义已经过了鼎盛时期的标志。

One of the more controversial points I make is that far from the early twenty-first century being a period of very rapid technical change, such advances are now much slower than they were in the twentieth century. This slowdown in technical progress is a mark of capitalism having passed its heyday.

一个世纪以来，社会主义经济一直作为资本主义的替代品而存在。第六章探讨了社会主义的基本结构。我从技术开始。电力，以及大量的电力，被视为社会主义的支柱之一。社会主义改造。另一条腿是人口，人口数量取决于出生率、死亡率和家庭结构，所有这些都将在第 6.3 节中介绍。

For a century now, socialist economies have existed as an alternative to capitalism. Chapter 6 examines the basic structure of socialism. I start with technology. Electricity, and lots of it, was seen as one leg of socialist transformation. The other leg was people and the number of people depended on birth rates, death rates, and family structures, all of which are covered in section 6.3.

在资本主义经济中，可供投资的剩余取决于私人利润；在社会主义制度中，它取决于消费品和投资品之间有计划的产出分配。用古典马克思主义的术语来说，社会主义经济具有历史上独一无二的提取剩余产品的机制。这种机制是苏联在 1970 年代之前以及中国直到现在实现的非常高的增长速度的基础。第 6.5 节介绍了费尔德曼在 1920 年代发展的社会主义增长基本理论，并表明他的理论很好地解释了接下来五十年所取得的成就。西方没有广泛认识到苏联在生产大众消费品方面有多么成功。如果它生产了这么多，为什么会给人留下持续短缺的印象？

In capitalist economies the surplus available for investment depends on private profits; in a socialist system it depends on the planned division of output between consumer goods and investment goods. In classical Marxist terms, socialist economies have a historically unique mechanism for the extraction of a surplus product. This mechanism underlay the very fast growth rates achieved by the USSR before the 1970s and by China right up until to the present. Section 6.5 presents the basic theory of socialist growth developed by Feldman in the 1920s and shows that his theory gives a good explanation of what was achieved over the next fifty years. What is not widely appreciated in the West was just how successful the USSR was in the production of mass consumption goods. Why, if it was producing so much, was there an impression of continuous shortages?

归根结底，问题在于苏联如何管理消费市场，更重要的是，为什么消费品市场仍然存在。本章的后半部分讨论了为什么社会主义经济体仍然保留货币，以及为什么它们无法逃脱马克思主义者所说的“价值规律”。本章最后分析了导致欧洲社会主义国家最终解体的进程。

It comes down in the end to how the Soviets managed the consumer market, and, more fundamentally, to why there still was a market in consumer goods. The later parts of the chapter deal with why the socialist economies still retained money, and why it was impossible for them to escape what Marxists term “the law of value.” The chapter finishes with an examination of the processes that led to the final disintegration of the European socialist countries.

最后，我以一章关于未来经济的内容作为结束。我探讨了向碳中和经济转变将带来的制约因素。我问的是，未来的经济是否会是共产主义的，以及共产主义是否必须依赖某些特定的技术基础。本章不可避免地带有一些推测性！

I finish with a chapter on future economies. I look at the constraints that will be imposed by a shift to carbon-neutral economics. I ask whether future economies will be communist and whether communism has some specific technical basis on which it must rest. This chapter is inevitably slightly speculative!

面向更多技术读者的评论

COMMENTS FOR MORE TECHNICAL READERS

虽然本书的视角深受马克思的影响，但在许多观点上，我的表述与马克思主义的普遍观点有很大不同。

Although this book is written from a perspective strongly influenced by Marx, there are a number of points on which my presentation will differ significantly from what has become common in Marxism.

第一个不同之处在于技术所扮演的角色。早在十九世纪中叶，马克思就提出了一种大胆的、技术决定论的社会观。但到了二十世纪末，这种观点开始被视为一种尴尬，尤其是欧洲和美国的理论家。西方马克思主义理论由受过人文或社会研究训练的人主导。像贝尔纳尔、博尔迪加、潘涅库克或马霍弗这样的例外非常少，他们的存在本身就值得注意。西方马克思主义者的专业教育背景产生了许多影响：对科学新概念的接受速度缓慢、对技术决定论的敌意以及不愿使用数学和定量方法。

The first difference is on the role assigned to technology. Back in the mid-nineteenth century Marx put forward a bold, technologically determinist view of society. But this view came to be seen as something of an embarrassment by the late twentieth century, particularly by European and American theorists. Western Marxist theory was dominated by people with a training in the humanities or social studies. Exceptions like Bernal, Bordiga, Pannekoek, or Machover were so few that their very existence was noteworthy. The specialized educational background of Western Marxists had a number of effects: slow adoption of new concepts from the sciences, hostility to what is seen as technical determinism and reluctance to use mathematical and quantitative methods.

从 20 世纪 80 年代中期开始，一种新型的马克思主义逐渐发展起来，它更加倾向于自然科学和定量分析。在这里，我将这种方法应用于生产方式的一般历史。在此过程中，我对“生产方式”一词进行了比大多数近期马克思主义者所做的更为字面化、技术性的解释。对于每一种历史形式的经济，我首先关注其基础技术，然后关注其人口统计。在我看来，技术和人口制约着其他一切。

From the mid-1980s a new type of Marxism has gradually developed that has been more sympathetic to the hard sciences and to quantitative analysis. Here I apply this approach to the general history of modes of production. In the process I give the term “mode of production” a much more literal, technological interpretation than most recent Marxists have done. For each historical form of economy, I focus first on its underlying technology and then its demography. In my view, technology and population constrain everything else.

长期以来，我一直批评“价值形式”学派的经济学家 [Heinrich and Locascio, 2012]，在我看来 [Cockshott, 2013a]，他们过分地将价值和抽象劳动的观念局限于现代资本主义社会。我认为，抽象劳动的观念对于分析所有形式的经济都至关重要，而不仅仅是资本主义。抽象劳动表示人类存在的一种属性，即我们的可塑性和适应性。我在第 1 章的开头就阐述了这种方法。除了对劳动的误解之外，价值形式学派还倾向于将价值视为仅适用于资本主义经济的概念。我认为这种观点完全误解了历史。因此，经过一番深思熟虑，我选择在第 3.5 章中介绍我的价值分析，在该章中我研究了古典奴隶文明。我还想纠正这样一种错觉，即价值关系被视为资本主义特有的东西，与社会主义经济无关。在第 6.8 节中，我将说明为什么即使在社会主义经济中，价值关系仍然有效。苏联官方承认“价值规律”仍然适用于他们。尽管理论上承认，但政治压力使得社会主义政府表现得好像价值关系可以简单地被忽略。后果是不幸的。如果未来的社会主义政府可能受到价值形式理论的影响而重蹈覆辙，那将是更糟糕的不幸。

I have long been critical of the “value form” school of economists [Heinrich and Locascio, 2012] who, in my opinion [Cockshott, 2013a], unduly restrict the idea of value and abstract labor to modern capitalist society. I think that the idea of abstract labor is critical to the analysis of all forms of economy, not just to capitalism. Abstract labor denotes an attribute of the human species being, our plasticity and adaptability. I lay out this approach right at the start of chapter 1. Along with a misapprehension about labor, the value form school has tended to see value as a concept that only applies to capitalist economies. I think this view gets the history all wrong. I thus chose, with some deliberation, to introduce my analysis of value in chapter 3.5 where I am examining classical slave civilizations. I am also concerned to correct the illusion that value relations, seen as something specifically capitalist, have no relevance to socialist economies. In section 6.8 I show why, even in socialist economies, value relations still operated. Officially, the Soviets accepted that the “law of value” still applied to them. Despite the theoretical acceptance, political pressures were such as to make socialist governments act as if value relations could be simply ignored. The consequences were unfortunate. It would be an even worse misfortune were a future socialist government, influenced perhaps by value form theory, to repeat that mistake.

阿尔都塞等人 [2006] 批评了传统马克思主义中单线模型的使用。为了回应这一批评，当我研究经济形式之间的转变时，我抛弃了旧的单线经济形式连续性，转而采用基于马尔可夫模型的方法。马尔可夫方法允许你将历史概念化为既有统计趋势，又有“向后”转变的可能性 [Cockshott，2013b]。

Althusser et al. [2006] criticized the use of unilinear models in traditional Marxism. In response to this critique, when I look at transitions between forms of economy I discard the old unilinear succession of forms of economy for an approach based on Markov models. The Markov approach allows you to conceptualize history as having both a statistical trend and at the same time the possibility of “backward” transitions [Cockshott, 2013b].

熟悉 Farjoun 和 Machover 作品的读者会注意到，我对价格理论的阐述源自这些作者。然而，我超越了他们，将同样的论证形式应用于分析父权制的兴起（第 2.4 节）和对古典工资定律的重新表述（第 5.7 节）。我试图表明，人们仍然可以应用古典思想最低工资由人们仍能养活自己的最低工资决定。自 Farjoun 和 Machover [1983] 以来的实证研究表明，与马克思相反，利润率在各行业之间并不均衡。马克思主义经济学家已经说服了很多人相信这是事实。单纯的现实世界数据似乎在经济学中没有那么重要。为了使人们发现更正式的方法令人信服，附录 B 介绍了一种基于随机矩阵的新型数学方法，以说明利润为何不均衡。

Readers familiar with the work of Farjoun and Machover will notice that my presentation of price theory is derived from those authors. I have, however, gone beyond them in applying the same forms of argument to analyzing the rise of patriarchy (section 2.4), and to a reformulation of the classical law of wages (section 5.7). I try to show that one can still apply the classical idea of the wage minimum as being set by the lowest wage on which people can still feed themselves. Empirical work since Farjoun and Machover [1983] has shown that, contra Marx, the rate of profit does not equalize between industries. Marxist economists have taken some persuading that this is the case. Mere real-world data does not seem to carry that much weight in economics. In the hope that more formal methods will be found convincing, Appendix B introduces a novel mathematical approach based on random matrices to show why profits do not equilibrate.

在第 4.4 节和第 5.4.8 节中，我批判了韦伯-布伦纳关于资本主义生产关系更合理性的论点。根据这一观点，需要用金钱进行计算，迫使资本家比以前的统治阶级更加经济理性。在第 5.4.8 节中，我指出，这种想法是基于对推动资本主义创新的成本结构的误解，事实上，资本主义成本核算系统性地阻碍了创新。从理论上讲，前资本主义社会关系实际上更有利于节省劳动力的合理化。在第 4.4 节中，我使用麦克唐纳最近的研究来证明情况确实如此：封建农业与资本主义一样高效，甚至比资本主义更有效率。

In sections 4.4 and 5.4.8 I develop a critique of the Weber-Brenner thesis about the superior rationality of capitalist relations of production. In this view, the need to perform calculations in terms of money, forces capitalists to be more economically rational than previous ruling classes had been. In section 5.4.8 I show that this idea is based on a misunderstanding of the cost structures driving innovation under capitalism, and that in fact capitalist costing systematically biases against innovation. On theoretical grounds, precapitalist social relations are actually more conducive to labor-saving rationalization. In section 4.4 I use the recent work of McDonald to show that this was the case: feudal agriculture was as efficient as, if not more efficient than, capitalism.

资本主义效率低下，是因为货币计算发出了误导性信号。低工资意味着它不断低估劳动力的真实成本。这不仅仅适用于资本主义。只要以货币工资而不是劳动小时数来估算成本，就会发生这种情况。在第 6.8.1 节中，我表明苏联使用的货币计算系统在合理使用劳动力方面也发出了错误的信号。只有通过过渡到完全共产主义的经济计算体系，苏联才能摆脱最终的停滞。

Capitalism is inefficient because of the misleading signals that come from monetary calculation. Low wages mean that it constantly underestimates the true cost of labor. This does not just apply to capitalism. It happens wherever costs are estimated in terms of money wages not hours of labor. In section 6.8.1 I show that the system of monetary calculation used in the USSR also generated the wrong signals when it came to a rational use of labor. Only by a transition to a fully communist system of economic calculation could the USSR have escaped its terminal stagnation.

第一章

CHAPTER 1

介绍

Introduction

人类社会必须努力才能生存。1^我们的食物、衣服和住所都是靠劳动获得的，正如每个父母都知道的那样，下一代也是靠劳动养育的。社会首先是一种集体努力，以确保其自身的物质延续。

Human society has to work to survive.¹ Our food, clothing, and shelter are won by work and, as every parent knows, the next generation is raised by work. Society is, before all else, a collective effort to ensure its own physical continuity.

我们生于一个社会，并由这个社会塑造，而这个社会已经围绕着物质生产、人类繁衍以及实现这一切的社会关系的再生产等集体任务而构建。

We are all born into and formed by a society already structured around collective tasks of physical production, of human reproduction, and the reproduction of the social relations that achieve it all.

社会将成员分配到不同的社会角色中，并将他们清醒的时间分配到各种活动上。有些活动，如自己吃饭或穿衣，纯粹是个人活动。有些活动，如照顾孩子、家庭烹饪、务农或做工，则有益于他人。不同类型的活动会产生各自的有益效果：性生活——生孩子，烘焙——面包，砌砖——墙壁。为了达到每种效果，我们需要进行特定的身体动作序列，与环境、工具和其他人互动。这些是活动的具体方面。

Societies distribute their members into different social roles, and divide up their waking hours between activities. Some activities, like feeding or dressing oneself, are purely personal. Some, like childcare, family cooking, farming, or industry, benefit others. Different kinds of activity produce their own useful effects: sex—babies, baking—bread, bricklaying—walls. For each effect we need to carry out particular sequences of body movements that interact with the environment, implements, and other people. These are the concrete aspects of activity.

但从整个社会的角度来看，每项活动都有另一个更抽象的方面，因为每项活动都是劳动分工的一部分。社会成员的身体和时间是社会的基本资源。它们都是有限的。每天活着的人数量是有限的，一天只有 24 小时，其中有些时间我们的身体必须睡觉。社会分工必须将所有这些身体的可用时间分配给生存所需的任务。这里被划分的是构成社会工作日的数百万人小时。这是活动的抽象社会方面：活动是社会有机体的一部分。

But from the standpoint of society as a whole, each activity has another more abstract aspect, since each is part of the division of labor. The bodies and time of its members are society’s fundamental resource. They are both limited. There are only a given number of people alive on any given day, and there are only 24 hours in the day, for some of which our bodies must sleep. The social division of labor has to partition the available time of all these bodies between the tasks required for survival. What is being divided up here are all the millions of person hours that go to make up the social working day. This is the abstract social aspect of activity: activity as part of the social organism.

分工将具体的成果（特定主体执行特定行动）与不同的抽象可能性结合起来。结果。人员与任务的分配必须有所不同。六个月后，你或我可能会从事不同的工作。如果情况不同，我们现在可能会做不同的事情。

The division of labor combines a concrete achieved result, particular bodies performing specific actions, with the abstract possibility of a different result. The allocation of bodies to tasks would have to be different. You or I could be doing a different job in six months’ time. Had circumstances been other, we could have been doing something different right now.

为了实现劳动分工，机构必须灵活，能够执行多项任务。我们可以做到这一点。我们可以切换，我们可以学习。

For a division of labor to exist bodies must be flexible, able to perform more than one task. We can do this. We can switch, we can learn.

人类既不是地球上唯一的社会动物，也不是第一批社会动物。在人类城镇出现之前，白蚁有城堡，蜜蜂有公寓楼，鼹鼠有迷宫。从生物量和食物消耗量来看，白蚁是占主导地位的社会生物。我们的生物量总计约为 3.5 亿吨 [Walpole 等人，2012]，白蚁的生物量为 4.5 亿吨 [Sanderson，1996]。

We humans are neither the only, nor the first social animals on Earth. Before our towns, there were the castles of the termites, the apartment blocks of the bees, and mazes of the mole rats. Termites are, in terms of sheer biomass and food consumption, the dominant social organism. Our biomass totals some 350 million tons [Walpole et al., 2012], that of termites, 450 million tons [Sanderson, 1996].

这些社会也有各自的分工。白蚁工蚁建造的塔楼与我们的摩天大楼相比，与它们的身体高度相当。它们采集木材，照料地下蘑菇园并照顾幼虫。这是一种不断变化的分工。执行不同任务的工蚁比例根据蚁群的需求而变化。

These societies too have their division of labor. Termite workers build towers every bit as tall in relation to their bodies as our skyscrapers. They gather wood, they tend underground mushroom gardens and look after young ones. This is a fluctuating division of labor. The proportions of workers performing different tasks vary according to the needs of the colony.

它们的任务有限，而且它们的技术只会随着进化的时间尺度而变化，但这仍然是一种劳动分工。单个白蚁工蚁不会学习。作为物种，它们会学习，但它们使用的任何技术（数百万年前，它们的每项技术都一定是新的）都是通过缓慢的遗传适应过程获得的。

They have a limited repertoire of tasks and their technology changes only over evolutionary time scales, but this is still a division of labor. Individual termite workers do not learn. As species they learn, but any technology they use, and once, millions of years ago, each of their technologies must have been new, was acquired by the slow process of genetic adaptation.

除了工蚁，它们的蚁丘上还有其他蚁群。它们是多态性物种。

Alongside the workers, their mounds contain others. They are polymorphic species.

有些兵蚁的头部和下颚巨大，蚁母体巨大，蚁父体型中等。兵蚁不会干活。它们唯一的任务是保护家园不受蚂蚁侵扰。它们用巨大的头部堵住通道，咬住入侵者，或向入侵者喷射有毒胶水。除此之外，它们没有生产力，无法收集木材或种植庄稼，只能依靠工蚁获取食物。

There are soldier termites with huge heads and mandibles, huge mothers, and medium-sized fathers. The soldiers cannot work. Their sole task is to defend the home from ants. They block the passages with their huge heads, biting intruders, or squirting noxious glue at them. Aside from this, they are unproductive, unable to gather wood or raise crops, dependent on the workers for their food.

体型巨大的母蚁或“蚁后”——一种像男人手指般大小、带有脉动条纹的黄色香肠——也无法工作。她躺在安全的巢穴里，喘着气，一边产卵，一边吃着真菌。母蚁和兵蚁的活动总是具体的：母蚁产卵，兵蚁防守。它们不能像工蚁那样在需要时承担任务。

The huge mother or “queen,” a sort of yellowish pulsating striped sausage as big as a man’s finger, can’t work either. She lies in her secure chamber, panting, being fed fungus as she lays eggs. The activities of the mother and the soldiers are always concrete: the mother lays eggs, the soldiers defend. They cannot take up tasks as the need arises the way the workers do.

面对昆虫社会，人们很难不将其与我们自己的社会进行比较。工蚁、兵蚁、蚁后等术语显然是类比：将我们社会的阶级制度投射到一个非常陌生的社会上。人们用种姓这个词来描述不同的白蚁体型，这与印度古代社会制度明显相似。但这种类比是有限的。不同种姓的印度人的身体是相同的，是社会压力，而不是体格，迫使人们从事与种姓相关的工作。印度而且，种姓是世袭的，而白蚁巢穴中不同“种姓”的成员，无论是工蚁还是兵蚁，都有同一个父母。

Faced with insect societies people find it hard not to make analogies to our own. The terms worker, soldier, queen are obvious analogies: a projection of the class systems of our society onto a very alien one. People use the term castes to describe the different termite body forms, an obvious analogy with the ancient social system of India. But this analogy is limited. The bodies of people in different Indian castes are the same, it is social pressure, not physique, that forces people into the types of work associated with castes. Indian castes, moreover, are hereditary, whereas the members of different “castes” in a termite nest, workers or soldiers all share the same parents.

图 1.1。白蚁是地球上占主导地位的社会生物，就生物量而言。它们的工蚁建造的塔楼与我们的摩天大楼相比，高度与身体高度相当。它们是多态动物，一个群体中有多种不同的体型。A：初级王蚁，B：初级蚁后，C：次级蚁后，D：三级蚁后，E：兵蚁，F：工蚁。由于这种多态性，它们没有完全发达的分工。地球上另一种主要的社会动物是二态性的，可以有更普遍的分工。资料来源：NASA 和 Wikimedia。

Figure 1.1. Termites are, in biomass, the dominant social organism on Earth. Their workers build towers every bit as tall in relation to their bodies as our skyscrapers. They are polymorphic animals with multiple different body forms within a colony. A: Primary king, B: Primary queen, C: Secondary queen, D: Tertiary queen, E: Soldiers, F: Worker. Because of this polymorphism they do not have a fully developed division of labor. The other main social animal on Earth is dimorphic and can have a more general division of labor. Source: NASA and Wikimedia.

然而，在谈论白蚁种姓时，有效的观点是，就像印度教的种姓一样；白蚁的不同体型阻碍了灵活的分工 [Ambedkar，1982]。

The point that is validly made when talking of termite castes though, is that like the castes of the Hindus; the different body forms of the termites impede a flexible division of labor [Ambedkar, 1982].

虽然白蚁兵蚁无法转而从事建筑工作，反之亦然，但必须存在某种机制来调节这两种体型的比例。在敌对蚂蚁众多的环境中，兵蚁数量过少可能会对蚁群造成致命影响，而兵蚁数量过多则意味着工蚁需要喂养大量无用之人。原则上，种姓比例可以通过基因调节，即不同的蚁后产卵，其兵蚁比例会有所不同。有证据表明情况确实如此 [Long et al., 2003]。在这里，虽然特定的白蚁社会无法完全调节其劳动分工，但自然选择意味着，在一系列代代蚁群中，兵蚁比例将适应这些蚁群的平均需求。

Although termite soldiers cannot transfer to building work or vice-versa, there has to be some mechanism regulating the proportions of these two body forms. Too few soldiers in an environment with a lot of hostile ants could be fatal for the colony, but too many means a lot of idle mouths for the workers to feed. In principle the caste ratios could be regulated genetically with different queens laying eggs whose soldier ratio varied. There is some evidence that this is the case [Long et al., 2003]. Here, although a given termite society could not fully regulate its division of labor, natural selection would mean that over a series of generations of colonies, the soldier ratio would adapt to the average needs of these colonies.

另一种可能性是，信息素用于根据需要调整个体发育成不同的体型 [Long 等人，2003]。如果这是机制，那么即使成年白蚁无法改变种姓，幼年白蚁成年后种姓的确定时间也相当晚，因此蚁群可以相当迅速地调整其劳动力的构成。这意味着白蚁之间的职业流动性实际上比人类种姓社会更大。

Another possibility is that pheromones are used to adjust the development of individuals into different body forms as the need arises [Long et al., 2003]. If this is the mechanism, then even though a mature termite cannot change caste, the caste into which a young one matures is decided quite late in life, so that the colony can adjust the composition of its workforce quite rapidly. This would imply that there was actually more occupational mobility among the termites than in human caste societies.

为什么要关注这些身体形态千差万别的奇怪小生物呢？

Why pay attention to these odd little creatures with their grotesquely differentiated bodies?

因为当我们思考陌生的事物时，更容易识别熟悉事物的特征。

Because it is easier to recognize features of the familiar when contemplating the strange.

白蚁和其他社会性昆虫似乎是共产主义的完美典范。个体的行为主要是为了整个群体的利益，而不是自己的利益。白蚁兵蚁愿意为它们的群体牺牲自己的生命。如果蚁巢中出现了一个洞，兵蚁就会冲出去对抗任何试图闯入的蚂蚁，而工蚁则会在它们身后把洞堵住。它们无路可退。当工蚁把墙堵好后，兵蚁就会被困在外面。工蜂会无所畏惧地围攻黄蜂。许多工蜂死于黄蜂的螫咬，但它们会围住黄蜂并发出嗡嗡声，使黄蜂死于中暑。

The termites and other social insects seem perfect examples of communism. The individuals act primarily in the interests of the community as a whole rather than themselves. Termite soldiers willingly sacrifice their lives for the sake of their colony. If there is a hole formed in the nest, the soldiers rush out to confront any ants that attempt to break in, while behind them the workers wall up the hole. There is no retreat for them. When the workers finish the wall, the soldiers are marooned outside. Worker bees will fearlessly mob hornets. Many die from the hornet’s sting, but by surrounding the hornet and buzzing they cause it to die of heat exhaustion.

这种共产主义生活方式的优越性可以从社会性昆虫（尤其是白蚁和蚂蚁）占据的生态主导地位中得到证明。任何见过这些生物的人都会对非洲肉食蚁大军对其行进领土的完全统治感到印象深刻，它们在行进过程中会形成可怕的微型轨道网络、主干道和多车道交通的主要道路，以及当地其他昆虫的恐慌。它们徒劳地试图逃跑，但最终被微小的折磨者撕成碎片，这些折磨者会组成团队将甲虫或蟑螂撕成碎片。它们的远亲，和平的白蚁，发挥着一种隐蔽的、更微妙但更强大的统治力，只在它们临时的拱形小路上冒险。在这些墙后面，它们可以免受掠食，为蘑菇洞收集大量枯木，从而主宰生态系统。除了我们的家牛之外，没有一种陆地动物的生物量比它们更多。

The superiority of this communist lifestyle is testified by the ecologically dominant position that the social insects, particularly the termites and ants, occupy. Anyone who has seen these creatures cannot but be impressed by the complete domination that an army of carnivorous African driver ants exerts over the territory it marches through, the fearful network of miniature tracks, trunk, and major roads with multilane traffic and the panic of other insects in the locality. and their fruitless attempts to escape before being torn limb from limb by tiny tormentors who form up into teams to pull a beetle or cockroach apart. Their distant relatives, the peaceful termites, exert a hidden, more subtle but even greater domination, venturing out only in their temporary vaulted paths. Secure from predation behind these walls they gather so much dead wood for their mushroom caves that they dominate their ecosystems. No land animal, other than our domestic cattle, has more biomass.

社会性昆虫之间兄弟般的团结之所以产生，是因为它们都是同一个家庭的成员，有同一个父母。当一只兵蚁牺牲自己时，它是在保护自己的直系亲属，并间接地最大限度地延长自己基因的存活时间。但从另一个角度看，我们在这些群体中看到的正是君主专制和剥削的形象，工人们永远处于反抗的边缘。

The literally fraternal solidarity of social insects arises because they are all members of the same family with the same parents. When a soldier termite sacrifices itself, it is protecting its direct kin, and indirectly maximizing the survival of its own genes. But look at it another way and we see in these communities the very image of monarchical despotism and exploitation, with workers perpetually on the verge of rebellion.

想想那些可怜的工蜂。它们基因上是雌性，但却被剥夺了为了获得生育后代的权力，它们一生都在为女王辛勤劳作，女王是唯一被允许产卵的人。女王释放的信息素使它们处于从属地位。如果这些信息素被拿走，它们就会反抗。Nieh [2012] 写道：

Think of the poor worker bees. Genetically female but deprived of the power to bear their own offspring, they toil all their lives for a queen who alone is allowed to lay eggs. They are kept in this subordination by the pheromones released by the queen. Take these pheromones away and they rebel. Nieh [2012] writes that:

蜂王带走蜂群后，蜜蜂群落中会出现表现出叛逆特征的孤儿幼虫。成年后，这些孤儿幼虫的食物腺体减少，无法为蜂群的幼虫提供食物，卵巢发育得更加发达，可以自私地繁衍自己的后代。

After their queen has left with a swarm, orphaned larvae exhibiting rebel traits emerge in honeybee colonies. As adults, these orphans have reduced food glands to feed the colony’s larvae and more developed ovaries to selfishly reproduce their own offspring.

在发现系外行星之前，我们曾想象所有行星系统都会像我们的系统一样。现在，随着对它们巨大多样性的了解，太阳系被掩盖的特殊性变得显而易见，因此成为科学的一个问题。

Until exo-planets were discovered we had imagined that all planetary systems would be like ours. Now, with a knowledge of their vast diversity, the masked peculiarity of the solar system becomes apparent, and hence a problem for science.

当代学院派经济学不仅使人类社会制度永恒化，而且使当代西方资本主义制度永恒化。2^研究社会有机体的人类学家、考古学家和生物学家都向我们揭示了社会生活的生产和再生产可以有多种形式。他们帮助我们质疑经济学认为理所当然的特征。

Contemporary academic economics eternalizes the institutions not just of human society, but of contemporary Western capitalism.² Anthropologists, archaeologists, and biologists studying social organisms all bring home to us the variety of forms that the production and reproduction of social life can have. They help us to question features that economics takes for granted.

白蚁多态性（图 1.1）似乎无关紧要，除非它提醒我们，我们并不比它们更单一。我们是二态的，有雄性和雌性的身体形态。从外表上看，人类女性和男性之间的差异并不像白蚁蚁后和白蚁工蚁之间的差异那样让我们感到奇怪。但实际上，我们敏锐地意识到这些细微的差异对我们的社会分工产生了深刻的影响^。3

Termite polymorphism (fig. 1.1) might seem irrelevant unless it reminds that we are no more monomorphic than them. We are dimorphic, with male and female body forms. Externally the differences between human females and males do not strike us as grotesque, the way those between termite queens and termite workers do. But in reality we are acutely aware of these slighter differences that impinge profoundly on our social division of labor.³

所有白蚁种姓都在某种程度上存在残疾：只有兵蚁可以自卫，只有雄蚁⁴可以飞翔，只有蚁后产卵，只有工蚁建造房屋。它们的形态意味着，在它们之中，分工的抽象潜力只能在代际之间实现。但人类并非如此：一半的白蚁拥有可以充分参与所有社会任务的身体。女性拥有白蚁所没有的灵活性。她们可以做任何人类的工作。⁵但与昆虫不同的是，我们每个人都在一生中学会了各自的任务。人类技术的巨大发展既归功于这种学习能力，也归功于在代际之间传递所学技能的能力。

All termite castes are to some degree disabled: only soldiers can defend themselves, only alates⁴ can fly, only queens lay eggs, only workers build. Their forms mean that among them the abstract potential of the division of labor is only realized between generations. But this is not true of humans: half have bodies that allow full participation in all social tasks. Women have a flexibility no termite has. They can do any human work.⁵ But unlike insects we each learn our tasks within one lifetime. The great development of human technology owes itself both to this ability to learn and to the ability to transmit learned skills between generations.

其他动物也经历了技术进化。蜘蛛网是一种技术，它从圆网（似乎是原始形式）发展到片状网或蛛网（图 1.2）。从化石中得知的最古老的圆网可追溯到白垩纪，但我们拥有的圆网蜘蛛化石可以追溯到侏罗纪。从那时起，似乎出现了几次独立的片状网发明[Blackledge 等人，2009]。Dimitrov 等人[2012] 认为片状网不必遵循蜘蛛的织网结构受到与圆网相同的严格限制。这样，蜘蛛就可以利用无法织圆网或无法高效捕食猎物的空间。这是技术发展的一个例子，但这一发展过程耗时数千万年。只有当蜘蛛妈妈的基因中编码了如何织造新型网的知识，并且通过自然选择获得了这些知识，它才能从妈妈传递给后代。6^但当女性开始发展编织和纺织技术时——大约在公元前 7000 年 [Barber, 1991] ，她们能够通过口口相传将改进的技术传递给女儿，从而导致布料形式和类型的快速发展：亚麻布、羊毛布、不同编织物和针织物。

There is technological evolution by other animals. Spider webs are a technology that has developed from orb webs, which seem to be the primitive form, to sheet webs or cobwebs (fig. 1.2). The oldest orb webs known from fossils date from the Cretaceous, but we have fossils of the orb web spiders themselves dating from the Jurassic. There appear to have been several subsequent independent inventions of the sheet web since then [Blackledge et al., 2009]. Dimitrov et al. [2012] argue that sheet webs do not have to obey the same strict architectural constraints that govern orb webs. This allows spiders to use spaces where orbs cannot be constructed or are very inefficient in catching prey. This is an example of technological development, but one that took tens of millions of years to achieve. Knowledge of how to build a new type of web can only be passed on from a mother spider to her offspring if it is encoded in her genes, and it has been acquired by natural selection.⁶ But when women started to develop weaving and textile technology—perhaps around 7000 BC [Barber, 1991] they were able to pass on improvements to their daughters by word and example leading to a rapid development of forms and types of cloth: linen, woolen, different weaves and knits.

图 1.2. 动物的技术发展。原始的圆网（左）发展成为片状网（右），片状网可以放置在圆网无法使用的位置。资料来源：维基媒体。

Figure 1.2. Technological development by animals. The primitive orb web (left) was developed into the sheet web (right) which can be placed in positions that are unusable by orb webs. Source: Wikimedia.

这种文化信息的传递并非人类独有。自达尔文时代以来，人们就知道其他灵长类动物也会使用工具。7 自从^古道尔在贡贝进行研究以来，我们就知道使用工具可能是一种地方文化 [Whiten 等人，1999]，而不是普遍特征。形成独特技术文化的能力是灵长类动物的原始特征，只是人类的这种能力更为发达。我们在这方面的能力更强，因为我们能够使用语言而不是仅仅通过例子来教育我们的婴儿。

This kind of transmission of cultural information is not unique to us. It has been known since Darwin’s day that other primates can use tools.⁷ Since Goodall’s studies at Gombe we have known that tool use can be a local culture [Whiten et al., 1999] rather than a universal trait. The ability to form distinct technical cultures is a primitive primate trait, just more developed among humans. Our greater ability in this stems from our being able to use language rather than mere example to educate our infants.

技术的蓬勃发展使得人类彻底改变了生活方式。这不仅仅是我们获取食物的方式的变化：从狩猎到放牧，从采集野生植物到种植庄稼。这也是劳动分工的变化、组织劳动的社会关系的变化，以及日益复杂的统治、服从和反叛关系的增长。

Our dynamic development of technology has allowed our species to completely transform the way it lives. This is not just a matter of changes in the way we obtain our food: going from hunting to herding, from gathering wild plants to raising crops. It is also a matter of changing divisions of labor, changing the social relations that organize labor, and the growth of ever more complex relations of domination, subordination, and rebellion.

我们将研究技术如何构建人类时间的分配、规范时间的社会关系以及由此产生的剥削和争取自由的斗争形式。我们将相对简要地讨论工业革命之前的时期。革命，但在我们解释当今世界经济的主导结构时，我们会越来越详细地审视社会关系。

We will be looking at the way technologies have structured the allocation of human time, the social relations under which this has been regulated, and the forms of exploitation and struggles for freedom that this has given rise to. We will deal relatively briefly with the period before the Industrial Revolution, but look at social relations in increasing detail as we explain the dominant structures of today’s world economy.

任何社会的前提都是人的再生产。这是劳动分工中最基本的、最根本的分支。但在当代社会中，这似乎并不是经济的一部分。相反，它只是“家庭生活”，是私人的而非社会的。资本主义市场社会认为，除非涉及金钱，否则任何活动都不是经济的。但直到最近，为报酬而进行的活动还只是经济生活中非常小的一部分。即使是现在，它们也只占经济生活的一半。如果我们抛开只有有偿工作才是工作这一狭隘的历史观点，就会清楚地发现，性以及生育、喂养和社会化儿童是经济生活的基础。

The precondition of any society is the reproduction of people. This is the most basic, in the sense of fundamental, branch of the division of labor. But it is something that in contemporary society appears as not part of the economy. Instead it appears as just “family life,” something that is private rather than social. Capitalist market society does not think of an activity as economic unless it involves money. But activities done for payment have been only a very small part of economic life until recently. Even now, they constitute barely half of economic life. If we cast aside the historically narrow perspective that only paid work is work, it becomes clear that sex and the bearing, feeding, and socialization of children are the foundation of economic life.

毫无疑问，没有人就没有经济，但是，当我们断言人类繁衍是经济的基础时，我们所说的远不止于此。

It is trivially true that without people there would be no economy, but in asserting that human reproduction is the foundation of the economy we are saying more than this.

• 下一代的诞生需要时间和体力的付出，时间和能源的可用性是任何经济体必须遵守的基本约束。

• The production of the next generation takes time and bodily effort, and the availability of time and energy are the fundamental constraints that any economy has to obey.

• 生育决定人口。人口变化可以推动经济变化和权力关系的变化。这一原则在今天和过去一样适用。

• Reproduction determines population. Population changes can drive economic change and changes in power relations. This applies as much today as it ever did.

• 正统经济学的观点是个人主义的。它从个人最大化满足的角度来定义“经济问题”。当我们以再生产为出发点时，我们关注的焦点是社会作为一个有机体。这个有机体必须再生产自己的生存条件：人民、他们使用的资源以及他们所处的社会关系。构成生物体的物质不断变化，细胞死亡，新细胞产生，但结构保持不变。社会也是如此。它的细胞、个人在变化。它的物质、建筑物和工具也在变化。它们都通过再生产和替换而发生变化。

• The perspective that orthodox economics has is individualist. It defines the “economic problem” in terms of individuals maximizsing their satisfaction. When we take reproduction as our starting point we focus instead on society as an organism. This organism has to reproduce its own conditions of existence: the people, the resources they use, and the social relations they live in. The matter making up a living organism constantly changes, cells die, new ones are generated, but the structure remains. The same applies to a society. Its cells, individuals, change. Its matter, the buildings and tools, change. They both change by being reproduced and replaced.

为了生下并断奶一个婴儿，母亲必须消耗足够两个孩子的能量。食物量决定了母亲的这一能力。如果食物长期短缺，她可能没有足够的能量给双胞胎提供奶水，或者喂养一个新生儿和一个未断奶的两岁孩子。因此，在这种情况下，母亲必须调节自己的生育能力，有时甚至会杀婴 [Diamond，2012，第 5 章]。生孩子也会消耗能量，直到最近婴儿总是需要被抱在怀里。除非发明了可以将婴儿绑在背上的布，否则婴儿必须用一只手臂抱着。这意味着母亲在抱着孩子时失去了一半生产食物的能力。孩子的生存很可能取决于母亲寻求他人帮助的能力：祖母、哥哥姐姐、男性亲属或伴侣为婴儿提供食物或照顾 [Hawkes et al., 1997]。在这里，在生殖方面，我们有社会合作和劳动分工的基础。

To produce and wean a baby a mother must consume enough energy for two. The amount of food available determines the extent to which this is possible. If food is in permanently short supply, she may not have enough energy to supply milk to twins, or to feed both a new infant and an unweaned two-year-old. So under these circumstances mothers must regulate their fertility and at times practice infanticide [Diamond, 2012, chap. 5]. The carrying of children also consumes energy, and until very recently babies always had to be carried. Unless cloth has been invented, allowing the baby to be strapped to her back, the baby must be carried on one arm. This means that a mother loses half her ability to produce food while carrying the child. The survival of the child is then likely to depend on the mother’s ability to call on the assistance of others: grandmothers, older siblings, male relatives or partners to provide food or care for the infant [Hawkes et al., 1997]. Here, in reproduction, we have the basis for social cooperation and a division of labor.

断奶后，孩子就必须吃固体食物。这从何而来？

Once weaned, children have to eat solid food. Where is this to come from?

孩子断奶的年龄取决于社会的技术水平和食物生产方式。在农业社会中，婴儿牙齿发育前，可以喂动物奶和谷物粥。在前农业社会中，这是不可能的，所以母乳喂养必须持续更长时间。在现代社会，配方奶和奶瓶的普及意味着母乳喂养可以完全消除：现代劳动力市场对那些想在有偿工作期间母乳喂养或抱着婴儿的母亲毫不留情。

The age at which the child can be weaned depends on the technological level of society and how it produces food. In an agricultural society the milk of animals and gruels made from grains can be fed to infants before their teeth have developed. In a pre-agricultural society this is not possible, so breastfeeding has to go on for longer. In modern society the availability of formula milk and bottles means that breastfeeding can be eliminated entirely: the modern labor market is unforgiving toward mothers who want to breastfeed or carry their baby around during paid work.

孩子们一旦学会四处奔跑，就能立即开始为自己收集一些食物。在大多数社会中，儿童是劳动力的重要组成部分 [Minge-Klevana 等，1980]，但直到他们十几岁时，他们生产的食物才足以养活自己。在此之前，他们仍然是成年亲属的净能量消耗。自 19 世纪以来，儿童逐渐脱离生产性工作，这对整个社会的时间分配以及其他家庭成员的劳动产生了巨大影响。

Children, once they can run around, immediately start to be able to gather some food for themselves. In most societies children make up a significant part of the labor force [Minge-Klevana et al., 1980], but it is not until they are teenagers that the food they produce is sufficient to feed themselves. They remain a net energy drain on their adult relatives until then. The removal of children from productive work, which has happened progressively since the nineteenth century, has a huge impact on the allocation of time in society as a whole and on the labor of other family members.

生育率是人口繁衍的第一个制约因素。其次是死亡率，尤其是婴儿死亡率。要繁衍后代，社会需要女性生育率达到一定水平，以确保平均至少有一名女儿活到育龄。存活的男婴数量则不那么重要。人类每出生 20 个女婴，就会有 21 个男婴出生。乍一看，似乎母亲有选择地杀死一部分男性后代最能发挥人口的生殖潜力，但这似乎从未发生过。最近有社会杀死女婴的例子 [Hughes，1981；George 等，1992]。也有男女婴儿都被杀死的情况 [Eng and Smith，1976]。但有选择地杀死女婴只有在预期寿命相对较长的社会中才有可能。 Engels [1980] 指出，在一个出生时预期寿命在 20 到 30 岁之间的社会中（直到近代，这种情况在世界上还是很常见的），任何严重的女婴溺杀都会导致人口下降，因为没有足够的幸存下来成为母亲的女性。其他人则认为，恩格斯对其他死亡原因做出了不切实际的假设，古代世界人口的稳定应该用女婴溺杀来解释 [Harris, 1982]。虽然男孩出生率高于女孩，但这可以通过更高的死亡率来抵消。他们从事的工作类型更有可能导致致命事故，他们也更有可能死于战争。

Fertility is the first constraint on the reproduction of the population. The next is mortality, particularly infant mortality. To reproduce a society needs a level of female fertility sufficient to ensure that on average at least one daughter survives until child-bearing age. The number of surviving male children is less of a constraint. In humans about 21 boys are born for every 20 girls. It might at first sight appear that the reproductive potential of the population might be best served by mothers selectively killing off a portion of their male offspring, but this never seems to happen. There are recent instances of societies in which baby girls are killed off [Hughes, 1981; George et al., 1992]. There are also cases where babies of both sexes are killed off [Eng and Smith, 1976]. But selectively killing off female children is only possible in a society with a relatively long life expectancy. Engels [1980] showed that in a society with a life expectancy at birth of between twenty and thirty, which was typical of the world until recent times, any significant level of female infanticide will result in population decline since there will not be enough women surviving to become mothers. Others argue that Engels made unrealistic assumptions about other causes of death, and that the very stability of population in the ancient world should be explained by female infanticide [Harris, 1982]. Although more boys are born than girls, this can be offset by a higher rate of mortality. The type of work they do is more likely to result in fatal accidents, and they are more likely to die in wars.

表 1.1：劳动力年龄和性别分布

TABLE 1.1 : Division of Workforce by Age and Gender

人口统计

Demographic

属于劳动力的一部分吗？

Part of the Workforce?

祖母

Grandmothers

是的

Yes

母亲

Mothers

是的

Yes

男性

Men

是的

Yes

孩子们

Children

部分

Partially

婴儿

Infants

不

除了故意杀害婴儿或死于冲突之外，限制人们在生育子女之前生存的主要因素就是饥饿和疾病。疾病本身是一种社会现象。疾病必须在人与人之间传播，因此疾病的存在取决于一定的人口密度和人口的联系程度。孤立的小群体不允许病菌存活 [McNeill，2010；Diamond and Ordunio，1997]。随着人口密度的上升以及贸易和旅行的增长，流行性瘟疫成为一种巨大的危险。它们必须最初从某种病菌或病毒自然寄生的动物身上传播。例如，引起黑死病的病菌从蒙古平原的土拨鼠传播给人类，流感的变种从家养的猪和鸭传播给我们。因此，要使其成为一种危险，社会需要发展到驯养动物的阶段，并且拥有足够密集的人口来传播疾病。能够将疾病传播给我们的动物宿主似乎集中在非洲和欧亚大陆。美洲以前与世隔绝的人群从未接触过旧大陆的病菌，与携带感冒和天花病毒的欧洲人接触会产生灾难性的影响 [Diamond and Ordunio, 1997]。面对新的疾病压力，整个种群崩溃了。

Leaving aside deliberate killing of babies or dying in conflict, the main constraints on people surviving until they can have children of their own have been hunger and disease. Disease itself is a social phenomenon. Diseases have to pass from person to person, so their existence depends on a certain density of population and the degree of connectedness of the population. Isolated small populations do not allow disease germs to survive [McNeill, 2010; Diamond and Ordunio, 1997]. As population density rises and as trade and travel grows, epidemic plagues become a huge danger. They have to spread initially from some sort of animal in which the germ or virus lives naturally. For example, the germ causing the Black Death spread to humans from marmots on the Mongolian Plains and variants of influenza spread to us from domesticated pigs and ducks. So for this to be a danger society needs to have advanced to the stage of domesticating animals and have a sufficiently dense population for the disease to spread. The animal hosts able to spread diseases to us seem to have been concentrated in Africa and Eurasia. In previously isolated populations in the Americas that had never been exposed to Old World germs, the effect of contact with Europeans carrying viruses for colds and smallpox were catastrophic [Diamond and Ordunio, 1997]. Whole populations collapsed in the face of the new disease pressure.

但瘟疫导致的崩溃是偶发性灾难。人口增长更紧迫、更持久的障碍是粮食。在没有粮食限制的情况下，人类扩大人口的能力是巨大的。迪克曼研究了定居在以前无人居住的岛屿上的人口对此的不同估计，得出人口数量每三十年可以增加三倍的数字[迪克曼，1975年]。这些是农业自给人口定居在已经拥有发达农业技术和作物品种的岛屿上，但它们表明人口增长的速度有多快。如果人口通常没有以这种速度增长，通常是因为他们在某种程度上已经达到了环境的承载能力，考虑到他们当时拥有的技术。粮食供应不足会增加死亡率，并促使人们采取措施限制人口。因此，粮食生产是最紧迫的，因此在短期内是最重要的生产过程。

But collapses due to plagues are episodic catastrophes. The more pressing and permanent barrier to population growth is food. The human ability to expand its population in the absence of food constraints is huge. Dickeman examined different estimates of this from populations that settled on previously uninhabited islands and came up with the figure that population numbers could triple every thirty years [Dickeman, 1975]. These were agricultural subsistence populations settling on islands with already developed agricultural techniques and crop varieties, but they indicate just how fast population growth can be. If populations generally do not grow at that rate it is often because they have in some way reached the carrying capacity of the environment, given the technology they have at the time. Lower food availability increases mortality and induces people to take steps to limit their population. So the production of food is the most urgent, and thus in the short term the most important production process.

（在下一章中，我们将探讨粮食生产的主要历史发展及其对社会总体经济结构的影响。）

(In the following chapter we will be looking at the main historical developments in food production and the implications this has had for the general economic structure of society.)

除了食物，我们最需要的就是衣服。我们是热带物种，迁徙到了地球上所有的气候带。由于缺乏正常哺乳动物的皮毛，我们进入这些气候带依赖于制造衣服替代品的能力。保暖是如此重要，以至于人类愿意为此付出巨大的努力。几千年来，线和布的制造一直是人类经济中劳动密集程度最高的活动 [Barber, 1991]。制衣技术的变革——动力纺纱和织布的发明——是现代资本主义社会建立的基础。

After food our primary need is clothing. We are a tropical species that has migrated across all the climatic zones on the planet. Lacking normal mammalian fur, our penetration of these zones has been dependent on an ability to manufacture a substitute in the form of clothes. The importance of keeping warm is so great that humans have been willing to devote huge effort to it. The manufacture of thread and cloth were, for millennia, the single most labor-intensive activity carried out by human economies [Barber, 1991]. Transformations in cloth-making technique—the invention of power spinning and weaving—were fundamental to the establishment of modern capitalist society.

没有能源，任何活动、自然界的改造都无从谈起。肌肉为我们提供了最初的动力，食物为我们提供了最初的能源供应。但接下来出现了火。使用工具并非人类独有，甚至也不是学会使用工具的人。其他灵长类动物甚至鸟类都能做到这一点。但操纵和使用火却是我们人类独有的。为了取暖、烹饪、照明和防御，我们至少已经使用火 40 万年了 [James et al., 1989; Roebroeks and Villa, 2011]，有人认为甚至可能更早。无论最早使用火的日期如何，火让我们能够获取原本无法消化的食物资源。它让我们能够在一年中有部分时间处于冰点以下的气候中生活。它让我们能够加工材料：最初只是木制工具的硬化，后来则发展为陶瓷、金属、玻璃和其他由热量驱动的化学过程。

There is no activity, no transformation of nature without an energy source. Muscles provided our first motors, and food our first energy supply. But next came fire. The use of tools is not specifically human, nor even the learned use of tools. Other primates and even birds can do this. But the manipulation and use of fire is unique to our species. For warmth, for cooking, for light and for defense it has been with us for at least 400,000 years [James et al., 1989; Roebroeks and Villa, 2011], with some suggestions that it could be even earlier than that. Whatever the date of its earliest use, fire allows access to food resources that would otherwise be indigestible. It allows people to live in climates that are below freezing for part of the year. It allows materials to be processed: initially just hardening of wooden tools, but later ceramics, metals, glass, and other chemical processes driven by heat.

因此，数十万年来，获取燃料一直是人类努力的重要来源。起初，人们必须收集木柴或动物粪便。后来，人们开始开采化石燃料资源。这仍然是我们自身经济活动的重要组成部分。

Thus the acquisition of fuel has, for hundreds of thousands of years, been a significant absorber of human effort. Firewood or animal dung had to be collected at first. Later it became possible to mine fossil fuel resources. This continues to be a major part of our own economic activity.

继火之后，人们开始普遍利用能源：役畜的肌肉、船帆上的风、风车、瀑布的水力，以及现在的原子或太阳能。人类控制的能源数量决定了我们改造自然的规模，以及人类对自然的改造程度。提高我们日常工作的生产力。通过垄断能源，个人、公司和国家能够主宰他人。

After fire came the harnessing of energy in general: the muscles of draft animals, wind in sails and then windmills, the power of falling water, and now energy from atoms or the sun. The quantity of energy under human control determines the scale of our transformation of nature and the productivity of our daily efforts. By monopolizing energy sources individuals, companies, and states have been able to dominate others.

我们用火和衣服来保暖，但为了保持干燥和阴凉，我们需要庇护所。这涉及房屋的建造和维护以及随之而来的辛勤工作。一旦人们有了永久的房屋，日常清洁和维护等家务就随之而来。如果你四处奔波，这不是必要的，但固定的住所迫使你整理东西、清除和处理垃圾，并将燃料和水运进房子。房屋可能需要几个人多年的努力才能建成。如果这些房屋是一代或几代人建造的，那么房屋的存在必须得到适当的社会关系的支持。这可能需要像易洛魁人或婆罗洲伊班人的长屋这样的社区努力，这意味着一种基于氏族的社会制度[Loeb and Broek，1947]。如果房屋较小，定居点是按领土而不是血统组织的，那么每个家庭都有自己的房子，并由他们维护。一旦城市出现，建造房屋（通常是多层的）的时间成本意味着所有权将从家庭手中转移。相反，房屋的实际拥有者是地主阶级，后来是银行或国家。然后，广大民众就需要向房屋的最终所有者支付租金。

We have kept warm using fire and clothing, but to stay dry and shaded we needed shelter. This involved construction and maintenance of houses and the hard work which goes along with that. Once people have permanent houses, housework in the sense of day-to-day cleaning and maintenance follows. If you live on the move this is not necessary, but settled accommodation forces you to tidy things, remove and dispose of waste, and transport fuel and water into the house. Houses can take several person years of work to build. If these are built up over one or more generations, then the existence of houses must be supported by appropriate social relations. These can involve communal effort like the longhouses of the Iroquois or the Iban of Borneo, which implies a social system based on clans [Loeb and Broek, 1947]. If houses are smaller and settlements are organized on a territorial rather than a lineage basis, every family has its own house, which it maintains. Once cities arise, the time cost of building houses, which are often multistory, means that ownership passes out of the hands of families. Instead a landlord class or later the banks or the state effectively own the dwellings. The mass of the population is then subjected to the need to pay rent to the ultimate owners of their houses.

住房是改变环境的一种方式：从局部改变。但随着人类社会的发展，环境也发生了更大的变化。它重组了人类生活的生态系统，用家养动物取代野生动物，用田野取代森林，改变水流方向，改变大气成分。这些变化反过来又影响了我们生活的社会体系。

Housing is one way of modifying the environment: locally. But as human society has advanced it has changed much more of the environment. It has restructured the ecosystems within which people live, replacing wild animals with domestic ones, forests with fields, redirecting water flows, and changing the composition of the atmosphere. These changes in their turn have an impact on the social system we live in.

任何经济都依赖于信息。信息是物质生产和经济协调所必需的。在生产层面，需要有关如何制造物品的信息。一旦一项新技术或发明为人所知，信息就会迅速传播，改变人们做事的整个方式。这些信息通过实例、口口相传以及后来的书面文本在人们之间传递。信息还需要形成，即赋予事物形式。建筑物的信息可以预先存在于建筑师的图表中。书籍的信息可以预先存在于原始手稿中。汽车的信息可以预先存在于模具的形状和生产线上机床的胶带中。信息体现的不同阶段对应于劳动分工和从属的不同阶段。在整个经济层面，需要信息来协调生产：印加人的奇普记录、写在粘土上的税收记录、纸上的商业信函、价格和商品编码中的信息钱包。所有这些都将在我们对不同社会生产形式的分析中体现出来。

Any economy depends on information. Information is required for physical production and for the coordination of the economy. At the level of production, information is required about how to make things. Once a new skill or invention is known, the information can pass rapidly, changing the whole way people do things. This is information that is passed between people by example, word of mouth, and later in written texts. Information is also required to in-form, that is, give form to things. The information for a building can preexist as an architect’s diagram. The information for a book can preexist as an original manuscript. The information for a car can preexist in the shapes of the dies, and the tapes of the machine tools on the production line. To such different stages of the embodiment of information there correspond different stages in the division and subordination of labor. At the economy-wide level, information is required to coordinate production: quipu records of the Inca, tax records written on clay, commercial correspondence on paper, information encoded in prices and in purses. All these will feature in our analysis of different social forms of production.

过程如何呈现稳定的循环形式这一问题在科学界中非常普遍。研究生命起源的生物学家和生物化学家尤其关注这一问题。他们必须解释，与热力学定律明显偏向于最大无序相反，我们（包括我们自己）看到的却是高度有序的结构。道金斯 [2004] 和考夫曼 [1993] 都对如何概念化有序过程的稳定性做出了有益的贡献。他们提出的基本论点是，如果特征在某一时刻的存在增加了它们在未来某一时刻存在的概率，那么这些特征就会稳定下来。但这种概率是一种条件概率，取决于特征是否位于考夫曼所说的“自催化网络”中。这些网络最初是根据聚合物合成来概念化的 [Farmer et al., 1986]，其中每个组成部分的存在都会增加整个网络持续存在的概率。火焰或细胞就是这样一种自催化网络。细胞是聚合物的集合：酶、脂质和核酸，在外部能量源存在的情况下，它们会自我维持，甚至生长。不同的酶共同作用，相互合成。目前的细胞依赖于 DNA，但在更早的时代，一定存在着更原始的自给自足网络，细胞就是从这些网络进化而来的。如果没有 DNA 的指导作用，这些网络将完全依赖酶反馈。

The problem of how processes come to take on a stable recurrent form is widespread in science. It has been of particular concern to biologists and biochemists working on the origins of life. They have to explain how, contra the apparent preference of thermodynamic laws for maximal disorder, we see highly ordered structures, including ourselves. Both Dawkins [2004] and Kauffman [1993] have made useful contributions to how we can conceptualize the stability of orderly processes. The basic argument they develop is that features stabilize if their existence at one time increases their probability of existence at a future moment. But this probability is a conditional probability, conditional on the features being situated in what Kauffman calls “autocatalytic networks.” These are networks initially conceptualized in terms of polymer synthesis [Farmer et al., 1986], each of whose components, when present, increases the probability of the whole network persisting. A flame or a cell is such an autocatalytic network. A cell is a polymer collection: enzymes, lipids, and nucleic acids which, in the presence of an external energy source, will maintain itself and perhaps grow. The different enzymes work together to synthesize one another. Current cells depend on DNA, but at a much earlier epoch more primitive self-sustaining networks must have existed from which cells evolved. These networks, in the absence of the directing influence of DNA, would have relied purely on enzymatic feedback.

这些概念适用于生产方式，特别是那些没有明确指导影响的生产方式，如资本主义。我们将在分析不同的历史生产方式及其产生的社会形式时，隐含或明确地使用这些概念。

These concepts are applicable to modes of production and in particular to those, like capitalism, that develop without a definite directing influence. We will use these concepts either implicitly or explicitly in our analysis of the different historical modes of production and the social forms to which these give rise.

第二章

CHAPTER 2

课前经济舱

Pre-Class Economy

启蒙政治经济学的奠基人亚当·斯密说过，人类社会的发展经历了狩猎民族、畜牧民族和农耕民族三个阶段[Meek et al., 1978]，最后一个阶段代表了十八世纪的文明世界，当时所有文明国家的人口中，大多数还是农民。

The founder of Enlightenment political economy, Adam Smith, said that human social development went through the states of Nations of Hunters, Nations of Herdsmen, and Nations of Farmers [Meek et al., 1978]. This last category represents the civilized world of the eighteenth century when all civilized nations were still, in the majority of their population, farmers.

尽管这些社会形态呈现为一个上升的序列，因此也分为一系列阶段，但它们确实可以在世界不同地区共存。这种历史唯物主义方法的关键在于从社会产生其需求的方法中寻找社会制度的解释。

Although presented as an ascending sequence, and thus a series of stages, these social forms could, and indeed did, coexist in different areas of the world. The key thing about this materialist method in history was to seek the explanation for social institutions in the methods by which societies produced their needs.

这种经济史观最初由马克思⁸作了简短的概括，后来经他和恩格斯提炼 [Marx and Engels, 1976; Marx and Engels, 1977; Engels and Hunt, 2010] 为更为复杂的社会形态集合：蒙昧时代（斯密的猎人国）、野蛮时代、奴隶社会、封建社会、简单商品生产和资本主义，并以历史顺序呈现。

This view of economic history was given an initial short summary by Marx⁸ and was refined by him and Engels [Marx and Engels, 1976; Marx and Engels, 1977; Engels and Hunt, 2010] into a more elaborate set of forms of society: savagery (Smith’s Nations of Hunters), barbarism, slave society, feudalism, simple commodity production, and capitalism, which were presented as a historical sequence.

我们在这里采取的方法大体上遵循了斯密和恩格斯的方法，并根据历史经验和他们之后发表的历史著作进行了更新。

The approach we take here broadly follows those of Smith and Engels updated in the light of historical experience and historical work published since their days.

值得注意的是，尽管这些社会形态在它们最早的历史出现时是有序的，但在任何特定时期，这些不同的社会形态都可能共存。这些社会形态将在世界范围内相互作用，有时甚至在一个国家内也会相互作用。例如，19 世纪 50 年代的美国将奴隶制、小规模商品生产和资本主义工业结合在一个国家内，结果证明这是一个极具爆炸性的组合。

It is important to note that though these forms of society have an order in terms of their earliest historical appearance, at any given time there can be several of these different forms coexisting. These forms will be interacting on a world scale, and at times even within one country. For example, the United States in the 1850s combined slavery, small-scale commodity production, and capitalist industry within a single country, something that turned out to be a highly explosive combination.

在本章和接下来的几章中，我们将简要介绍迄今为止主要社会类型中技术和社会生产关系的典型组合：狩猎采集群体、游牧部落、早期农业社区、奴隶经济、地主经济、资本主义经济和工业社会主义经济。我们将更详细地研究资本主义和社会主义经济的经济结构，因为它们与二十一世纪最为相关。早期形式为较新的形式提供了一定程度的历史视角。

We will in this and the next few chapters give a short run-through of the characteristic combinations of technology and social relations of production in the main hitherto existing types of society: hunting-gathering bands, nomad tribes, early agricultural communities, slave economies, landlord economies, capitalist economies, and industrial socialist economies. We will look in much more detail at the economic structure of capitalist and socialist economies as these are most relevant to the twenty-first century. The earlier forms provide a degree of historical perspective on the more recent ones.

2.1 农业

2.1 AGRICULTURE

人类发展中最大的革命性一步是将狩猎采集生活与随后的所有生活形式区分开来的，因为农业和畜牧业的发展意味着人类下降到较低的营养级。对于地球表面的任何生态系统来说，主要的能量来源都是阳光。初级生产者——植物和藻类——捕获阳光并利用它固定二氧化碳，_从而生产糖和其他碳水化合物。生物体还需要固定氮来制造蛋白质，所有酶和大多数动物组织都由这些蛋白质组成。在自然环境中，这种固定氮主要来自于特殊的细菌，其中一些细菌与植物共生。植物制造的碳水化合物和蛋白质构成了生态系统的基础，即最低的营养级。有机物质的最大流动发生在这个基础层面。处于这一级别的生物被称为自养生物或自给自足的生物。

The biggest revolutionary step in human development is the one that separates hunting and gathering from all subsequent forms, since the development of agriculture and animal husbandry involves humanity descending to a lower trophic level. For any ecosystem on the surface of the world, the primary energy source is sunlight. Primary producers—plants and algae—capture sunlight and use it to fix CO₂ to produce sugars and other carbohydrates. Living organisms also require fixed nitrogen to manufacture the proteins from which all enzymes and most animal tissues are made. This fixed nitrogen comes, in natural environments, primarily from specialized bacteria, some of which are symbiotic with plants. Carbohydrates and proteins made by plants constitute the base of the ecosystem, the lowest trophic level. It is at this base level that the greatest flow of organic material takes place. The organisms at this level are termed autotrophs or self-feeding.

在这个层次之上是异养生物，即以其他生物为食的生物。动物、真菌和分解细菌都是异养生物。进食是一个低效的过程。食物中只有大约十分之一的化学能被转化为动物自身身体的营养。因此，如果植物是营养级 1，那么食草动物就是营养级 2，而以这些食草动物为食的食肉动物就是营养级 3。在海洋环境中可能还有几个营养级：浮游动物吃浮游植物，被鱼吃掉，被海豹吃掉，而海豹又被熊和人吃掉。

Above this level come the heterotrophs, organisms that feed on others. Animals, fungi, and decomposition bacteria are heterotrophs. Feeding is an inefficient process. Only about a tenth of the chemical energy in food is converted into building up an animal’s own body. So if plants are trophic level 1, herbivorous animals are trophic level 2, and carnivores that eat these herbivores are trophic level 3. In marine environments there may be several more trophic levels: zooplankton eating phytoplankton, being eaten by fish, being eaten by seals, which in turn are eaten by bears and people.

狩猎采集型种群生活在上层营养级：3 级或以上。在气候允许的情况下，它们可能会采集一些植物性食物，但人类的消化系统会限制它们可以食用的植物。在自然生态系统中，只有一小部分植物生物量可供食用：主要是水果和块茎。许多块茎如果不煮熟就无法消化，因此，使用火一定是扩大食物资源的关键技术步骤。狩猎型种群还必须与狼和熊等其他顶级捕食者争夺可用的猎物，因此人类只能捕获部分顶级生物资源。

A hunting-gathering population lives in upper trophic levels: 3 or above. They may gather some plant food where climate permits, but the human digestive system restricts what plants they can eat. In a natural ecosystem only a small part of the plant biomass can be eaten: primarily fruit and tubers. Many tubers are indigestible unless cooked, so the harnessing of fire must have been a key technological step in expanding food resources. A population of hunters also has to compete with other apex predators like wolves and bears for the available game, so only a portion of the biological resources at the apex is captured by humans.

图 2.1. 营养级 1、2、3 呈三角形；三角形各层的面积与该营养级可支持的生物量成正比。

Figure 2.1. Trophic levels 1, 2, 3 as a triangle; the area of each layer of the triangle is proportional to the biomass that trophic level can support.

生活在高营养级的代价是只能维持较低的人口密度。这反过来又限制了社会群体的规模和复杂性。如果狩猎种群恰好生活在渔业资源丰富的地区或猎物必须到湖边饮水的地方，它们可以定居下来并建立小型定居点。但定居点的规模不可能大到农业社会可以维持的程度。

The penalty for living at a high trophic level is that only a low population density can be supported. This in turn constrains the size and complexity of social groups. Hunting populations can settle down and build small settlements if they happen to live somewhere abundant in fishing resources or at the edge of lakes to which game must come to drink. But the settlement sizes cannot be as big as can be supported by agricultural societies.

我们无法对石器时代狩猎社会的社会关系发表太多评论，但人类学家已经详细研究了非洲较近的狩猎采集社会。伍德伯恩 [1982] 认为，虽然狩猎采集社会并非都是平等的，但所研究的所有平等社会都是狩猎采集社会。

We are not in a position to say much about the social relations of Stone Age hunting societies but more recent hunting and gathering societies in Africa have been studied in detail by anthropologists. Woodburn [1982] argues that while hunting and gathering societies are not all egalitarian, all egalitarian societies studied have been hunting and gathering ones.

他认为，要使狩猎采集社会实现平等，游牧主义必不可少。它们必须是他所说的“即时回报社会”，人们外出狩猎采集，当天就吃自己生产的食物。没有船只、水坝、栅栏、陷阱等非便携式劳动产品，这些产品需要经过很长时间的延迟才能产生回报。没有建筑物中的食物储存。不依赖经过选择性照料的可食用野生植物。消除竞争对手。没有女性资产由男性持有并通过婚姻制度进行交换。在平等的狩猎采集社会中，人们可以随意在不同的游牧群体之间流动，从而破坏了权威结构的建立。但这种情况在男性身上比在女性身上更常见。一般来说，母系居住原则适用于女性。她们和母亲住在一起。狩猎采集社会的遗传学研究证实了这一点，表明 Y 染色体相关变异在地理上比线粒体变异更加分散 [Destro-Bisol 等，2004]。由于前者在男性系中遗传，后者在女性系中遗传，这表明母系居住的历史很长。母系居住家庭的进化优势是显而易见的——母亲很可能得到祖母的帮助来抚养孩子 [O'Connell 等，1999]。考虑到人类成长所需的时间非常长，这很可能是一个决定性的优势。

For a hunting and gathering society to be egalitarian, he argues, nomadism is essential. They must be what he calls “immediate return societies” in which people go out hunting and gathering and eat the food they produce the same day. There is an absence of non-portable products of labor that produce a return only after a significant delay, such as boats, weirs, stockades, pit-traps. There is an absence of stores of food in buildings. There is no dependence on edible wild plants that have been tended by selectively removing competitors. There are are no assets in the form of women held by men and exchanged by marriage systems. In egalitarian hunting and gathering societies people can and do move between different nomadic groups at will, undermining the establishment of authority structures. But this happens more for men than women. In general, the principle of matrilocality holds for women. They stay with their mothers. Genetic study of hunting-gathering societies bear this out showing that the Y chromosome linked variations are much more geographically dispersed than mitochondrial ones [Destro-Bisol et al., 2004]. Since the former are inherited in the male line and the latter in the female line, this indicates a long prehistory of matrilocality. The evolutionary advantages of the matrilocal family are clear—the mother is likely to have the help of a grandmother in bringing up children [O’Connell et al., 1999]. Given the very long time it takes humans to grow up, this is likely to have been a decisive advantage.

狩猎社会还普遍拥有暴力手段。用于狩猎的武器很容易杀人。任何试图控制他人的人都有理由担心遭到秘密伏击和谋杀。

Hunting societies also have a universal access to means of violence. Weapons for hunting animals can easily kill people. Any man attempting to dominate another can reasonably fear secret ambush and murder in return.

食物也是普遍可得的——取决于性别分工的影响。任何男人都可以自己出去打猎，自己觅食，只要他愿意。当然，实际上人们会分享食物，但他们并没有被强迫这样做。男人在外出打猎时，会期望自己能够靠浆果和野味养活自己。女人会吃掉她当场采集的大部分食物，只有超出个人需要的食物才会在两性之间交换。这种个人独立性阻碍了权威的积累——包括代际权威。年轻人只要身体健全，就可以自己打猎或采集。父亲无法控制储存的食物、牲畜等，无法用这些东西来对孩子施加权威。

There is also a universal access to food—up to the effects of a sexual division of labor. Any man can go off and hunt by themself and feed himself if he wishes. Of course in practice people share food, but they are not constrained to do so. A man will expect to be able to feed himself off berries and game when out hunting. A woman will eat most of what she gathers on the spot, only food surplus to personal need is exchanged between the sexes. This personal independence prevents the buildup of authority—including inter-generational authority. As soon as they are physically able, young persons can hunt or gather by themselves. Fathers have no control over stored food, cattle, etc., with which to exert authority over their children.

分享很普遍。当一只动物被杀后，如果一个人吃不完，就会把它分给整个族群。可能会有其他协议，让猎人以外的人肢解尸体并分配肉块。这些协议意味着，一个特别优秀的猎人最终会贡献比他自己从别人那里得到的更多的肉。进一步的商品分配是通过赌博进行的。伍德伯恩指出，在他研究的哈扎人中，人们花在赌博上的时间远远多于打猎的时间。某些基本商品被排除在赌博之外，比如弓和木箭。这些足以让人生存。但像毒箭这样稍微稀有的工具则被用作赌博游戏。这阻止了任何实质性和持久的财产积累。

Sharing is widespread. When an animal too big for one person to eat is killed, it is divided among the band. There may be protocols in which somebody other than the hunter dismembers the carcass and distributes the pieces. These protocols mean that a particularly good hunter will end up contributing more meat than he himself gets from others. Further distribution of goods occurs via gambling. Woodburn notes that among the Hadza he studied men spent far more time gambling than they did hunting. Certain basic goods were excluded from gambling, such as bows and wooden arrows. These are enough for a person to survive. But slightly rarer tools like poison arrows were gambled in games of chance. This prevents any substantial and lasting buildup of possessions.

这些特点结合起来，阻止了以私有财产关系作为实施社会统治手段的形成。

Combined, these characteristics prevent the formation of relationships of private property as a means of exerting social domination.

现代权威人士认为，一天的工作时间狩猎者和采集者需要做的工作比后来的农业社会要少。

Modern authorities are of the opinion that the number of hours a day that hunters and gatherers had to work was less than in the agricultural society that followed.

表 2.1：哈扎狩猎者和采集者的时间分配（每周小时数）

TABLE 2.1: Time Allocation among Hadza Hunters and Gatherers (hours per week)

来源：Hawkes 等人，1997 年。

Source: Hawkes et al., 1997..

表 2.2：尼泊尔女性花费的时间（每天小时数）

TABLE 2.2: Time Spent by Nepalese Women (hours per day)

如果与表 2.1进行比较，请注意这些数字需要乘以 7。来源：Levine，1988 年。

If comparing with table 2.1, note that these figures need to be multiplied by 7. Source: Levine, 1988.

一个很好的例子是，狩猎者和采集者的工作量比我们少；而且，与持续的辛劳相比，食物的寻找是间歇性的，闲暇时间充裕，人均白天睡眠时间更长。平均每人每天用于分配和准备食物的时间是四五个小时。此外，他们并不是连续工作。生存追求是高度间歇性的。当人们获得足够的食物时，就会暂时停止，这让他们有足够的空闲时间。[Sahlins，1998]

A good case can be made that hunters and gatherers work less than we do; and, rather than continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year. The average length of time per person per day put into the appropriation and preparation of food was four or five hours. Moreover, they do not work continuously. The subsistence quest was highly intermittent. It would stop for the time being when the people had procured enough food, which left them plenty of time to spare. [Sahlins, 1998]

萨林斯报告称，在多贝族丛林人中，平均工作日甚至更短：获取食物的时间在两到三个小时之间。妇女一天的觅食时间就能收集到足够三天的食物。在非觅食日，食物准备工作需要一到三个小时。因此，既然狩猎采集社会的人们可以在短暂的工作日内轻松生存，那么问题就在于解释为什么人们会采用农业。

Among the Dobe bushmen Sahlins reports that the average working day was even shorter: between two and three hours obtaining food. A woman would gather enough food for three days with one day of foraging. On non-foraging days, food preparation routines took between one and three hours. So given that people in hunting and gathering society could easily survive on a short working day, the problem is to explain why agriculture was ever adopted.

考虑到耕作技术耗时，这意味着与普遍看法相反，狩猎者和采集者的工作量比早期农民少，而且向农业的过渡几乎不会提高生活水平，因此人们不愿意从事农业也就不足为奇了。[Weisdorf，2003]

Considering that cultivation techniques are time-costly, meaning that hunters and gatherers, contrary to common belief, worked less than early farmers, and that the transition to agriculture involved little or no increase in standards of living, the reluctance to take up farming is hardly surprising. [Weisdorf, 2003]

Hawkes 等人给出的哈扎人的数据比 Sahlins 估计的多贝人的数据要多得多。这意味着每周最多工作 42 小时，这意味着平均工作时间要少得多。表 2.1显示，任何 14 岁以上的群体每周花费的最低时间为 42 小时，而年轻男性和祖母级的总花费约为 50 小时。尽管如此，这仍然低于一些农业社会中女性的花费（表 2.2）。通过查阅大量资料，Cohen [1977] 得出结论，就每劳动小时的卡路里产出而言，狩猎和农业大致相当。

The figures given by Hawkes et al. for the Hadza are rather more than Sahlins estimates for the Dobe. These would imply a maximum of 42 hours work a week, with the implication that the average was substantially less. Table 2.1 shows that the minimum spent by any over-14 group was 42 hours a week, and that for young men and grandmothers the total was around 50. Nonetheless this is still less than women in some agricultural societies expend (table 2.2). Reviewing a wide range of sources Cohen [1977] concludes that in terms of calorie output per labor hour expended, hunting and agriculture are broadly comparable.

欧亚大陆的最后一个狩猎采集时期被称为中石器时代。向农业社会过渡的过程被称为新石器革命。

The last hunting and gathering period in Eurasia is referred to as the Mesolithic or Middle Stone Age. The process of transition to agricultural society has been referred to as the Neolithic Revolution.

时期

PERIOD

经济

ECONOMY

什么时候

WHEN

旧石器时代

Paleolithic

游牧狩猎

Nomadic hunting

公元前250 万年

from 2.5 million BC

中石器时代

Mesolithic

久坐狩猎、钓鱼

Sedentary hunting, fishing

公元前 12000 年开始

from 12,000 BC

新石器时代

Neolithic

农业和畜牧业

Agriculture and herding

公元前 8000 年开始

from 8,000 BC

中石器时代人们掌握的技术综合体具有以下特点：

The technology complex available to Mesolithic people can be characterized by:

• 木、骨、石器工具

• Wood, bone, stone tools

• 火

• Fire

• 绳索、网

• Cords, nets

• 针线、皮革器具和服装

• Needles, leather implements and garments

• 用木材、皮革或篱笆和泥板建造小型临时和永久性避难所

• Building of small temporary and permanent shelters of wood, skin, or wattle and daub

• 原木船和其他船只

• Log and other boats

这种技术综合体导致了表 2.3所示的劳动分工。中石器时代似乎是游牧狩猎采集社会与定居农业社会之间的过渡阶段。在中石器时代，固定的社区在野味或鱼类特别丰富的地区建立起来。人们开始制造船只等寿命较长的生产资料。根据伍德伯恩的说法，这种狩猎采集社会不再像纯游牧社会那样平等。我们还没有看到社会阶层的形成，但确实看到了男女之间、父母与子女之间的不平等。定居社区的生活习惯很可能有助于向农业过渡的过程。生活在一个地方的人们可以反复收获相同的野生谷物，并学会通过有选择地去除竞争植物来提高产量。干谷物可以保存，所以养成保留种子而不是立即吃掉的习惯，可以让人们养成农民需要的纪律，以克制自己不吃种子谷物。

This technology complex induced the division of labor shown in table 2.3. The Mesolithic appears to have been a transition stage between a nomadic hunting and gathering society and a settled agricultural one, During the Mesolithic fixed communities established themselves in areas particularly rich in game or fish. Long-lived means of production like boats came to be built. According to Woodburn this type of hunting and gathering society is no longer as egalitarian as the purely nomadic type. We do not yet get the formation of social classes but we do get inequalities between men and women and between parents and offspring. The habit of living in settled communities may well have aided the process of transition to agriculture. People living in one place could repeatedly harvest the same wild grains and learn to improve their yield by selectively removing competing plants. Dried grain will keep, so the habit of keeping seeds instead of eating them immediately would prepare people for the discipline that farmers need in order to refrain from eating their seed grain.

表 2.3：中石器时代黎凡特和安纳托利亚的劳动分工

TABLE 2.3: Division of Labor in Mesolithic Levant and Anatolia

生育工作

Reproductive Work

生育、喂养婴儿、断奶后喂养、语言指导等。

Bearing babies, feeding infants, feeding post weaning, language instruction, etc.

工具生产

Production of Tools

骨制品、绳索制作、网制品、燧石、黑曜石制品、木工。

Bone working, cord making, net making, flint, obsidian work, wood working.

庇护所

Shelter

用木头和泥土或木头和皮革建造庇护所，用皮革制作衣服。

Building wood-and-daub or wood-and-skin shelters, leather working for clothes.

运输

Transport

用手或用皮袋或皮网携带燧石/黑曜石、用皮袋装水、运输采集的植物性食物和肉类、收集燃料。

Carrying flint/obsidian, water carrying in skins, transporting gathered vegetable foods and meat, gathering fuel, by hand or in leather bags or nets.

获取食物

Obtaining Food

狩猎、钓鱼、收集坚果、块茎、野生谷物、野生橄榄。

Hunting, fishing, collecting nuts, tubers, wild grains, wild olives.

食物准备

Food Preparation

研磨种子和块茎，烘烤。

Grinding seeds and tubers, roasting.

来源：Düring，2010 年。

Source: Düring, 2010.

谷物要想收获，必须在种子成熟后保持完整的穗状。野草一旦成熟就会掉落种子。如果发生这种情况，当人们试图割下它们时，它们就会掉到地上，这使得收集变得更加困难。一旦人们播种故意将种子留在穗上实际上成为谷物的生存特性。人类会选择性地收获整个穗并妥善保存种子，直到重新播种。曾经有害的突变现在受到青睐。

For grain to be harvestable it must have ears that remain intact after the seeds have ripened. Wild grasses tend to drop their seeds as soon as they mature. If this happens they will fall to the ground when one tries to cut them, making gathering appreciably more difficult. Once people sow seeds deliberately, keeping seeds on the ear actually becomes a survival trait in grain. Humans would selectively harvest the whole ears and keep seeds safe until they were re-sown. What had once been a harmful mutation was now favored.

但既然农业人口的工作似乎比猎人的工作更辛苦，我们不禁要问，人们为什么要这么费力呢？

But since the work of an agricultural population seems harder than that of hunters, we have to ask, why did people go to the trouble?

^{这不是发现的问题。科恩认为，}驯化的原理是众所周知的。9所有的狩猎采集者似乎都知道植物来自种子。问题在于提供研究种子的动机。

It is not a matter of discovery. Cohen argues that the principles of domestication were well understood.⁹ All hunter-gatherer people seem to know that plants come from seeds. The problem is providing a motivation to bother with seeds.

一种理论是韦斯多夫 [2003] 提出的，他认为非粮食生产专家的崛起使得转向农业变得值得。他的观点是学习新技能需要时间。当食物可能更容易通过狩猎获得时，为了获得食物而工作更长时间可能不值得，但为了获得由熟练工人制作的衣服、鞋子或工具而工作更长时间可能是值得的。他认为，这提供了转向农业经济的动机，在这种经济中，农业多数可以养活少数熟练工匠。但这种论点有假设其想要证明什么的危险。专业工人的人口依靠农业盈余来养活他们。但如果这些还不存在，那么人们如何才能对工人将要制造的东西产生兴趣呢？

One theory is that of Weisdorf [2003], who argued that it was the rise of non–food-producing specialists that made it worth shifting to agriculture. His argument was that it takes time to learn new skills. It might not be worth working longer to get food when food may be more easily had by hunting, but it may be worth working longer to get clothes, shoes, or tools made by skilled workers. This, he argued, provided the incentive to shift to an agricultural economy in which a farming majority could support a minority of skilled craftspeople. But this sort of argument is in danger of of assuming what it wants to prove. The population of specialized workers depended on an agricultural surplus to support them. But if these did not already exist, then how would people gain a taste for the things that workers were to make?

它还假设狩猎采集者认为拥有更耐用的商品比定居所导致的自由丧失更重要，但对这些人的观察似乎并未证实这一点。

It also assumes that hunting and gathering people would see having more durable goods as more important than the loss of freedom associated with settling down, but observation of such peoples does not seem to bear this out.

如果这些专家在中石器时代就已经存在，那么人们就能品尝到他们生产的商品，但这也意味着狩猎采集人口能够养活他们。如果狩猎采集能够以较少的努力获得食物，那么坚持狩猎而不是转向农业实际上会更容易养活这些专家。如果狩猎采集已经存在了一百万年，为什么突然改变成一种完全不同的生活方式呢？

If these specialists already existed in the Mesolithic, that would allow a taste for their goods to be acquired, but it would imply that it had been possible for a hunting and gathering population to support them. If hunting and gathering enabled food to be obtained at less effort, then it would actually have been easier to support the specialists by sticking to hunting rather than swapping to agriculture. If hunting and gathering had worked for a million years, why suddenly change to an entirely different mode of life?

直到 10,000 年前，每个人都靠野生食物为生。到 2,000 年前，世界人口的大多数都靠农业为生。在 8,000 年的时间里，四大洲的人们都转向种植农作物。只有在澳大利亚，由于缺乏合适的谷物野生前体，^农业才没有发展。

Until 10,000 years ago everyone lived off wild foods. By 2,000 years ago the majority of the world population lived off agriculture. In 8,000 years, on four continental landmasses, people switched to crops. Only in Australia, which arguably lacked appropriate wild precursors of grains,¹⁰ did agriculture not develop.

值得注意的不仅是农业发展得如此之快，而且它还独立发展，在如此多不同的地方种植了不同的农作物。至少从地质学的角度来看，这种转变开始于上一次冰河时代的结束。这自然会让人们怀疑气候变化可能与此有关。但自人类进化以来，已经经历了几次冰河时代和间冰期。为什么最后一次冰河时代引发了全球农业的发展，而之前的几次却没有？

The remarkable thing is not only that agriculture developed so quickly, but that it developed independently, with different crop plants in so many different places. The transition started a short time, in geological terms at least, after the end of the last Ice Age. That naturally leads people to suspect that climate change may have had something to do with it. But there have been several Ice Ages and interglacials since humans evolved. Why did this last one trigger agriculture around the world, whereas previous ones did not?

图2.2. 从狩猎经济向农耕经济的转变。

Figure 2.2. Transition from hunting economy to farming economy.

另一种理论认为，这种变化是由于人口压力造成的 [Cohen, 1977]。该理论认为，农业的关键在于它能够让每平方公里的土地上养活更多的人，这是降低营养级的结果，也是确保粮食作物在耕地中占主导地位的结果。该理论认为，由于狩猎技术的进步，人口增长到了生态系统在猎物数量方面无法承受的地步。由此导致的粮食短缺使人们人类有动机利用这个机会刻意种植以前的野生植物。在此过程中，他们走上了一条生产方式的道路，这条生产方式一方面比狩猎更需要劳动力，但另一方面，每平方公里的产量更高。农业化这一步骤使人口进一步增长，永远阻止了普遍恢复狩猎生活方式的可能性。有大量证据表明，狩猎采集人口是造成世界许多地方大型猎物动物灭绝的原因，特别是在猎人进入此前无人居住的新地区时 [Mosimann and Martin，1975；Burney and Flannery，2005]。这似乎首先发生在大约 45,000 年前的澳大利亚，然后发生在 12,000 年前的美洲。克洛维斯人从西伯利亚带着先进的石矛来到北美洲后，他们似乎像闪电战一样横扫了美洲，一路上将大型猎物消灭殆尽 [Harris, 1991]。欧亚大陆北部的巨型动物灭绝时间更长，但结束时间与美洲大致相同。这些动物在澳大利亚以外的灭绝可能促使人们转向更为定居的中石器时代生活方式，这种生活方式以更密集地收获剩余的野生资源为基础。通过迁徙到尚未被占领的地区来缓解人口压力的可能性消失，可能会进一步加剧开发新食物来源的动机。从这个角度来看，相对于人口规模而言，对现有资源的过度开发推动了生产方式的改变。

An alternative theory puts the change down to population pressure [Cohen, 1977]. The argument is that the key thing about agriculture is that it allows more people to be supported per square kilometer, a consequence of moving down a trophic level, and also a consequence of ensuring that the food crops dominate all other plant life in the cultivated area. The argument is that due to improvements in hunting technology the population had grown to the point where it was beyond the carrying capacity of the ecosystem in terms of game available. The resulting food shortages gave people the incentive to take advantage of the opportunity to deliberately grow previously wild plants. In the process they set themselves on the path to a mode of production that was on the one hand more labor intensive than hunting, but on the other more productive in terms of output per square kilometer. This step to agriculture allowed further population growth that blocked forever the possibility of a generalized reversion to a hunting mode of life. There is considerable evidence that hunting and gathering populations were responsible for the extinction of large prey animals in many parts of the world, especially where hunters entered new areas that until then had been unpopulated by humans [Mosimann and Martin, 1975; Burney and Flannery, 2005]. This seems to have occurred first in Australia about 45,000 years ago and then in the Americas 12,000 years ago. After the Clovis people arrived in North America from Siberia with their advanced stone spears, they seem to have swept through the Americas like a blitzkrieg wiping out the large prey animals as they went [Harris, 1991]. Northern Eurasian extinction of megafauna took longer but ended about the same time as in the Americas. The extinction of these, outside of Australia, may have prompted the move to a more sedentary Mesolithic mode of life based on a more intensive harvesting of the remaining wild resources. The removal of the possibility to relieve population pressure by migrating into as yet unoccupied territory could further intensify the incentive to develop new food sources. In this view it is the overexploitation of existing resources relative to the size of population that drove change in the mode of production.

一旦过渡到种植作物并随后驯养动物，人口密度就会上升到足以形成大村庄或小城镇的程度，尽管现在土耳其的 Askl Hðyuk（公元前 8500 年）或 Çatalhðyuk（公元前 7500 年 - 公元前 6000 年）等早期定居点的设计与我们现在熟悉的城镇和村庄非常不同。街区由挤在一起的建筑物组成，它们之间没有通道或道路，房屋也没有门，似乎要通过平屋顶和通往房间的梯子才能进入 [Düring, 2010]，如图2.3所示。这些定居点似乎是平等的，没有明显区分住宅大小，也没有寺庙的证据。这些定居点也没有加固防御工事。

Once the transition to raising crops and later to domesticating animals had taken place the population density rose enough to allow the formation of large villages or small towns, though the design of such early settlements as Askl Hðyuk (8500 BC) or Çatalhðyuk(7500 BC–6000 BC) in what is now Turkey was very unlike towns and villages we are now familiar with. Neighborhoods consisted of buildings packed so close together that there were no passageways or roads between them and the houses had no doors, access to them apparently being via flat roofs with ladders down into the rooms [Düring, 2010], as shown in figure 2.3. The settlements appear to have been egalitarian with no obvious distinction between sizes of dwellings and no evidence of temples. The settlements were also unfortified.

人们仍然使用石器工具，早期缺乏陶器，尽管在新石器时代后期才获得陶器。生活以驯养和采集野生植物为基础。最初放牧的是野羊，但到了恰塔尔霍多克时期，它们似乎已经被驯养了。此外，人们还吃牛和马，尽管这些似乎仍然是野生品种。虽然吃的牛比羊少，但每头牛提供的肉相当于三十只羊，所以牛提供的肉可能更多。

The people still used stone tools, and at the earlier stages lacked pottery, though this was acquired in the later Neolithic Period. Subsistence was based on a mixture of domesticated and collected wild plants. Wild sheep were initially herded but by the time of Çatalhðyuk they appear to be domesticated. In addition, cattle and horses were eaten, though these still seem to be wild varieties. Although fewer cattle than sheep were eaten, each cow provides as much meat as thirty sheep, so cattle probably provided more of the meat.

图 2.3. Çatalhðyuk 一所房屋内部的重建。

Figure 2.3. Reconstruction of the interior of a house at Çatalhðyuk.

原始的劳动分工是性别分工，女性负责采集植物并准备蔬菜食品，这可能提供了大部分卡路里 [Mies, 1981]，男性负责捕捉动物。艺术证据表明，恰塔尔霍尤克也有类似的劳动分工。

The primitive division of labor is a sexual one, with women gathering plants and preparing vegetable foods, which probably provided the majority of the calories [Mies, 1981] and men catching animals. Artistic evidence indicates that Çatalhðyuk had a similar division of labor.

图 2.4. 旧石器时代（左）和新石器时代（右）的女性形象右边的例子是在 ÇatalhSyuk 出土的。

Figure 2.4. Paleolithic (left) and Neolithic (right) female figures The example on the right was excavated at ÇatalhSyuk.

目前尚不清楚在向农业过渡的过程中，新石器时代的社会是否变成了母系社会，尽管它们很可能已经变成了母系社会。在加泰罗尼亚遗址出土的一些艺术品证实了这一观点（图 2.4）。这些艺术品以及旧石器时代的前辈通常被称为女神形象，但人们在用一种来自更晚时代的语言来解释它们时应该小心谨慎。在加泰罗尼亚遗址的发掘中还发现了大量阴茎雕塑，因此两性的形象都有出现。将这些考古发现称为宗教图像、色情图像或性玩具是一个有争议的问题。由此得出结论，认为某一性别占主导地位。最近的发掘工作被解释为表明恰塔霍久克的性别大致平等——仪式葬礼中两性同等重要、饮食相似¹¹，骨骼磨损模式也都证明了这一点。在男性和女性骨骼中发现的生前吸入的烟灰沉积物数量相等，这意味着两性在家里和外面做了类似数量的工作。根据整体数据，Hodder [2004] 得出结论，没有证据表明存在父权制或母权制。然而，正如 Ryan 和 Jethá [2010] 指出的那样，人类学家和考古学家并不一定擅长识别母权制，他们习惯于将其视为父权制的简单颠倒。那里似乎也没有司法制度。墓葬中没有发现任何人死于暴力的证据，而且该镇的艺术作品中也没有对法庭、处决或惩罚的描述。

It is not clear whether in the transition to agriculture Neolithic communities became matriarchies, though they may well have been. This idea was lent credence by some of the artwork excavated at Çatalhðyuk (figure 2.4). These, and the Paleolithic predecessors, are normally referred to as goddess figures, but one should be careful about interpreting them in a language drawn from a much later date. The excavations at Çatalhðyuk have also yielded a plethora of phallic sculptures, so representations of both sexes are present. It is a moot point whether to call archaeological finds like these religious images, erotic images, or sex toys. It is even more risky to come to conclusions about the dominance of one sex or the other on the basis of them. More recent excavations have been interpreted as showing that in Çatalhðyuk there was rough equality between the sexes—equal prominence to both sexes in ceremonial burials, similar diet,¹¹ and patterns of bone wear and tear are cited as evidence for this. Deposits of soot, inhaled during life, are found equally in male and female skeletons implying that both sexes did similar amounts of work in house and outside. In light of the data overall, Hodder [2004] concludes that there is no evidence for either patriarchy or matriarchy. However, as Ryan and Jethá [2010] point out, anthropologists and archaeologists are not necessarily that good at recognizing matriarchies, being wont to see them as simple inversions of patriarchies. There also seems to have been no judicial system. The burials show no evidence of anyone having died from violence, and there are no depictions of tribunals, executions, or punishments in the art of the town.

新石器革命带来了一段长期相对平等的社会发展。如果我们将农业的起源追溯到大约 11,000 年前，那么从那时起大约有一半的时间都被无阶级农业社会的扩张所占据。根据颇具影响力的考古学家伦弗鲁勋爵 (Lord Renfrew) 的说法，安纳托利亚农业的发明对现在欧洲、澳大利亚和美洲使用的语言产生了深远的影响 [Renfrew, 1989]。人们早就知道欧洲、伊朗和北印度的主要语言有一个共同的祖先——称为原始印欧语。这是通过研究这些地区使用的语言的当前版本和历史版本之间的词汇相似性来确定的（图 2.5）。

The Neolithic Revolution led to a long period of comparatively egalitarian social development. If we date the start of agriculture to about 11,000 years ago, then around half the time since then was taken up by the expansion of classless agrarian societies. According to the influential archaeologist Lord Renfrew, the invention of agriculture in Anatolia had a profound effect on languages now spoken across Europe, Australasia, and the Americas [Renfrew, 1989]. The main European, Iranian, and North Indian languages have long been known to have a common ancestor—referred to as Proto Indo-European. This was established by studies of the similarities in vocabularies between current and historical versions of the languages spoken in these areas (figure 2.5).

伦弗鲁意识到，这种语言模式与农业发明后人口从安纳托利亚向外扩散的现象相一致。农业可以支持比狩猎更大的单位面积人口，因此，农业民族往往会以牺牲狩猎邻居为代价来扩张。他们不仅拥有更多的食物，而且定居下来后，生育率也会上升。必须抚养孩子的游牧妇女在最后一个孩子能够走路和跟上之前不会再生一个。定居生活可以消除这个问题，同时提供动物奶和稀粥作为婴儿食品，缩短哺乳期并恢复生育能力。

Renfrew realized that this pattern of languages was consistent with a spread of population out of Anatolia following the invention of farming. Farming can support a larger population per unit area than hunting can, so a farming people will tend to expand at the expense of their hunting neighbors. Not only do they have more food, but having settled down their birth rate rises. A nomadic woman who has to carry her children will not have another until the last one can walk and keep up. A settled life removes this problem while making available animal milk and gruels as baby food, shortening lactation and the return of fertility.

随着农耕人口的增长和迁徙，他们也把语言带到了原籍地之外。语言的当前分布是数千年迁徙的结果，这些迁徙部分抹去了语言传播的原始新石器时代焦点。在近代历史上，安纳托利亚地区由突厥语使用者定居，他们取代了当地居民。但对各种语言随时间变化的详细研究表明，它们在 8700 年前开始分化，这与有人认为这些语言的传播与安纳托利亚的新石器时代革命同时发生 [Gray and Atkinson，2003；Bouckaert et al.，2012]。

As farming populations grew and spread beyond their original homeland they took their languages with them. The current distribution of languages is the result of thousands of years of migrations that have partially erased the original Neolithic focus of the language spread. Anatolia, within recent history, was settled by Turkic speakers who displaced the original population. But detailed study of how the various languages have changed over time indicates that they started to diverge 8,700 years ago, which is consistent with the idea that the spread of the languages coincided with the Neolithic Revolution in Anatolia [Gray and Atkinson, 2003; Bouckaert et al., 2012].

图 2.5. 欧亚大陆上使用印欧语的地区（顶部）；建议从安纳托利亚扩张的人口（底部）。

Figure 2.5. Areas in Eurasia where Indo-European languages are spoken (top); suggested population expansion from Anatolia (bottom).

伦弗鲁认为，这并不是一个孤立的事件。类似的人口扩张和相关语言传播也发生在农业发明的其他地方 [伦弗鲁，1994]：中国和班图语从西非植物驯化地传播开来。

According to Renfrew, this was not an isolated occurrence. Similar population expansion and associated language spreads happened at other places where agriculture was invented [Renfrew, 1994]: in China and with the spread of the Bantu languages from a locus of plant domestication in West Africa.

2.2 繁殖

2.2 REPRODUCTION

一个无阶级的农业社会可以分为三类：直接生产者的成年人、适时替代他们的儿童以及无法从事种植粮食的艰苦劳动的老年人和体弱者。在本节中，我们将推导出这样一个社会中生产和再生产的简单经济模型^。12

A classless agricultural society can be divided into three groups: adults who are direct producers, children who in due course will replace them, and the elders and infirm unable to do the hard work of growing food. In this section we shall derive a simple economic model of production and reproduction in such a society.¹²

我们将使用符号 A 来表示人口在成年工作年限中所占的比例，C 表示作为受赡养子女所占的比例，E 表示一个人作为老人所占的比例。假设一个人从 18 岁起就能从事繁重的农业工作，但到了 60 岁就太老了，无法继续工作，而且如果他们活到了 60 岁，他们很可能会在 65 岁时去世。这意味着 C = [18/65] = 27.7%，A = [42/65] = 64.6%，E= [5/65] = 7.7%。

We will use the symbol A to stand for the fraction of the population in their years of adult working life, C the fraction of years spent as a dependent child, and E the fraction of years a person spends as an elder. Suppose a person is able to do heavy agricultural work from 18 and at 60 is too old to continue, and that if they reach 60 they are likely to die at 65. This would imply C = [18/65] = 27.7%, A = [42/65] = 64.6%, E= [5/65] =7.7%.

表 2.4中显示了这一估计值，但忽略了婴儿死亡率的影响。出生的婴儿中有很大一部分未成年。假设一半出生的婴儿在平均 5 岁时死亡，但此后儿童死亡率很低。其结果是，出生时的孩子只能度过 11.5 年的童年、21 年的成年生活和 2.5 年的老年生活，预期寿命为 35 岁（图 2.4）。高婴儿死亡率的净效应是，整个人口中具有生产力的比例低于没有婴儿死亡率的情况^。13

This is shown as the first estimate in table 2.4, but that ignores the effect of infant mortality. A large part of those born never reached adulthood. Suppose half the babies born die in childhood at an average age of 5, but afterward childhood death rates are low. The effect of this is that at birth a child has the prospect of only 11.5 years of childhood, 21 years of adult life, and 2.5 years as an elder, to give a life expectancy of 35 years (figure 2.4). The net effect of high infant mortality is that the fraction of the whole population who are productive is lower than would otherwise be the case.¹³

假设一年中成人消耗a卡路里，儿童消耗ß，则n人社区每年的食物消耗量F为：F = n((A+E)a+ Cß)。

Suppose that in a year an adult consumes a calories and a child consumes ß, then the annual food consumption F by a community of n people will be: F = n((A+E)a+ Cß).

现在让我们假设一个成年工人每年可以以农作物的形式生产p卡路里。因此，社区的粮食产量将是 nAp。显然，为了使社区生存，种植的粮食量必须平均超过食用量。它必须超过食用量，因为他们必须留出储备以备歉收。一个每年吃掉全部收成的社区，在第一次歉收到来时就会出现短缺并出现高死亡率。但是粮食储存是不可靠的。害虫会吃掉部分储存的粮食，因此粮仓必须不断补充。如果我们假设社区每年储备 1/fa 的粮食，并且每年浪费掉其中的一小部分w ，那么粮食需求量将是 F((1+[w/f])。

Now let us assume that an adult worker can produce p calories per year in the form of crops. So the community food output will be nAp. Clearly, in order for the community to survive the amount of food grown must on average exceed what is eaten. It must exceed it since they will have to set aside stores to make allowance for bad harvests. A community that ate its entire harvest each year will run short and experience high mortality with the first bad harvest that arrives. But storage of grain is unreliable. Pests eat part of what is stored, so the granaries have to be constantly replenished. If we assume that the community keeps 1/f a year of grain in reserve and that a fraction of this w is wasted each year the food requirement will be F((1+[w/f]).

一个社区仅仅为了生存就必须满足的基本生产力条件是 pb ≥ ((A+E)a+ Cß)(1+w/f)/A。

The base productivity condition that has to be met for a community to simply survive is pb ≥ ((A+E)a+ Cß)(1+w/f)/A.

让我们来看看一些数据。我们以联合国数据 [Tontisirin and de Haen, 2004] 为基础，这些数据是从事中等强度工作的人的食物需求。这些数据分别针对男性和女性给出，取决于他们的体重。如果我们假设男性的平均体重为 68 公斤，女性的平均体重为 60 公斤[Igiri et al., 2009]，我们得出成人平均每年 a = 922,000kcal，儿童平均每年 ß = 600,000kcal。

Let us take some figures for this. As a basis we take UN figures [Tontisirin and de Haen, 2004] for food requirements of people doing moderately strenuous work. These are given separately for men and women and depend on their weights. If we take average weights of men as 68kg and women as 60kg [Igiri et al., 2009], we get an average a = 922,000kcal per year for adults, and for children an average of ß = 600,000kcal per year.

表 2.4：高婴儿死亡率对平均生产寿命的影响

TABLE 2.4: Effect of High Infant Mortality on Average Productive Life

使用表 2.4中的 A、C、E 值，并假设饥荒储备是半年的收成，其中每年有四分之一会腐烂，这意味着自给农业中的成年农民每年必须生产大约 150 万大卡的热量^。14

Using the values of A, C, E from table 2.4, and the assumption that the famine reserve is half a year’s harvest, a quarter of which spoils each year, implies that an adult peasant in subsistence farming had to have a calorie production of around 1.5 million kcals per year.¹⁴

除了每个成年工人的最低粮食生产率外，简单的社会再生产还需要最低有效生育率。到目前为止的例子假设替代水平生育率为每名妇女生育 4 个孩子，儿童死亡率为 50%。如果儿童死亡率更高，比如 55%，那么就需要 4.4 的生育率。规则是替代生育率 FR 定义为 FR=2 /(1-DC)，其中 DC 是儿童死亡率。

In addition to having a minimum food production rate per adult worker, simple social reproduction required a minimum effective fertility rate. The example so far has assumed a replacement level fertility rate of 4 children per woman and a 50 percent rate of child mortality. If the level of child mortality was higher, say 55 percent, then a fertility level of 4.4 would be needed. The rule is that the replacement fertility FR is defined by FR=2 /(1-DC) where DC is the child death rate.

要使人口增长，实际生育率必须高于替代率。这可以通过提高每名妇女的生育数量或降低儿童死亡率来实现。儿童死亡率与食物供应非常敏感，因此农业生产力的提高可以让吃得更好、更健康的儿童更有可能活到成年。但从简单的生存角度来看，任何超过基本生育阈值的产量增加都构成了盈余。与此相反的是，任何没收这种盈余的阶级剥削制度都倾向于提高婴儿死亡率并阻止人口增长。

For the population to expand the actual level of fertility must be above the replacement rate. This can come about either by the number of births per woman rising or by child mortality declining. Deaths in childhood are very sensitive to the supply of food, so an improvement in agricultural productivity can allow better-fed, healthier children more likely to survive to adulthood. But from the standpoint of simple survival, any increase in production beyond the basic reproduction threshold constitutes a surplus. The obverse of this is that any system of class exploitation that confiscates this surplus tends to raise infant mortality and prevent population growth.

农业首次引入了当前劳动力对过去劳动力的依赖。猎人无法长期保存他们的猎物，因此生产是针对眼前需求的。在大多数地方，农业与年度周期有关。除了需要维持缓冲库存之外，粮食不足以弥补歉收，甚至正常的生产也依赖于储存。秋粮必须储存起来，以备来年的播种和养活来年的工人。春季种植的工人靠前一年收获的粮食养活。这就造成了现在的工人对以前劳动者的依赖。这种暂时的依赖首先表现为对长辈的依赖，即那些先来先收割的人。后来，它成为雇主或放贷者剥削的基础。长辈控制着养活年轻人的粮食，反过来又占有了今年的收成。

Agriculture introduces, for the first time, a dependence of present labor on past labor. Hunters cannot long preserve their catch, so production is directed at immediate needs. Agriculture is, in most places, tied to an annual cycle. Over and above the need to maintain a buffer stock of grain to cover a bad harvest, even normal production depends on storage. Autumn grain must be stored for next year’s seed and to feed next year’s workers. Those working on planting in the spring are fed by grain harvested the previous year. This creates a dependence of those now working on those who worked before. This temporal dependence first appears as a dependence on the elders, those who came before and harvested before. It later becomes the basis for exploitation by employers or lenders. The elders control the grain that feeds the young and in turn take possession of this year’s harvest.

社会生产关系与血统关系和后来的赞助关系重叠，并被视为血统关系。在仪式方面，我们可以观察到，随着新石器时代农业的发展，祖先崇拜也开始兴起。精心修建的墓葬成为永久的纪念碑。当代人对上一代人的依赖，一种真实的生产关系，被投射到神话世界中。每年对父母的真正尊敬，交出收获，成为祭祀的基础，首先是祭祀祖先，后来是祭祀更抽象的神圣父母。亲子关系成为氏族社会的组织原则，成为嵌套关系圈的组织原则，从中可以发展出氏族领导的等级制度，最终发展出王权。

Social relations of production overlap with, and are perceived as, relations of descent and later of patronage. In terms of ritual we can observe, with Neolithic agriculture, the rise of ancestor cults. Elaborate burial mounds are constructed and become lasting memorials. The dependence of the present generation on the past one, a real relation of production, gets projected into the world of myth. The annual real honoring of the father and mother, the handing over the harvest, becomes the basis for sacrificial offerings, first to the ancestors, and later to more abstract divine parents. Relations of filiation become the organizing principle of clan society, of nested circles of relationship out of which hierarchies of clan leadership and ultimately of kingship can grow.

2.3 班级形成

2.3 CLASS FORMATION

白蚁社会和我们所知的所有昆虫社会一样，是无阶级的。在进化的时间尺度上，阶级社会似乎确实被淘汰了。但在人类文明较短的时间尺度上，阶级社会却很普遍。据我们所知，像恰塔尔霍多克这样的早期新石器时代城镇也是平等的。11,000 年前农业的发展和大约 5,000 年前阶级国家的兴起之间似乎存在数千年的延迟。这一时期，农业人口从欧洲、印度、中国等原始驯化中心开始扩张。根据我们之前的论点，扩张将依赖于用于额外孩子的大量粮食盈余。剥削阶级对粮食盈余的消费将抑制人口的增长。

Termite society, like all insect societies of which we are aware, is classless. On an evolutionary timescale class society does seem to be selected against. But on the shorter timescale of human civilization it is prevalent. As far as we can make out, the early Neolithic towns like Çatalhðyuk were also egalitarian. There seems to have been a delay of thousands of years between the development of farming 11,000 years ago and the rise of class-based states about 5,000 years ago. This period saw the expansion of agricultural populations from the original centers of domestication across Europe, India, China, et al. By our previous argument that expansion would have been dependent on an appreciable food surplus devoted to extra children. The consumption of a food surplus by an exploiting class would have inhibited the population spread.

虽然阶级形成的前提是粮食过剩，但这还不够。粮食过剩可以简单地扩大劳动分工，让一些人专门从事非农业工作：制陶工或铁匠。一个有农民、铁匠和制陶工的社会本身并不是一个阶级社会，即使这些行业成为世袭的，因为这些行业之间的关系是平等的。不会涉及剥削。

Though a precondition for class is a food surplus, this is not enough. A food surplus could go to simply extend the division of labor, allowing some people to specialize in non-agricultural work: potters or smiths. A society with farmers, smiths, and potters is not, as such, a class society, even if the trades become hereditary, since the relationship among the trades is one of equals. There would be no exploitation involved.

图 2.6. 类别形成的先决条件阶段。

Figure 2.6. Precondition stages for the formation of classes.

阶级的形成要求至少有一部分剩余食物用于支持不再从事物质生产的人群。而且这种非生产性地位必须延续几代人。在任何社会中，婴儿都是非生产性的，但这并不意味着婴儿就属于一个阶级。非生产性阶级的存在必须有一生大部分时间都从事非生产的人，而他们的孩子也必须有可能拥有同样的地位。

Class formation requires that at least part of the food surplus goes to support a group of people that no longer engages in physical production. And this non-productive status has to extend over generations. In any society, infants are non-productive, but that does not make babies a class. For a nonproductive class to exist there must be people who spend the greater part of their life as non-producers, and their children in turn must be likely to have the same status.

但当然，社会上层阶级的消费往往不止食物。他们通常拥有不成比例的其他商品、衣服、珠宝、器皿、装饰品等。因此，他们所依赖的剩余不能仅仅是食物剩余。食物剩余是前提。没有食物剩余，就没有食物供生产展示品和炫耀品的工匠食用。上层阶级意味着更普遍的剩余。如果生产的布料只够劳动人民穿，统治者就会赤身裸体。皇帝穿衣服意味着布料过剩，国王穿鞋意味着皮革过剩。

But of course the upper class in society tends to consume more than food. They typically have a disproportionate share of other goods, clothes, jewelry, utensils, ornaments, etc. So the surplus they depend on cannot simply be a food surplus. A food surplus is the precondition. Without it there would be no food for the craftspeople producing the items of display and ostentation. An upper class implies a more general surplus. If only enough cloth is produced to clothe the working population rulers go naked. Emperors with clothes imply a cloth surplus, and shodden kings a leather surplus.

粮食过剩最初是为了人口增长，其次是专业分工。如果铁匠把大部分时间花在制造青铜工具上，他们就没有多少时间种植自己的食物。但这种过剩并不一定需要通过实际增加粮食产量来实现。如果在一个有 50 人的社区中，一个人成为铁匠，另一个人成为他的助手，那么所需的粮食并不比所有 50 人都从事农业要多。但这确实要求剩下的 48 名农民要么更加努力地工作，要么提高生产力。在青铜或后来的铁器锻造中，产品包括农具，最初是斧头，后来是挖掘工具，因此一小群配备金属工具的农业工人能够生产出与一大群使用石器的农业工人一样多的食物。Gilman 等人 [1981] 认为，在欧洲青铜时代遗址中发现的青铜农具相对较少。但 Wells [同上] 认为，这是由于保存方式不同造成的，青铜工具与装饰品不同，太有用了，不能埋在挖掘重点的墓地中，如果损坏，就会被熔化。因此，考古学家对于青铜农具的生产是否真的对生产做出了很大贡献存在一些争议。

A surplus of food is initially required for population growth, next for a specialized division of labor. If smiths are to spend most of their time making bronze tools, they have little time left for growing their own food. But this surplus need not come about by an actual increase in food production. If in a community of 50 one person becomes a smith and another his assistant, no more food is required than if all 50 were engaged in farming. But it does require the 48 who remain farming to either work a bit harder or to become more productive. In the case of bronze or later iron smithing, the products include agricultural tools, initially axes and later digging tools, so a smaller group of agricultural workers equipped with metal tools would have been able to produce as much as a larger group with stone tools. Gilman et al. [1981] argued that relatively few bronze agricultural tools have been found in European bronze age sites. But Wells [ibid.] argues that this is due to differential preservation, that bronze tools, unlike ornaments, are too useful to be buried in the grave sites that are the focus of excavations, and would have been melted back down if damaged. So there is some dispute among archaeologists as to whether the production of bronze agricultural tools actually contributed much to production.

这有什么关系？

Why is this relevant?

因为社会阶层化最早出现在青铜时代的欧洲考古记录中。新石器时代的欧洲，就像新石器时代的安纳托利亚一样，似乎相对平等。长屋表明当时的居住方式相对公有化，例如在巴尔布里迪发掘的长屋，类似于近代历史上无阶级的社区所使用的长屋。此外，在新石器时代，习俗是在古墓中进行集体埋葬 [Barclay, 1998]。尸体可能暴露在猛禽的攻击下 [Hedges, 1984]，以便在将骨头转移到古墓之前去除肉。在青铜时代，这种做法转变为个人埋葬，一些大型墓葬只有一个尸体。我们现在发现与尸体相关的装饰品、陶器和武器。在同一时期，开始建造越来越复杂的仪式场所，包括著名的石环。

Because social stratification first becomes evident in the European archaeological record during the Bronze Age. Neolithic Europe, like Neolithic Anatolia, seems to have been relatively egalitarian. Relatively communal dwelling is indicated by longhouses, such as those excavated at Balbridie, similar to those used within recent history by communities known to be classless. In addition, during the Neolithic the custom was to have communal burials in barrows [Barclay, 1998]. Bodies were probably exposed to birds of prey [Hedges, 1984] in order to have the flesh removed before bones were transferred to the barrow. In the Bronze Age this shifts to individual burials with some large burial mounds having only one body. Associated with the bodies we now find ornaments, pottery, and weapons. Over the same period ceremonial sites of increasing complexity, including the famous stone rings, start to be built.

然而，我们无法解释阶级分化的加剧是生产力提高的直接结果——无论青铜工具是否起到了作用。如果青铜工具使生活更加轻松，那么为什么农民不干脆少干点活，或者支持青铜匠为他们制造青铜炊具等等呢？

However, we have a problem with explaining the rise of class stratification as a direct result of rising productivity—whether bronze tools contributed or not. If bronze tools made it easier, why should the farmers have not simply worked less, or perhaps supported bronze smiths to make them bronze cooking pots, etc.?

图 2.7. 当今的锄头农业（左）；青铜时代的锄头（右）。来源：知识共享，Cristian Chirita

Figure 2.7. Hoe agriculture today (left); Bronze Age hoe heads (right). Source: Creative Commons, Cristian Chirita

该主题比专门涉及青铜器的主题更为普遍时代，因为我们知道，在欧洲以外，没有青铜或铁的社会就变成了阶级社会。为什么过剩会导致阶级结构？

The topic is more general than one specifically relating to the Bronze Age, since we know that outside of Europe societies without bronze or iron became class societies. Why should a surplus have led to a class structure?

阶级社会需要有剩余，但反之则不然。粮食过剩并不一定意味着剥削阶级。建立这一社会似乎需要其他不幸：战争、父权制和宗教。

A class society requires a surplus, but the converse does not hold. A food surplus does not necessitate an exploiting class. Establishing that seems to have required other misfortunes: war, patriarchy, and religion.

2.4 战争、父权制、宗教和统计规律

2.4 WAR, PATRIARCHY, RELIGION, AND THE LAWS OF STATISTICS

要发生战争，就需要有争夺的东西。在纯粹的狩猎采集社会中，战争似乎很少见 [Fry，2007；Ryan 和 Jethá，2012]，但在畜牧或至少某种形式的农业社会中，战争却很常见。很明显，一旦牛或其他野兽被放牧，它们就会被偷走，并可能成为战争团体的目标。但战斗并不局限于史密斯所说的牧羊人国家，尽管这些国家非常强大。15将一些锄头园艺与狩猎相结合的^国家和部落都好战。为什么？

For warfare to exist you need something to fight over. Whereas warfare in pure hunter-gatherer societies seems rare [Fry, 2007; Ryan and Jethá, 2012] it has been common in societies with either herding or at least some form of agriculture. It is clear that once cattle or other beasts are herded they can be stolen, and can be the object of a war party. But fighting is not limited to what Smith called Nations of Shepherds, formidable as these have been.¹⁵ Nations and tribes that combine some hoe horticulture with hunting have been warlike. Why?

根据梅亚苏（1981）的观点，冲突的动机不是抢夺牲畜，而是抢夺年轻女性。纯粹的狩猎采集社会是游牧社会，没有固定的村庄，人们在游荡的小群体之间流动。农业将人们束缚起来。他认为，向农业过渡的最初家庭形式是母系居住，这意味着成年女性留在母亲的家中或社区。只要社区之间存在流动性，那么就是男性会搬家，在其他社区寻找妻子。

According to Meillassoux [1981] the motive for the conflict was the capture not of cattle but young women. Pure hunter-gatherer societies are nomadic, with no fixed villages, and mobility of people between wandering small bands. Agriculture ties people down. He argues that the initial form of family in the transition to agriculture is the matrilocal, which means a society in which adult women stay in their mother’s home or community. Insofar as there is mobility between communities, it is the men who move, seeking wives in other communities.

原则上，任何性别都可以流动。你可以采用母系从属制度，即女性留在出生地，男性则流动；或者采用父系从属制度，即相反的情况。虽然从逻辑上看，这两种制度似乎不过是镜像，但它们的经济影响实际上非常不同。一个社区的生殖潜力取决于它有多少年轻女性，而不是有多少年轻男性。这对相对较小的社区有着严重的影响，因为这些社区还不能完全通过农业来养活自己一整年。这样的社区相对于其腹地来说必须较小，以防止可用的猎物枯竭。16^在如此小的群体中，机会法则意味着每种性别的成年人数都会波动。

In principle either sex can move. You can have a matrilocal system where women stay in their birthplace and the men move, or patrilocal communities where the reverse happens. Although these seem logically to be no more than mirror images, their economic effects are actually very different. The reproductive potential of a community is set by how many young women, rather than young men, it has. This has serious implications for relatively small communities, ones that are not yet able to fully support themselves through the whole year by agriculture. Such communities have to be small relative to their hinterland to prevent the exhaustion of the available game.¹⁶ Within such small groups the laws of chance mean that the numbers of each sex coming of age will fluctuate.

假设我们有一个小社区，每个成年一代平均有 40 人。我们预计其中约有一半是年轻女性，但如图2.8所示，女性人数可能在 0 到 40 之间变化。某一代女性人数少于 18 人的概率约为 30%，即缺口同龄女性与男性的比例为 4。这将预示着下一代人口将下降 10%。在较小的社区中，这种影响更为明显。一个由 8 个家庭组成的社区，大约 22% 的时间里，年轻女性会少于 6 名。但在这个小社区中，女性缺口 4 人意味着人口将减少四分之一，这将威胁到社区未来的生存，要知道，并不是所有女性都有生育能力，有些人可能会早逝，等等。

Suppose that we have a small community in which each generation coming of age has on average 40 people. We would expect about half of these to be young women, but as figure 2.8 shows, the number of women could vary between 0 and 40. There is about a 30 percent percent chance that in a given generation there would be fewer than 18 women, a shortfall of 4 women relative to men in their age group. This would presage a 10 percent fall in the population over the next generation. In smaller communities the effect is more marked. A community of 8 families would end up with fewer than 6 young women about 22 percent of the time. But a shortfall of 4 women in this small community implies a shrinkage of the population by a quarter, which would threaten the future survival of the community, bearing in mind that not all of these may be fertile, some may die young, etc.

原则上，一些年轻男子可以离开并尝试加入另一个拥有过剩女性的社区，但根据梅亚苏的说法，经常发生的情况是，这些男子袭击邻近社区并绑架年轻女性。鉴于该社区仍然部分依赖狩猎，这些男子擅长使用弓箭，这些技能很容易从狩猎转移到劫掠。

In principle some of the young men could leave and try to join another community with a surplus of women, but what often seems to have happened, according to Meillassoux, is that the men raid neighboring communities and abduct young women. Given that the community still depends partly on hunting, the men are skilled in the use of bows and arrows, and these skills transfer readily from hunting to raiding.

这导致社区之间普遍存在敌意和猜疑。男性获得战士的社会角色，既是为了从其他群体中绑架女性，也是为了保护自己的女性。这样的社会可能仍然是母系社会，孩子们在一个相对集体的家庭中长大，他们的叔叔扮演着我们认为的父亲角色。可能没有严格的一夫一妻制。但男性对女性的集体统治的开端是存在的。作为猎人和战士的男性形成了将他们视为保护者和英雄的意识形态，并为将女性贬低为所谓的卑微的园艺工作辩护。尤其是那些被绑架的女性，由于与自己的社区隔绝，很可能处于非常从属的地位。

This leads to endemic hostility and suspicion between communities. Men acquire the social role of warrior both to abduct women from other groups and to protect their own women. Such societies may remain matrilineal, with children being brought up in a relatively communal household with their uncles playing what we would regard as a paternal role. There may be no system of strict monogamy. But the beginnings of the collective dominance of men over women exist. Men as hunters and warriors develop ideologies that represent them as protectors and heroes and which justify relegating women to what are presented as menial horticultural tasks. In particular the abducted women, cut off from their own community, are likely to be in a very subordinate position.

狩猎与园艺的结合限制了定居社区的规模。梅亚苏声称，生育的不稳定性导致了绑架和劫掠。猎人发展出战士属性，男性统治地位开始发展。但这是集体的，而不是个人的。还没有出现父权制的形象，对“他的”女人的性行为行使独占控制。社会可能仍然认可相当大的性放纵，有各种狂欢仪式和非常模糊的父亲观念[Beckerman and Valentine，2002；Ryan and Jethá，2010]。

The combination of hunting with horticulture limits the size of settled communities. Meillassoux claims that the precariousness of reproduction leads to abductions and raiding. Hunters develop warrior attributes and male dominance begins to develop. But this is collective rather than individual. There is not yet the figure of the patriarch, exercising exclusive control over the sexuality of “his” women. The society may still approve of considerable sexual license, with various orgiastic rituals and very blurred ideas of paternity [Beckerman and Valentine, 2002; Ryan and Jethá, 2010].

与母系小社区相关的基本矛盾可以得到解决

The basic contradiction associated with small matrilineal communities could be solved

• 通过更加专注于农业和渔业。在规模扩大的同时，有可能形成大型母系甚至母系氏族社区，而不会经常遭受育龄妇女随机短缺的困扰。

• by becoming more exclusively agricultural and piscatorial. While growing in size it is possible to form big matrilineal or even matriarchal communities that do not suffer from frequent random shortages of women of childbearing age.

• 走向父系家庭和宗族形式，并随后走向父权制家庭和宗族形式。

• by moving toward a patrilineal and subsequently patriarchal form of family and clan.

图 2.8. 小型社区中下一代女性的预期数量，其中有 8 个或 20 个家庭，每个女性有两个孩子活到成年。形式为累积二项分布：Σ _k=0ⁿ [n!/(k!(nk)!)]。

Figure 2.8. Expected number of women in the next generation of small communities where there are 8 or 20 families and each woman has two children surviving to adulthood. The form is a cumulative binomial distribution: Σ_k=0ⁿ [n!/(k!(n-k)!)].

一个拥有数百人的社区遭受性别比例严重随机波动的可能性非常低。像安纳托利亚新石器时代城镇这样的社区规模足够大，并且足够依赖农业，可以避免梅亚苏在较近的部落中观察到的那种将锄耕与狩猎相结合的劫掠和武士文化。如果没有女儿，这样的社会在个别母系家庭中仍然会存在潜在问题。但对于一个和平的社区来说，这不是什么问题。可以通过收养其他家庭的女儿来解决这个问题，就像现代母系摩梭人中发生的那样 [Stacey, 2009]。虽然我们只能推测这种情况是否发生在安纳托利亚，但它可以解释这些社区似乎长期和平发展的原因，而考古记录中没有阶层或性别不平等的证据。

The probability that a community with several hundred people will suffer serious random swings in its sex ratio is very low. Communities like the Neolithic towns of Anatolia would have been big enough, and sufficiently dependent on agriculture, to avoid the raiding and warrior culture that Meillassoux observed in the more recent tribes that combined hoe agriculture with hunting. Such societies would still have had potential problems within individual matrilineal households if there were no daughters. But this is not such a problem for a peaceful community. It could be dealt with by adoption of daughters from other families, as occurs among the modern matriarchal Mosuo [Stacey, 2009]. While we can only speculate as to whether this took place in Anatolia, it could account for what seems to have been a long period of peaceful development of these communities, without evidence of either stratification or gender inequality in the archaeological record.

我们确实知道的是，后来的谷物农业文化似乎主要是父系和男权制。梅亚苏从理论上解释了为什么会出现这种情况：定居谷物农业的产量更高，人口密度更高，同时使从种植转向战斗的精力变得不那么有吸引力。相邻的小家庭社区之间的和平关系允许年轻女性的非暴力交换，以弥补偶然发生的不足。搬到另一个社区的女性，如果她们缺乏母亲的支持，她们很可能会被同化为以前被俘女性所拥有的地位：从属于她们的婆婆和丈夫。一旦这种转移变得更加普遍，越来越多的女性就会处于从属地位，然后推广到所有新娘都要服从现任女族长和新丈夫的权威。在此过程中，男性对女性的总体权威上升。

What we do know is that later historical cultures with grain agriculture seem to have been predominantly patrilineal and patriarchal. Meillassoux gives a theoretical account of why this happens: The higher output of settled grain agriculture allows a denser population and at the same time makes the diversion of effort from growing things into fighting less attractive. Peaceful relations between adjacent small domestic communities allow the nonviolent exchange of young women to make up the deficits that would always occur by chance. Women moving to another community, where they lack maternal support, are likely to be assimilated to the status that was formerly held by female captives: subordinate to their mother-in-law and husband. Once such transfers become more common, an increasing number of women are in a subordinate status which then generalizes to all brides being subject to the authority of the existing matriarch and the new husband. In the process the general authority of men over women rises.

当女性被带入另一个群体，且通常被认为与她的生育能力一样长时，她的生育能力就成为谈判的主题。双方达成协议，决定女性后代的继承权，因为由于上述情况，女性不会为她的原籍社区生育（从她的生育中受益的家庭身份必须公开，而其他社区的主张受到限制），而且由于女性不会为自己的利益生育，因此法律上规定的父系亲子关系必须取代不言而喻的母系亲子关系。[Meillassoux，1981，43]

It is the procreative powers of a woman that are the subject of negotiation when she is taken into another group for a period generally held a priori to last as long as her fertility. An agreement is reached which decides the devolution of the woman’s offspring since, due to the circumstances cited above, a woman does not procreate for her community of origin (the identity of the family which will benefit from her procreation must be made public while the claims of the other community are restricted) and also because, since the woman does not procreate for her own benefit, jurally constituted patrilineal filiation must replace self-evident maternal filiation. [Meillassoux, 1981, 43]

社区之间的交换可能会变得相当复杂，随着时间的推移会产生债务：如果今年有两名女性从社区 A 前往社区 B，那么双方就同意在未来某个时候再有两名新娘回来。这使得女儿在与贸易有相似之处的交换过程中具有价值。一家之主，最初可能是一名女性，更可能是男性，将女儿视为赋予他们权力和影响力的资源。因此，默认假设是所有女儿都会在社区外寻找伴侣，而外婚制则变得普遍。

The exchanges between communities can become quite complex, involving debts over time: if 2 women go from community A to community B this year, then it is agreed that at some time in the future 2 other brides will come back in return. This makes daughters valuable in an exchange process that has some similarities with trade. The head of the family, perhaps initially a woman, more probably a man, views them as a resource that gives them power and influence. As such, the default assumption becomes that all daughters will take partners outside the community, and exogamy becomes general.

由于婚姻和社会生育是这些外部关系的主要原因，为了维护长老的权威，必须在群体内禁止婚姻，以便适龄女孩仍然可作为这些交易的对象。矛盾的是，这种对婚姻的限制变得越来越必要和严格，因为群体通过扩大可以通过族内通婚而发展。当通过社区成员的交配在统计上实现生育时，长老在婚姻管理上重建的权力正受到这种管理的影响的威胁，这种管理使得社区的扩张成为可能。因此，政治权威取决于一种情况，当它加强自身时，它往往会废除这种情况。

Since marriage and social reproduction are the main reason for these external relations, marriage, in order to maintain the elder’s authority, must be prohibited within the group so that nubile girls remain available as subjects of these transactions. Paradoxically, this restriction on marriage becomes increasingly necessary and rigorous in that the group, by expanding, could grow through endogamous intermarriage. When reproduction becomes statistically possible through the mating of members of the community, the power of the elders, rebuilt on matrimonial management, is threatened by the very effects of this management which makes expansion of the community possible. Thus political authority depends on a circumstance which it tends to abolish when it reinforces itself.

为了维护政权，必须设计和发展一种强制性的、专制的意识形态。宗教、巫术仪式和恐怖主义基于迷信的性禁忌被强加于受赡养人、年轻人，尤其是青春期女性身上；性禁忌变得绝对化，对违法行为的惩罚也越来越重。族内通婚变成了乱伦，性禁忌成了禁忌。[Meillassoux，1981，45]

The authority must, to be preserved, devise and develop a coercive and authoritarian ideology. Religion, magic ritual, and a terrorism based on superstition is inflicted upon dependants, young people and above all on pubescent women; sexual prohibitions become absolute and punishments for transgression increase. Endogamy becomes incest, and sexual prohibition a taboo. [Meillassoux, 1981, 45]

宗教、魔法、仪式和基于迷信的恐怖主义为父权制和阶级等级制度提供了正当理由。Watts 等人 [2016] 提出了令人信服的证据，表明宗教（特别是以活人献祭的形式）与分层社会的形成有着密切的关系。Watts 的研究以 93 个不同的南岛社会为样本，这些社会是相对孤立的岛屿文化。

Religion, magic, ritual, and terrorism based on superstition justified both patriarchy and class hierarchy. Watts et al. [2016] present convincing evidence that religion, specifically in the form of human sacrifice, was deeply implicated in the formation of stratified societies. The Watts study used as their data a large sample of 93 different Austronesian societies, which being island cultures were comparatively isolated.

在 93 个文化样本中，有 40 个（43%）观察到了活人献祭的证据。在 20 个平等主义社会中，有 5 个（25%）实施了活人献祭，在 46 个中等阶层社会中，有 17 个（37%）实施了活人献祭，在 27 个高度阶层社会中，有 18 个（67%）实施了活人献祭。

Evidence of human sacrifice was observed in 40 of the 93 cultures sampled (43 percent). Human sacrifice was practiced in 5 of the 20 egalitarian societies (25 percent), 17 of the 46 moderately stratified societies (37 percent), and 18 of the 27 highly stratified societies (67 percent) sampled.

随后，他们利用马尔可夫模型模拟了高度分层和活人祭祀的演变，并将其叠加在文化语言演化系统树上，追溯了分层的起源和活人祭祀的起源。他们得出结论，活人祭祀提高了向高度分层状态过渡的可能性，并且一旦这种状态存在，就会稳定下来。

They then performed a Markov model simulation of the evolution of high stratification and human sacrifice superimposed on the phylogentic tree of the language evolution of the cultures, tracing the origins of stratification and the origins of human sacrifice. They concluded that human sacrifice enhances the probability of transition to a highly stratified state, and stabilizes such a state once it exists.

他们得出的结论是：

They conclude:

活人祭祀将最高权威（夺取生命）的展现与神圣的超自然理由相结合，使基于阶级的权力区别合法化，将权威视为神所命定的……

Human sacrifice legitimizes class-based power distinctions by combining displays of ultimate authority—the taking of a life—with supernatural justifications that sanctify authority as divinely ordained….

我们的研究结果为“活人祭祀在阶层化社会的构建和维持中发挥了重要作用”这一说法提供了强有力的证据。虽然我们样本中大多数高度阶层化的社会都实行活人祭祀，但在平等主义社会中，活人祭祀却很少见，我们发现其效果取决于阶层化的程度。具体而言，活人祭祀大大增加了高度社会阶层化出现的可能性，并防止了社会阶层化一旦出现就消失，但在平等主义社会中，活人祭祀并没有增加社会阶层化。这与历史记载相一致，历史记载推测，要想让社会精英利用活人祭祀，首先必须有社会精英来利用它。

Our results provide strong evidence for the claim that human sacrifice played a powerful role in the construction and maintenance of stratified societies. Though human sacrifice was practiced in the majority of highly stratified societies in our sample, it was scarce in egalitarian societies, and we find that its effect depended on the level of stratification. Specifically, human sacrifice substantially increased the chances of high social stratification arising and prevented the loss of social stratification once it had arisen, yet was not found to increase social stratification in egalitarian societies. This is consistent with historical accounts that speculate that in order for human sacrifice to be exploited by social elites, there must first be social elites to exploit it.

Ingham [1984] 用阿兹特克社会的数据提出了类似的论点。战争、父权制、宗教和等级制度的存在为奴隶制的出现奠定了基础。

Ingham [1984] makes a similar argument using data from Aztec society. With war, patriarchy, religion and hierarchy in place, the scene was set for the emergence of slavery.

第三章

CHAPTER 3

奴隶经济

Slave Economy

在狩猎和捕鱼社会中，奴隶制发展得并不多。尼波尔 [1971] 列举了⁸⁸个狩猎部落的例子，发现其中只有 18 个部落拥有奴隶。17奴隶制在氏族社会中通过战争产生。俘虏可以被杀死、赎回或被强迫工作。但在商品生产不发达的氏族社会中，奴隶制的潜在规模受到拥有奴隶的家庭的消费需求的限制。这种部落家庭奴隶制直到最近才在非洲部分地区存在 [Evans-Pritchard，1940]，过去曾广泛存在。要大规模使用奴隶，要让奴隶成为经济体系的决定性因素，他们生产的农作物必须出售，而这又取决于其他几个因素：

Among hunting and fishing societies slavery is little developed. Nieboer [1971] listed 88 examples of tribes of hunters and found that only 18 of these had slaves.¹⁷ Slavery arises in clan society through war. Captives can be killed, ransomed, or put to work. But in clan societies without developed commodity production, the potential scale of the institution is limited by the consumption needs of the household holding the slave. This kind of tribal domestic slavery existed until recently in parts of Africa [Evans-Pritchard, 1940] and was in the past widespread. For slaves to be used on a large scale, for it to become the determining element of an economic system, the crops they produce must be sold and that in turn depends on several other things:

1. 必须有一个消费者市场，其中的消费者¹⁸不能自己种植粮食。这通常意味着城市人口。

1. There must be a market of consumers¹⁸ who are not able to grow their own food. Typically this implies an urban population.

2. 必须有运输工具将产品从农场运送到遥远的消费者。

2. There must be the means of transport to move the product from the farms to distant consumers.

3. 必须有奴隶市场。

3. There must be a market for slaves themselves.

因此，奴隶经济的建立依赖于一定的人口密度，没有人口密度就没有城镇；也依赖于一定的技术水平，特别是运输技术，没有运输技术就没有商品市场。

Thus the establishment of a slave economy depends on a certain density of population, without which there are no towns; and a certain level of technology, particularly the technology of transport, without which there are no commodity markets.

3.1 技术综合体

3.1 TECHNOLOGY COMPLEX

无人协助的人力无法经济地长距离运输大量货物。为此，你需要非人力的动力。现代全球化资本主义依靠船用柴油机和高通透平机的动力 [Smil, 2010]。古典奴隶制依靠地中海方形船具 [Whitewright, 2007] 和牛车。

Unaided human labor cannot transport large loads economically for long distances. For that you need non-human sources of power. Modern globalized capitalism rests on the power of the marine diesel and the high bandpass turbine [Smil, 2010]. Classical slavery depended on the Mediterranean square rig [Whitewright, 2007] and the ox cart.

古典文明这一独特特征的前提是其沿海特征。希腊罗马古代文明在其最深层的结构中是典型的地中海风格 [Anderson, 1996, 20]。

The precondition of this distinctive feature of classical civilization was its coastal character. Graeco-Roman antiquity was quintessentially Mediterranean in its innermost structure [Anderson, 1996, 20].

长途运输总是依赖海洋。现在和过去一样，陆路运输重型货物所需的能源远高于水路运输。陆路驮畜运输仅限于高价值产品：盐、布等。轮式运输又依赖于道路，并受到现有马具效率的严重制约。古代马具只能拉动有限的重量，而不会对马的脖子施加窒息压力 [Singer and Holmyard，1956]，因此，在古典地中海文明中，牛车是首选的货运车辆。一个人在工作时只能维持 50W 到 90W 之间的功率输出，而一对拉车的牛可以输出大约 1000W [Smil，2004]。

Long-distance transport always depends on the sea. Overland, now as in the past, costs far more in energy to move heavy cargoes than water transport. Land transport by pack animals was limited to high-value products: salt, cloth, etc. Wheeled transport depends in turn on roads and is heavily constrained by the efficiency of the harnesses available. Ancient horse harnesses only allowed limited weights to be pulled without exerting a choking pressure on the horse’s neck [Singer and Holmyard, 1956], so the yoked ox cart was the preferred goods vehicle in the classical Mediterranean civilizations. A person can only sustain a power output of between 50W and 90W when working, where a pair of oxen drawing a cart can deliver around 1000W [Smil, 2004].

图 3.1。希罗涡轮机，或称汽转球。来源：Jude，1910 年。

Figure 3.1. Hero’s turbine, or aeolipile. Source: Jude, 1910.

高级奴隶文明有轮子用于运输；它还利用旋转用于其他目的：制陶轮、车床、机械计算机、¹⁹用于生产橄榄油的螺旋压榨机，以及利用水人类首次利用车轮来产生旋转机械运动 [Singer and Holmyard, 1956]。人类知道曲柄（与 White [1964] 的说法相反），并且可以制造直到 19 世纪才再次实现的复杂往复式机械。尽管罗马人知道蒸汽涡轮机或汽转球，并且可以制造与蒸汽机几乎同态的往复式活塞，²⁰但他们没有动力陆上运输。即使在良好的道路上，马车也只在短途旅行中才具有经济效益。更远更重的运输依赖于水路。马车可以从农场转移到海岸，但无论是在古代经济中，还是在近代大西洋周围奴隶文明复兴期间，以奴隶为基础的出口产业的整体可行性都依赖于海洋和帆船。

High slave civilization had the wheel for transport; it also harnessed rotation for other purposes: the potter’s wheel, the lathe, mechanical computers,¹⁹ the screw press for olive oil production and, with the water wheel harnessed for the first time, an artificial source of rotary mechanical motion [Singer and Holmyard, 1956]. It knew the crank, contra claims by White [1964], and could build reciprocating machinery of a sophistication not achieved again until the nineteenth century. Although the Romans knew of a steam turbine or aeolipile and could make reciprocating pistons that were almost homomorphic to those in steam engines,²⁰ they had no powered land transport. Even on good roads the cart was only economically effective for shorter journeys. Longer heavier transport relied on water. Carts can transfer from farm to shore, but the overall viability of slave-based export industries, whether in the ancient economy or during the early modern renaissance of slave civilization around the Atlantic, depended on sea and sail.

图 3.2. 罗马商船模型。方形帆具可能能够通过选择性收帆来适应三角帆式结构。照片：Wolfgang Sauber，知识共享。

Figure 3.2. Model of a Roman merchant vessel. The square rig may have been capable of adopting a lateen-style configuration by selective reefing. Photo:Wolfgang Sauber, Creative Commons.

人力通过桨可以推动一艘小船以 2 到 3 节的巡航速度航行。但要达到这个速度，船必须很窄，因此不适合运载重物。宽大的适航货船需要帆或发动机动力。

Human energy, via oars, can propel a small ship at a cruising speed of 2 to 3 knots. But to achieve this the ship must be narrow and thus ill suited to carrying heavy cargo. A beamy, seaworthy cargo ship needs sail or engine power.

风帆是第一种可以利用无生命力量的技术。古典地中海帆船只有单桅杆，并且是横帆。直到最近，人们才相信这会限制他们可以或多或少地直接迎风航行。最近有人得出结论，使用当时可用的装备可以迎风航行。21^但迎风航行的速度要慢得多。卡森[1951]根据古代文字记载和现代盛行风数据提供了可能的航行时间表。他认为，虽然从罗马到亚历山大的航行在有利的西风中大约需要 12 天，但逆风返程需要 50 到 70 天。

Sails were the first technology that could be used to harness inanimate power. The classical Mediterranean sailing vessels had single masts and were square-rigged. It was believed until recently that this would have limited them to sailing more or less directly before the wind. More recently it has been concluded that sailing to the windward was possible using the rig then available.²¹ But the speeds attained beating to windward would be much slower. Casson [1951] provides tables of probable sailing times based on a combination of ancient textual accounts and modern data on prevailing winds. He suggests that while a voyage from Rome to Alexandria, with favorable westerlies, could be made in about 12 days, the return voyage, going against the wind, would have taken between 50 and 70 days.

按照现代标准，当时的船只应该很小。虽然肯定存在重量超过 350 吨的船只，但大多数船只重量不超过 100 吨。总体而言，船只大小与近代早期欧洲使用的船只大小差不多 [Houston, 1988]。在跨大西洋奴隶贸易时期，帆船仍然是主要推动力，尽管到 18 世纪末，跨大西洋贸易中使用的船只往往比休斯顿估计的古典船只大两倍 [Garland and Klein, 1985; North, 1968]。

By modern standards the ships would have been small. While ships of over 350 tons certainly existed, the great bulk would have been under 100 tons. Overall the size range would not have been dissimilar to those used in early modern Europe [Houston, 1988]. Sail continued to be the prime mover during the period of transatlantic slavery, though the ships used in the transatlantic trade up to the late 1700s tended to be twice as large as Houston estimates classical vessels to have been [Garland and Klein, 1985; North, 1968].

1000 年至 1900 年间，印度洋沿岸的奴隶经济也使用海上运输，采用前后索具。在这种情况下，季风盛行风的季节性变化使得迎风航行的重要性不如地中海 [Heuman and Burnard，2010]。地中海和大西洋奴隶经济之间航运的主要技术进步是：

The slave economy of the Indian Ocean littoral between 1000 and 1900 also used sea transport, with fore-aft rigging. In this case, the seasonal shifts in the prevailing winds of the monsoon made sailing to windward less essential than in the Mediterranean [Heuman and Burnard, 2010]. The principal technical advances in shipping between the Mediterranean and Atlantic slave economies were:

• 改进的导航仪器、指南针、星盘以及后来的六分仪。

• Improved navigational instruments, compass, astrolabe and later the sextant.

• 采用更坚固的龙骨和框架内部结构。

• Adoption of stouter keel and frame internal construction.

• 内部甲板——对于奴隶运输尤为重要。

• Internal decks—particularly important for slave transport.

• 更好的索具、多个桅杆和更多的前后帆，改善了迎风航行。

• Better rig, multiple masts, and more fore and aft sails, improved sailing to windward.

有人认为，阿拉伯和印度洋的奴隶经济率先发明了这种纵帆，即所谓的三角帆。英语中的“mizzen”一词，即后桅杆，可能源于阿拉伯语中的“ mizan”，意为天平。三角帆呈三角形，但悬挂在一根形似天平的帆桁上，一端较低 [Hourani and Carswell，1995]。但 Casson [1956] 和 Whitewright [2009] 认为，有证据表明，三角帆在罗马晚期就已开始使用。如果真是这样，那么促进奴隶经济形式所需的长途贸易的关键技术步骤可能通过 15 世纪的葡萄牙人从古典奴隶经济传到了近代奴隶经济。

The slave economy of Arabia and the Indian Ocean is thought by some to have pioneered the fore and aft rig with what was called the lateen rig. The English term “mizzen,” as in mizzenmast, arguably derives from the Arabic mizan meaning a balance. A lateen sail is triangular but hangs from a yard that looks like a balance, low at one end [Hourani and Carswell, 1995]. But Casson [1956] and Whitewright [2009] argue that there is evidence that the lateen sail was in use during the late Roman period. If that is the case, then a key technical step facilitating the long- distance trade required for the slave form of economy may, via the fifteenth-century Portuguese, have been transmitted from the classical to the early modern slave economies.

这些进步是建立海洋规模而非地中海规模的奴隶经济的先决条件。

These advances were a precondition for the establishment of a slave economy of oceanic rather than Mediterranean scale.

图 3.3. 三角帆索具。资料来源：Pearson Scott Foresman 档案，已发布到公共领域。

Figure 3.3. The lateen rig. Source: Pearson Scott Foresman archive, released to public domain.

帆船的运营必然倾向于资本主义形式。不仅船只价格昂贵，需要采用预示着股份公司出现的合伙形式 [Banaji, 2016]，而且在前资本主义经济中，航运是使用动力机器进行生产的主要实例。帆船利用风力来取代原本需要大量船上奴隶的工作。在这方面，它具有资本主义工业的典型特征之一——用动力设备取代人力。古代和中世纪存在的商人资本异常现象应该被理解为航运是这种机器首次应用的领域。商人资本的利润应该被理解为相对剩余价值生产的一个特殊的早期和早熟的例子（见第 5.4.9 节）。

The operation of sailing ships necessarily tended to take a capitalist form. Not only were the ships expensive, necessitating partnership forms that presaged the joint stock company [Banaji, 2016], shipping was, in the precapitalist economies, the main instance of production by means of powered machines. The sailing ship used wind power to replace what would otherwise have required a large number of galley slaves. In this it shared one of the archetypal traits of capitalist industry—the replacement of human labor with powered devices. The anomaly of merchant capital existing in antiquity and the Middle Ages should be understood as arising from shipping being the first field to which such machines were applied. The profit of merchant capital should then be understood as a special early and precocious case of the production of relative surplus value (see section 5.4.9).

例如，公元一世纪，意大利的船运商利用风帆将酿酒葡萄转化为埃及玉米，在意大利销售，这样种植葡萄所需的劳动力加上运输劳动力，就少于在意大利种植相同数量玉米所需的劳动力。从亚历山大进口的玉米用于意大利奴隶的生活，玉米价格的下降会减少奴隶为维持生计而必须工作的时间，从而增加奴隶主每周的收入时间。船长和船运商随后将增加的盈余中的一部分作为货币利润。

By using sail-power shippers in, say, first-century Italy could convert grapes for wine into Egyptian corn for sale in Italy such that the labor that would go into growing the grapes, plus the labor of shipping, was less than the labor that would be required to grow the same amount of corn in Italy. To the extent that the corn imported from Alexandria entered into the subsistence of slaves exploited in Italy, the cheapening of corn would have decreased the fraction of time that slaves had to work to produce their subsistence, increasing the number of hours a week that yielded an income for the slave owners. A portion of this increased surplus was then appropriated by the sea captains and shippers as monetary profit.

3.2 繁殖方案

3.2 SCHEME OF REPRODUCTION

即使奴隶只占人口的少数，奴隶制也能主宰一个经济体。根据芬利 [1980] 的研究，奴隶占美国南部人口的三分之一左右，巴西、古罗马和古雅典的比例也差不多。22^这些都是奴隶社会，因为奴隶制是剥削的主要来源，因此也是经济剩余的主要来源，统治阶级的繁荣和政治权力依赖于此。每一个伟大的经济体系都有一种独特的经济剩余提取机制。这种机制构成了整个社会再生产体系。由此产生了独特的政治斗争和国家形式。23^从这个角度来看，奴隶制的关键特征是奴隶是被买卖的人，被迫为他人劳动。

Slavery can dominate an economy even if slaves make up only a minority of the population. According to Finley [1980] slaves made up around a third of the population in the U.S. South, and similar proportions in Brazil, ancient Rome, and ancient Athens.²² These were slave societies because slavery was the main source of exploitation and hence the main source of the economic surplus upon which the prosperity and political power of the ruling classes depended. Each great economic system is characterized by a distinct mechanism by which an economic surplus is extracted. This mechanism then structures the whole system of social reproduction. From it arise characteristic political struggles and forms of state.²³ From this standpoint, the crucial feature of slavery is that the slave is a person who is bought and sold and who is forced to perform labor for another.

这种在市场上购买的因素意味着奴隶经济与资本主义经济一样，拥有一套相对发达的市场。图 3.4概述了与奴隶生产基本单位——农业庄园相关的基本市场流动。庄园主必须花钱购买奴隶。奴隶一旦被买下，就会开始工作。他们种植的部分作物留在庄园里，以养活劳动力。这部分作物不会进入市场。庄园的剩余产品会进入市场。因此，奴隶庄园的生存能力取决于剩余产品的价值是否远远超过为生产这些产品而购买的奴隶的价值。奴隶在市场上的存在，其价值可以与他们被迫种植的作物的价值相提并论，这意味着奴隶主有时让他们累死是合理的。

This element of being bought on the market means that slave economies have, like capitalist ones, a relatively well-developed set of markets. Figure 3.4 outlines the essential market flows associated with the basic unit of slave production: the agricultural estate. The estate owner must lay out money for the purchase of slaves. Once bought the slaves are set to work. Some of the crops they raise are retained on the estate to feed the workforce. This portion of the crop does not enter the market. The surplus product of the estate does. Hence the viability of a slave estate depends on the surplus product being worth significantly more than the slaves bought to produce it. The existence of slaves on a market, whose value can be compared to the value of the crop they can be forced to grow, means that it is at times rational for the slave owner to work them to death.

虽然各国依靠本国奴隶人口的自然增长来供应奴隶劳动力，但奴隶制度的范围和它所能造成的苦难显然是有限的。在气候特征或工作性质严重损害人类生命的地方，奴隶制如果从内部招募，就只能通过关注奴隶的身体需求才能存在。没有这一点，奴隶制就会因受害者的毁灭而灭绝。但是，一旦建立了奴隶贸易，对奴隶制充分发展的限制就会被有效消除[Cairnes and Smith，2003，IV.iii]。

While countries depended for the supply of servile labor on the natural increase of their own slave population, there existed an obvious limit to the range of the system and the hardships it was capable of inflicting. Where the character of the climate, or the nature of the work to be done, was such as to be seriously prejudicial to human life, slavery, if recruited from within, could only exist through giving attention to the physical requirement of slaves. Without this slavery would become extinct by the destruction of its victims. But, once a commerce in slaves is established, restraints upon the fullest development of slavery are effectually removed [Cairnes and Smith, 2003, IV.iii].

与现代资本主义制度不同，奴隶并不构成庞大的商品市场。他们本身就是商品，而不是商品的购买^者。农业奴隶主要靠他们在庄园里种植的食物为生。他们提供的衣服可以由庄园里的其他奴隶生产。因此，尽管奴隶社会确实发展了市场，但其规模比现代经济要有限得多。奴隶的剩余产品可以出售，但不是他们生存所必需的产品，也不是奴隶庄园旁边和之间的通常非常庞大的自给性农业部门的产品。

Unlike a modern capitalist system, slaves do not constitute a large market for commodities. They themselves are commodities, and are not²⁴ buyers of commodities. The agricultural slaves subsist largely on the food they grow on the estate. Such clothes as they are provided can be produced by other slaves on the estate. So though a slave society does develop a market, its extent is much more limited than in a modern economy. The surplus product of the slaves is marketable, but not the product necessary for their subsistence, nor the product of what is often a very large subsistence agriculture sector alongside and between the slave estates.

图3.4. 奴隶庄园买卖的主要模式。

Figure 3.4. Main pattern of purchases and sales by slave estates.

农村的剩余产品（主要来自奴隶农业）必须卖到城市市场。这要求有我之前讨论过的交通工具，包括道路、马车、轮船和港口。但这也意味着城市人口必须有钱购买农作物。

The surplus product of the countryside, predominantly from slave agriculture, had to be sold to urban markets. This presupposed technical means of transport, as I have discussed, are roads, carts, ships, and harbors. But it also implied that the urban population had to have the money to buy the crops.

政治经济的基本平衡必须是：

The basic balance of the political economy has to be:

1. 大庄园的销售量 – 奴隶购买量 = 庄园主的利润

1. Sales by latifundia – purchases of slaves = Owners’ profits

2. 城市经济的粮食购买量 = 业主的利润 + 向奴隶进口商的销售量

2. Food purchases by urban economy = Owners’ profits + sales to slave importers

城市部门有钱购买大庄园的产品，因为奴隶主贵族住在城里，并在那里消费利润。他们在那里维持他们的城市家庭。这个家庭不仅由家长、他的妻子和孩子组成，还有一群家奴。这些家庭的食物和用品都是在城市市场上购买的，间接地养活了整个中产阶级的专业人士和商人，其中许多人自己拥有一两个奴隶。这整个群体直接或间接地由奴隶主的收入来维持。

The urban sector gets the money to buy the products of the latifundia because the slave-owning aristocracy live in town and spend their profits there. They maintain their familia urbana there. This is made up not only of the paterfamilias, his wife, and children, but also a retinue of domestic slaves. Food and supplies for these families are bought on the urban market and indirectly support a whole middle class of professionals and traders, many of whom would themselves own one or two slaves. This entire mass is directly or indirectly supported by the revenues of the slaveowners.

剩下的就是大庄园购买奴隶的费用。这些钱从大庄园流向奴隶商人。这些钱如何流回城镇，让他们购买食物？

There remains the cost of the slaves purchased by the latifundia. The money for these goes from the latifundia to slave merchants. How does that money circulate back to the towns to enable them to purchase food?

如果没有它，城镇就没有足够的现金来购买大庄园的全部剩余产品。虽然奴隶商人可以从城镇购买出口商品，然后在蛮族边境用这些商品交换奴隶，但这是一种对古典奴隶制的过度简化，但却是英国大都市经济与西印度群岛奴隶种植园之间关系的合理模型。因此，奴隶政治经济的闭式和平衡方程是：

Without it, the towns would not have sufficient cash to buy the entire surplus product of the latifundia. Although one possibility would be for the slave merchants to purchase export goods from the towns which they then exchange for slaves on the barbarian frontier. This is an oversimplification for classical slavery but a fair model of the relation between the metropolitan British economy and its slave plantations in the West Indies. So the closing and balancing equation of the slave political economy is:

奴隶销售量 = 奴隶商人购买量

Sales of slaves = Purchases by slave merchants

3.3 矛盾与发展

3.3 CONTRADICTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

实际上，迄今为止概述的再生产方案过于简单化。自由农民会向城镇出售一些产品，并向这些农民出口一些制成品。但我们可以认为这种交换与奴隶经济产生的货币流通无关。消除奴隶部门，城乡之间的商品交换量就会低得多。相反，如果市场萎缩，大规模奴隶农业的可行性也会随之下降。事实上，随着西方古典奴隶经济在 6 世纪的崩溃，商品流通水平大幅下降，货币经济萎缩。

In reality the reproduction scheme outlined so far is a considerable oversimplification. There would be some sales to the towns by free peasant farmers, and some exports of manufactures to these peasants. But we can think of this exchange as being independent of the monetary circuit generated by the slave economy. Remove the slave sector, and the volume of commodity exchange between town and country would be much lower. Conversely, should the market shrink, so would the viability of large-scale slave agriculture. Indeed, with the collapse of the classical slave economy in the West by the sixth century there was a huge relapse in the level of commodity circulation and shrinkage of the monetary economy.

图 3.5 奴隶经济中农业子系统之间的转换。

Figure 3.5 Transitions between agriculture subsystems in a slave economy.

图 3.6. 奴隶社会的阶级对立。绘图：Karen Renaud。

Figure 3.6. Class antagonisms in slave society. Drawing: Karen Renaud.

罗斯托夫采夫 [1927] 将此归因于古典文明的逐渐传播破坏了其自身存在所必需的市场条件。

Rostovtzeff [1927] attributed this to the progressive spread of classical civilization undermining the market conditions necessary for its own existence.

希腊和意大利为全世界供应葡萄酒和石油的时代已经过去了。在罗马帝国统治下，几乎所有省份都种植了足够的这两种商品来满足自己的需求，甚至将多余的出口出去。这对希腊和意大利的农业繁荣造成了严重打击。由于进口的粮食没有出口，他们被迫恢复到更原始的农业形式，再次种植玉米以满足自己的需求 [Rostovtzeff，1927，258]

The time was past when Greece and then Italy supplied the whole world with wine and oil. Under the Roman Empire nearly all the provinces grew enough of both commodities to satisfy their own requirements and even export the excess. This was a serious blow to the agricultural prosperity of Greece and Italy. Having nothing to export in return for the imported grain they were forced to revert to a more primitive form of agriculture and once more to grow corn for their own needs [Rostovtzeff, 1927, 258]

此外，在不同时期，从一个地区向另一个地区出口特殊制造品：布料、陶器、金属和玻璃器皿等。其中大部分也是由奴隶制造的。根据罗斯托夫采夫的说法，大规模生产陶器的技术从希腊传播到意大利，再传播到南高卢和北高卢，抑制了意大利原有的工业繁荣。

In addition there was, at various times, exports of specialized manufactures: cloth, pottery, metal, and glasswares, etc., from one area to another. Much of this too was made by slaves. According to Rostovtzeff the spread of the technology of mass production of pottery from Greece to Italy, to Southern and then Northern Gaul, had the effect of suppressing the original industrial prosperity of Italy.

与此同时，土地上出现了越来越多雇佣雇佣劳动和分成制的现象。这是对越来越难获得奴隶的理性反应。芬利 [1980]、哈珀 [2011] 和罗斯托夫采夫都认为，庄园主在雇佣奴隶和其他形式的剥削（雇佣劳动、分成制、佃农）之间做出的选择是理性的，取决于这些类型的工人的相对可用性（图 3.5）。从共和国时期开始，自由自耕农就受到奴隶主的竞争压力。庄园里的奴隶不断受到威胁，他们要么被迫成为债务奴隶，要么沦为佃户或城市无产阶级。

At the same time a shift to an increasing employment of wage labor and sharecropping took place on the land. This was a rational response to the increasing difficulty in obtaining slaves. Finley [1980], Harper [2011], and Rostovtzeff all argue that the choice by the estate owners between employing slaves and other forms of exploitation—wage labor, sharecropping, tenant farming—was rational and dependent on the relative availability of these types of workers (Figure 3.5). The free yeomanry, from the period of the Republic on, were subjected to the pressure of competition from the slave estates and were constantly threatened with being forced into debt slavery themselves or into the statuses of tenants or urban proletarians.

奴隶经济是不稳定的，除非它有一个利用大量自由人口作为对奴隶制衡的政治上层建筑^。25

A slave economy is unstable unless it has a political superstructure that uses a substantial free population as a counterpoise to the slaves.²⁵

奴隶生活在一个把他视为奴隶的社会中；没有自由人社会，奴隶制就不可能存在。因此，专制君主无论权力有多大，都不是奴隶的主人。奴隶主有社会的支持。[Nieboer，1971，32]

The slave lives in a society that regards him as a slave; slavery cannot exist where there is not a society of freemen. Therefore the despot, however great his power, is not, as such, a master of slaves. The slave owner has the community on his side. [Nieboer, 1971, 32]

我们从美国的经验知道，在传统的奴隶制地区，武装的自由公民形成了反对奴隶的坚实阵地，他们的民兵随时可以镇压奴隶叛乱。26^同样的原则也适用于古代的奴隶共和国，它们也建立在武装的自由公民的基础上。但是，虽然奴隶和自由人之间的区别以及后者的傲慢阻碍了自由农民和奴隶之间的团结，但这不足以抑制自由人内部的阶级冲突。正如 Parenti [2004] 和 Rostovtzeff [1927] 所描述的，由此产生的以自由农民和无产阶级为一方与奴隶主贵族为一方的阶级冲突主导了罗马共和国晚期。雅典的类似冲突导致了一场革命（公元前 508 年），开启了雅典民主制度（图 3.7）。当时的人认为这是穷人的统治，而不是“富人”的统治，我们可以将其解释为农民和工匠的自由民，而不是富裕的奴隶主的政治统治。27^在罗马宪法中，政治权力相当牢固地掌握在奴隶主贵族手中，这一因素无疑鼓励了美国奴隶主贵族将其作为榜样。

We know from the United States that in the traditional slaveholding territories the armed free citizenry formed a solid block against the slaves, with their militias being readily available to suppress slave rebellions.²⁶ The same principle held in the ancient slave republics, which also rested on an armed free citizenry. But while the distinction between slaves and freemen and the pride of the latter prevented any solidarity between free peasant and slave, it was not enough to suppress class conflict within the free. As described by Parenti [2004] and Rostovtzeff [1927], the resulting class conflicts between the free peasants and proletarians on the one hand and the slave-owning aristocracy dominated the late Roman Republic. Similar conflict in Athens had led to a revolution (508 BC) which inaugurated the Athenian democracy (figure 3.7). This was recognized by contemporaries to be the rule of the poor as opposed to the “rich,” which we can interpret to mean the political dominance among the free of the peasants and artisans as opposed to wealthier slave owners.²⁷ In the Roman constitution political power was pretty securely in the hands of the slave-owning aristocracy, a factor that doubtless encouraged the American slaveholding aristocracy to adopt it as a model.

农业和制造业中都存在着大量的奴隶部门，这使得罗马无产阶级无法联合起来争取更好的条件。奴隶制降低了所有劳动者的条件。罗马帝国晚期（公元 300 年）自由劳动者的实际工资约为资本主义早期伦敦或阿姆斯特丹的三分之一。他们的工资甚至低于 17 世纪印度的工资，尽管他们的工资可能与 19 世纪印度的工资相当 [Allen, 2009]，当时印度本土的手工业被英国的工业竞争摧毁了。奴隶社会的巨大物质财富，从其纪念碑和考古遗迹中可以看出，很少一部分流向了底层的工人。与奴隶的竞争意味着自由人的工资不可能比奴隶本身的工资高出太多。无论何时何地，只要存在奴隶制，情况都是如此，而英国工人表现出的团结正是对这一点的认识美国内战中，奴隶制运动转向联邦事业。奴隶制度导致工资下降，这意味着无论是在城镇还是在乡村，只能有一个有限的市场来供应工薪阶层。

The existence of a large slave sector in both agriculture and manufacturing made it impossible for the Roman proletariat to combine in unions to achieve better conditions. Slavery degraded the condition of all labor. Real wages for free laborers in the late Roman Empire (300 AD) were about a third of those in London or Amsterdam during the early period of capitalism. They were even below wages in India during the seventeenth century, though they probably compared well with wages in India during the nineteenth century [Allen, 2009] after the native Indian handicraft industry had been ruined by British industrial competition. Very little of the great material wealth of the slave society, evident in its monuments and archaeological remains, filtered down to those working at the base. Competition with slaves means that wages of the free cannot rise much above the level of the slaves themselves. This is true wherever and whenever slavery exists and recognition of this was behind the solidarity shown by the British workers movement to the Union cause in the U.S. Civil War. The depression of wages produced by the institution of slavery meant that there could be only a restricted market supplying wage earners either in the town or the country.

图 3.7。雅典宪法体现了自由农民和工匠政治影响力的最极端形式。绘图：Karen Renaud。

Figure 3.7. The Athenian constitution represented the most extreme form of the political influence of the free peasants and artisans. Drawing: Karen Renaud.

3.4 人类生殖

3.4 HUMAN REPRODUCTION

与继承而来的封建经济不同，古代的奴隶生产方式不具备自然的、内在的自我再生产机制，因为其劳动力无法在系统内达到稳态稳定 [Anderson，1996，76]。

Unlike the feudal economy that succeeded it, the slave mode of production of antiquity possessed no natural, internal mechanism of self-reproduction, because its labor force could never be homeostatically stabilized within the system [Anderson, 1996, 76].

奴隶制度的存续依赖于源源不断的新俘虏。在韦伯 [2013] 看来，奴隶经济造成了奴隶的永久短缺，只能从外部来源弥补。最初，在共和国和帝国首先在意大利、北非、希腊、小亚细亚和欧洲大部分地区扩张的几个世纪里，奴隶的来源是战俘。这一过程为大庄园提供了奴隶，同时，通过战争税，自由农民陷入贫困，使奴隶制成为主导的经济形式。

The preservation of the slave system depended on a steady stream of new chained captives. In the view of Weber [2013], slave economy creates a permanent deficit of slaves that can only be made up from outside sources. Initially, during the centuries in which first the Republic and then the Empire spread over Italy, North Africa, Greece, and then Asia Minor and much of Europe, this source of slaves were as war captives. This process supplied slaves to man the latifundia and at the same time, by war taxes, impoverished the free peasantry, enabling slavery to become the dominating economic form.

作为俘虏，奴隶因过度劳累而死亡率很高，而且几乎没有机会组建家庭。韦伯认为，罗马奴隶往往按性别分开，男性被关在农场的营房里，女性则被当作家仆。再加上因过度劳累和虐待而导致的高死亡率，这意味着将存在永久的短缺，这反过来又促使统治阶级发动了长达数个世纪的战争和征服。据说凯撒卖掉了他征服的数十万俘虏[Finley，1980，71]。随着征服的结束，达契亚（现代罗马尼亚）是公元二世纪最后一次大规模征服，奴隶供应枯竭。结果，统治阶级阶级认为，转向以地主为基础的剥削制度是经济的——要么是分成制，要么是原始封建制度，即所谓的殖民制。佃农仍然与他们的赞助人有联系，他们的家人可以作为一代又一代劳动力的来源。

As captives, slaves suffered high levels of mortality through overwork and had few opportunities to form families. Weber argued that the Roman slaves tended to be sexually segregated with men kept in barracks on farms, and women kept as domestic servants. Coupled with a high rate of mortality through overwork and ill treatment this meant that there would be a perpetual deficit, which in turn motivated the ruling class in its centuries-long spree of war and conquest. Caesar was reputed to have sold off literally hundreds of thousands of captives from his conquests [Finley, 1980, 71]. With the end of conquests, Dacia (modern Romania) in the second century being the last sizeable one, the supply dried up. In consequence the ruling class found it economic to shift to a system of landlord-based exploitation—either sharecropping or a form of proto-feudalism called the colonate. Tenants were still tied to their patron, and their families could be relied on as a source of labor from generation to generation.

表 3.1：美国内战前奴隶的超额死亡率（每 1,000 人的数据）

TABLE 3.1: Excess Mortality among Slaves in Ante-Bellum U.S. (figures per 1,000)

年龄

Age

奴隶

Slaves

整个美国

Entire United States

350

179

1–4

201

5–9

二十八

10–14

三十七

15–19

三十五

二十八

20–24

三十九

来源：Steckel，1986年。

Source: Steckel, 1986.

奴隶制与统治阶级的父权制家庭结构有关。自由妇女的性行为受到严格控制。根据罗马法律，任何与自由妇女婚外性行为都是犯罪行为：已婚妇女为通奸罪；未婚妇女为强奸罪。由于罗马国家没有常备警察，因此只有当妇女的家人或丈夫提出刑事指控时，才会起诉此类罪行。妇女的性能力被视为其家人或丈夫的财产，因此，他们必须寻求补救。

Slavery was associated with a patriarchal family structure in the ruling class. Strict control was exercised over the sexual activity of free women. In Roman law any sex with a free woman outside of marriage was a criminal offense: criminal adultery in the case of a married woman; stuporum, or violation, in the case of an unmarried one. Because the Roman state had no standing police, such crimes would only be prosecuted if the family or husband of the woman brought criminal charges. The sexual powers of a woman were regarded as the property of her family or husband, who were, consequently, the ones who had to seek redress.

虽然形式上是一夫一妻制，但对于拥有奴隶的男性来说，却是一夫多妻制。只有男性自由出生的妻子所生的孩子才可以算作家庭继承人，但除此之外，还有社会认可的婚外性行为：

Although formally the system was one of monogamy, for the slave-owning men it was one of polygyny. Only children of a man’s free-born wife could count as family heirs, but over and above that there were socially sanctioned forms of extramarital sex:

1. 纳妾关系是公开承认的，对象是社会地位较低的女性，要么是奴隶，要么最多是被释放的奴隶。这些非婚姻关系的目的是为了不生育后代而发生性关系。

1. Concubinage relationships were openly acknowledged with women of inferior social class, either slaves or at best freed slaves. The aim of these non-marital relationships was sex without offspring.

2. 卖淫作为一种制度，是随着奴隶制度而产生的。卖淫制度存在的必要条件是：

2. Prostitution as an institution arose with the slave system. The necessary conditions for its existence were, and remain:

a. 男权社会中男性对女性的统治。

a. Patriarchal dominance of men over women.

b. 贩卖被奴役或贫困的妇女来填补妓院的空缺。Heuman 和 Burnard [2010] 报告称，即使在今天，南亚每年被贩卖的妇女数量也高达 30 万。

b. A trade in enslaved or impoverished women to fill the brothels. Heuman and Burnard [2010] report that, even today, the flow of sexually trafficked women in South Asia is on the order of 300,000 a year.

c. 相对富裕的一群人。

c. A class of relatively wealthy men.

d. 货币经济体系发达，使性成为一门有偿的交易。

d. A well-developed system of monetary economy, in order that sex could be converted into a paying business.

3. 对家奴的性剥削。

3. Sexual exploitation of domestic slaves.

在所有雇佣仆人的阶级社会中，有^{28 名}家政服务人员倒下成为主人欲望的牺牲品。虽然这一点遭到了女主人的谴责，但仆人们在主人面前却无能为力，如果被发现屈服，还可能遭到女主人的鞭打。另一方面，主人不仅获得了性满足，还获得了可供出售的奴隶儿童。

In all class societies employing servants,²⁸ domestic servants have fallen victims to the lusts of their masters. While this was deplored by the mater familia the servants were at once powerless in the face of their masters and liable to whipping by their mistresses if their having yielded was discovered. The dominus on the other hand obtained not only sexual gratification but saleable slave children.

妓女主要是奴隶，奴隶主阶级对剥削她们并不感到特别羞耻。基督教道德家萨尔维安在他的格言“通奸，妓院”中总结了罗马性政策的虚伪双重标准。

The prostitutes were, in the main, slaves, and the slave-owning class felt no particular shame in exploiting them. The hypocritical double standards of Roman sexual policy were summarized by the Christian moralist Salvian in his aphorism adulteria vetantes, lupanaria aedificantes, “prohibition of adultery, building of brothels.”

值得注意的是，性剥削和经济剥削是截然不同的。经济剥削涉及剥削阶级对劳动阶级物质产品的占有。性剥削是指任何通过虐待他人性行为来获得性满足或后代的行为 [Defeis, 2000]。这在后奴隶社会中仍然是一个问题^。29

It is worth noting here that sexual and economic exploitation are distinct. Economic exploitation involves the appropriation of the physical product of a laboring class by an exploiting class. Sexual exploitation is any practice in which persons achieve sexual gratification or offspring through the abuse of another person’s sexuality [Defeis, 2000]. This remains an issue in post-slave societies.²⁹

韦伯的分析最近受到了哈珀（Harper）[2011]的批评，他说韦伯低估了奴隶自然繁殖的重要性。即使将女性奴隶和男性奴隶分开，奴隶女性也是主人性剥削的对象，而由此产生的任何孩子都可以在奴隶市场上以高价出售。哈珀认为，将美国奴隶死亡率普遍较高这一现象推广到更早的奴隶经济是不安全的。早期奴隶制的死亡率可能略低一些，尽管缺乏可靠的数据，对如此久远的死亡率估计不可避免地存在不确定性。然而，我们确实知道，奴隶制在奴隶贸易终止后在美国还存活了一段时间，在征服停止后的罗马帝国，奴隶制肯定还存活了下来，尽管规模不一定相同。这表明，在两个奴隶制度的后期，相当一部分劳动力可能生来就是奴隶。

Weber’s analysis has been criticized more recently by Harper [2011], who says that Weber underestimates the significance of natural reproduction among the slaves. Even if female and male slaves were kept apart, slave women were objects of sexual exploitation by their masters, and any resulting children could be sold off at a profit at the slave market. Harper argues that it is unsafe to generalize from the generally high slave mortality of the United States to older slave economies. Mortality in early slavery may have been somewhat lower, though in the absence of reliable data there is an inevitable uncertainty about estimates of mortality so long ago. We do, however, know that slavery survived in the United States for some time after the termination of the slave trade, and it certainly survived, though not necessarily on the same scale, in the Roman Empire after conquests ceased. This indicates that a substantial proportion of the labor force in the latter period of both slave systems may have been born slaves.

另一方面，哈珀本人记录了远距离奴隶贸易的规模，从撒哈拉以南非洲、哥特边境和高加索地区进口奴隶。如此大规模的进口表明，自然繁殖不足以维持奴隶经济，它在很大程度上仍然寄生于周围部落和氏族社会的人口过剩。因此，韦伯可能是对的，随着奴隶的外部供应放缓，无论是由于征服还是贸易，奴隶的价格都会上涨，并促使奴隶转向殖民地。这反过来会将基本的剥削关系从以商品生产为前提的关系转变为以商品生产为辅助的关系。生产关系的这种变化将进而产生与西方帝国崩溃同时出现的市场普遍崩溃的效应。

On the other hand Harper himself documents the extent of the longdistance slave trade, importing slaves from sub-Saharan Africa, from the Gothic frontier, and as far away as the Caucasus. Such large-scale imports indicate that natural reproduction was insufficient to maintain the slave economy, and that it remained to a significant extent parasitic on the population surplus of the surrounding tribal and clan societies. It is therefore possible that Weber was right, that as the external supply of slaves slackened, whether from conquest or trade, their price rose and motivated a shift to the colonate. This in turn would have changed the basic relation of exploitation from one that presupposed commodity production to one in which commodity production was ancillary. This change in production relations would then produce as an effect the general collapse of markets observed alongside the collapse of the Western Empire.

韦伯的解释认为，奴隶制将沦为地主统治佃农和受奴役农民的制度，这也符合美国和巴西在奴隶制结束后的情况。如果奴隶剥削的可能性被切断，但土地仍归旧奴隶主所有，这可能是不可避免的后果。

The Weber account, in which slavery collapses into a system of landlord dominance over sharecroppers and tied peasants, also fits in with what happened in the United States and Brazil after slavery. If the possibility of slave exploitation is shut off, but land is still held by the old slave owners, this is probably the inevitable consequence.

那么，为什么跨境进口奴隶的行为没有一直持续下去呢？

Why, then, did importing slaves over the frontiers not continue indefinitely?

武器技术的发展是一个可能的答案。铁的普及促进了铁甲骑兵或装甲骑士的发展。随着马镫的发明（公元 5 世纪），装甲骑兵可以使用长矛而不会因撞击而从马上摔下来。这些技术变革导致军事力量平衡从步兵转向骑兵的冲击力 [Wintringham and Blashford-Snell，1943；Ferrill，1986；White，1964]。奴隶国家依靠其专业步兵的卓越战斗能力来保持对周围野蛮社会的战略优势。无论这种军事技术是否是帝国崩溃的一个因素，它确实解释了为什么在封建制度建立之后，公民步兵直到中世纪晚期才能够挑战骑马贵族的统治地位。重骑兵的衰落，以及军事贵族的衰落，必须等待火枪的出现。

Technological development of weapons is one possible answer. The greater availability of iron enabled the development of the cataphract, or armored knight. With the invention of the stirrup (fifth century) an armored horseman could use a lance without being thrown from his horse by impact. These technical changes produced a decisive shift in the balance of military power from infantry to the shock power of cavalry [Wintringham and Blashford-Snell, 1943; Ferrill, 1986; White, 1964]. The slave state had relied on the superior fighting ability of its professional infantry to maintain strategic dominance over the barbarian societies around it. Whether this military technology was a factor in the collapse of empire, it does explain why, feudalism having been established, citizen infantry were unable to challenge the dominance of the horse-riding aristocracy until the late Middle Ages. The undermining of heavy cavalry, and thus the military aristocracy, had to await musketry.

野蛮社会向阶级社会的渐进式社会转型 [Heather, 2009] 也消除了罗马国家相对于其邻国的组织优势，并可能削弱了其在奴隶袭击中剥削邻国的能力。

The progressive social transformation of barbarian society into class society [Heather, 2009] also removed the organizational superiority that the Roman state had over its neighbors and may have undermined its ability to exploit them in slave raids.

然而，罗马奴隶制国家衰落的确切历史偶然性并不是奴隶制经济整体动态理论的核心，因为那只是一个奴隶社会。奴隶制一直存在，即使只是中世纪剥削制度的一个次要组成部分。1066 年，大约有 10% 的英国人口是奴隶，在罗马之后的拜占庭、阿拉伯和奥斯曼帝国，奴隶制也继续存在 [Heuman and Burnard，2010]。奴隶从未停止在撒哈拉以南非洲被捕获并穿过沙漠贩卖到北方。奴隶生产方式在博尔努和索科托等萨赫勒帝国牢固确立。Heuman 和 Burnard 报告说，到 19 世纪中叶，索科托的奴隶数量与美国一样多。从 1500 年代起，奴隶贸易从原来的北部和东部转向南部，到贝宁湾和跨大西洋贸易。1500 年至 1900 年间，约有 1200 万奴隶从非洲海岸运往巴西、加勒比海和北美的种植园。在同一时期，约有 500 万非洲奴隶被卖到伊斯兰世界。这一时期在印度洋地区贩卖的奴隶总数要大得多，但大多数是从其他地区贩卖的：印度境内、中亚和中国（同上，第 3 章）。

The precise historical contingencies by which the Roman slave state fell are not, however, central to a theory of the overall dynamics of the slave form of economy, since that is just one slave society. Slavery continued to exist, even if as a minor component of the system of exploitation well into the Middle Ages. Perhaps 10 percent of the English population were slaves in 1066, and in the Byzantine, Arab, and Ottoman empires that succeeded Rome slavery also continued [Heuman and Burnard, 2010]. Slaves never stopped being captured in sub-Saharan Africa and traded across the desert to the North. The slave mode of production became firmly established in the Sahel empires like Bornu and Sokoto. Heuman and Burnard report that by the mid-nineteenth century there were as many slaves in Sokoto as in the United States. From the 1500s on the slave trade, which had previously been directed North and East, was diverted to the South, to the Bight of Benin and the transatlantic trade. Between 1500 and 1900, about 12 million slaves were shipped from the coasts of Africa to the plantations of Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Over the same period about 5 million African slaves were sold to the Islamic world. The total number of slaves traded in the Indian Ocean area over this period was much larger, but most were traded from other areas: within India, from Central Asia and China (ibid., chap. 3).

两千年的奴隶贸易对非洲造成了长期的人口流失，减缓了社会和经济发展。这是奴隶制度的根本寄生现象。奴隶劳动有利可图，因为奴隶的繁殖成本由他们被带出的社会承担。总的来说，他们将人类繁殖的工作从一个地区转移到另一个地区。通过将奴隶劳动力的价格降低到允许其繁殖的水平以下，它鼓励了可怜的俘虏最肆无忌惮地过度劳作。

The effect of two thousand years of slave trade on Africa was a chronic demographic drain, slowing down social and economic development. This is the essential parasitism of the slave system. Slave labor is profitable because the reproduction costs of the slaves are met by the societies from which they are taken. Overall they transfer the work of human reproduction from one territory to another. And by reducing the price of slave labor below the level that would allow their reproduction, it encourages the most reckless overworking of the wretched captives.

关于奴隶经济，需要注意的重要事项如下：

The important things to take away about the slave economy are:

• 这是一种商品交换发达的生产体系。这是它与资本主义的共同点。

• It is a system of production that generates a well-developed commodity exchange. This is something it has in common with capitalism.

• 它相对于其他形式的剥削的优势在于它能够利用外部奴隶劳动力。这种对外部劳动力供应的依赖是资本主义经济中我们会遇到的情况。

• Its dominance over other forms of exploitation rests on an ability to draw on external sources of slave labor. This dependence on external supplies of labor is something we will meet in capitalist economy.

3.5 商品和价格

3.5 COMMODITIES AND PRICES

在前面关于奴隶制的讨论中，我说过奴隶经济的一个显著特征是它们拥有发达的市场。但到目前为止，我以一种非正式的、常识性的方式处理了市场和商品的概念。我们需要更深入地探讨这个问题，并提出一种商品理论。在这本书中，我将使用商品流通和价格的古典理论。

In the preceding discussion of slavery I said that one of the distinguishing features of slave economies is that they have well-developed markets. But so far I have treated the idea of markets and commodities in an informal, commonsense fashion. We need to go into the issue more deeply and present a theory of commodities. In this book I will use the classical theory of commodity circulation and price.

我所说的古典理论是指劳动是价值的源泉的理论。从伊本·卡尔敦³⁰到配第³¹和亚当·斯密，再到卡尔·马克思，这一理论被普遍接受^。32 , ³³

By the classical theory, I mean the theory that labor is the source of value. This was generally accepted from the time of Ibn Kaldun³⁰ through Petty³¹ and Adam Smith down to that of Karl Marx.³², ³³

3.5.1 新古典价格

3.5.1 Neoclassical Prices

如果你在学校或大学上过经济学课程，你学到的理论不太可能是古典理论。相反，你学到的是 19 世纪末由杰文斯或马歇尔等作家发展起来的新古典理论。可以说，新古典理论之所以如此受欢迎，是因为古典理论当时已经被社会主义作家采用，在上流社会中形象不佳。新古典主义理论似乎要复杂得多。它更数学化，具有科学感。34^它对年轻学生的可信度因使用图表而增强。对于那些没有上过经济学课程的人来说，图 3.8就是数百万学生所学的价格理论。

If you had an economics course at school or college, classical theory is unlikely to be the theory you were taught. Instead you would have been taught the neoclassical theory that was developed in the late nineteenth century by writers like Jevons or Marshall. It is arguable that neoclassical theory gained its popularity because the classical theory, having by then been adopted by socialist writers, had a rather disreputable image in polite society. The neoclassical theory appeared considerably more sophisticated. It was more mathematical and had a scientific feel.³⁴ Its plausibility for young students is enhanced by a beguiling use of diagrams. For those of you who did not take an economics course, figure 3.8 is what millions of students have been given as the theory of price.

有两条线，有时画得略微弯曲：一条称为供给函数，另一条称为需求函数。需求函数基于一个常识性的概念，即如果某样东西便宜，人们就会购买更多，因此它呈下降趋势。教师们很容易向课堂传达这一思想。

There are two lines, sometimes drawn slightly curved: one is called the supply function, the other the demand function. The demand function rests on the commonsense notion that if something is cheap, people will buy more of it, so it slopes down. Teachers have little difficulty getting this idea accross to their class.

另一条线，即供给函数，则向另一方向倾斜。它旨在表明，随着供应量的增加，每件商品的成本也会上升。教师在这方面会遇到更多困难，因为常识和经验会告诉学生情况恰恰相反：随着工业增加产量，他们发现他们可以更高效地生产，并以更低的成本供应产出。这样的反对意见不仅会招来一些人的反对，还会招来一些人的借口^。35

The other line, the supply function, is shown sloping the other way. What it purports to show is that as more is supplied, the cost of each item goes up. Teachers have more difficulty with this, as common knowledge and experience will have taught students that the reverse is the case: as industries ramp up production they find they can produce more efficiently and supply the output at a lower cost. Such objections provoke some hand waving at the blackboard as well as excuses.³⁵

经典图表的优点在于它既令人难忘又直观易懂。如果你能以这种方式呈现数学，你就能利用视觉皮层的处理能力来理解它。这就是为什么维恩图比公理集合论更容易让学生掌握的原因[Lakoff and Nunez，2001]。我们的大脑告诉我们，如果它看起来正确，那么它不仅是正确的，而且是真实的。因此，看过这些图表后，学生们会认为供需函数是真实存在的——毕竟，他们已经见过它们了。不仅如此，我们还可以看到，这些函数的交点准确地预测了商品的销售量q和价格 p。

The great thing about a classic diagram is that it is both memorable and intuitively understandable. If you can present math this way you leverage the processing ability of our visual cortex to understand it. That is why Venn diagrams are so much easier for students to grasp than axiomatic set theory [Lakoff and Nunez, 2001]. Our brains tell us that if it looks right, it not only is right, but it is real. So having seen the diagrams, students come out thinking that supply and demand functions are real things—after all, they have seen them. Not only that, one can see that the intersection of these functions exactly predicts both the quantity of the commodity sold q, and its price p.

如果该理论完全以代数形式呈现，那么它将更加令人困惑、缺乏吸引力，并且更容易受到批判性分析。我将证明，一旦将其转换为代数符号，就会发现该理论违反了科学方法的两个基本原则。它的科学感是伪造的。

Had the theory been presented entirely in algebraic form it would be more confusing, less appealing, and more subject to critical analysis. I will demonstrate that once you convert it to algebraic notation it is evident that the theory violates two cardinal principles of the scientific method. Its science feel is faked.

“奥卡姆剃刀”原则被广泛认为是中世纪僧侣威廉·奥卡姆发明的。据说，他曾说过，在“frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora” [Adams, 1987] 的解释中，“用很多东西来解释用更少的东西就能做到的事情是徒劳的。”他的名言被科学家广泛采用，他们将其解释为在构建假设时应该保持简单^。36

“Occam’s razor” is the principle widely credited to the monk William of Ockham in the Middle Ages. He is supposed to have said that in an explanation “frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora” [Adams, 1987], “it is futile to explain with many things what can be done with fewer.” His dictum has been widely adopted by scientists who interpret it to mean that when constructing a hypothesis you should keep it simple.³⁶

为什么这对于科学来说是一个很好的原则？

Why is this a good principle for science?

除了自然法则简单而优雅的哲学信仰之外，坚持奥卡姆剃刀原则还有务实的理由科学实践。主要原因是，如果你的理论足够复杂，你可以让它适合任何特定的观察集，但这是以失去预测能力的普遍性为代价的。一个著名的例子是希腊地心天文学理论通过增加本轮来解释火星的逆行视运动。37^托勒密能够得到很好的预测，这是古典经济学家明显做不到的，但他是以一个几乎没有内在逻辑的理论为代价的，我们现在知道这个理论完全是颠倒的。

Beyond philosophical beliefs that the laws of nature are simple and elegant, there are pragmatic reasons why sticking to Occam’s razor is good scientific practice. The main one is that if you make your theory complicated enough you can make it fit any particular set of observations, but this is at a cost of loss of generality of predictive ability. A famous example is the way that the Greek geocentric theory of astronomy was extended by adding epicycles to account for the retrograde apparent movement of Mars.³⁷ Ptolemy was able to get good predictions, something that classical economists signally fail to do, but he got them at the cost of a theory with little inner logic, and one that we now know was totally inside out.

图 3.8. 向数百万学生传授的价格理论。

Figure 3.8. The theory of price taught to millions of students.

新古典供需理论确实会无缘无故地增加实体。每个函数至少有两个参数指定其斜率和位置。38但实际观察到的数据只有两个参数：特定日期的价格和数量。^因此，该理论试图解释两个数字，并在此过程中引入了四个新数字——缺乏必要性的实体。

The neoclassical supply and demand theory does multiply entities without cause. Each of the functions has at least two parameters specifying its slope and position.³⁸ But the real observed data only has two parameters: a price and quantity on a particular day. So the theory attempts to explain two numbers and in the process introduces four new numbers—entities lacking necessity.

对于托勒密来说，本轮的复杂性为预测行星运动带来了精确度，从实现这种精确度所需的本轮数量来看，托勒密的理论遵循了奥卡姆剃刀原理。但经济学家们肆意散布自由变量，却带来了相反的效果。他们的价格理论是不确定的，根本没有做出可检验的预测。

For Ptolemy the epicyclic complexity brought precision in predicting planetary motion, and in the sense that there were no more epicycles than was necessary to achieve that precision, Ptolemy’s theory obeyed Occam’s razor. But the profligacy with which the economists strew free variables around, brings the opposite effect. Their price theory is underdetermined and makes no testable predictions at all.

可测试性是科学方法的另一个基石。因果理论应该可以测试，以判断其是否正确。要做到这一点，你使用的实体必须是可测量的。但是，新古典主义理论对美国经济等工业价格结构做出了哪些可测试的预测呢？

Testability is another cornerstone of the scientific method. A causal theory should be testable to see if it is true. For that to work, the entities you use have to be measurable. But what testable predictions does the neoclassical theory make about the structure of industrial prices in, for example, the U.S. economy?

它无法做出任何结论，因为各种商品的供给和需求函数不仅是偶然未知的，而且原则上也是不可知的。该理论认为，这两个函数唯一地定义了某一天的销售价格和销售数量，但是可以画出无数对线，使其交于图 3.8中的点 (q, p) 。试图研究销售价格和数量每天如何变化是没有用的，因为理论本身认为价格或数量的任何变化都必须由函数的“转移”引起。这意味着经济学老师拿着尺子走到黑板前，再画两条线，相交于新的价格和数量。老师告诉全班，这就是真实市场中发生的事情：价格会因为供给和需求函数的变动而发生变化。

It can make none, since the supply and demand functions for the various commodities are not only contingently unknown, but are in principle unknowable. The theory says that the two functions uniquely define the price and quantity that will be sold on a particular day, but there are infinitely many pairs of lines that could be drawn so as to intersect at the point (q, p) in figure 3.8. It is no good trying to look at how the prices and quantities sold vary from day to day, since the theory itself holds than any changes in price or quantity must be brought about by “shifts” in the functions. What this means is that the economics teacher goes to the board with a ruler and draws two more lines intersecting at the new price and quantity. This, the teacher tells the class, is what happens in a real market: prices change because the supply and demand functions move about.

但是，在价格-数量图上随意放置一组点，你都可以画出穿过每个点的相交线。假设这些点是连续几天的价格，那么这些价格价值测量的序列就不可能不能通过适当移动标尺并画出相交线来解释。因此，该理论是不可证伪的。它没有对价格和数量做出任何具体的操作预测。从定义上讲，它是正确的，从定义上讲，它也是空洞的。它甚至不是错误的 [Woit，2002]。

But splatter any arbitrary set of points on the price-quantity graph, and you can draw intersecting lines through each and every one of them. Let these points be prices on successive days, there could never be a sequence of these price value measurements that could not be explained by suitably shifting a ruler about and drawing pairs of intersecting lines. So the theory is unfalsifiable. It makes no specific operational predictions about prices and quantities. It is true by definition and vacuous by definition. It is not even wrong [Woit, 2002].

3.5.2 古典价格理论

3.5.2 The Classical Theory of Prices

古典价格理论简单、可测试、经过检验，并被证明是正确的。它认为商品的售价往往与制造它们所需的劳动成正比。如果东西难以制造，它们就有价值，如果东西易于制造，它们就会便宜。马克思的一句话概括了这一理论：

The classical theory of prices, was simple, testable, has been tested, and has been shown to be correct. It said that the prices at which commodities sell tend to be in proportion to the labor required to make them. Things are valuable if they are hard to make, they are cheap if they are easy to make. A pithy summary of the theory was Marx’s statement:

一种商品的价值与另一种商品的价值之比，等于一种商品中固定的劳动量与另一种商品中固定的劳动量之比。[马克思，1910年，第6节]

The value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labor fixed in the one is to the quantity of labor fixed in the other. [Marx, 1910, sec. 6]

古典经济学家用各种限定条件来对冲这一立场，但这些限定条件并不妨碍该理论产生有意义的、可测试的预测。这些限定条件大多是这样的，即这样或那样的条件会导致相对价格和相对劳动比率之间出现一定程度的随机波动。39^例如，如果一个女人是一个异常快的工人，她一小时的工作将创造比平均水平更高的价值。如果一家工厂使用一种异常高效的生产系统，使其能够使用比平时更少的劳动力，那么其工人一小时的工作将创造比平均水平更高的价值。此外，古典经济学家预计相对市场价格会略高于和低于商品所含的劳动比率波动。这些理论家在统计学作为现代统计工具发展之前就开始工作了。纪律，但把他们所说的话翻译成现代术语却很容易。

The classical economists hedged this position with various qualifications but these do not prevent the theory from giving rise to meaningful, testable predictions. The qualifications are mostly of the form that such and such will cause some degree of random fluctuation between relative prices and relative labor ratios.³⁹ For example, if one woman is an unusually fast worker an hour of her work will create more value than average. If one factory uses an unusually efficient system of production that enables it to use less labor than usual, then one hour of its workers’ time will create more value than average. In addition classical economists expected relative market prices to fluctuate slightly above and below the ratios of labor the goods contained. The theorists were working prior to the development of statistics as a modern discipline, but it is easy to translate what they were saying into modern terms.

20 世纪 80 年代的两位数学家 Farjoun 和 Machover [1983] 对经典命题进行了粗略的表述：商品对之间的价格比率是随机变量，其预期值是两种商品的劳动含量之比。

Two mathematicians in the 1980s, Farjoun and Machover [1983], formulated the classical claims roughly as follows: price ratios between pairs of commodities are random variables whose expected value is the ratio of the labor contents of the two commodities.

因此，如果我们拿两种商品：一种特定型号的 8 码男靴和一种特定型号的大众高尔夫车，并且我们知道每种商品的劳动量比率，那么我们就可以合理地预测它们的相对价格。更准确地说，价格比率将呈正态分布（图 5.21），围绕劳动含量比率，标准差相对较小。

So if we take two commodities: a particular model of size 8 men’s boots, and a particular model of a Volkswagen Golf car, and we knew the ratio of how much work went into each of them, then we would have a reasonable prediction of what their relative prices would be. More precisely, the price ratio will be normally distributed (figure 5.21) around the labor content ratio with a relatively small standard deviation.

3.5.3 该理论的证据

3.5.3 Evidence for the Theory

古典价格理论的预测在这种形式下是可以检验的，只要我们对标准差有多小做出一些规定。有人认为，至少有一位古典经济学家，李嘉图，估计相对价格差异的 93% 可以用劳动含量的差异来解释 [Petrovic，1987]。Farjoun 和 Machover 从非常普遍的统计学角度认为，价格/劳动比率的标准差约为分布平均值的 1/6。因此，如果平均货币与时间比率为每小时 18 美元，不同商品的这一比率的差异约为 3 美元。

In this form the prediction of classical price theory is eminently testable, provided that we make some stipulation about how small this standard deviation will be. It has been argued that at least one of the classical economists, Ricardo, estimated that 93 percent of the differences in relative prices would be explicable by differences in labor content [Petrovic, 1987]. Farjoun and Machover argue on very general statistical grounds that the standard deviation of the price/labor ratio would be about 1/6 of the mean of the distribution. Thus if the average ratio of money to time was $18 per hour, the spread of this ratio for different goods would be about $3.

自 20 世纪 80 年代以来，人们已经能够利用计算机计算来估计工业产出的销售价格与这些行业使用的直接和间接劳动力之间的相关程度。大量的研究⁴⁰倾向于证实这些假设。一般来说，研究发现工业产出价格与劳动含量之间的相关性大于李嘉图预期的 93%。一般来说，相关性在 95% 到 97% 之间。Cockshott 和 Cottrell [1997a] 测试了价格与价值分布的标准差，发现标准误差实际上小于 Farjoun 和 Machover [1983] 的预测，更接近 1/10 而不是 1/6。

Since the 1980s it has been possible to use computer calculations to obtain estimates of just how closely the selling prices of industrial outputs correlate with the direct and indirect labor used by these industries. There have been a large number of studies done⁴⁰ that tend to confirm these hypotheses. In general the studies find the correlation between industrial output prices and labor contents to be greater than the 93 percent anticipated by Ricardo. Generally the correlations are in the range of 95 to 97 percent. Cockshott and Cottrell [1997a] tested the standard deviation of the price to value distribution and found that the standard error was actually smaller than that predicted in Farjoun and Machover [1983], closer to 1/10 than 1/6.

古典价格理论已经过检验，被证明是正确的。新古典理论是无法检验的，下文将不再讨论。

The classical theory of price has been tested and found to be correct. The neoclassical theory is untestable, and will be ignored in what follows.

3.6 奴隶制下的劳动力和价格

3.6 LABOR AND PRICE UNDER SLAVERY

但劳动量决定价格的证据都来自现代经济。历史上第一部将劳动时间与价值联系起来的著作是在 14 世纪伊本·卡尔敦的著作中。如果他当时将价值源于劳动作为事实，我们可以放心地假设他在实践中观察到了这种关系。当然，这将是一个粗略的经验观察，而不是精确的计量经济学研究，但它确实表明这种关系在 14 世纪很明显。

But this evidence that labor content determines price all comes from the modern economy. The first historical writing linking labor time to value is in the work of Ibn Kaldun in the fourteenth century. If he at that date was stating as a fact that value originated in labor, we can safely assume that he observed this relationship in practice. Of course, it would be a rough and ready empirical observation, not a precise econometric study, but it does indicate that this relationship was apparent in the fourteenth century.

我们没有任何书面资料在古典奴隶社会时期做出类似的因果观察。十四世纪的北非确实广泛使用奴隶，但他们主要在家庭环境中和小规模农业中使用奴隶。七世纪和九世纪之间的一系列奴隶起义导致大规模种植园奴隶制减少[Heuman and Burnard，2010]。大批奴隶更有可能反抗。因此，卡尔登的观察不可能基于对完全奴隶经济中价格的观察。

We do not have any written sources making a similar causal observation from the time of classical slave society. North Africa in the fourteenth century did have a fairly extensive use of slaves, but they were predominantly in domestic contexts and in small-scale agriculture. A series of slave revolts between the seventh and ninth centuries had led to a reduction in large-scale plantation slavery [Heuman and Burnard, 2010]. Large groups of slaves were more likely to rebel. So Kaldun’s observations cannot have been based on observing prices in a full slave economy.

我们不知道这些时期的价格是否受劳动力含量的支配，但这个想法是合理的，因为奴隶种植园似乎合理地利用了他们可用的劳动力。请考虑以下卡托关于如何组织奴隶劳动的讨论。

We do not know that prices were governed by labor content in these periods, but the idea is plausible because slave plantations appear to have made rational use of the labor available to them. Consider the following discussion of how to organize slave labor by Cato.

当主人到达农场，向家神致敬后，让他检查整个农场，如果可能的话，当天就检查一遍；如果不行，至少第二天检查一遍。当他了解了农场的状况，已经完成了哪些工作，还有哪些工作要做时，让他第二天叫来监工，向他询问哪些工作已经完成，哪些工作没有完成；已经完成的工作是否及时完成，是否有可能完成剩余的工作；葡萄酒、谷物和其他产品的产量是多少。了解完这些之后，他应该计算一下工人的数量和所耗费的时间。如果工作量似乎不令人满意，监工就会声称他已经尽了最大努力，但奴隶们身体不好，天气不好，奴隶逃跑了，他有公共工作要做；当他给出这些和其他许多借口时，请监工回来评估已完成的工作和雇用的工人。如果是雨季，提醒他雨天可以做的工作：擦洗和清理酒桶、打扫农庄、搬运谷物、清理粪肥、建造粪坑、清理种子、修补旧马具和制作新马具；工人应该修补他们的工作服和风帽。还要提醒他，在节日里，可以清理旧沟渠、修路、剪除荆棘、用铲子打理花园、清理草地、捆扎柴捆、拔除荆棘、清理斯佩尔特小麦地，以及进行一般清洁完成。当奴隶生病时，不应该发放如此大量的口粮。在平静地完成这一切之后，下令完成剩下的工作；检查现金账户、谷物账户和饲料购买情况；检查酒类账户、石油账户——已售出的、已收的、应付的余额以及剩余的可销售物品；应该为账户提供担保的地方，就让其提供担保；检查手头的供应。下令补充当年可能缺少的任何东西；出售多余的东西；应该出租的任何工作。指示你想在这个地方做什么工作，以及你想出租什么，并以书面形式留下指示。检查牲畜并进行销售。如果价格令人满意，就卖掉你的油，卖掉你多余的酒和谷物。[Hooper and Ash，1935，9]

When the master arrives at the farmstead, after paying his respects to the god of the household, let him go over the whole farm, if possible, on the same day; if not, at least on the next. When he has learned the condition of the farm, what work has been accomplished and what remains to be done, let him call in his overseer the next day and inquire of him what part of the work has been completed, what has been left undone; whether what has been finished was done betimes, and whether it is possible to complete the rest; and what was the yield of wine, grain, and all other products. Having gone into this, he should make a calculation of the laborers and the time consumed. If the amount of work does not seem satisfactory, the overseer claims that he has done his best, but that the slaves have not been well, the weather has been bad, slaves have run away, he has had public work to do; when he has given these and many other excuses, call the overseer back to your estimate of the work done and the hands employed. If it has been a rainy season, remind him of the work that could have been done on rainy days: scrubbing and pitching wine vats, cleaning the farmstead, shifting grain, hauling out manure, making a manure pit, cleaning seed, mending old harness and making new; and that the hands ought to have mended their smocks and hoods. Remind him, also, that on feast days old ditches might have been cleaned, road work done, brambles cut, the garden spaded, a meadow cleared, faggots bundled, thorns rooted out, spelt ground, and general cleaning done. When the slaves were sick, such large rations should not have been issued. After this has been gone into calmly, give orders for the completion of what work remains; run over the cash accounts, grain accounts, and purchases of fodder; run over the wine accounts, the oil accounts—what has been sold, what collected, balance due, and what is left that is saleable; where security for an account should be taken, let it be taken; and let the supplies on hand be checked over. Give orders that whatever may be lacking for the current year be supplied; that what is superfluous be sold; that whatever work should be let out be let. Give directions as to what work you want done on the place, and what you want let out, and leave the directions in writing. Look over the livestock and hold a sale. Sell your oil, if the price is satisfactory, and sell the surplus of your wine and grain. [Hooper and Ash, 1935, 9]

请注意，需要计算生产特定产量的葡萄酒、谷物等所花费的劳动时间。假设有“现金账户、谷物账户、葡萄酒账户、石油账户”，这些都是合理计算每个农业生产部门投入的劳动及其产量所需的一切。指令最终会以价格令人满意时出售的指令结束。我们在这里拥有了在奴隶经济中劳动时间调节价格所需的一切。

Note the reference to the need to calculate the amount of labor time expended to produce particular yields of wine, grain etc. It is assumed that there are “cash accounts, grain accounts, wine accounts, oil accounts,” everything that is required for a rational computation of the labor devoted to each branch of agricultural production and the yields it produces. The instructions end up with the instruction to sell if the price is satisfactory. We have here all that is necessary for labor time to regulate prices in a slave economy.

庄园主知道每件产品的劳动力成本，知道现行的市场价格，只有价格“令人满意”时，庄园主才会出售产品。但这意味着什么呢？令人满意的标准是由“计算劳动者和所耗时间”以及石油、谷物和葡萄酒的账目提供的。他知道不同产品的奴隶劳动相对成本，因此可以判断相对价格何时足够令人满意，可以出售。如果价格低于令人满意的水平，庄园主将停止出售该产品，直到价格上涨。

The dominus knows what each product has cost in terms of labor, knows the prevailing market price and will only sell if the price is “satisfactory.” But what can this mean? The standard of what is satisfactory is provided by the “calculation of the laborers and the time consumed” along with the oil, grain, and wine accounts. He knows the relative costs in terms of slave labor of the different products, and can thus judge when the relative prices are satisfactory enough to justify selling. If the price falls below a satisfactory level, the estates will withdraw from selling that product until the price rises.

我们没有必要像斯密那样，把劳动力对价格的调节追溯到想象中的过去，那时个体化的猎人用海狸换鹿。那是一个只能想象的过去，因为在狩猎采集社会中，常规贸易所需的个体化并不存在。斯密想象在私有财产和一般商品交换出现之前，有专门的鹿和海狸猎人，以便对他观察到的 18 世纪大西洋经济中奴隶制和资本主义制度相结合的现象给出一个神话般的解释。但是，如果我们阅读古典农业作家的作品，我们就能更好地理解这个过程。大庄园生产多种商品，它们的相对劳动力成本为业主所知，这为劳动力调节价格提供了依据。

It is not necessary to do what Smith did, and project back the regulation of price by labor to an imagined past when individualized hunters exchanged beavers for deer. A past that could only be imagined, since the individualization required for regular trade does not exist in hunter-gatherer society. Smith imagines specialized deer and beaver hunters prior to the private property and general commodity exchange in order to give a mythical account for something that he observed to be actually occurring in the combined slavery and capitalist systems of the eighteenth-century Atlantic economy. But if we read the classical writers on agriculture we can grasp the process better. The latifundia produced multiple commodities, their relative labor costs were known to the owners and this provided the basis for labor to regulate price.

奴隶主阶级不仅拥有农场，还经营其他形式的业务。如果奴隶劳动在其他行业中能带来更高的现金回报，他们要么在自己的庄园里开展农业生产，要么投资城市奴隶工场。我们不知道罗马的价格是否真的由劳动力控制，但这是一个合理的假设。这也是可以检验的。

The slave-owning class did not only own farms, they also ran other forms of business. If slave labor yielded a higher return in cash terms in some other branch of activity, they would either set up rural production on their estates, or invest in urban slave workshops. We do not know that prices were actually regulated by labor in Rome, but it is a reasonable hypothesis. It is also one that could be tested.

原则上，可以进行研究，看看奴隶经济中的价格是否遵循劳动价值规律。例如，公元 301 年戴克里先法令 [Bolin, 1958] 中给出的相对价格可以与当时技术条件下制造物品所需时间的估计值进行比较。对于农产品，生产技术直到近代历史仍然相似，因此可以利用最近时期的劳动力使用数据。对于美洲的奴隶经济，当然有更广泛的数据可用。这将使类似的调查变得容易得多。

In principle, research could be done to see if prices in slave economies followed a law of labor value. The relative prices given for example in the edict of Diocletian [Bolin, 1958] in 301 A.D. could be compared with estimates of the time taken to make things under the technical conditions of that era. For agricultural products, techniques of production remained similar until recent history, so data on labor use from more recent periods could be exploited. For the slave economies of the Americas there is of course much more extensive data available. This would make a similar investigation much easier.

3.7 资金

3.7 MONEY

货币以铸币的形式出现于有市场的社会，事实上，可以说这是迫使此类市场存在的一个主要因素。发达的奴隶经济以货币和货币交换为前提。在本节中，我将研究在奴隶制下首次出现的货币的一般属性。这些属性一直延续到现在。

Money in the form of coinage arises in societies with markets, and indeed it is arguable that it is a major factor forcing such markets into existence. Developed slave economy presupposes money and monetary exchanges. In this section I will look at the general properties of money that first arose under slavery. These are properties that persist right down to the present.

用金钱购买可以建立一套一致的市场价值。假设，如戴克里先的价格法令中所述，一个鸡蛋售价 1 迪纳里，一量酒售价 8 迪纳里，一量橄榄油售价 40 迪纳里。我们可以将其列为表 A（第 73 页）。

Purchases with money allow the establishment of a set of consistent market values. Suppose, as in Diocletian’s price edict, an egg sold for 1 denarius, and a measure of wine for 8 denarii, and a measure of olive oil for 40. We can set this out as a table A (page 73).

那么我们不难看出，1量杯的酒的价值相当于8个鸡蛋。

Then we can easily see that a measure of wine has the value of 8 eggs.

这对于两种商品和货币来说显而易见，但如果你考虑一个没有货币的假设易货经济，那么整个业务就会复杂得多。现在你有一个成对交换比率矩阵，如表 B（第 73 页）。

This is obvious with two commodities and with money, but if you consider a hypothetical barter economy without money then the whole business is much more complicated. You now have a matrix of pairwise swap ratios as in table B (page 73).

例如，可以理解为，1 份橄榄油可以兑换 40 个鸡蛋或 5 份葡萄酒。

Read this as saying, for example, that a measure of olive oil will swap for 40 eggs or for 5 measures of wine.

但请考虑一下，如果没有货币价格，这三种商品可能会产生多么复杂的情况。我们不会有 3 种价格，而是有 9 种汇率。如果我们有 4 种商品，我们将有一个 4×4 的表格，其中包含 16 种比率。一般来说，汇率表的大小会随着交换商品数量的平方而增长。戴克里先设定了其中大约 1,000 种商品的价格。如果他不指定货币价格，而是确定一组易货汇率，那么这张表上就会有上百万个数字。考虑到罗马人必须使用算盘进行所有计算，因此很难为这样的一张表进行计算，更不用说分发它的副本了。

But consider the complexity that can arise with these three commodities without money prices. Instead of 3 prices, we have 9 exchange ratios. If we had 4 commodities we would have a 4×4 table with 16 ratios. In general the size of your exchange rate table grows as the square of the number of commodities being bartered. Diocletian set the prices of around 1,000 of them. If, instead of specifying money prices he had fixed a collection of barter rates, the table would have had a million numbers. Given that the Romans had to do all their calculations using the abacus it would have been quite impossible to do the calculations for such a table, let alone distribute copies of it.

因此，货币的一个作用就是数据压缩。

One effect of money is therefore data compression.

无需指定一百万个比率，只需给出一千个以第纳尔为单位的价格就足够了。

Instead of specifying a million ratios it was enough to give a thousand prices in denarii.

但这种压缩只适用于我所说的一致交换表。从某种意义上说，这个定义是循环的，因为一致的交换利率表是你可以从一组货币价格中创建的。但私人代理参与交易的逻辑意味着任何其他类型的交换表都是不稳定的。假设我们拿 B 表来，只改变一个数字，橄榄油和鸡蛋之间的交换比率就会得到上面 C 表，其中的条目已更改，并以粗体显示。

But this compression only works for what I have called consistent swap tables. In a sense this definition is circular, since the consistent swap rate tables are the ones you can create from a single set of money prices. But the logic of private agents engaging in exchanges means that any other sort of swap table is unstable. Suppose we took table B and changed just one number, the swap ratio between olive oil and eggs to give table C (above) with the changed entries is shown bold.

假设我一开始有 20 个鸡蛋。按照表格 C1 中的交换比率可以得到 1 份油。然后，到最后一行，我将其换成 5 份酒。然后到中间一行，我可以将每份鸡蛋换成 8 个鸡蛋，这样我就有 5 × 8 = 40 个鸡蛋，是开始时的两倍。

Suppose I start out with 20 eggs. By the exchange ratio in table C I can get 1 measure of oil. Then, by the last row, I swap that for 5 measures of wine. Then by the middle row, I can swap each of these for 8 eggs each, giving me 5 × 8 = 40 eggs, twice as many as I started with.

一致的交换表不允许您这样做。它是一致的，因为任何循环的易货交易序列都会让您回到最初拥有的状态。它不允许交易获利。实际上，您永远不会得到复杂的易货系统，所需的交换比率数量根本难以管理。但即使假设您可以进行这样的易货交易经济，不一致的交换表会不稳定。再考虑一下表 C。没有一个有橄榄油的人愿意直接用它换 20 个鸡蛋，因为他们知道先换成葡萄酒，然后再换成鸡蛋，这样就能得到 40 个鸡蛋。因此，在一定量的随机噪声的影响下，您只能得到一致的交换比率集。

A consistent swap table does not let you do this. It is consistent because any circular sequence of barters takes you back to what you initially had. It does not allow trading for profit. In reality, you never get elaborate systems of barter, the number of exchange ratios that would be needed are simply intractable to manage. But even supposing you could have such a barter economy, inconsistent swap tables would be unstable. Consider table C again. Nobody who had olive oil would be willing to swap it directly for only 20 eggs, since they would know that by swapping first for wine and then for eggs they could get 40 eggs. So, subject to a certain amount of random noise, you would only get consistent sets of swap ratios.

成对易货交易会产生大量难以处理的比率：一千种商品意味着一百万种交换比率。它们还涉及复杂的计算和大量的除法，这在过去是很难做到的^。41

Pairwise barter gives an intractable number of ratios: a thousand goods imply a million swap ratios. They also involve hard calculations, and lots of divisions, which were hard to do in the past.⁴¹

从信息角度来看，一致的交换比率可以简化为如表 A 中的一列数字^。42这一列给出了商品的相对价值。因此，任何发生交换的社会都由交换逻辑促成，并由于计算复杂性的原因而被迫使用相当于一列价格的东西。此列中的信息内容将数字与每种类型和单位的商品关联起来，是一个价值体系。用来表达价值的单位是价值标准。我们使用市场上的一种商品作为价值标准并不重要：牛、白银、大麦数量，还是使用国家发行的单位，如第纳尔。其中任何一种都可以充当价值标准。我们正在处理一个与所用材料无关的抽象计算命令。

Consistent swap ratios are reducible, in information terms, to a single column of numbers as in table A.⁴² Such a column gives us the relative values of the goods. Any society in which exchange occurs is thus enabled by the logic of exchange, and forced by reasons of computational complexity to use something equivalent to a column of prices. The information content in this column, associating a number with each type and unit of a good, is a value system. The units used to express the values are the standard of value. It does not matter if we use one of the goods on the market as the standard of value: cattle, silver, volumes of barley, or instead use a state-issued unit like the denarius. Any of these are capable of acting as the standard of value. We are dealing with an abstract computational imperative that is indifferent to the material used.

你不需要有实体硬币来拥有价值标准。Polanyi 等人 [1957] 认为，在古代美索不达米亚，存在一种价值标准，即谢克尔，它要么是衡量大麦的标准，要么是与大麦粒重量相同的银量。这种标准的存在并不意味着交易实际上是通过交出大麦来购买东西来完成的。相反，账目是由抄写员在泥板上记下的，记录货物的物理移动及其以谢克尔为单位的等值价值。但要使这种交易发挥作用，你需要依靠书面记录和一类数字抄写员。依赖抄写员的美索不达米亚体系不允许文盲像硬币那样轻松地参与分布式交易^。43

You do not need physical coins to have a standard of value. Polanyi et al. [1957] argued that in ancient Mesopotamia there was a standard of value, the shekel, which was either a measure of barley or the amount of silver that weighed the same as a barley corn. The existence of this standard did not imply that transactions were actually carried out by handing over measures of barley to buy things. Instead accounts were kept by scribes on clay tablets, recording physical movements of goods and their equivalent value in shekels. But for this kind of transaction to work you depend on written records and a class of numerate scribes. The Mesopotamian system, which relied on scribes, did not allow illiterate people to engage in distributed transactions as easily as coinage does.⁴³

价值标准不仅仅用于买卖。它们还被用于苏美尔文明，用来衡量纳税义务。通过用大麦来表示这些，但允许用不同的商品来结算纳税义务：石油、盐、枣等，大麦作为价值标准，允许国家接受不同的实物商品，而不必具体说明每个农民将提供哪些商品。因此，法律法规规定了各种商品的大麦等价物 [Postgate, 1992]。正如我所说，出于计算的原因，系统通用的易货交易的想法是一种幻想，但人们仍然可以假设，一致交换的逻辑以及计算的简单性促使商品生产者采用像苏美尔人的古尔（gur）是大麦。但尚不清楚这是否源于商品交换，还是出于征税的需要^。44

Standards of value have not just been used for buying and selling. They were also used in the Sumerian civilization to measure tax liabilities. By expressing these in measures of barley, but allowing tax debts to be settled in different goods: oil, salt, dates etc., barley as the standard of value allowed the state to accept different goods in kind without having to specify exactly which goods each farmer would supply. Law codes therefore specified the barley equivalent of a wide range of goods [Postgate, 1992]. As I said, the idea of a system-generalized barter is a fantasy for computational reasons, but one could still hypothesize that the logic of consistent exchange along with computational simplicity drove commodity producers to adopt a universal equivalent like the Sumerian gur of barley. But it is not even clear that this arose out of commodity exchange rather than the demands of tax collection.⁴⁴

流通货币与抽象的价值衡量标准或会计单位的区别在于，货币是由可以随身携带、计数和传递的不同实物组成的。它们有两种不同的形式：

What distinguishes circulating money from an abstract measure of value or unit of account is that money is made up of distinct physical objects that can be carried about, counted, and passed from hand to hand. These take two distinct forms:

^1.相对稀少的私人生产的物品，如在西非城市化半奴隶经济中广泛使用的宝贝壳，或用于较高面额货币的青铜手镯马尼拉。45这被称为“原始货币”。

1. Relatively rare privately produced objects like the cowrie shell, widely used in the urbanized semi-slave economy of West Africa, or the bronze bracelet manillas they used for higher denominations.⁴⁵ This is referred to as “primitive money.”

2. 国家发行的硬币起源于中国，后来又起源于地中海的奴隶经济体。

2. State-issued coins that originated in China and later in the slave economies of the Mediterranean.

货币的物理属性很重要。货币必须由耐用的离散单位组成，而不是连续的量。宝贝可以作为货币，但棕榈酒不能。离散性和计算之间存在联系。“计算”一词源于拉丁语中的鹅卵石，因为计算是用鹅卵石或计数器进行的。硬币是一种自我记录和自我计算的系统。如果你的钱包里有一堆硬币，它们通过它们的物理存在，成为你对社会劳动索取的记录。你不必在账簿或计算机上单独对其进行符号记录。

The physical properties of the money are important. The money has to be made up of durable discrete units rather than being a continuous quantity. Cowries could serve as money but palm wine cannot. There is a link between discreteness and calculation. The term “calculation” derives from the Latin for pebble, because calculations were done with pebbles or counters. Coins are a self-recording and self-calculating system. If you have a collection of coins in your purse, they, by their physical presence, act as a record of your claim upon social labor. You do not have to make a separate symbolic record of it in a ledger or on a computer.

记录信用的银行系统至少从巴比伦时代 [Davies, 2010] 就已经存在。它们在罗马时期 [Banaji, 2016] 广泛传播，现在已完全成熟。在希腊化埃及，转账系统已经发展得很好，在这种情况下，记账单位是谷物而不是硬币。但银行业务需要永久记录交易和余额。这需要时间、资源和一群识字和算数的劳动者，而这种劳动者在现代之前一直供不应求。这些成本意味着，虽然商人和富人可以求助于银行来促进交易，但绝大多数人都置身于银行系统之外，直到计算机记录的发明。他们可能在个人交易者那里有本地借记账户，按计划购买，但仅此而已。直到 20 世纪后期电子记录保存变得普遍之前，信用账户或 Visa 运营的借记账户才能够扩展到整个人口。

Banking systems of recorded credits have existed since Babylon [Davies, 2010] at least. They were widespread in the Roman period [Banaji, 2016] and have reached full fruition now. Systems of giro transfer were already well developed in Hellenistic Egypt, with the unit of account in this case being grain rather than coin. But banking requires the permanent recording of transactions and balances. This demands time, resources, and a class of literate and numerate laborers that was, until the modern age, in short supply. These costs meant that while merchants and the wealthy could resort to banks to facilitate transactions, the vast bulk of the population stood outside the banking system until the invention of computerized records,. They might have local debit accounts with individual traders, buying on the slate, but that was all. Credit accounts, or debit accounts of the sort run by Visa, could not extend to the whole population until electronic record keeping became general in the late twentieth century.

相比之下，硬币或宝贝提供了一种分布式记录系统，只需要简单的计数能力。你甚至不需要知道如何加减。从钱包里拿出硬币，交给对方，相应的金额就会自动从你的账户中扣除。账户。同样，卖家在收到硬币后，其账户就会立即记入金额，而无需知道如何进行长时间的加法。

In contrast, coins or cowries provide a distributed system of record that requires no more than a simple ability to count. You do not even need to know how to add or subtract. Take the coins out of your purse and hand them over and the relevant sum is automatically deducted from your account. Similarly, the sellers’ accounts are credited as soon as they pocket the coins without them needing to know how to do long addition.

除了这些实际优势之外，货币还必须在逻辑上与银行业务有所区别。如今，这一点对我们来说已不再明显，因为现代商品交易中，很多业务都使用银行业务，而不是货币。这导致人们将银行账户等同于货币。但两者之间存在很大的逻辑差异。货币只有正量。银行账户可以持有正值或负值、贷方或借方。因此，货币是正整数的模型，而银行账户是有符号整数的模型 [Badiou et al., 2007]。这种差异在有关“货币供应”和公共财政的现代话语中被掩盖了。应用于货币时逻辑上有效的论点，在应用于银行信贷时不再有效。

In addition to these practical advantages, money has to be logically distinguished from banking. This is no longer obvious to us today since so much of modern commodity exchange uses banking operations rather than money. This leads people to identify bank accounts with money. But there is a big logical difference. Money only comes in positive quantities. Bank accounts may hold positive or negative values, credits or debits. Money therefore is a model for the positive whole numbers whereas bank accounts are a model for the signed whole numbers [Badiou et al., 2007]. This difference is obscured in modern discourse about the “money supply” and public finance. Arguments that are logically valid when applied to money are no longer valid when applied to bank credit.

体现社会权力的记录必须具有防伪性。如今，我们使用复杂的电子密码进行最普通的购买，而这些密码在 20 世纪中叶甚至超出了最复杂的情报机构的理解范围。其他时代则依靠记录上的签名和印章，或依靠断裂的计数棒的匹配端 [Wray, 2004]。无论采用何种技术，货币都依赖于其单位难以伪造。在远离软体动物发现地的地方，人们使用贝壳作为货币，而且作为天然产品，贝壳无法手工制作。

Records that embody social power need to be proof against forgery. Today we use elaborate electronic ciphers for the most mundane purchase, ciphers that were beyond the ken of the most sophisticated intelligence services in the mid-twentieth century. Other ages have relied on signatures and seals on records or on the matching ends of broken tally sticks [Wray, 2004]. Whatever the technique, money relies on its units being hard to forge. Cowrie shells were used as currency far from where the mollusks were found, and as natural products could not be handmade.

硬币的铸造依赖于两种技术。一是很难精确复制硬币的铸模，因此仔细检查后，假币与真币明显不同。二是对于大面额硬币而言，制造硬币的材料本身可能很昂贵：要么是纯贵金属，要么是含有昂贵成分的合金。过去 2600 年来，许多欧洲铸币系统都是以这种方式运作的。

Coins have relied on two techniques. The exact replication of the dies from which they are stamped is hard, so counterfeit coins were visibly different from originals when closely examined. Second, for high-denomination coins, the material from which they are made may itself be expensive: either a pure precious metal or an alloy that has expensive components. Many European coinage systems for the past 2,600 years worked this way.

相比之下，中国货币在 1890 年发行银币之前，三千年来一直都是纯贱金属货币。最初的硬币形状像宝贝或农具：锄头、刀子等。[Davies, 2010]。到公元前三世纪，硬币的标准形状已经形成，中间有一个孔。46^西方经济学家忽视了中国贱金属货币的悠久历史，倾向于认为货币的贵金属含量至关重要。中国人不得不依靠国家权力而不是硬币的成分来抑制伪造。单个硬币的价值低也降低了伪造的诱因。对于大额交易，纸币在中国已经使用了一千多年。纸币显然具有与宝贝和硬币相同的离散自记录特性。

In contrast, Chinese money was exclusively base metal for three thousand years until they issued silver coin in 1890. Initially the coins were shaped like cowries or agricultural implements: hoes, knives, etc. [Davies, 2010]. By the third century BC the standard form of round coin with a central hole had been arrived at.⁴⁶ Western economists, ignoring this long history of base metal money in China, tended to assume that the precious metal content of a currency was essential. The Chinese had to rely on the power of the state rather than the composition of the coins to suppress forgery. Incentives to forge were also diminished by the low value of the individual coins. For larger transactions paper money has been in use in China for over a thousand years. Paper notes obviously have the same discrete self-recording character that cowries and coins had.

为什么硬币以及随后而来的纸币能够衡量价值并记录社会劳动的债权？

Why are coins and, leaping ahead, paper notes able to measure value and record claims on social labor?

古典经济学家的答案略有不同。根据马克思的观点，货币之所以有价值，是因为这些硬币是由金或银制成的，而金币的价值仅仅是其中所含黄金的价值。47^黄金需要大量的劳动力才能开采，因此少量的黄金会换来大量时间在其他活动上的花费。根据这种观点，硬币只是国家标准化的黄金重量。国家只是介入提供方便携带的金属块。硬币上的皇家印章是一份证明，表明黄金是纯净的，重量准确。

The answers given by the classical economists differed somewhat. According to Marx, money had value because the coins were made of gold or silver and the value of a gold coin was simply the value of the gold it contained.⁴⁷ Gold required a lot of labor to mine, so a small weight would exchange against many hours spent on other activities. In this view, coins were just state-standardized weights of gold. The state simply steps in to provide convenient portable chunks of the metal. The royal stamp on them was a certificate to say that the gold was pure and the weight accurate.

李嘉图从类似的假设出发，但随后表示，商品的实际价格不仅会受到开采黄金所需劳动力的影响，还会受到一国流通货币数量的影响 [Ricardo, 1811]。如果黄金外流以支付进口，则以铸币形式流通的黄金存量将减少。由于可用于购买商品的货币减少，价格将普遍下跌。该国商品价格下跌将促进出口，同时，黄金短缺将阻碍进口。最终，贸易不平衡将通过货币数量变化带来的价格变动得到补偿。这是著名的货币价值数量论的最初形式。

Ricardo started out from a similar assumption, but then said that the actual prices of goods would be affected not just by the labor required to mine gold, but by the quantity of money circulating in a country [Ricardo, 1811]. If there was an outflow of gold to pay for imports, the stock of gold circulating as coin would be curtailed. With less money being available to purchase commodities, there would be a general fall in prices. Lower prices of that nation’s goods would then promote exports, while at the same time the shortage of bullion would hamper imports. In the end the imbalance in trade would be compensated for by price shifts brought about by the change in the quantity of money. This was the initial form of the famous quantity theory of monetary value.

马克思对这种机制提出了质疑。他认为，一个国家中只有一小部分黄金在任何时候真正流通。大部分黄金被作为储备持有，以缓冲数量变化的影响。一个国家的黄金储备增加只会导致更多的黄金被储存在私人保险箱或银行中作为储备。

Marx disputed this mechanism. He held that only a small portion of the bullion in a country was at any time actually in circulation. A larger part was held as hoards so that these would buffer the effect of changes in quantity. An increase in the gold stock in a nation would simply cause more bullion to be hoarded as reserves in private strongboxes or banks.

这些观点反映了十九世纪初欧洲发生的一系列争论，并且是在欧洲金银铸币历史的背景下提出的。但这种观点未能推广到中国货币的悠久历史或当代世界存在的货币体系，这两个体系都不依赖黄金或白银。李嘉图对金银外流的担忧实际上与欧洲和中国之间贸易的一个持续特征有关。尽管自从通往东方的海上航线开通以来，欧洲一直渴望获得高质量的中国制造品，但它几乎没有同等质量的产品可以出口。西方不得不依靠出口金银来购买从中国进口的商品。新大陆欧洲殖民地的大量白银流过太平洋，用于支付从中国进口的茶叶、陶瓷、丝绸等商品。鉴于从中国的角度来看欧洲出口产品的质量很差，李嘉图所谓的平衡机制是无效的。欧洲劣质陶器的价格下跌不会诱使中国人从这些制造商那里购买，而是从他们自己的优质瓷器制造商那里购买。东印度公司的办法是从事毒品贸易并通过香港贸易站向中国出口鸦片。当然，一旦进入中国，这些金银就不会产生李嘉图所预测的通货膨胀效应，因为这种货币不是以金银为基础的；正如马克思的货币理论所预测的那样，它们会消失在囤积中。

These views reflect the range of debate taking place in early nineteenth-century Europe, and are posed in the context of a specifically European history of gold and silver coinage. But the perspective fails to generalie to the long history of money in China or to the monetary systems that exist in the contemporary world, neither of which rely on gold or silver. Ricardo’s concern with bullion outflows actually related to a persistent feature of the trade between Europe and China. While Europe had, since the opening up of sea routes to the East, craved high-quality Chinese manufactures, it had little of equivalent quality that it was able to export in return. The West had to resort to exporting bullion to purchase its imports from China. A large part of the silver from European colonies in the New World went across the Pacific to pay for imports of tea, ceramics, silks, and the like from China. Ricardo’s purported equilibrating mechanism was ineffective given the poor quality, as seen from the Chinese perspective, of European exports. A fall in the price of substandard European potteries would not induce the Chinese to buy from these rather than their own fine porcelain manufacturers. The recourse of the East India Company was instead to go into the drug trade and export addictive opium to China via their Hong Kong trading post. Once in China, of course, the bullion did not have the inflationary effect predicted by Ricardo because the currency was not bullion based; it vanished into hoards as predicted by Marx’s monetary theory.

但李嘉图和马克思的理论都不能充分解释中国的情况，中国的货币不是纸币就是铜币，那它有什么价值呢？

However, neither Ricardo’s nor Marx’s theory adequately explained the Chinese situation. Since China’s money was either paper or copper why did it have any value at all?

如果我们回顾西方货币的历史起源，最早的钱币是在公元前七世纪初由传说中的迈达斯国王的故乡吕底亚发行的 [Bolin, 1958]。这些钱币似乎确实符合国家统一重量的贵金属这一概念。它们的形状像咖啡豆，一面有狮子的徽章。它们是按照精确的标准重量铸造的。在短短不到一个世纪的时间里，它们演变成圆形硬币。

If we look at the historical origin of coinage in the West, the earliest coins were issued by Lydia, home of the legendary King Midas, at the start of the seventh century BC [Bolin, 1958]. These certainly seemed to fit in with the idea that they were state-standardized weights of precious metal. They were shaped like coffee beans and had an emblem of a lion on one side. They were made to an accurate standard weight. Within a short period of less than a century these evolved into round coins.

关于钱币起源的经典记载在一个关键细节上出现了问题。吕底亚钱币不是用黄金制成的，而是由该地区天然存在的金银合金——琥珀金制成。这意味着，如果人们认为这些钱币是黄金的标准重量，那他们就会被欺骗。不仅如此，这些钱币的含金量低于天然存在的琥珀金，这表明吕底亚王国在铸造钱币之前会将银加入其中 [Cowell and Hyne, 2000]。Bolin [1958] 指出，从最早的时候起，发行钱币就可能是一项有利可图的活动。他讲述了在罗马帝国时期，曾有一个减少货币中贵金属含量的过程，第纳尔从银币变成了以铜为主的硬币，为了美观，硬币外面镀了一层薄薄的银。这一过程反映在近代货币史上，英国便士从银币变成了铜币，一直到 18 世纪，然后又变成了铜币，再后来又变成了青铜币，并且随着这一过程而缩水。当代的便士甚至不是纯铜的，而是有一个涂有铜的铁芯。48这强化了中国的经验，即商业活动可以通过代币货币长期进行——罗马的情况^是公元三世纪的大部分时间，英国的情况是自 1947 年以来。

The classical account of the origin of coins falls down on one crucial detail. The Lydian coins were not made of gold but of electrum, a gold-silver alloy that naturally occurs in the area. This means that people accepting the coins as a standard weight in gold would have been deceived. Not only that, but the gold content of these coins was lower than in naturally occurring electrum, indicating that the kingdom of Lydia was adding silver to the mix before stamping the coins [Cowell and Hyne, 2000]. Bolin [1958] points out that from the earliest days the issue of coins could be a profitable activity. He recounts that during the Roman Empire there was a process of reducing the precious metal content of the currency, with the denarius moving from a silver coin to a predominantly copper coin with a thin silver coat for appearance’s sake. The process is mirrored in more recent monetary history with the English penny moving from a silver coin, up to the eighteenth century, and then switching to copper, then to bronze, and shrinking as it did so. The contemporary penny is not even solid copper; it has an iron core coated with copper.⁴⁸ This reinforces the Chinese experience that commercial activity can be carried out for prolonged periods with token currencies—much of the third century in the Roman case, since 1947 in the British case.

^{宝藏中的硬币是过去时代最常见的遗物之一，有些人}倾向于将纯银和金币的时代与商品生产特别发达的时代联系起来。如果这是一个安全的假设，那么伦敦在乔治一世统治下一定比在乔治六世统治下更加繁荣和商业化，在乔治六世统治期间，硬币完全变成了贱金属^。50

Coins found in hoards are one of the most common relics of past ages, and there has been a temptation on the part of some⁴⁹ to equate periods of fine silver and gold coins with particularly well-developed commodity production. Were this a safe assumption, then London must have been more prosperous and commercial under George I than under George VI in whose reign the coinage became entirely base metal.⁵⁰

另一种货币理论，其最近的倡导者包括 Wray [2004] 和 Ingham [2004]，将货币的价值归因于国家向其臣民施加税收和罚款等义务的能力。国家声称拥有社会剩余产品的一部分。如果国家规定纳税义务必须以劳动或粮食来满足，那么货币就不会产生。但如果国家愿意接受自己发行的硬币，那么这些硬币就会获得价值。它们之所以这样做，不是因为硬币中投入了劳动，而是因为硬币代替了本来可以直接完成的劳动。只要一个地区有一个统一的国家，拥有有效的税收或征税权力，并且它愿意接受自己的硬币来偿还税收债务，那么这些硬币就会有效流通。该理论解释道：

An alternative theory of money, whose recent exponents include Wray [2004] and Ingham [2004], attributes its value to the ability of the state to impose obligations like taxes and fines on its subjects. The state lays claim to part of the social surplus product. If the state specifies that the tax obligation is to be met in labor or grain, then money does not arise. But if it is willing to accept coins of its own issue, then these acquire value. They do this not because of labor that went into the coin, but because the coins stand in for the labor that would otherwise have been directly performed. So long as there is within an area a unified state with effective tax or tribute-raising powers, and it is willing to accept its own coin in settlement of tax debts, then these coins will have an effective circulation. This theory explains:

1. 为什么每个州通常都有独特的货币或铸币体系。

1. Why there is usually a distinct monetary or coinage system for each state.

2. 为什么社会能够仅靠象征性的货币来长期运转。

2. Why societies have been able to operate for long periods with purely token monies.

3.为什么货币发行不仅是国家的收入来源，而且还受到严厉惩罚的保护。

3. Why the issue of money is not only a source of revenue for the state but has been protected by ferocious penalties.

4. 国家为何以及如何改变货币体系。例如，英国殖民当局规定纳税人必须用英国发行的硬币来偿还债务，从而使宝贝币不再流通 [Forstater，2003]。

4. Why and how states can change the monetary system. For example, British colonial authorities demonetized the cowrie by specifying that tax debts now had to be met in British-issued coin [Forstater, 2003].

在硬币或纸币发明之前，国家对剩余劳动力的占有是以劳动义务的形式或以粮食或农作物的实物形式指定的。我们称之为对剩余产品的实际占有。相比之下，货币税只是一种形式或象征性的财富占有。

Prior to the invention of coins or paper money the state’s appropriation of surplus labor was in the form of labor obligations or it was specified in the physical form of grain or crops. We call this the real appropriation of the surplus product. Monetary taxes are, in contrast, a merely formal or symbolic appropriation of wealth.

但国家需要拨出真正的盈余。它需要真正的劳动力来修建道路，需要真正的食物来供士兵食用，需要真正的铁来制造武器。这些真正的财富是用硬币购买的。

But the state needs to appropriate a real surplus. It needs actual labor to build roads, actual food for its soldiers, real iron for its weapons. Such real wealth is purchaseds with coin.

铸币将真实与正式占有分离。两者在时间、空间和人身上是分开的。它们可以在时间上分开，因为国家可以在支付货币税之前购买资源，占用实际盈余。事实上，除非国家通过购买东西发行硬币，否则就没有钱来纳税。它在空间上是分开的，因为在国家一个地方征收的税款可用于购买另一个地方的劳动力和资源。这使帝国的地区政府摆脱了对纯粹地方资源的依赖。最后，铸币的发明使纳税人与物质盈余提供者分开。对农民征收的税款可以支付一支专业常备军的工资，而农民自己不必服役。如果没有能力支付一支雇佣专业军队的工资，亚历山大或图拉真就不可能征服 [Davies，2010]。

Coin divorces real from formal appropriation. The two become separate in time, space, and person. They can be separate in time because the state can purchase resources, appropriating the real surplus, prior to money taxes being paid. Indeed, unless the state has issued the coins by buying things, there is no money available to pay taxes. It is separated in space since taxes raised in one part of the state can be used to purchase labor and resources in another part. This frees a regional state administration in an empire from a dependence on purely local resources. Finally, the invention of coinage allowed the separation of the taxpayer from the physical surplus provider. Taxes levied on peasants can pay the wages of a professional standing army without the peasants themselves having to serve. Without the ability to pay a mercenary professional army, the conquests of an Alexander or Trajan would have been impossible [Davies, 2010].

为了实现这一切，社会必须按照商业模式重组。农民必须种植经济作物才能以货币形式纳税。商人、船长和船员必须将征税的省份与纳税的大都市联系起来，而大都市的人口部分依赖于帝国的开支。

For all this to happen, society had to reorganize itself on mercantile lines. The peasants, to pay their taxes in money, must produce cash crops. Merchants, sea captains and crew must link the provinces where taxes are raised to the metropolis where they were spent, and whose population partly depended on the imperial expenditure.

无论是在马其顿、罗马还是英国帝国，帝国货币和帝国税收都将自给自足的社区转变为商品生产者 [Forstater, 2003]。货币化将有限的家庭奴隶制转变为对大庄园的无情剥削，增加了支持城市统治阶级的剩余价值。现金通过商品生产和处理链条将国家和贵族联系在一起，以解放或奴役初级生产者。从国家发行货币并强制征税的那一刻起，人们就通过银镜看世界，而镜子里的一切都颠倒了。他们被迫将凯撒的东西交给凯撒，他们臣服的工具——货币，开始成为最真实的财富。他们真正有用的农作物和手工艺品现在只是获取金钱的工具，只有金钱才算真正的价值。在向亚里士多德所说的追求金钱的过渡时期，诗人和哲学家仍然可以看到金钱的荒谬性。迈达斯（Midas）——发明硬币的土地上的国王——的寓言揭开了金钱镜子中的形象的神秘面纱，但无论寓言或道德家如何，人类仍然被迫生活在幻想中^。51

Whether in the Macedonian, Roman, or British empires, imperial coins and imperial taxes transformed self-sufficient communities into commodity producers [Forstater, 2003]. Monetization transformed limited domestic slavery into the ruthless exploitation of the latifundia, boosting the surplus that supported an urban ruling class. Cash linked state and aristocracy, via a chain of commodity production and handling to free or enslaved primary producers. From the moment the state issued money and compelled its return in tax, people saw the world in its silver mirror, and in a mirror everything is reversed. Forced to give unto Caesar that which was Caesar’s, the very instrument of their subjection, coin, came to appear as the truest of true wealth. Their actually useful crops and artifacts now appeared as mere instruments to acquire money, which alone now counted as real value. In the epoch of the transition to what Aristotle called chrematistics, or the striving for money, its absurdity could still be seen by poets or philosophers. The parable of Midas, king from the land where coins were invented, demystified the image in money’s mirror, but heedless of fable or moralist, humanity were yet forced to live the illusion.⁵¹

图 3.9。图拉真柱上的图像。如果没有钱来支付雇佣军的费用，图拉真不可能完成征服。来源：Cichorius，1900 年。

Figure 3.9. Image from Trajan’s Column. Without coins to pay a mercenary professional army, the conquests of Trajan would have been impossible. Source: Cichorius, 1900.

第四章

CHAPTER 4

小农经济

Peasant Economy

圈占土地和拥有财产的权力是你们祖先用剑创造的；他们先是杀害了他们的同胞，然后掠夺或偷走了他们的土地，并把这片土地相继留给你们，他们的子孙。因此，虽然你们没有杀人或偷窃，但你们却用剑的力量把这件该死的东西握在手中；这样你们就为你们祖先的恶行辩护，你们祖先的罪孽将降临到你们和你们的子孙头上，直到第三代和第四代，甚至更久，直到你们血腥和偷窃的权力从这片土地上被根除。

The power of enclosing land and owning property was brought into the creation by your ancestors by the sword; which first did murder their fellow creatures, men, and after plunder or steal away their land, and left this land successively to you, their children. And therefore, though you did not kill or thieve, yet you hold that cursed thing in your hand by the power of the sword; and so you justify the wicked deeds of your fathers, and that sin of your fathers shall be visited upon the head of you and your children to the third and fourth generation, and longer too, till your bloody and thieving power be rooted out of the land.

—杰拉德·温斯坦利

—GERRARD WINSTANLEY

第二章讨论的前阶级经济是一个世界体系，或者换句话说，是社会发展的一种普遍状态。我在第 5 章中研究的资本主义经济同样已成为一个世界体系，一种近乎普遍的经济发展状态。第三章的奴隶经济与这些形成对比，它只在世界某些地区占据主导地位，而且是在很短的时间内。奴隶制的世界是海洋及其沿岸地区。在本章中，我将回到一种近乎全球的经济形式——农民经济，以及与之相伴的剥削形式。世界上有些地方确实跳过了农民经济，或者至少从未在土著发展中经历过它：北方地区、草原和半沙漠。但对于大多数定居的人类来说，它一直是最广泛和最持久的经济形式。在传统的马克思主义模式中，农民经济被不同程度地纳入封建主义或亚细亚生产，后者是图 4.1中原本美好的历史序列的一个悬而未决的分支。

The pre-class economy discussed in chapter 2 was a world system, or to put it another way, a universal state in social development. The capitalist economy that I examine in chapter 5 likewise has become a world system, a near universal state of economic development. The slave economy of Chapter 3 contrasts with these in that it became dominant only in certain portions of the world, at widely spread intervals. The worlds of slavery were seas and their littorals. In this chapter I return to a near global form of economy, peasant economy, with its accompanying forms of exploitation. Some parts of the world did skip peasant economy or, at least, never experienced it from autochthonous development: boreal regions, steppes, and semi-deserts. But it has been, for most of settled humanity, the most widespread and longest-lasting sort of economy. In the traditional Marxist schema peasant economy was subsumed variously under feudalism or Asiatic production, with the latter being a dangling branch from the otherwise nice historical sequence in Figure 4.1.

相比之下，我将提出一个模型，其中存在一种农民生产方式，其背景下存在多种类型的阶级结构是可能的。现在，只需将所有农民经济视为一个整体，并将图 4.1中的顺序模型替换为更像图 4.2 的模型。这种图像（另见图3.5）就是现在所谓的马尔可夫过程或状态转换图。马尔可夫过程⁵²是一种概念化具有有限数量可区分状态的系统的时间演变的方法。图中的椭圆是状态，它们之间的标记箭头（通常称为弧）表示可能的转换。对于适当的马尔可夫模型，标记的弧将各自具有与之相关的概率，从而给出在给定时间段内沿着其中一个弧发生转换的可能性。对于历史过程，人们可能希望有每个世纪的转换概率。原则上，给定足够的历史数据，可以为我在图中标记为a到i 的转换分配粗略的值。 ⁵³

In contrast, I will present a model in which there is a peasant mode of production in the context of which more than one type of class structure is possible. For now just consider all peasant economies as a group and replace the sequential model in figure 4.1 with something more like figure 4.2. This kind of picture (see also figure 3.5) is what would now be called a Markov process or state transition diagram. Markov processes⁵² are a way of conceptualizing the time evolution of systems with a finite number of distinguishable states. The ellipses in the diagram are states and the labeled arrows, often called arcs, between them represent possible transitions. For a proper Markov model the labeled arcs would each have a probability associated with them, giving the likelihood that a transition would occur along one of those arcs in a given period of time. For historical processes one would probably want to have transition probabilities per century. In principle, given enough historical data, one could assign rough values to the transitions I have labeled a to i in the diagram.⁵³

图4.1。马克思主义生产方式序列模型。

Figure 4.1. Marxist model of sequence of modes of production.

图 4.2中标记的弧线是那些易于找到清晰实例的弧线。查看这两个图中的任何一个，都会给人一种完全自给自足发展的印象，其中单个社会要么经历一系列阶段，要么在不同状态之间跳跃。这确实是简单马尔可夫模型所描述的。但现实社会在不同的地方相互作用：贸易和入侵；信息的传播使一个社会能够影响其他社会，因此简单的马尔可夫过程不足以表示。一些转变，(b) 例如德国向封建主义的转变，是德国氏族社会与相邻的罗马奴隶帝国对抗的长期结果 [Anderson，1996] ^。54

The labeled arcs in figure 4.2 are those for which clear instances are easy to find. Looking at either of the two diagrams the impression is given of entirely self-sufficient development in which an individual society either goes through a sequence of stages or jumps between states. That indeed is what simple Markov models describe. But real societies interact with one another in different places: trade and invasions; and the diffusion of information allows one society to affect others, so a simple Markov process is inadequate as a representation. Some of the transitions, (b) for example, the transition to feudalism in Germany, came about as a long-term consequence of the confrontation between German clan society and the adjacent slave empire of Rome [Anderson, 1996].⁵⁴

总体情况是历史状态的有向图。系统中可能有循环，但尽管如此，总体上还是有方向性的。方向性源于某些转型的缺失（例如，没有从资本主义向小农经济的转型），以及转型概率的差异。在给出的图中，社会主义和资本主义经济的哪种组合将长期占主导地位是一个悬而未决的问题，因为它取决于相对转型概率 (i) 和 (f)。

The overall picture is one of a directed graph of historical states. There may be loops in the system, but despite this there is an overall directionality. The directionality arises from the absence of certain transitions—no back transition to peasant economy from capitalism, for example—and from differences in the probabilities of transitions. In the graph given, it is an open question what mix of socialist and capitalist economies will prevail in the long run, depending as it does on the relative transition probabilities (i) and (f).

图 4.2. 经济形式间转变的马尔可夫模型表示。标示转变的例子：(a) 蒙古；(b) 德国向封建主义的转变；(c) 西非奴隶经济；(d) 中国革命；(e) 英国；(f) 东德；(g) 罗马共和国；(h) 西罗马帝国晚期；(i) 俄罗斯。

Figure 4.2. Markov model representation of transitions between forms of economy. Examples of the labeled transitions: (a) Mongolia; (b) Germany transition to feudalism; (c) slave economy West Africa; (d) Chinese Revolution; (e) Britain; (f) East Germany; (g) Roman Republic; (h) Late West Roman Empire; (i) Russia.

图 4.2中的节点应理解为社会状态的宏观描述。在“农民经济”这一宏观描述中，可能存在各种不同的财产关系和阶级关系，正如标记为“奴隶经济”的节点包含一个嵌套的马尔可夫模型（图 3.5）来描述其内部动态。

The nodes in Figure 4.2 should be understood as macroscopic descriptions of the states of societies. Within the macro description “peasant economy” there would be a variety of different possible property relations and class relations, just as the node labeled “slave economy” contains a nested Markov model (figure 3.5) that describes its internal dynamics.

4.1 自然与技术条件

4.1 NATURAL AND TECHNICAL CONDITIONS

顾名思义，农民经济以农业为主。大部分人口生活在以种植农作物为主要活动的家庭中。家庭的次要活动包括食物准备、纺织品准备或生产、建筑和一些辅助手工艺。

Peasant economies, as the name implies, are primarily agricultural. The greater part of the population live in families whose main activity is the growing of crops. Secondary activities of the families are food preparation, textile preparation or production, building, and some ancillary crafts.

农业唯一可用的机械能源是人力，尽管风和水可用于碾磨。唯一可用的热能源是生物废物，如木材、粪便或稻草。

The only available mechanical energy source for agriculture is muscle power, though wind and water may be used for milling. The only available thermal energy sources are biological waste such as wood, dung, or straw.

这些生存条件对于农民经济有何普遍影响？

What general implications do these conditions of existence have for peasant economies?

它们对这些经济体中的生活和社会关系构成了什么限制？

What restrictions do they pose on life and the social relations operating in these economies?

技术限制相当广泛，因为农民经济存在于如此多的气候区，种植的作物种类如此广泛。人们不得不问，这种生产方式的共同特性是什么涵盖了所有偶然的农业类型差异。中世纪北印度农民经济依赖于抽水技术的进步：波斯轮子、衬砌井和水箱。但从欧洲封建主义的角度来看，其他技术：犁板犁、三田轮作被视为至关重要 [White, 1964]。技术的多样性和不同形式的剩余提取的存在被用来论证 [Mukhia, 1981]，用单一的封建概念来指称如此不同的制度是没有意义的。其他人则认为，超经济强制 [Hirst and Hindess, 1975] 或非常详细的特征（如农奴制、庄园经济、商品流通限制）的存在相当普遍 [Sharma, 1985; Sharma, 1958]，并允许我们在各大洲使用相同的基本概念。封建一词的适用性是一个有争议的问题。⁵⁵相反，我将研究农民经济的一般制约因素，以及这些制约因素如何影响他们所支持的剥削类型的变化。

The technological restrictions are pretty broad, since peasant economies have existed in so many climatic zones, with such a broad range of crops. One has to ask what the common properties of this mode of production are that reach across all the incidental differences in types of farming. North Indian peasant economy of the Middle Ages depended on advances in the lifting of water: the Persian wheel, lined wells and tanks. But from the standpoint of European feudalism other technologies: moldboard ploughs, three-field rotation have been seen as crucial [White, 1964]. The varieties of technology and the existence of rather different forms of surplus extraction have been used to argue [Mukhia, 1981] that it is pointless to use the single concept of feudal to designate such different systems. Others have argued that the existence either of extra-economic coercion [Hirst and Hindess, 1975], or very detailed features such as serfdom, manorial economy, restriction of commodity circulation were quite general [Sharma, 1985; Sharma, 1958] and allow us to use the same basic concept right across continents. The applicability of the term feudal is a controversial question.⁵⁵ Instead I will look at general constraints of peasant economy and how these shape the variations in the types of exploitation they have supported.

第一点是，农民经济不同于游牧经济：回想一下史密斯对农民、牧羊人和猎人民族的区分。人口固定是建立剥削的先决条件。游牧民族可以简单地离开。

The first point is that peasant economy is distinct from nomadism: recall Smith’s distinction between nations of farmers, shepherds, and hunters. A stationary population is the precondition for the establishment of exploitation. Nomads can simply remove themselves.

什么使农民固定在原地？

What fixes a peasantry in place?

有人可能会说他们是被土地束缚的农奴，但这种对土地的法律约束只有在有其他选择的情况下才是必要的，如果农民有迁移的选择。这要么是他们迁移到无人认领的土地，要么是移居到城镇。

One may say that they were serfs tied to the land, but that kind of legal binding to the land only becomes necessary if there is some alternative, if the peasants have the option of moving. This either involves them moving to unclaimed land or emigrating to towns.

如果有大量无人认领的土地，这无疑会成为封建剥削的潜在制约因素。任何有机会的奴役劳动力都会试图逃跑，而防止这种逃跑取决于多种因素。一是必须有一个有效的国家结构，可以依靠它来遣返逃跑者。另一个是距离处女地不能太远。最后，自然植被的类型也起着一定的作用。清理硬木森林以开辟田地比耕种草原要困难得多，这项工作实际上会阻碍移民。因此，在草原边缘国家薄弱的地区，农民人口的战略地位与在人口稠密、长期被清理过的河谷中部的农民截然不同。在第一种情况下，无论法律怎么说，都会倾向于自由定居，而在后一种情况下，法律禁止迁移只是作为一种限制向城市迁移的方式，而且只有在城镇和乡村拥有相同的国家权力的情况下才有效。在有自由城镇的地方，比如封建时期的欧洲，农奴一旦进入城镇，就很安全。国家权力在城镇中有效运作的地方，就像在在一些国家，例如奥斯曼帝国或内战前的美国南部，奴隶逃亡要困难得多。

If there is plentiful unclaimed land this certainly acts as a potential constraint on feudal exploitation. Any servile workforce given the opportunity will try to escape, and the prevention of such escape depends on multiple factors. One is that there must be an effective state structure that can be relied on to return escapees. Another is that the distance to the virgin soil must not be too far. Finally, the type of natural vegetation plays a role. Clearing hardwood forests for fields is much harder work than plowing steppe-land, and this work acts as a practical disincentive to migration. So the strategic position of a peasant population in an area with a weak state on the edge of steppe is rather different from a peasant in the middle of a densely settled and long cleared river valley. In the first circumstance, whatever the law says, there will tend to be a drift to free settlements, in the latter the legal proscription on movement only takes effect as a way of restricting migration to cities, and that is only effective where the same state power prevails in town and country. Where you have free towns, as in Europe during the feudal period, once in the town the serfs were safe. Where state power operates as effectively in town as in country, for instance in the Ottoman Empire or the antebellum U.S. South, servile flight was much harder.

农耕民族和狩猎采集民族之间的边境地带，如新石器时代最初的扩张或欧洲殖民地，不利于封建主义，而游牧民族居住的草原边缘，如十六世纪的俄罗斯，则为封建军事阶层的存在提供了理由。多马尔 [1970] 认为，在农民经济中，有三个因素永远不能共存：剥削地主阶级、自由的未占用土地和自由农民。三者中可以存在两个，但不能同时存在。如果有未占用的土地，自由农民会迁移到那里，而不是屈服于支付租金，因此地主阶级无法稳定下来。如果没有自由土地，那么自由农民可以被迫支付租金以获得私有土地。但如果存在剥削地主阶级，而且还有未开垦的森林或草原，那么必须将农民贬为农奴，以阻止他们迁移。

Frontier territory between agriculturalists and hunter gatherers, as in the original Neolithic expansion or European colonies, is not conducive to feudalism, whereas the edge of steppes inhabited by nomads, as in sixteenth-century Russia, allows a feudal military caste to justify its existence. Domar [1970] argued that in a peasant economy there are three elements that can never coexist: a class of exploiting landlords, free unoccupied land, and free peasants. Two of the three can exist but not all three. If there is unoccupied land free peasants will migrate to it rather than submit to paying rents, so a landlord class cannot stabilize. If there is no free land, then a free peasantry can be forced to pay rent to gain access to privately held land. But if an exploiting landlord class exists, and there yet remain untilled forests or steppes, then the peasants must be reduced to serfdom to prevent their movement.

假设劳动力和土地是唯一的生产要素（没有资本或管理），并且质量和位置一致的土地无处不在。在土地上投入劳动力不会出现收益递减的情况；劳动力的平均生产率和边际生产率都是恒定且相等的，如果雇主之间的竞争将工资提高到该水平（这是可以预料的），那么土地租金就不会产生，正如李嘉图过去所证明的那样。在没有相反的具体政府行动的情况下……该国将由家庭规模的农场组成，因为任何形式的雇佣劳动力都将不可用或无利可图：雇佣工人的工资或租户的收入必须至少等于他在自己的农场上可以赚到的钱；如果他得到那么多，他的雇主就不会剩下任何剩余（租金）。政府可以通过向农民征收（直接或间接）的税款来支持非工人阶级的仆人或其他人，但他们无法通过土地租金来养活自己。[Domar，1970]

Assume that labor and land are the only factors of production (no capital or management), and that land of uniform quality and location is ubiquitous. No diminishing returns in the application of labor to land appear; both the average and the marginal productivities of labor are constant and equal, and if competition among employers raises wages to that level (as would be expected), no rent from land can arise, as Ricardo demonstrated some time past. In the absence of specific governmental action to the contrary … the country will consist of family-size farms because hired labor, in any form, will be either unavailable or unprofitable: the wage of a hired man or the income of a tenant will have to be at least equal to what he can make on his own farm; if he receives that much, no surplus (rent) will be left for his employer. A non-working class of servitors or others could be supported by the government out of taxes levied (directly or indirectly) on the peasants, but it could not support itself from land rents. [Domar, 1970]

多玛/内波尔关于农奴制经济根源的理论预测了图4.3所示的动态转型系统。在历史上不难找到这种转型的例子。

The Domar/Neiboer theory of the fundamental economic origins of serfdom predicts the dynamical transition system shown in figure 4.3. It is not difficult to find historical examples of these transitions.

4.2 盈余形式

4.2 FORMS OF SURPLUS

我们应该避免把现代政治经济学的土地、劳动力、资本三位一体理论投射到前资本主义社会，这是一种不合时宜的做法。人们倾向于认为奴隶制以人身财产为基础，封建制度以土地财产为基础，资本主义以资本品财产为基础。这可以表述为土地贵族对土地拥有阶级垄断或个人私有制。他们赖以生存的剩余物被视为所有权或垄断的结果。虽然这一概念在现代时期以及土地租金市场发达、众多农民想要租赁土地的国家是有意义的，但将其投射到早期的农民经济上是值得怀疑的。农奴制的存在，或印度封建法律对村庄社区迁移的限制[Sharma，1985]表明，关键不是土地，而是土地上的工人。只有当劳动生产率和人口增长到只需部分人口就能对所有土地进行生产性耕作的程度时，土地所有权本身才能成为垄断收入来源[Domar，1970]。否则，封建剥削就像奴隶制一样，是对劳动人口劳动力的直接或间接控制。

One should avoid the anachronism of projecting back the trinity of land, labor, and capital of modern political economy onto precapitalist society. There is a temptation to see slavery as being based on property in persons, feudalism on property in land, and capitalism on property in capital goods. This may be formulated as a landed aristocracy having either a class monopoly over land or individual private ownership of land. The surplus they live off is then seen as the consequence of that ownership or monopoly. While this concept makes sense in the modern period and in countries where there is a well-developed market in the rent of land and a multiplicity of farmers wanting to rent it, projecting this back onto earlier peasant economies is questionable. The very existence of serfdom, or the restrictions that Indian feudal law placed on village communities moving [Sharma, 1985], shows that it was not the land that was key, but the workers on the land. Only when labor productivity and the population rises to the point where all the land can be productively worked using only part of the population, can ownership of the land itself act as a monopoly source of revenue [Domar, 1970]. Otherwise, feudal exploitation, like slavery, was about the direct or indirect control over the labor of the working population.

图4.3. 小农农业产权关系的转变。

Figure 4.3. Transitions between property relations in peasant agriculture.

所有权主要通过王室分配、继承或婚姻而非购买而传递，是针对封建阶级其他成员的所有权。它们不是针对农奴的财产所有权，而是针对农奴的所有权。它们使一个家族及其后代有权获得领土人口产生的收入，而同一阶级的其他家族则无权获得。历史学家将这些收入称为租金还是税收并不重要。对我们来说并不重要，对农民来说也不重要。两者之间的区别最多与军事封建阶级的哪一部分有关。在所有情况下，收入都是地方性的，来自农民人口的劳动，他们直接或间接地放弃了部分工作时间来创造收入。这种放弃工作时间可以有三种基本形式：

Titles to ownership, which passed mainly by royal assignment, inheritance, or marriage rather than purchase, were titles against other members of the feudal class. They were not property titles against serfs, but over them. They entitled one family and their descendants to the revenues accruing from the population of a territory, to the exclusion of other families from the same class. Whether these revenues are called by historians rents or taxes is not terribly significant to us now, nor was it important to the peasants. The distinction between these relates at most to which part of the military feudal class it went to. In all cases the revenues are local and arise from the labor of a peasant population that directly or indirectly gives up part of its working year to generate the revenues. This giving up of work time can come in three basic forms:

1.庄园上的直接劳务。

1. Direct labor service on manorial estates.

2. 放弃他们在分配到的地块上种植的部分作物供自己种植。

2. Giving up part of the crop they had grown on the plot they were allotted for their own cultivation.

3.以金钱支付租金。

3. Paying a rent in money.

在特定的时间和地点，哪种形式占主导地位将与历史有关。第一种形式只有在土地被划分为农民地块和庄园时才会出现，而这又可能取决于一个国家先前的历史。在西欧，封建制度取代了罗马以前的别墅奴隶劳动制度，庄园土地比通过征服自由农民而发生封建征服的地方更有可能出现。马克思主义对此的标准解释是将所有这些都视为不同形式的超经济胁迫，与资本主义下的纯经济劳动合同形成对比。这种超经济胁迫随后被用来解释为什么封建制度下的国家形式将司法权下放给当地贵族，而贵族作为军事阶层，有手段直接胁迫下属。因此，与资本主义法律表面上公正的匿名性不同，这种关系表现为个人依赖和征服的关系。

Which of these dominate at a particular time and place will be history sensitive. The first form is only going to occur if the land is divided between peasant plots and manorial estates, which in turn may be dependent on the prior history of a country. In Western European lands where feudalism succeeded the prior Roman system of slave labor on villas, manorial lands were more likely than in places where feudal subjugation occurred by the conquest of a free peasantry. The standard Marxian account of this is to treat all of these as varying forms of extra-economic coercion, contrasted with the purely economic labor contract under capitalism. This extra-economic coercion is then used to explain why the state form under feudalism devolves judicial powers to the local aristocracy, who as a military caste have the means to directly coerce their subordinates. Relations thus appear as those of personal dependence and subjugation, unlike the apparently impartial anonymity of capitalist law.

图 4.4. 当代苏格兰巴克卢公爵的城堡。土地所有权和土地收入的封建集中一直持续到现代。

Figure 4.4. The castle of the contemporary Duke of Buccleuch in Scotland. Feudal concentration of land ownership and land revenue continued well into the modern era.

人们可能想知道这种超经济胁迫的概念是否真正触及了问题的本质。

One may wonder whether this notion of extra-economic coercion really gets to the heart of things.

考虑一下当代苏格兰农民的处境，那里的土地所有权的封建集中几乎没有改变。该国一半的土地归 432 个贵族家庭所有 [Hunter et al., 2013]。假设农民从巴克卢公爵那里租房，却未能支付租金。公爵可以向邓弗里斯郡治安法庭申请驱逐令，如果佃户不服从，治安官或女王的信使将被派去执行驱逐令。自 2000 年废除封建土地保有权以来 [Parliament, 2000]，公爵不再是农民的个人封建上级，但他仍可申请使用强制手段。他不再派遣自己的士兵执行他的意愿，但王室权威仍可执行。

Consider the position of a farmer in contemporary Scotland, where the feudal concentration of land holding has scarcely changed. Half of the country is owned by 432 aristocratic families [Hunter et al., 2013]. Suppose the farmer, renting from, say, the Duke of Buccleuch, fails to pay his rent. The Duke can apply to the Dumfries Sheriff’s court for an eviction order and, if the tenant does not comply, the sheriff officers, or Queen’s Messengers at Arms, will be dispatched to enforce the eviction order. The Duke is no longer, since the abolition of feudal tenure in 2000 [Parliament, 2000], the personal feudal superior of the farmer, but he can still apply for coercion to be used. He no longer sends his own men-at-arms to enforce his will, but the authority royal still enforces it.

在苏格兰，人们可能会说这只是封建主义和君主制的残留特征。但想象一下俄克拉荷马州的一位农民，他欠了银行的债，贷款被取消赎回权，俄克拉荷马县警长强迫他出售农场。俄克拉荷马州从未经历过封建主义或君主制，却对农民施加了同样的超经济胁迫，不是强迫他们服从领主，而是强迫他们服从银行。同样的胁迫适用于任何拖欠抵押贷款的房主。这种胁迫是经济胁迫还是超经济胁迫？

In Scotland, one may say that this is just a residual trait of feudalism and monarchy. But consider a farmer in Oklahoma who, having got into debt to a bank, having the loan foreclosed, has the Oklahoma County Sheriff conduct a forced sale of the farm. Here we have the State of Oklahoma, which has never known feudalism or monarchy, applying the same extra-economic coercion to a farmer, not to enforce subservience to a lord, but to a bank. The same coercion applies to any homeowner who defaults on their mortgage. Is this coercion economic or extra-economic?

在当今社会，法律和经济理论认为，利息和租金的支付是相互的。你为借入的资本或租用的土地支付价格。因此，这是一种市场交换，纯粹是经济上的，是一种自愿交易，价格公平。但这只不过是一个方便的虚构。公爵没有给农民提供任何东西。他只是有权收取他没有贡献的租金，不再是公爵头衔，但仍然是土地所有者。权利的背后仍然是强制。

The payment of interest and rent in today’s society is presented, by law and economic theory, as something reciprocal. You pay a price for capital you borrow or land you rent. As such it is a market exchange, something purely economic, a voluntary transaction with a fair price. But this is no more than a convenient fiction. The Duke provides nothing to the farmer. He is just entitled, no longer by the title duke, but still as a landowner, to collect a rent to which he has not contributed. Behind right still stands coercion.

同样，平等和互惠也掩盖了封建依赖关系。上级向下级提供武装保护，并在需要时提供援助：

Equivalence and reciprocity likewise masked relations of feudal dependence. The superior offered armed protection to the subordinate, and, perhaps, aid in time of want:

致那位伟大的某某君主，我，某某君主。众所周知，我衣食无忧，所以我请求您的仁慈，您的善意让我将自己交给您或委托给您监护，我已照做了；也就是说，您应该在食物和衣服上帮助和资助我，只要我有能力为您服务并且值得这样做。

To that magnificent lord so and so, I, so and so. Since it is known familiarly to all how little I have whence to feed and clothe myself, I have therefore petitioned your piety, and your good-will has decreed to me that I should hand myself over or commend myself to your guardianship, which I have thereupon done; that is to say in this way, that you should aid and succour me as well with food as with clothing, according as I shall be able to serve you and deserve it.

只要我还活着，我就应该以适合我自由状态的方式，为你服务和荣誉；在这段时间内，我不会我一生中有权退出你的权力或监护；但必须在我一生中一直处于你的权力或监护之下。因此，如果我们任何一方希望退出这些协议，他应向另一方支付相同数量的先令（pari suo），并且本协议应保持完整。[法兰克式表扬公式，惠特科姆，1899 年]

And so long as I shall live I ought to provide service and honour to you, suitably to my free condition; and I shall not during the time of my life have the ability to withdraw from your power or guardianship; but must remain during the days of my life under your power or defence. Wherefore it is proper that if either of us shall wish to withdraw himself from these agreements, he shall pay so many shillings to the other party (pari suo), and this agreement shall remain unbroken. [A Frankish Formula of Commendation, Whitcomb, 1899]

将当代农民向银行支付的利息标记为经济行为，而将徭役标记为超经济行为，这仍然属于现代法律的观点。从封建法律的角度来看，现代抵押协议可能看起来是非人性化的、赤裸裸的、非基督教的剥削。阶级社会有自己为剥削辩护的特定方式。然而，当历史学家谈到超经济胁迫时，有人指出了一些东西。这个术语是神秘的，但它暗示了两种生产方式之间的真正对比：小规模农业——封建主义与机器工业的生产方式——和资本主义的生产方式。

To label contemporary interest payments by a farmer to a bank economic but corvée, extra-economic, is to remain within the viewpoint of modern law. From the standpoint of feudal law, a modern mortgage agreement might seem impersonal, naked, and un-Christian exploitation. Class societies have their own specific ways of justifying exploitation. There is, however, something that is being pointed out when historians talk of extra-economic coercion. The term is mystification, but it hints at a real contrast between two modes of production: small-scale agriculture—the mode of production of feudalism versus machine industry—and the mode of production of capitalism.

如表 4.1所示，封建制度下的基本生产单位很小。56 《末日审判书》列出的庄园中，劳动力中位数只有 5 人。由于农民的妻子和^孩子可能在一年中的一部分时间工作，因此这个数字有些低估，但这仍然是一个相当小的企业，中等庄园只有 3 台犁。如果这是 2 支牛队那么中世纪的土地测量系统意味着他们可以耕种 2 头 15 英亩的牛，总共 30 英亩。如果牛队有 4 头，那么数量将是原来的两倍，如果是 8 头牛队，数量将是原来的四倍。如果我们假设领地队专门耕种庄园土地，并且有 8 头牛队，那么中位领地的最大估计面积将约为 240 英亩。除此之外，可能还有另外 120 英亩的土地由农民直接耕种以供自己享用。在耕种自己的地块时，农民控制着作物的生产并直接拥有他们收获的作物。与此同时，同样的工作过程每年都在继续耕种领主的土地^。57

As Table 4.1 brings out, the basic unit of production under feudalism was small.⁵⁶ The median workforce on an estate listed in the Domesday Book was only five. Since the peasants’ wives and children may have worked part of the year this is a bit of an underestimate, but this is still a pretty small enterprise, with the median estate having access to only 3 plows. If these are 2 ox teams then the medieval land measurement system would imply that they could plow 2 oxgangs of 15 acres for a total of 30 acres. If the teams were of 4 oxen then the amount would be twice as much, if 8 ox teams 4 times as much. If we assume that the demesne teams exclusively plowed the manorial land, and were 8 ox teams the maximum estimate of median demesne would have been around 240 acres. Alongside this there may be another 120 acres of land directly farmed by the peasants for their own benefit. When cultivating their own plots the peasants were in control of the production of the crop and took direct possession of the crop they harvested. In parallel with this, the same kind work process goes on each year to cultivate the lord’s land.⁵⁷

表 4.1：《末日审判书》中埃塞克斯庄园的平均房产

Table 4.1: Average Properties of Essex Estates in the Domesday Book

多变的

Variable

意思是

Mean

中位数

Median

年值

Annual Value

108英镑

£108

65英镑

£65

设备：

EQUIPMENT:

领地犁地队

Demesne Plow Teams

1.9

2.0

农民犁队

Peasant Plow Teams

2.3

1.0

家畜

Livestock

542

388

劳动：

LABOR:

自由民

Freemen

0.6

农奴

Serfs

12.1

4.0

奴隶

Slaves

2.2

1.0

土地：

LAND :

耕地英亩数

Plow Land Acres

504

360

森林猪

Woods Pigs

105

三十

草地英亩

Meadow Acres

牧场绵羊

Pasture Sheep

二十八

由于生产规模小，分工有限，农民亲眼目睹了从播种到收获的整个过程，并亲眼目睹了粮食进入他们的粮仓或领主的粮仓。最终的结果是他们可以用来养活自己家人的东西。这种转移是显而易见的。如果我们将其与资本主义企业进行对比，至少有以下区别：

Because the production is small-scale, with only a limited division of labor, the peasants see the whole process through from sowing to harvest, and literally see the results going to their granary or the lord’s granary. The end result is something with which they could potentially feed their own family. The diversion is clear and unmasked. If we contrast this to a capitalist firm there are at least the following differences:

1. 员工们并不是在重复他们在家里做的事情；他们正在做一些完全不同的事情。

1. The employees are not replicating what they do at home; they are making something quite different.

2. 生产规模更大；每个员工都是复杂劳动力队伍中的一小部分。

2. The scale of production is much larger; each employee is a small fragmented part of a complex workforce.

3. 由于流程的碎片化，许多员工可能永远都看不到最终产品。没有一个人能看透整个流程。

3. The final product may well never be seen by many employees, given the fragmented character of the process. No one person sees the whole process through.

4. 只有在特殊情况下，例如面包店、啤酒厂等，最终产品才可能成为工人直接赖以生存的东西。相反，它注定要以不为人知的价格无形出售。

4. In only exceptional cases, such as bakeries, breweries, etc., is the end product something that the workers could potentially live off directly. Instead it is destined to be invisibly sold for prices that are obscure.

5. 工人似乎是因其所做的工作而直接得到报酬 —— 它不是像徭役义务那样的免费劳动。

5. The worker appears to be directly paid for the work put in—it is not free labor like a corvée obligation.

资本主义生产的技术结构意味着产品不可能被公司员工个人占有。甚至产品的价值也难以确定，如今产品销售可能经过如此多的空壳公司，即使是训练有素的政府税务检查员也很难发现真正发生了什么，这种情况尤其严重。除了公司占有产品价值之外，唯一的替代方案就是国家或工人合作社以某种形式接管。这样做的尝试将直接具有政治性，相当于农民起义。非正式接管工厂的工人受到法律程序的阻挠，这些程序会阻止供应、没收产品等。他们遭遇了超经济的法律胁迫。

The technical structure of capitalist production means that there is no real possibility of the product being individually appropriated by the employees of the firm. Even the value of the product is obscure, immensely so nowadays when the sale of the product may go through so many shell companies that even highly trained government tax inspectors have difficulty finding out what is really happening. The only alternative to the appropriation of the product’s value by the firm would be some form of takeover by the state or workers’ cooperatives. An attempt to do this would be directly political, the equivalent of a peasant revolt. Workers who unofficially take over factories are stymied by legal proceedings that block supplies, confiscate products, etc. They meet extra-economic legal coercion.

相反，小农经济中的产品可以直接被占有。一个农民家庭收获了庄稼，如果他们不必支付租金，他们就会保留所有的庄稼。并非只有封建剥削才有强制手段。这是所有剥削的共同特征。剥削更加透明，支持剥削的国家权力具有个人权威的特征。

The product in a peasant economy can, in contrast, be directly appropriated. An individual peasant family gathers its harvest and would retain all of it did they not have to pay rent. It is not only feudal exploitation that is backed by coercion. That is a property of all exploitation. It is that the exploitation is more transparent and the state power that backs it takes on the character of personal authority.

封建经济中国家权力的这种个人特征是国家难以维持领薪官僚和领薪常备军的必然结果。如果国家缺乏定期货币收入，就不得不分配土地来维持其官员和军队。这种情况发生的确切法律形式，无论是授权向农民征收地方税，还是明确授予农民征集军队的庄园，都是次要问题。货币收入的缺乏是根本原因。货币收入的缺乏可能与无法建立可靠的税基有直接关系，但长期来看，最主要的原因是商品流通不发达。商品流通不发达本身是两个经济原因之一或两者兼而有之的结果：剩余产品少或运输技术不发达，阻碍了商品在远离生产地的地方消费。由此产生了奴隶经济与早期封建经济之间的对比，前者商品流通发达，公路和海上运输良好，而后者两者都没有。随着交通和货币经济的重新发展，更加非人性化的国家权力形式再次成为可能。

This personal character of state authority in feudal economies is a necessary outgrowth of circumstances in which it is difficult for the state to maintain a salaried bureaucracy and a salaried standing army. If the state lacks a regular monetary income it is forced to allocate land for the maintenance of its officials and troops. The exact legal form in which this occurs, whether it is the delegated right to raise local taxes from the peasantry or an explicit grant of estates in return for raising troops, is a secondary issue. It is the absence of a well-developed monetary revenue that is the underlying cause. That absence may have immediate reasons associated with the inability to establish a reliable tax base, but the overriding long term cause will be a poorly developed commodity circulation. A poor commodity circulation is itself the result of either or both of two economic causes: a small surplus product or an undeveloped transport technology that impedes the consumption of commodities far from where they were produced. From thence comes the contrast between slave economies with developed commodity circulation, good road and sea transport, and early feudal economies with neither. With the redevelopment of transport and monetary economy, more impersonal forms of state authority again became possible.

4.3 再生产结构

4.3 REPRODUCTION STRUCTURE

图 4.5展示了欧洲传统封建制度下的庄园制度下的劳动力和货物流动情况。将其与图 3.4中罗马帝国鼎盛时期的别墅/大庄园经济下的流动情况进行对比。

Figure 4.5 illustrates the flow of labor and goods under a manorial system such as existed in classic European feudalism. Contrast this with the flows under the villa/latifundia economy of the high Roman Empire, illustrated in Figure 3.4.

在这两种情况下，直接生产者只能得到他们所生产食物的一部分。另一部分归领主所有。只有一部分产品进入贸易。但是，别墅制度被迫在经常账户上至少维持部分货币盈余以支付替换奴隶的费用，而庄园可以在产品贸易比例低得多的情况下生存下来。贸易额至少可以限制在领主购买的奢侈品和武器上。因此，早期封建经济支持的城市部门比奴隶经济要小。1086 年，埃塞克斯的城市人口不到 5%（表 4.2）。人们可以使用这样的人口细分来对经济中的剥削率设定一些广泛的限制。要得到上限，假设所有城市部门都由领主的支出支持，奴隶都是家仆，其他人——被描述为“男人”和牧师——都是非生产性的。然后我们得到表 4.3所示的计算结果。

In both cases the direct producers get only a portion of the food they produce. Another portion is appropriated by the dominus or lord. Only a portion of the product enters into trade. But whereas the villa system was obliged to run at least a partial monetary surplus on current account to pay for replacement slaves, a manor can survive with a much lower portion of the product being traded. At its minimum, trade can be limited to luxuries and weapons purchased by the lord. Early feudal economies therefore supported a smaller urban sector than slave economy had. In Essex in 1086 less than 5 percent of the population was urban (Table 4.2). One can use population breakdowns like this to set some broad limits on the rate of exploitation in the economy. To get an upper limit, assume that all of the urban sector was supported by the expenditures of the lords, that the slaves were all domestic servants, and that the others—who are variously described as “men” and priests—were all unproductive. We then get the calculation shown in Table 4.3.

图4.5. 庄园制度下的产品和劳动力流动。

Figure 4.5. Product and labor flows in manorial system.

为了得到剥削率的下限，我们假设所有奴隶都不是家仆，都是田间劳工，城镇一半的产出被卖给农民，以换取他们部分农作物。如果我们采用上述方法，剥削率只有 3%，这个数字似乎低得令人难以置信，因此必须假设被列为仆人的人中，很大一部分实际上是现代意义上的仆人。但请注意，即使是剥削率的上限，以现代标准来看也是非常低的。

To get a lower bound on the rate of exploitation assume that none of the slaves were domestic servants, all being field laborers, and that half of the output of the towns was sold to peasants in return for part of their crop. If we apply the same method as above, that gives an exploitation rate of only 3 percent, which seems implausibly low, so the assumption has to be that a significant proportion of those listed as servi were actually servants in the modern sense. But note that even the upper bound for the rate of exploitation is very low by modern standards.

奴隶制经济和封建经济之间的下一个重要区别是庄园经济；大多数直接生产者组成家庭，要么自食其力，要么靠工资养活自己。无论是哪种情况，劳动人口都可以自行繁衍，而无需依靠进口强迫劳动力。

The next important distinction between slave and feudal economies is that on the manorial estate; the majority of the direct producers formed family households which either fed themselves on their own plots or were fed by wages. In either case the laboring population reproduced itself without recourse to imported forced labor.

表 4.2：埃塞克斯 1086 年人口分布

TABLE 4.2: Breakdown of Population of Essex, 1086

类别

Category

人口百分比

Percent of Population

乡村的

Rural

95.5％

95.5%

城市的

Urban

4.5％

4.5%

边界

Bordars

47.9％

47.9%

反派

Villains

27.6％

27.6%

奴隶

Slaves

12.3%

自由民

Freemen

7.1％

7.1%

其他的

Others

0.7％

0.7%

来源：McDonald，2002 年。

Source: McDonald, 2002.

表 4.3：封建剥削率的计算

TABLE 4.3: Calculation of a Feudal Rate of Exploitation

城市的

Urban

4.5％

4.5%

奴隶

Slaves

12.3%

其他的

Others

0.7％

0.7%

维持盈余

Maintained out of Surplus

17.5％

17.5%

（編號）

(s)

生产人口

Productive Population

82.5％

82.5%

（页）

(p)

农村剥削率

Rural Exploitation Rate

21.2％

21.2%

（序号/列）

(s/p)

中国和欧洲的封建庄园广泛使用人工动力——主要是水力，但也有风力。《末日审判书》列出了 6,000 多个磨坊，大约每三个庄园就有一个磨坊，这是 11 世纪的数据。磨坊为领主剥削佃户提供了另一种手段，因为庄园会从磨碎的所有谷物中分得一杯羹。从某种意义上说，这类似于一种资本主义剥削形式，因为领主拥有机器而不是土地，从而获得了收入。但它与后来的资本主义不同，被剥削的人不操作机器。领主可以分得的份额显然是有限的，因为在最后的手段中，农民可以回到以前的方式，在家里用磨石磨玉米。但领主可以占有水力带来的部分生产力收益。

Feudal estates in China and Europe made extensive use of artificial power—primarily water, but also in places wind power. There are over 6,000 mills listed in the Domesday Book, about one mill for every three manors, and this is for the eleventh century. The mills provided an additional means by which the lords could exploit their tenants, since the estate would take a share of all grain milled. In a sense this was analogous to a form of capitalist exploitation, since it gave the lords a revenue by virtue of owning machinery rather than land. But it differed from later capitalism in that the people being exploited did not operate the machinery. There was obviously a limit to the cut that the lords could take, since in the last resort the peasants could go back to grinding the corn the old way, using querns at home. But the lords could appropriate part of the productivity gain that came from water power.

农民农业与商业奴隶经济和资本主义农业最关键的区别在于，很大一部分劳动人口能够获得土地，并以此养活自己。这种获得方式可以是土地的所有权、公共使用权或租用土地。关键在于，他们至少能够生存，而且经常有足够的繁殖剩余，使人口逐渐增长。多马理论预测，一旦无人占用、未被占用的土地不再存在，农奴经济中的人口增长就会导致脱离农奴制。但这最多是一个必要条件。这还不够，因为土地所有者可能会试图在一段时间内保持农奴制。要真正从支付金钱/租金的自由佃农转变为主要由资本主义佃农进行农业耕作的佃农，就像英国的情况一样，需要剥夺很大一部分农村人口的土地使用权和获得公共土地的权利。公有土地的持续存在是许多传统农民经济的一个主要特征。

The most critical feature that differentiates peasant agriculture from commercial slave economies and capitalist agriculture is that a large part of the working population has access to land on which they can feed themselves. This access may be in the form of secure ownership of plots, communal access rights, or rented plots. The crucial thing is that they are able at least to survive, and that there is often a sufficient reproductive surplus to allow gradual population growth. The Domar theory predicts that population growth in a serf economy should lead to a transition out of serfdom once the unoccupied, unappropriated land no longer exists. But this is at most a necessary condition. It is not sufficient since the landowners are likely to try to hold onto serfdom for some time. An actual shift from free tenants paying money/rent to one where farming is carried out mainly by capitalist tenant farmers, as occurred in Britain, requires that a significant part of the rural population be deprived both of security of tenure and of access to communal lands. The persistence of communal lands was a key feature of much traditional peasant economy.

4.4 与资本主义的比较

4.4 COMPARISON WITH CAPITALISM

我们既不应接受认为大量资源公有的传统农业效率低下的观点，也不应承认封建农业（传统农民农业的一个分支）在经济上不合理。哈丁（1968）的论点是，公有土地因过度使用不可避免地会退化，这一论点已被奥斯特罗姆等人（1999）系统地驳斥。我们知道，社区往往有详尽的程序和规则来防止过度使用公有土地并规范公平使用权。

We should neither accept the view that suggests that traditional agriculture with substantial resources held in common is inefficient, nor concede that feudal agriculture, a sub-species of traditional peasant farming, is economically irrational. The Hardin [1968] thesis that communal lands will inevitably be degraded by overuse has been systematically refuted by Ostrom et al. [1999]. We know that communities tended to have elaborate procedures and rules to prevent the overuse of common land and to regulate fair access.

有一种回顾性的自满情绪，认为资本主义的组织方式是独一无二的理性，只有货币经济，即土地和雇佣劳动的普遍私有制，才是高效的。这种观点在盎格鲁-撒克逊自由主义经济学中盛行并不奇怪，因为在英国，旧地主阶级不仅在他们的传统地产中保持稳固，而且在社会等级中的地位也保持稳固。同样，在贵族哈布斯堡王朝统治下形成的奥地利经济学派长期以来一直强调，没有私有制和货币，就不可能有合理的经济组织 [von Mises，1935；von Mises，1951；Hayek，1935]。但这种可以说是韦伯式的独特资本主义理性主义观念甚至在马克思主义经济学家海因里希和洛卡西奥 [2012] 中也很有影响力。在这种观念中，除非你有雇佣劳动，否则就不可能合理地计算比较成本。该论点认为，理性计算需要价值形式，而这种形式只有在劳动成为抽象劳动（被视为等同于有偿劳动）时才会占据主导地位。在第 3.6 节中，我指出，奴隶经济中的价格不仅发展得很好，而且至少在当时的农业手册中，明显试图合理利用奴隶劳动力。我先前论点的弱点在于它缺乏统计支持，因为它依赖于文学资料。对于封建经济来说，更好的统计资料仍然存在，因此可以有力地证明该系统的经济合理性。

There is a certain retrospective complacency that holds that capitalist ways of organizing are uniquely rational, and that only monetary economy, with universal private property in land and wage labor, can be efficient. That this view is prevalent in Anglo-Saxon liberal economics is not surprising, given that in Britain the old landowning classes remain secure not only in their traditional estates, but also in their position within the social hierarchy. Similarly, the Austrian school of economics, formed under an aristocratic Habsburg monarchy, has long emphasized the impossibility of rational economic organization without private ownership and money [von Mises, 1935; von Mises, 1951; Hayek, 1935]. But this arguably Weberian notion of unique capitalist rationalism is influential even among Marxist economists Heinrich and Locascio [2012]. In this conception, unless you have wage labor there can be no rational calculation of comparative costs. The argument goes that rational calculation requires the value form, and that this form only comes into dominance once labor becomes abstract labor, which is treated as being equivalent to waged labor. In section 3.6 I argued that not only were prices well developed in slave economy, but that there was, at least in the manuals of agriculture of the day, a clear attempt to make rational use of the slave labor available. The weakness of my earlier argument is that it lacked statistical support, relying as it did on literary sources. For feudal economy much better statistical sources have survived, and it is possible to make a strong case for the economic rationality of the system.

与奥地利学派的说法相反，自 20 世纪 30 年代以来，人们就已知道一些技术 [Kantorovich，1960；Panne 和 Rahnama，1985]，这些技术可以独立于价格进行效率计算。所使用的数学分支线性优化是苏联率先提出的，旨在在计划经济中实现工业产出最大化。如果一家工厂有一套特定的机器（比如三种类型的车床），并被要求以固定比例最大化两种商品的产出，那么安排机器使用的最佳方法是什么？

Contra the claims of the Austrian school, techniques have been known since the 1930s [Kantorovich, 1960; Panne and Rahnama, 1985] that allow efficiency calculations independent of prices. The branch of math used, linear optimization, was pioneered in the USSR as a means of maximizing industrial output in the planned economy. If a factory had a particular set of machinery—say three types of lathes—and was tasked with maximizing output of two goods in fixed proportions, what was the best way to schedule the use of the machines?

线性优化给出了答案^。58

Linear optimization provided an answer.⁵⁸

这里的关键思想是，一个生产单位，无论是封建庄园、苏联工厂还是美国露天煤矿，都会有几种类型的资源，这些资源必须结合起来才能产生产出。生产资源的性质以及当代知识将决定所谓的“技术”，这些技术将以固定比例组合投入。例如，在中世纪耕作时，农夫、犁和牛可以组合成两队、四队或八队牛。每一种都包含一种技术。如果一个人拥有足够多的农场投入和产出的数据，那么他就可以使用线性优化算法来推断出最好的底层技术是什么。

The key idea here is that a unit of production, whether it is a feudal manor, a Soviet factory, or an American open-cast coal mine, will have several types of resources that have to be combined to produce outputs. The nature of the productive resources along with contemporary knowledge will determine what are called “techniques” which combine inputs in fixed proportions. For example, when plowing in the Middle Ages, plowmen, plows, and oxen could be combined as two, four, or eight ox teams. Each of these would comprise a technique. If one has enough data on inputs and outputs from enough farms one can use linear optimization algorithms to deduce what the best underlying techniques are.

McDonald [2002] 将线性优化分析应用于《末日审判书》中描述的埃塞克斯和威尔特郡庄园的大型数据库 [McDonald, 2010]。对于 500 多个独立庄园，他都汇总了数据（见表4.1），并提供了每个庄园的产出信息。据此，可以根据当时的最佳实践对每个庄园的效率进行评级。对于每个庄园，他计算了其在土地面积、劳动力、犁队、磨坊等条件下可以生产的最大产量。他将这个数字与实际产量进行了比较。这个比率就是该庄园的效率。他发现，封建庄园的平均效率为 64%。

McDonald [2002] applied linear optimization analysis to large databases of estates in Essex and Wiltshire [McDonald, 2010] described in the Domesday record. For each of over 500 individual estates he had the data summarized (see Table 4.1), along with information on the output of each estate. From this it was possible to rate the efficiency of each of the estates against what was contemporary best practice. For each estate he calculated the maximum it could have produced given its acreage, labor force, plow teams, mills, etc. He compared this with what it actually produced. The ratio gives the efficiency of that particular estate. He found that on average the feudal estates ran at 64 percent efficiency.

64% 的效率评级是好还是坏？只有拥有其他历史时期大量生产单位的效率评级，才能做出判断。这些评级必须采用与末日审判样本相同的线性优化技术计算，才能进行比较。麦克唐纳将末日审判庄园与线性规划文献中使用类似方法的其他例子进行了比较。他的结果总结在表 4.4中。

Was 64 percent good or bad as an efficiency rating? One can only make a judgment if one has efficiency ratings for large groups of production units from other historical periods. These ratings, to be comparable, must have been computed by the same linear optimization technique used for the Domesday sample. McDonald compared Domesday estates with other examples in the linear programming literature where similar methods had been used. His results are summarized in Table 4.4.

必须承认，从这些数据来看，撒克逊封建经济看起来相当不错。它比 19 世纪或 20 世纪的美国农场效率高得多，与美国机械化露天煤矿的效率相当。只有在蒸汽发电站这种高度工程化的技术中，生产单位群体的效率才更高。

It has to be admitted that, from this data, Saxon feudal economy looks pretty good. It was a lot more efficient than nineteenth- or twentieth-century U.S. farms and comparable to the efficiency of mechanized U.S. open-cast coal mines. Only in the highly engineered technology of steam power stations did a population of units of production show better efficiency.

请记住，这里测量的不是农场或矿山的绝对劳动生产率。这是不可能的，因为 1086 年英国生产的作物（小麦、大麦、羊毛）与美国南部种植的棉花、玉米和豆类，或加利福尼亚的地中海式作物不同。我们也不能得出结论说，埃塞克斯郡每个工人每年的小麦产量与 19 世纪或 20 世纪同一片埃塞克斯土地上的产量一样大。不，这里比较的是，在当时可用的技术条件下，企业的运营效率如何。表 4.4显示，即使在没有竞争要素市场的情况下，在庄园无需担心破产的时代，在农奴和奴隶的劳动下，封建领地至少与现代领地一样高效。麦当劳的工作必须被视为反对资本主义优越理性主张的有力证据。

Remember, what is being measured is not the absolute labor productivities of farms or mines. This would be impossible since the crops produced in England in 1086—wheat, barley, wool—are not the same as the cotton, corn, and beans grown in the U.S. South, or the Mediterranean-style crops of California. Nor can we conclude that wheat production per worker year in Essex was as big as it was on the same Essex land in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. No, what is being compared is how efficiently the enterprises were being run given the technology available at the time. Table 4.4 shows that even in the absence of competitive-factor markets, at a time when manors never needed fear bankruptcy, with the labor of serfs and slaves, feudal demesnes were at least as efficient as their modern equivalent. McDonald’s work has to be counted as strong evidence against claims of superior capitalist rationality.

表 4.4：封建生产与现代生产的效率比较

TABLE 4.4: Comparing the Efficiency of Feudal Production with Modern Production

历史样本

Historical Sample

日期

Dates

效率平均值

Mean of Efficiency

末日审判庄园

Domesday Manors

1086

64.3%

美国南方农场

U.S. Southern Farms

1880

12.0％

12.0%

美国加州农场

U.S. California Farms

1977

28.0％

28.0%

美国中西部矿山

U.S. Midwest Mines

1975

60.8％

60.8%

美国西部矿山

U.S. West Mines

1975

61.1％

61.1%

美国蒸汽发电站

U.S. Steam Power Stations

1947–63

80.0％

80.0%

来源：McDonald，2002 年，第 6 章。

Source: McDonald, 2002, chapter 6.

我认为，现代农场的生产力更多地归功于拖拉机和哈伯⁵⁹，而不是任何固有的资本主义效率。

The productivity of modern farms owes, I think, more to tractors and to Haber⁵⁹ than to any inherent capitalist efficiency.

4.5 斯密对封建制度的批判

4.5 THE SMITHIAN CRITIQUE OF FEUDALISM

一个经济体可以分为两个总体部门：生产部门或基础部门 [Sraffa, 1960]，其产出直接或间接进入劳动人民及其家属的消费；以及由其余经济活动组成的“非生产部门”。60^我在第 4.3 节中使用了这种区分，以大致了解中期封建英格兰的剥削率。

An economy can be partitioned into two aggregate sectors: the productive or basic sector [Sraffa, 1960], the output of which enters directly or indirectly into the consumption of the working people and their dependants, and the “unproductive sector” that comprises the remaining economic activities.⁶⁰ I used this distinction in section 4.3 to get ballpark figures for the rate of exploitation in mid-feudal England.

这两类劳动的概念区别可以追溯到亚当·斯密。他批评地主阶级和“大商人”在雇佣没有生产力的私人仆人方面浪费资源的程度：

The conceptual distinction between these two types of labor goes all the way back to Adam Smith. He criticized the extent to which the landlord classes and “great merchants” wasted resources in employing unproductive personal servants:

土地租金和资本利润无处不在，因此，它们是非生产性劳动力维持生计的主要来源。这两种收入通常是土地所有者最省下的。他们可能都无差别地养活生产性劳动力或非生产性劳动力。然而，他们似乎对后者有些偏爱。大领主的开支通常养活的闲人多于勤劳的人。富商虽然用他的资本只养活勤劳的人，但他的开支，即通过利用他的收入，通常养活的也是大领主所养活的人。[Smith，1974，II.3.7]

The rent of land and the profits of stock are everywhere; therefore, the principal sources from which unproductive hands derive their subsistence. These are the two sorts of revenue of which the owners have generally most to spare. They might both maintain indifferently either productive or unproductive hands. They seem, however, to have some predilection for the latter. The expense of a great lord feeds generally more idle than industrious people. The rich merchant, though with his capital he maintains industrious people only, yet by his expence, that is, by the employment of his revenue, he feeds commonly the very same sort as the great lord. [Smith, 1974, II.3.7]

他继续论证说，随着封建制度的转变，用于支持生产工人的国家收入的比例将会增加。

He goes on to argue that with the transition out of feudalism the proportion of the national revenue that goes to the support of productive workers rises.

因此，目前，在欧洲富裕的国家，土地生产物的很大一部分，通常是最大一部分，都用于补偿富裕独立农民的资本；另一部分用于支付他的利润和地主的租金。但在古代，在封建政府盛行时期，只有很小一部分生产物足以补偿耕种所用的资本。它通常包括几头可怜的牲畜，完全由未开垦土地的自然产物维持，因此可以将其视为自然产物的一部分。它通常也属于地主，并由他预付给土地的占有者。其余所有生产物也都属于他，要么作为土地的租金，要么作为这笔微不足道的资本的利润。土地的占有者通常是奴隶，他们的人和财物同样是他的财产。[Smith，1974，II.3.9]

Thus, at present, in the opulent countries of Europe, a very large, frequently the largest portion of the produce of the land is destined for replacing the capital of the rich and independent farmer; the other for paying his profits and the rent of the landlord. But anciently, during the prevalency of the feudal government, a very small portion of the produce was sufficient to replace the capital employed in cultivation. It consisted commonly in a few wretched cattle, maintained altogether by the spontaneous produce of uncultivated land, and which might, therefore, be considered as a part of that spontaneous produce. It generally, too, belonged to the landlord, and was by him advanced to the occupiers of the land. All the rest of the produce properly belonged to him too, either as rent for his land, or as profit upon this paltry capital. The occupiers of land were generally bondmen, whose persons and effects were equally his property. [Smith, 1974, II.3.9]

斯密在论证中交替采用个人主义和社会主义的方法。从个人富人的立场来看，他说，花在仆人身上会耗尽他的资本，而花在生产工人身上则能为资本带来利润。他还研究了这对整体劳动分工的影响。61^在像英国和荷兰这样的进步资产阶级国家，城市是制造中心，而在罗马或凡尔赛的旧制度下，城市里充满了游手好闲、放荡不羁、贫穷的宫廷仆人。因此，他的基本论点是，在封建制度下，剩余产品绝大多数被浪费在了非生产性方面，而在现代（十八世纪）国家，大部分资金都用于雇用生产性劳动者，从而创造了一个更加勤劳、繁荣和清醒的社会。

Smith alternates in his argument between an individualistic and a social approach to the question. From the standpoint of the individual rich man he says that spending on servants depletes his capital whereas spending on productive workers returns the capital with a profit. He also looks at the effect that this has on the overall division of labor.⁶¹ In progressive bourgeois states like England and Holland the cities were manufacturing centers, whereas under the ancien regime at Rome or Versailles they were full of idle, dissolute, and poor servants of the court. So his basic argument was that under feudalism the surplus product was overwhelmingly spent unproductively, whereas in the modern (eighteenth-century) countries, the greater part of funds were spent employing productive laborers creating a more industrious, prosperous, and sober society.

要了解斯密论点的含义，首先请看表 4.5中与 16 世纪苏格兰经济规模相当的封建式经济的实物和货币账户。人口划分旨在与表 4.1 中所示的类似，表 4.1是先前讨论封建制度的一部分。我们忽略了领主自己和城市主人的食物消费。假设农民以 1,752,000 夸脱玉米的形式向领主交付租金，领主用 1,314,000 夸脱玉米来养活仆人和自己，其余的 438,000 夸脱在城镇市场上以 657,000 英镑的价格出售。领主用卖玉米得到的钱购买了价值 657,000 英镑的城市商品。我们可以假设这些将是农具、武器和奢侈品的混合体。假设城镇和乡村的剥削率都是25%，城镇的业主必须赚取164,000英镑的利润，他们将把这笔钱花在城市商品上。

To see the implications of Smith’s argument look first at the physical and monetary accounts of a feudal style economy about the size of sixteenth-century Scotland’s economy in Table 4.5. The population division is designed to resemble that shown in Table 4.1 as part of the earlier discussion of feudalism. We neglect the food consumption of the lords themselves and of the urban masters. The peasants are assumed to deliver rent in kind of 1,752,000 qts corn to the lords who use 1,314,000 qts to feed their servants and themselves and the remainder, 438,000 qts, is sold on the town markets for £657,000. With the money they get from selling the corn, the lords buy an equivalent £657,000 of urban goods. We can assume that these will be a mix of agricultural implements, arms, and luxuries. On the assumption that in both town and country the rate of exploitation is 25 percent, the masters in the towns must make a profit of £164,000 that they are assumed to spend on urban goods.

表 4.5：封建经济消费

TABLE 4.5: Feudal Economic Consumption

亚当·斯密批评的那种封建经济是低效的，价格大约为 1500 元，每季度 30 先令。食物消费量以每人每天 2,200 卡路里计算，然后以 1 磅玉米提供 1,637 卡路里热量为基础换算成玉米。来源：作者整理。

Feudal economy of the type criticized by Adam Smith as being unproductive, prices taken to be in ballpark for 1500 at 30/- per quarter. Consumption of food is estimated on the basis of 2,200 calories per person per day, which is then converted to corn on the basis that 1lb of corn provides 1,637 calories. Source: Compiled by the author.

虽然表格以货币形式显示了生产和消费的谷物价值，但这只是一种归因价值，因为在封建经济中，大多数作物从未上市销售。用斯密的术语来说，“可销售”商品的总和可以计算如下：

Although the table shows the value of corn produced and consumed in money terms, this is just an attributed value, since in a feudal economy most of the crop is never marketed. The total sum of “vendible” commodities, to use Smith’s terminology, can be calculated as follows:

现在假设发生了社会转型，仆人阶级转变为城市工厂的雇佣工人，正如史密斯所倡导的那样。城市部门的产出将增长 300%，因为现在城市工人的数量是原来的四倍。同样，城市部门的粮食销售也会增长，因为仆人在主人的大厅里吃饭，而雇佣工人则不得不在市场上购买面包。总体效果是市场经济将增长到 5,192,000 英镑。然而，这是否只是将曾经是自然经济要素的商品化所带来的幻觉？

Now suppose that there is a social transformation and the servant class is transformed into wage workers in urban manufactories as Smith advocated. The output of the urban sector would grow by 300 percent as there would now be four times as many urban workers. Similarly, grain sales to the urban sector would grow, since while servants were fed in their master’s hall, wage workers had to buy bread on the market. The overall effect would be to grow the market economy to £5,192,000. Is this just an illusion, though, brought about by commodifying what was previously an element of natural economy?

不，不完全是，因为城市经济的实际产出将是以前的家臣无产阶级化之前的三倍，尽管向城镇出售的粮食增加并不涉及实际生产量没有比以前增长多少。商品流通的增长夸大了生产量的实际增长，但实际生产量还是有增长的。

No, not entirely, since the real output in kind of the urban economy would be three times what it was before the erstwhile retainers were proletarianized, though the increased sale of grain to the towns does not involve any more actually being grown than before. The growth of commodity circulation exaggerates the real increase in production; but there is a real increase all the same.

但这并没有触及史密斯对封建主义产生的非生产性经济和制造业资产阶级产生的生产性经济的区分的核心。因为在我给出的例子中，几乎整个城市产品的市场仍然由农村贵族提供。他们将收取的租金的谷物市场化，为他们提供了收入，以消费大部分增加的城市生产。史密斯将爱丁堡在 17 世纪及更早时期的情况与 1707 年以后的情况进行了对比，如下所示：

But this does not get to the heart of Smith’s distinction between the unproductive economy generated by feudalism and the productive one generated by the manufacturing bourgeoisie. For in the example I have given almost the entire market for the urban product is still provided by the rural aristocracy. Their marketization of the grain they collect as rent gives them the revenue to consume the greater part of the augmented urban production. Smith contrasts the situation of Edinburgh in the seventeenth century and earlier with its position after 1707 as follows:

在联合之前，爱丁堡几乎没有贸易或工业。当苏格兰议会不再在这里召开，当它不再是苏格兰主要贵族和绅士的必需住所时，它就变成了一个贸易和工业城市。然而，它仍然是苏格兰主要法院、海关和消费税委员会等的所在地。因此，仍有相当一部分收入用于这里。在贸易和工业方面，它远不如格拉斯哥，格拉斯哥的居民主要靠资本的雇佣来维持生活。有时人们会发现，一个大村庄的居民在制造业取得长足进步后，由于一位大领主在他们附近定居，他们变得懒惰和贫穷。[Smith，1974，II.3.12]

There was little trade or industry in Edinburgh before the union. When the Scotch Parliament was no longer to be assembled in it, when it ceased to be the necessary residence of the principal nobility and gentry of Scotland, it became a city of some trade and industry. It still continues, however, to be the residence of the principal courts of justice in Scotland, of the Boards of Customs and Excise, etc. A considerable revenue, therefore, still continues to be spent in it. In trade and industry it is much inferior to Glasgow, of which the inhabitants are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital. The inhabitants of a large village, it has sometimes been observed, after having made considerable progress in manufactures, have become idle and poor in consequence of a great lord having taken up his residence in their neighbourhood. [Smith, 1974, II.3.12]

史密斯对这两座城市的观察至少在 20 世纪末期仍然有效。他认为格拉斯哥这样的城市“是贸易城市……这些城市不仅为自己的消费而贸易，还为其他城市和国家贸易。”相比之下，巴黎、罗马或 17 世纪的爱丁堡等城市仅为宫廷和贵族的消费而贸易。今天人们也可以做出类似的观察，将华盛顿与纽约、巴西利亚与里约、堪培拉与悉尼进行对比。关键问题是资本与收入之间的比率，因此也是生产性就业与非生产性就业之间的比率。

The observations that Smith makes about the two cities remained valid at least until the late twentieth century. He considered cities like Glasgow “as trading cities … as cities which trade not only for their own consumption, but for that of other cities and countries.” In contrast to cities like Paris or Rome or seventeenth-century Edinburgh that traded only for the consumption of the royal courts and nobility in residence. One could make similar observations today, contrasting Washington to New York, Brasilia to Rio, Canberra to Sydney. The key issue is the ratio between capital and revenue, and thus between productive and unproductive employment.

因此，资本和收入之间的比例似乎到处都在调节勤奋和懒惰之间的比例。资本占主导地位的地方，勤奋占主导地位；收入占主导地位的地方，懒惰占主导地位。因此，资本的每次增加或减少，自然都会增加或减少勤奋的实际数量，即生产工人的数量，从而决定了该国土地和劳动力年产量的交换价值，即该国所有居民的实际财富和收入。[Smith，1974，II.3.13]

The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere to regulate the proportion between industry and idleness. Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails: wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase or diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish the real quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and consequently the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labor of the country, the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants. [Smith, 1974, II.3.13]

问题不仅仅是我上面计算的那种静态比较，即一次性将保留金转移给雇佣劳动者，而是不断积累资本、不断将收入转化为资本的过程，从而提高物质生产力。斯密对非生产性支出的根本反对意见是，它阻碍了资本的积累。只有通过将收入转化为资本，社会的实际生产能力才能提高：

The issue is not just the sort of static comparison I calculated above, a one-time transfer of retainers to wage laborers, but the process of continuously accumulating capital, continuously converting revenue into capital, which increases physical productivity. Smith’s fundamental objection to unproductive expenditure is that it impedes the accumulation of capital. It is only by converting revenue into capital that the productive capacity of society in real terms can increase:

一个人的资本只能通过他从年收入或年收益中储蓄的资金来增加，因此，社会的资本（即组成社会的所有个人的资本）只能以相同的方式增加。[Smith，1974，II.3.15]

As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner. [Smith, 1974, II.3.15]

^{他意识到，}随着资本的积累，越来越多的劳动力只是从事资本的替换和维护，因此，随着资本与收入之比的上升，资本回报率将下降。62他认为，这是经济进步的必然伴随物。我们将在下一章中更详细地讨论这一点。

He realizes that with the accumulation of capital an increased part of the workforce is engaged in simply replacing and maintaining the capital, and that in consequence the rate of return on capital will fall as the proportion between capital and revenue rises.⁶² This, he believed, was a necessary accompaniment to economic progress. We will examine this in more detail in the next chapter.

他对资本积累的关注，使他明确区分了生产性活动和“在执行的瞬间就消亡”的非生产性服务，前者实际上生产出持久的有形产品。反对封建制度作为一种社会秩序的理由不是效率低下，而是挥霍浪费。贵族在挥霍浪费劳动以炫耀奢侈的方式阻碍了进步。我们将在下一章中看到，同样的反对意见也适用于现代资本主义的食利者阶级^。63

His concern with the accumulation of capital is why he makes a sharp distinction between productive activities, which actually produce a persisting physical product, and unproductive services that “perish in the very instant of their performance.” The objection to feudalism as a social order was not inefficiency, but profligacy and waste. It was the way that the nobility wasted labor in prodigal displays of luxury that held back progress. We will see in a subsequent chapter that this same objection comes to apply to the rentier classes of modern capitalism.⁶³

第五章

CHAPTER 5

资本主义经济

Capitalist Economy

手磨坊造就了封建领主主导的社会，而蒸汽磨坊则造就了工业资本家主导的社会。

The hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist.

— 卡尔·马克思，1847 年

— KARL MARX, 1847

资本主义生产方式是机器生产。资本主义社会的特点是：

The capitalist mode of production is machine production. Capitalist societies feature:

• 能源主要来自人工而非人类来源

• Energy mainly from artificial not human sources

• 高产农业支持大量城市人口。

• High-yield agriculture supporting large urban populations.

• 机械和应用科学的广泛使用。

• Widespread use of machinery and applied science.

• 大量受薪工人在私营企业中生产商品。

• Lots of waged workers making commodities in private enterprises.

• 剩余产品表现为货币利润。

• The surplus product appearing as monetary profit.

上述成分构成了一个自催化系统 [Kauffman, 1993]。在外部能源的供给下，这个组合系统会自我复制并成长。显然，这些成分并不是一蹴而就的。早期存在过自催化社会系统。构成资本主义的一些要素必须在资本主义统治之前由这些先前的系统产生。64^正如阿尔都塞等人 [2006] 所言，⁶⁵资本主义要素的部分组合以前曾出现过，但并未导致完全资本主义。如果鲁索 [2013] 的说法可信，那么几乎所有要素都在托勒密王朝的埃及出现过。阿尔都塞引用了文艺复兴时期的意大利作为另一种可能存在的资本主义。新系统的最终形成是一个随机的溅射过程，最终着火了。

The components listed above constitute an auto-catalytic system [Kauffman, 1993]. Given external sources of energy, the composed system reproduces itself and grows. Obviously these components do not spring full-formed. There were earlier auto-catalytic social systems. Some of the elements that make up capitalism must be generated by these prior systems before capitalist dominance.⁶⁴ As Althusser et al. [2006] argue,⁶⁵ partial combinations of capitalist elements have come together before without leading to full capitalism. If Russo [2013] is to be believed almost all the elements came together in Ptolemaic Egypt. Althusser cites Renaissance Italy as another capitalism that might have been. The eventual formation of a new system was a stochastic sputtering process before it finally caught fire.

每一种历史经济类型都涉及一种独特的技术制造方式——马克思的生产方式——它与社会形式或生产关系相结合。后者中最重要的就是剩余产品提取的形式。在本章后面的部分中，我将研究这种剩余产品是如何产生的，以及它如何与资本主义的典型技术综合体相互作用：高产农业、机械、应用科学和人工智能。由于所有这些都与市场生产联系在一起，所以我首先关注的是市场生产。

Each historical type of economy involves a characteristic technical way of making things—Marx’s mode of production—which is combined with social forms or relations of production. The most critical of the latter is the form of extraction of the surplus product. In later sections of this chapter I will examine how this surplus is produced and how that interacts with the typical technology complex of capitalism: high-yield agriculture, machinery, applied science, and artificial power. Since all of these are tied together by production for the market, that is what I look at first.

5.1 资本主义价格机制

5.1 THE CAPITALIST PRICE MECHANISM

在第 3.6 节中，我讨论了奴隶经济中劳动时间调节价格的方式。在第 3.5.3 节中，我引用了大量实证文献，这些文献表明劳动时间调节当代价格。但在现代资本主义经济中，这种情况发生的机制并不像奴隶制时期那样不言而喻。与我为大庄园描述的类似的过程也适用于同时生产多条产品线的公司。他们可以比较不同产品线（例如不同型号的汽车）所需的劳动力，并将其销售价格设定为与所用劳动力大致成比例。然而，汽车公司的情况与奴隶庄园在两个重要方面有所不同：

In section 3.6 I discussed how the regulation of prices by expended labor worked in slave economies. And in section 3.5.3 I referred to the extensive empirical literature showing that labor time regulates contemporary prices. But in modern capitalist economies the mechanisms by which this happens are not as self-evident as they were under slavery. A similar process to that I described for latifundia would work for companies that also made several product lines. They can compare the labor required by different lines of products—different models of cars, for example—and set their selling prices to be roughly proportional to the labor used. The situation of a car company, though, is different in two important respects from a slave estate:

1. 汽车公司必须购买构成最终汽车的许多零部件。这些零部件的成本可能占最终售价的很大一部分，而大庄园的自给自足程度要高得多。他们可能带来了一些供应，但数量不多^。66

1. A car firm has to buy many of the components that make up the final car. The cost of these components can be a significant part of the final selling price, whereas the latifundia was much more self-sufficient. They may have brought in some supplies, but not many.⁶⁶

2.封建领主已经拥有其奴隶和农奴的劳动能力。因此，他可以直接计算不同作物所耗费的劳动时间，而无需通过货币计算。因此，前资本主义经济在社会劳动方面应该更直接合理。企业必须按周或按月购买劳动力，因此面临的是更直接的货币成本，而不仅仅是劳动力成本。工资成本与组件成本是同质的。两者都是以货币计算的。

2. A dominus, or feudal lord, already claims the laboring capacity of his slaves and serfs. He can therefore directly calculate labor time expended on different crops without resorting to calculations in money terms. Thus precapitalist economy should be more directly rational in terms of social labor. A firm has to buy the labor force by the week or month, and so is faced with a more immediate monetary cost, not just a cost in terms of labor. The wage cost is then homogeneous with component costs. Both are in terms of money.

第一点，企业购买零部件，并不是一个严重的问题。如果企业只是将零部件成本转嫁到最终产品中，并使零部件的加价与所雇用的劳动力成比例，并且如果所有企业都遵循这种做法，那么包括零部件在内的所有价格，通过递归，最终将由最终使用的劳动力决定。

The first point, that firms buy in components, is not a serious problem. If the firms simply pass on the component costs in the final product, and make their markup on components proportional to the labor they employ, and if all firms follow this practice, all prices including those of the components will, by recursion, end up being determined by the ultimate labor used.

虽然公司确实需要雇佣劳动力，因此将其视为货币成本，但这并不妨碍他们根据人月数对项目成本进行内部估算。事实上，他们必须先这样做，否则他们不知道必须雇佣多少工人。即使在资本主义货币经济中，直接计算劳动时间在逻辑上也优先于现金计算。

Although firms do have to hire labor power, and are thus presented with it as a monetary cost, this does not prevent them from doing internal estimates of what a project will cost in terms of person months. Indeed they are obliged to do this first, otherwise they do not know many workers they must hire. Even in a capitalist monetary economy direct calculations of labor time are logically prior to calculations in cash.

但就其本身而言，这并非一个无懈可击的论点。为什么不同行业的不同企业应该对劳动力使用相同的加价？

But by itself this is not a watertight argument. Why should different firms in different industries use the same markup for labor?

为什么他们的加价依据应该是劳动力成本，而不是其他成本呢？

Why indeed should it be labor that they base their markup on, rather than other costs?

在我的论证中，我将反复依赖所谓的平均律或大数定律。平均律的一个例子是：每个女性的身高各不相同，但如果你随机抽取 100 名女性并计算出这 100 名女性的平均身高，它将非常接近所有女性的平均身高。样本中的高个子女性将抵消矮个子女性。我将反复使用这种论证。

In my argument I will repeatedly rely on what is called either the law of averages or the law of large numbers. An example of the law of averages is: individual women vary in heights, but it you take 100 women at random and work out the average height of these 100, it will be very close to the average height of all women. The tall women in the sample will cancel out the short women. I will use this kind of argument repeatedly.

回到企业：我们不必假设所有企业的加价都相同。我们只需证明，在实践中，使用的加价范围必须很窄。如果大多数加价都非常接近平均水平，那么劳动力最终将决定价格结构。

Returning to firms: we do not have to assume that all firms have the same markup We only have to demonstrate that there must in practice be a narrow range of markups used. If most markups are pretty close to the average, then labor ends up determining the price structure.

首先，考虑任何产品的劳动内容由两部分组成：

First, consider that the labor content of any product is made up of two parts:

这里的“组件”一词应理解为不仅包括物理上进入产品的事物，如汽车轮胎，还包括所使用的电力和生产线机械的局部磨损等。

The term “components” here should be understood to include not only things that physically pass into the product like tires on a car, but also the things like the electricity used and the fractional wear-and-tear on the productionline machinery.

现在考虑一下销售价格与劳动含量的比率。我们可以预期这会在不同产品之间随机变化，但这种随机变化的规模会很小。价格也有两个组成部分：

Now consider the ratio of selling price to labor content. We can expect this to vary randomly among products, but the scale of this random variation will be small. The price will also have two components:

由于任何给定产品都会使用许多不同的部件，而且这些部件的价格与劳动力比率会朝不同的方向变化，有些高于平均水平，有些低于平均水平，因此这些变化往往会抵消。根据大数定律，任何一大批部件的总价格与劳动力比率都将非常接近经济中普遍存在的平均比率。因此，我们可以近似地得到：

Since many different components will be used in any given product, and since the price-to-labor ratios of these will vary in different directions, some above the average, some below the average, these variations will tend to cancel out. The total price-to-labor ratio of any large bundle of components will, by the law of large numbers, be very close to the average ratio prevailing in the economy. So to a good approximation, we have:

表达式“平均加价 × 平均工资”给出了劳动增加值平均值 (AVAL)。它衡量一小时的工作为产出增加了多少英镑、美元或欧元。我们对个别公司的加价了解多少？

The expression Average markup × Average wage gives the Average Value Added by Labor (AVAL). It measures how many £, $, or € are added to the output by an hour’s work. What do we know about the markup in individual firms?

我们知道，平均加价率必须大于 100%。否则，就不会有利润，经济也不会是资本主义的。如果加价率为 150%，则意味着企业每支付 1 英镑工资，就会获得 50 便士的总盈余。我们并不关心这个总盈余如何划分为利润、租金、利息和税收。重要的是它存在。

Well we know that the average mark-up must be greater than 100 percent. Were it not, there would be no profits and the economy would not be capitalist. If the markup was 150 percent it would mean that firms made a gross surplus of 50p on every £1 they paid in wages. How this gross surplus is divided up into profit, rent, interest, and tax does not concern us here. What is important is that it exists.

我们还知道，很少有公司会亏损经营。一些公司可能会在短时间内亏损，但这个过程是自我限制的。它们要么恢复盈利，要么倒闭。因此，很少有个别公司的加价率会低于 100%。假设最多有 1% 的公司加价意味着他们亏损。如果平均加价率为 150%，我们可以使用正态分布表来计算加价的标准误差必须是多少才能确保只有 1% 的公司亏损。它必须是 21.5%。这意味着 95% 的公司最终的加价率将在 107% 到 193% 之间。

We also know that very few firms will be operating at a loss. Some firms may be loss making for a short while, but the process is self-limiting. They either return to profit or close. So very few individual firms will have a markup that is below 100 percent. Let us say that at most 1 percent of firms have a markup that means they make a loss. If the average markup is 150 percent we can use a table of the normal distribution to work out what the standard error of the markup must be to ensure that only 1 percent of firms make a loss. It has to be 21.5 percent. This means that 95 percent of firms would end up with a markup of between 107 percent and 193 percent.

我们可以用变异系数来衡量数据的分散程度，该变异系数由以下规则给出：

One measures the spread of data by its coefficient of variation given by the rule

在我们目前的例子中，标价的变异系数 (CV) 为 21.5/150 = 14%。标价变异的规律如下：

In the example we have so far the coefficient of variation (CV) in the markup would be 21.5/150 = 14 percent. The laws governing the markup’s variance are:

• 亏损公司的比例越小，加价幅度就越小

• The smaller the fraction of firms that are loss making, the smaller the spread of the markup

• 平均加价幅度越高，加价幅度越大。正态分布是对称的，因此，如果平均加价幅度为 200%，则加价幅度将在 114% 至 286% 之间，是 150% 加价幅度的两倍。

• The higher the average markup, the higher the spread of the markup. A normal distribution is symmetrical so if the average markup is 200 percent then the spread of markups would be between 114 percent and 286 percent, which is twice what you get with a 150 percent markup.

整个经济的平均加价幅度如下：

The average markup for the whole economy is given by:

所需的数据可从已发布的国民收入统计中轻松获得，从而让我们能够估计企业使用的加价幅度。显然，最终产出的英镑/小时比率的变化必然小于加价幅度。销售价格由企业加价加上转嫁的零部件成本决定。根据平均法则，一揽子零部件的英镑/小时比率的差额小于单个商品的差额。因此，转嫁零部件成本将抑制最终销售价格的英镑/小时差额。

The data needed can easily be obtained from published National Income statistics allowing us to estimate the spread of markups used by firms. It is obvious that the variation of the £/hour ratio of the final output is bound to be smaller than the spread of markups. Selling prices are determined by firm markups plus the passed on cost of components. By the law of averages, the spread in the £/hour ratio in a bundle of components is smaller than the spread for individual commodities. So passing on the component cost will dampen the £/hour spread of final selling prices.

如果零部件成本占到销售价格的 1/3，那么这将使加价 CV 从 14% 降低到销售价格 CV 10% 左右 [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998b] ^。67

If the component costs were to make up, say, 1/3 of the selling price then this would reduce a CV of 14 percent in mark-ups to something more like a CV of 10 percent for selling prices [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998b].⁶⁷

总之，我已经证明了⁶⁸古典经济学家关于价格由劳动力决定的假设是正确的。古典理论具有奥卡姆的威廉所规定的简单性，可以按照科学方法的要求进行检验，并且其操作由简单的统计数据强制执行。因此，我们在表 5.1中看到，美国不同行业产出的货币价值与生产这些产出所需的直接和间接劳动力之间的相关性达到 97%。请注意，行业货币产出的变化几乎完全是由于生产其产出所使用的直接和间接劳动力的差异造成的 [Cockshott and Cottrell，1997d]。

In conclusion, I have shown⁶⁸ why the classical economists were right in assuming that prices are determined by labor. The classical theory has the simplicity prescribed by William of Ockham, is testable as the scientific method demands, and its operation is enforced by simple statistics. So we see in table 5.1 that the correlation between the monetary value of output in different U.S. industries stands at the 97 percent level with the direct and indirect labor required to produce these outputs. Note that the variation in industry monetary outputs is almost completely due to the differences in direct and indirect labor used to produce their outputs [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1997d].

这一古典价格理论的另一个可检验的结果是，劳动资本比率越高，利润率就越高，反之亦然。我们稍后会看到，这是一个影响资本主义长期未来的重要历史效应，但它也会在现实中发挥作用，导致资本劳动比率高的行业利润率较低。

Another testable consequence of this classical theory of prices is that profit rates will be higher where the labor-to-capital ratio is higher and vice versa. We will see later that this is an important historical effect shaping the long-term future of capitalism, but it also operates in real time to cause those industries with a high capital-to-labor ratio to have a lower rate of profit.

表 5.1：斯拉法 (Sraffa, 1960) 预测的美国 47 个工业部门总产出的对数估计矩阵的相关性

TABLE 5.1: Correlation of Matrix of Logs of Estimates of Total Industry Output for 47 Sectors of U.S. Industry as Predicted by Sraffian (Sraffa, 1960) Prices

P = 产出的观测货币价值；E1 = 劳动含量；

P = observed monetary value of output; E1 = labor content;

E2 = 产出的货币价值。来源：Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1997d。

E2 = monetary value of output. Source: Cockshott and Cottrell, 1997d.

图 5.1. 美国工业利润率与资本构成之间的关系，经济事务局固定资本加上一个月流动不变资本作为资本存量的估计值（对数尺度）。来源：Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1997d。

Figure 5.1. Relationship between profit rates and capital composition for U.S. industries, Bureau of Economic Affairs fixed capital plus one month’s circulatingconstant capital as estimate of capital stock (log scales). Source: Cockshott and Cottrell, 1997d.

图 5.1和表 5.2显示了这一情况。表格显示了美国 47 个行业的利润率与有机构成之间的相关系数，以及利润率与有机构成倒数之间的相关系数。前者系数为 0.454，在 1% 的水平上具有统计显著性。69图 5.1^非常清楚地表明，资本与劳动比率高的美国行业利润率较低。

This is shown in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2. The table displays the correlation coefficient between the rate of profit and organic composition, and also between the profit rate and the inverse of organic composition, across 47 U.S. industries. The former coefficient—at .454—is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.⁶⁹ Figure 5.1 shows very clearly that those U.S. industries with high capital-to-labor ratios have low rates of profit.

5.2 递归关系

5.2 RECURRENCE RELATIONS

到目前为止，关于劳动力为何调节价格的论据都是务实而详细的。这些论据依赖于企业不破产，以及关于国家增加值在劳动力和资本之间的分配的偶然信息。这些因素是真实而直接的，但它们本身是更深层次结构的结果。

The arguments for why labor regulates prices have so far been pragmatic and detailed. They rely on firms not going bankrupt, and on contingent information about the distribution of national value added between labor and capital. These factors are real and immediate, but they are themselves consequences of deeper structures.

任何经济体系都是一个过程，它在精细层面上不断变化，但在粗糙层面上相对稳定。所有个体产品都在发生变化，这些产品被劳动转化，然后被消费或安置。人口是由凡人组成的，因此其成员不断更替。但也有一定的稳定性。每年人口数量变化不大。城镇会扩大和缩小，但它们可以保持相同的基本街道规划几个世纪。工业和家族在几十年到几个世纪的时间里发展和消亡。企业和家庭在较短的时期内也是如此。

Any economic system is a process, one that undergoes constant change at the fine level, but shows relative stability at the coarse level. There is change at the level of all the individual products that are being transformed by labor and are then consumed or emplaced. The population is made up of mortal members, so its membership constantly turns over. But there are certain stabilities. From year to year the number of people changes only slightly. Towns grow and shrink, but they can endure with the same basic street plan for centuries. Industries and family lines grow and die over periods from decades to centuries. Firms and households do the same over shorter periods.

但是这些生长、存活和死亡的东西到底是什么呢？

But what are these things that grow, persist, and die?

表5.2：利润率、加价率和资本构成，经济事务局固定资本加上一个月流动不变资本作为美国47个行业资本存量的估计值

TABLE 5.2: Profit Rates, Markup, and Capital Composition, Bureau Economic Affairs Fixed Capital Plus One Month’s Circulating Constant Capital as Estimate of Capital Stock for 47 U.S. Industries

利润 = s，工资 = v，资本存量 = C。来源：Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1997d。

Profits = s, wages = v, capital stock = C. Source: Cockshott and Cottrell, 1997d.

它们都是过程，其表面的“物性”依赖于重复，从而形成一种保持一定基本结构的稳态。生产往往是直接循环的，例如年度农业周期，或福特原生产线的三分钟重复周期。在造船等其他行业，重复更为近似。每艘船的大小、形状和建造时间各不相同，但仍保留着结构周期，从铺设龙骨到组装，再到下水和装配。

They are all processes, and their apparent “thingness” rests on repetition, which enmeshes a homeostasis that preserves a certain basic structure. Production is often directly recurrent, as in the annual agricultural cycle, or the three-minute repetition cycle of the original Ford production line. In other industries, like shipbuilding, the repetition is more approximate. The individual ships differ in size, shape, and construction time, but still retain a structural cycle, from laying the keel, through assembly, to launch and fitting out.

生产单位的短暂稳定性取决于其缓慢变化的劳动力和持久的生产设施。对于家庭经济而言，缓慢变化的劳动力是一代或几代家庭成员，他们逐渐相互替代。持久的设施是建筑物、粮仓和农田，它们最初是从森林中砍伐下来的，经过几代人的努力才得以开发。对于一家汽车公司来说，你的员工作为一个集体，拥有合作制造汽车的知识和技能。持久的设施是建筑物和设备，它们就像农场一样，随着时间的推移逐渐发展。

The fleeting stability of units of production rests on their slowly changing workforces and long-lasting production facilities. For the domestic economy, the slowly changing workforce was one or more generations of family members, who gradually replace one another. The long-lasting facilities were the buildings, granaries, and farmland which, having been originally cleared from forest, had by generations of effort been developed. For a car firm you have employees who, as a collectivity, have the knowledge and skill to cooperate in making cars. The long-lasting facilities are the buildings and equipment, which, like the farm, gradually develop over time.

这些稳定的成分在任何时候都会与流动的物质相结合。有物质等待转化：种子、汽车零件。有物质正在转化：种植燕麦、生产线上部分组装的汽车。有时，会有转化产品：装满的粮仓、停车场里的成品汽车。整个过程由外部能源推动。

These stable components combine, at any one instant, with material in flux. There is material waiting to be transformed: seed, car parts. There is material undergoing transformation: growing oats, partially assembled cars on the line. At times, there are transformed products: a full granary, finished cars in the lot. The whole process is impelled by external sources of energy.

传统农场仅靠太阳能。工业有两种能源。第一种是主要动力，如今是电力，但过去是煤炭或流水。第二种是人类劳动力，由食物提供能量。家庭农场在内部产生人力，但对于工厂来说，它来自外部。工人们吃饱喝足，精力充沛地走进来，开始一天的工作。而农场再生自己的投入，种子玉米、工厂的零部件和原材料投入从大门进来。商品的运输和销售符合这些（几乎）重复的循环。

Traditional farms are solely solar. Industry has two energy sources. First is the primary motive power, electricity today, but once coal or flowing water. Second is human labor power, energized by food. The domestic farm generated human energy internally, but for a factory it comes from outside. Workers walk in fed, energized for the day’s work. Whereas the farm regenerated its own inputs, its seed corn, the factory’s components and raw inputs come in the gate. The transport and sale of commodities fits within these (almost) repetitive cycles.

工厂的存在和生产事实约束了社会的其他部分必须有组织，以便每天都有一批工人准备跨过门槛；工厂的主要能源源不断地输送；工厂的零部件和原材料源源不断地定期交付；工厂生产的产品也定期地被提走和运走。

The fact that the factory exists and produces things constrains the rest of society to be so organized that each day a cohort of workers are ready to cross its threshold; that there is a flow of its primary energy source; that there is a stream of components and raw materials being delivered regularly; and that there is a regular uplift and transport away of the products it makes.

当我说工厂限制了社会其他部分具有某些特征时，我的意思是：

When I say that the factory constrains the rest of the society to have certain features I mean:

1. 具体体现的技术和社会形式的特定组合共同形成了一个倾向于持续存在的自催化网络。

1. That a particular combination of embodied technologies and social forms together form an auto-catalytic net that tends to persist.

2. 工厂的实际存在意味着一定存在一种可能的自催化系统来提高工厂存在的可能性。

2. That the actual existence of factories implies that there must exist one of the possible auto-catalysis systems that boost the probability of factories.

3. 从这个意义上来说，我们所知的工厂限制了社会的其他部分。

3. In this sense the factory, which we know to exist, constrains the rest of society.

总而言之，工厂意味着对社会其他部分施加比自给性农场更严格的约束。工厂与社会之间的接口非常复杂。这意味着工厂所处的社会必须能够产生并维持每天进来的工人。仅仅存在工人并拥有相关技能是不够的。他们必须作为工厂工人而不是其他类型的人产生。他们必须自由地在工厂工作，而不是耕种自己的农场或被束缚于其他活动。

In all, the factory implies a much more stringent set of constraints on the rest of society than is implied in the existence of a subsistence farm. The interface between the factory and society is complex. It implies that the society in which it is embedded must be able to generate and sustain the workers who come in each day. It is not enough that the people exist and have the relevant skills. They must be generated as factory workers, not as some other kind of person. They must be free to work in the factory rather than tilling their own farms or being tied up in some different activity.

一次能源的输送意味着整个有组织的供应网络。以前这可能是一个地方性的网络，比如用水坝和水渠开凿河道。后来它的范围更广：用运河输送煤炭，用矿井开采煤炭。现在它意味着电网，发电机网络与 50Hz 周期同步。

The delivery of primary energy implies a whole organized supply network. At one time this might be something local, an enchanneling of a river by weirs and millraces. Later it is more encompassing: canals to deliver coal, mines to extract it. Now it implies electricity grids, with networks of generators synched to a 50Hz cycle.

原材料和零部件的供应意味着运输网络和供应链。它意味着其他工厂。供应网络的复杂性随着工厂投入的数量而呈指数级增长。70这种循环约束的复杂性是生产力的决定性作用。循环关系只选择出^某些兼容的社会形式和关系集。

The supply of raw materials and components implies a transport network and a supply chain. It implies other factories. The complexity of the supply network grows, literally exponentially with the the number of inputs to the factory.⁷⁰ This complex of recurrence constraints is the determining role of the productive forces. Recurrence relations select out only certain sets of social forms and relations as compatible.

工业生产中，并非只有一套具有再生产能力的社会关系。理论和历史告诉我们，工业社会至少有两种甚至更多典型的社会形式。工厂嵌入哪一套社会关系取决于真实的历史。用现代术语来说，它是路径敏感的，取决于社会经历了资本主义还是社会主义工业化。

There is not just a single set of reproductively competent social relations for industrial production. Theory and history teach us that there are at least two, possibly more, characteristic social forms of industrial society. Which set of social relations the factory is embedded within depends on real history. In modern terminology it is path-sensitive, dependent on whether the society has undergone capitalist or socialist industrialization.

本章我们只关注前者。因此，我们必须假设没有总体社会计划机制来提供工厂所需的零部件，也没有一般劳动力分配系统来确保工人每天都有吃有穿。相反，所有这些先决条件都必须通过私人合同来实现。没有事先承诺支付等价的金钱，什么都无法实现。

We are in this chapter only concerned with the former. So we have to assume that there is no overarching social planning mechanism that will deliver the components that the factory needs, no system of general labor allocation that will ensure that fed and clothed workers turn up each day. Instead, all of these preconditions must be arrived at by the exercise of private contract. Nothing arrives without a prior promise to pay a monetary equivalent.

在缺乏对劳动力和资源的公共指导的情况下，以货币为象征的国家社会权力被私人企业所利用，以控制其生存所需的活体劳动和具体劳动。只要有现金，他们就可以要求劳动力和零部件。诚然，这些交易背后是国家权力，随时准备执行合同法，随时准备以货币执行债务，但合同本身是私人的。因此，我之前用来解释另一项法律执行的论点，即马克思主义经济学家所说的“价值规律”，^表达^了企业再生产对合同法的真正依赖。这些法律的构建是为了在货币的社会权力分配方面保持中立。国家平等对待合同中的两家公司，只关心交付的货物是否支付规定的货币等价物。合同法在法人之间的货币分配方面是中立的。73^因此，企业作为技术和劳动合作单位的生存取决于其作为合同单位、法人和财产所有者的生存。

In the absence of a public direction of labor and resources, the social power of the state symbolized in money is co-opted by private firms to command⁷¹ both the living and embodied labor their survival demands. They can demand labor and components, so long as they have the cash. Behind these transactions, admittedly, stands the state power, ready to enforce the law of contract, ready to enforce debts in its currency, but the contracts themselves are private. Hence the arguments I used earlier to explain the enforcement of another law, what Marxist economists called the “law of value,”⁷² express the real dependence of firms’ reproduction on the laws of contract. These are constructed so as to be neutral with respect to the distribution of the social power of money. The state treats both firms in a contract equally and is concerned only that stipulated monetary equivalents are paid for goods delivered. The law of contracts is neutral with respect to the distribution of money between legal personalities.⁷³ The survival of the firm as a technical and labor cooperative unit then depends on its survival as a contractual unit, as a legal person, an owner of property.

为了在没有社会计划的情况下进行再生产，工厂必须能够控制劳动力和零部件的交付。后者意味着他们必须能够（尽管是间接地）控制社会劳动力在制造这些零部件方面的分配。我在第 5.1 节中解释过的价格统计规律确保对货币的控制平均而言就是对等量劳动力的控制，从而允许对经济进行分散的规划。

In order to reproduce themselves in the absence of a social plan, factories have to be able to command the delivery of labor and components. The latter implies that they must, albeit indirectly, be able order the allocation of social labor into the making of those components. The statistical laws regulating price, which I explained in section 5.1, act to make sure that command over money becomes, on average, command over an equivalent amount of labor, thus allowing a decentralized planning of the economy to take place.

Finley [1980] 认为，尽管古代作者对其社会的剥削性质相当坦率，但现代意识形态却力图压制对此的谈论。奴隶主或奴隶主的指挥权和统治权是公开的、毫无羞耻的，并用鞭子和烙铁来执行。资本家的权力则以市场平等和公民博爱的幌子出现。工人和福特、农民和连锁超市沃尔玛在法律上是平等的。当然，事实上，在法律的幌子背后，他们远远不平等。福特或沃尔玛的财务资源可能比单个工人或农民多一百万倍。公司账户上的数百万英镑使他们比工人拥有更大的谈判实力，而工人本来可以一个月没有工资就很难生存，或者到了收获季节，农民的资产几乎耗尽。

Finley [1980] argues that whereas ancient authors were quite open about the exploitative nature of their society, modern ideology strives to suppress talking about it. The power of command, domination of the slave lord or dominus was open, unashamed and enforced with whips and branding irons. That of the capitalist is presented in the guise of equality on the market and fraternity as citizen. The worker and Ford, the farmer and chain supermarket Walmart, meet and contract as legal equals. The fact is, of course, that behind the legal facade, they are far from equal. Ford or Walmart have financial resources that are perhaps a million times as great as an individual worker or farmer. The £-millions in the accounts of the firms put them in a position of vastly greater bargaining strength than a worker who would be hard put to survive a month without pay, or a farmer who, by harvest time, has run down his assets to almost nothing.

图5.2 社会主义先驱罗伯特·欧文的劳工交易所颁发的劳工证。

Figure 5.2. The labor certificates issued by the labor exchanges of the socialist pioneer Robert Owen.

古典经济学家揭露了这一过程的真相。他们写作的时代仍是贵族制英国，普通民众既没有投票权，基本上也没有读书的权利。在斯密的著作中，你会发现受过古典教育的人对阶级和指挥持开放态度。他认为金钱就是指挥下层阶级劳动力的权力。在他那个时代，货币仍然是黄金；欧洲尚未出现公开的法定货币，尽管中国人早已知道这一点。但到了 19 世纪初，在经历了法国战争期间纸币兑换被暂停之后，社会主义作家开始提出，货币应该公开以劳动力来计价，而不是黄金。他们不再以“我承诺按要求向持票人支付一英镑”为座右铭，而是承诺提供价值一小时的商品（图 5.2）。

The classical economists had unmasked what was happening in this process. They wrote in a still aristocratic Britain, in which the common people could neither vote nor, in the main, read. You find in Smith an openness about class and command that came to those with a classical education. He saw that money was the power to command the labor of the lower classes. In his day the coinage was still gold; open fiat money in Europe was yet to come, though the Chinese had long known it. But by the early nineteenth century, having experienced the suspension of banknote redemption during the French wars, socialist writers started to propose that instead of gold, money should be openly denominated in terms of labor. Instead of having the motto “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of One Pound” they would promise goods to the value of one hour (Figure 5.2).

这个想法从未实施有两个原因。其中一个原因并不重要。尽管价格受劳动力调节，但价格是近似的，因此上下误差幅度约为 10%，因此，所付出的劳动和获得的价格之间永远不会完全相等。但与更大的政治障碍相比，这微不足道。如果引入这样的说明，它们将凸显出在雇主和雇员表面上平等的背后，实际上存在着一种极不平等的关系。这样的说明几乎就是革命小册子。只有在社会主义先驱罗伯特·欧文的交流背景下，如果它们是将整个经济转向共产主义运作过程的一部分，它们才有意义。

There are two reasons why this idea has never been implemented. One of these is minor. Although prices are regulated by labor, it is approximate, so there is around a 10 percent margin of error above and below, thus there would never be an exact equality between the labor performed and the price obtained. But that pales to insignificance compared to the much bigger political obstacle. Were such notes to be introduced they would highlight that behind the apparent equality of employer and employee there is in reality a deeply unequal relationship. Such notes would be little short of revolutionary pamphlets. They only made sense, in the context of socialist pioneer Robert Owen’s exchanges, if they were to be part of a process of moving the whole economy over to communist operation.

5.3 资本主义剩余

5.3 CAPITALIST SURPLUS

在奴隶制下，奴隶主的利润并不神秘。奴隶们免费工作，他们生产的所有东西都属于他们的主人。他必须给他们一部分农作物作为食物，但剩下的任何农作物他都卖掉作为利润。根据正统经济学，在现代社会中，工人不仅得到报酬，而且得到他们劳动所产生的全部边际产品。奴隶被赤裸裸地剥削，被鞭打着工作，在法律面前毫无地位。雇员签订了一份自愿合同，至少在法律上，这是平等双方之间的合同，如果经济理论是可信的，他/她得到的工资实际上表达了一种平等交换的关系。她得到的报酬是她劳动的价值，而这个价值是由公司雇佣她作为雇员所获得的边际或额外产品定义的。有人认为，如果她的工资较低，那么公司就值得雇佣更多的工人，直到最后一个雇佣的工人没有产生额外利润为止。

Under slavery, the profits of the slave owners were no mystery. The slaves worked for free, and everything they produced belonged to their master. He had to give them part of the crop as food, but anything that remained he sold as a profit. In modern society it appears, according to orthodox economics, that workers are not only paid, they are paid the full marginal product resulting from their efforts. The slave was nakedly exploited, whipped to work, with no standing before the law. An employee enters into a voluntary contract that, in law at least, is one between equal parties, and if economic theory is to be believed, the wage he/she gets actually expresses a relationship of equal exchange. She gets paid the value of her labor, and that value is defined by the marginal or extra product that the company gets by taking her on as an employee. The argument goes that were she paid less, then it would be worth the company taking on more workers until the point was reached at which the last worker taken on yielded no additional profit.

这种报酬理论所依据的理论就是图 3.8中所示的供需函数。我们在第 3.5 节中解释了从科学角度来看这一理论是多么空洞，但即使我们接受规模收益递减的反事实假设，那么除了最后一个被录用的工人之外，所有工人都必须受到剥削。所有其他工人的工资都低于他们的劳动生产的产品价值。显然，如果应用欧文主义原则，每个工人的工资都等于劳动增加的平均价值，那么就不会有利润；整个价值产品都将归于劳动。这意味着一个合作经济，而不是资本主义经济。如果所有权结构仍然是资本主义的，如果每个行业的平均工资等于该行业劳动增加的平均价值，那么显然大约一半的公司（那些劳动力使用率低于平均水平的公司）将盈利，而一半的公司（那些劳动力使用率高于平均水平的公司）将亏损。这将是一个不可持续的局面。一半的公司很快就会破产。因此，我们必须假设，在资本主义经济中，工资会上涨。显然，如果实际工资可以降低，或者可以让人们工作更长时间、更努力，工资上涨幅度就会更大。我们将在第 5.4 节和第 5.7 节中更详细地讨论决定工资上涨的因素，但表 5.3 （第 116 页）给出了资本主义经济中平均工资上涨的典型示例。

The theory on which this account of remuneration rests is the one that gave us the supply and demand functions shown in Figure 3.8. We explained in section 3.5 just how vacuous this theory was from a scientific viewpoint, but even if we accept the counterfactual assumption of diminishing returns to scale, then all workers but the last one taken on must be exploited. All others are paid less than the value of the product that their labor produces. Clearly if Owenite principles applied and each worker was paid the average value added by labor there would be no profit; the entire value product would go to labor. That would imply a cooperative rather than a capitalist economy. If the ownership structure remained capitalist, and if in each industry the average wage was equal to the average value added by labor in that industry, then clearly around half the firms, those with below average labor usage, would make a profit, and half, those with above-average labor usage, would make a loss. This would be an unsustainable situation. Half of the firms would soon be bankrupt. So we have to assume that in a capitalist economy there will be a markup on wages. Clearly, if real wages can be reduced, or people can be made to work longer and harder, the markup will be bigger. We will look at what governs this markup in more detail in sections 5.4 and 5.7 but a typical example of what average markup prevails in a capitalist economy is given in Table 5.3 (page 116).

可以设想，类似 19 世纪废除奴隶制的经济改革，同样可以废除雇佣劳动和资本主义利润。立法规定公司员工是剩余增值的所有者，这将取消对工资收入加价的需要。在合作经济中，过去在南斯拉夫，工人是剩余增值的最终所有者，因此加价是不必要的，因为生产率较高的合作社和生产率较低的合作社之间的净工资存在差异。在这种情况下，工人既承担市场变化的风险，又从中获益^。74

One could envisage that an economic reform, say analogous to the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, could similarly abolish wage labor and capitalist profit. Legislation specifying that the employees of a company are the owners of residual value added would abolish the need for a markup over wage income. In a cooperative economy like that which used to operate in Yugoslavia, with workers the final owners of residual value added, markup is unnecessary because there will be differences in take-home pay between more and less productive cooperatives. Workers in this case bear both the risks of market variations and pocket its benefits.⁷⁴

表 5.3：计算英国的工资加价

TABLE 5.3: Calculating the Markup on Wages in the UK

百万英镑

£M

中间体总消耗量

Total Consumption of Intermediates

1,526,425英镑

£1,526,425

生产税减补贴

Taxes Less Subsidies on Production

23,303英镑

£23,303

雇员薪酬

Compensation of Employees

873,202英镑

£873,202

营业盈余

Operating Surplus

650,409英镑

£650,409

附加值

Value Added

1,546,914英镑

£1,546,914

输出

Output

3,073,339英镑

£3,073,339

工资涨幅

Markup on Wages

1.77英镑

£1.77

剩余价值率

Rate of surplus value

0.77英镑

£0.77

数据来源于英国国家统计局2013 年供应与使用汇总表。

Data from 2013 Summary Supply and Use Tables for the United Kingdom, Office of National Statistics.

就其当前的再生产而言，资本主义经济形式直接建立在财产关系和财产法之上。它由公司法体系支撑，该体系将股东而非员工定义为价值的占有者。它的替代，就像美洲奴隶制度的替代一样，最终将是政治和法律变革的结果。但这并不能解释在私人商品交换体系中，特定的资本主义制造方式及其伴随的社会关系如何占据主导地位。要理解这一点，我们必须更详细地研究为什么资本主义特有的技术综合体会强化资本主义社会形式。

In terms of its current reproduction, the capitalist form of economy stands directly on property relations and property law. It is sustained by an edifice of company law that defines shareholders not employees as the appropriators of value. Its replacement, like the replacement of the slave system in the Americas, will ultimately be the result of political and legal changes. But that does not explain how, within the system of private commodity exchange, the specifically capitalist mode of making things, with its accompanying social relations, became dominant. To understand this we have to examine in more detail why the technological complex specific to capitalism reinforces capitalist social forms.

5.4 技术与剩余

5.4 TECHNOLOGY AND SURPLUS

我们之前说过，资本主义社会拥有高产农业，能够养活大量城市人口；社会劳动时间的很大一部分由私人生产者用于生产商品；机械和科学的广泛使用；人工能源；其剩余产品的很大一部分代表从雇佣奴隶制中获得的私人利润。应该清楚的是，从个别角度来看，这些特征中的几个在前资本主义社会中已经存在。任何城市文明都需要一种能够提供剩余产品的农业。奴隶经济有许多私人商品生产者，他们的剩余产品中很大一部分，因为这些产品被出售，所以代表了货币利润。无论是古代还是现代，中世纪知道雇佣劳动。奴隶制和封建经济与资本主义的显著区别在于，它们对人工能源的使用非常有限，而且没有开展可用于改善经济的持续科学研究。

We said earlier that capitalist societies have high-yield agriculture able to support a large urban population; a significant part of social labor time devoted to the production of commodities by private producers; widespread use of machinery and science; artificial sources of energy; and a significant part of their surplus product represented as private profit obtained from wage slavery. It should be clear that taken individually, several of these features have existed in precapitalist societies. Any urban civilization needs an agriculture that delivers a surplus product. The slave economies had many private producers of commodities, and a significant part of their surplus, since it was sold, was represented as money profits. Both antiquity and the Middle Ages knew of wage labor. Where slave and feudal economies differed significantly from capitalism is in a much more limited use of artificial energy and their failure to carry out ongoing scientific research that could be applied to improving the economy.

5.4.1 生命能量

5.4.1 Vital Energy

新石器革命之所以影响如此之大，是因为它使人类能够通过降低营养级来获取更多的能量。但在新石器革命和资本主义经济发展之间，社会在某种意义上仍然是自然经济。它们是自然的，因为它们的能量来源仍然是生物的，因此受到固有损失的限制，这些损失是由于太阳能经过光合作用、植物代谢损失，然后是人体和动物体内代谢效率低下，然后转化为肌肉中的机械能。有两个例外，首先也是最重要的，是利用微风导航，其次是奴役水仙来转动轮子。75^虽然水力发电所需的关键发明，即下冲和上冲磨坊，已经存在，但工业用途似乎相对有限。我们知道古代世界只有一种工业规模的水力应用，即巴贝加尔的 16 轮磨坊 [Leveau，1996]，尽管小型磨坊似乎很普遍。著名的 Barbegal 磨机，即使机械效率达到 100%，在 18 米落差下，估计流量为 250 升/秒，最大输出功率也只有 0.044MW [Lorenz et al., 2012]。在典型的 60% 效率下，更现实的估计值为 0.026MW。

The Neolithic Revolution had such a big impact because it enabled humanity to access much more energy by moving down a trophic level. But between the Neolithic Revolution and the development of capitalist economy, societies remained in a sense natural economies. They were natural in that their energy source was still biological, and as such was limited by the inherent losses that are incurred as solar energy goes through photosynthesis, metabolic loss in plants, and then metabolic inefficiencies in human and animal bodies before being converted into mechanical energy in muscles. There were two exceptions to this, first and most important the harnessing of zephyrs for navigation, and second, enslaving naiads to turn wheels.⁷⁵ Though the key inventions required for water power, undershoot and overshoot mills, were there, industrial use seems to have been relatively limited. We know of only one industrial scale application of water power in the ancient world, the 16-wheel mill at Barbegal [Leveau, 1996], though smaller mills were apparently widespread. The famous Barbegal mill, even at 100 percent mechanical efficiency would have had a maximum output of only 0.044MW from the estimated flow of 250L/s over an 18M drop [Lorenz et al., 2012]. A more realistic estimate at a typical 60 percent efficiency would be 0.026MW.

如表 5.5所示，即使在资本主义工业化的早期阶段，英国安装的水力发电量也比古代的庞然大物巴贝加尔磨坊多一千倍。同时，我们应避免将资本主义与以前的社会关系形式相比较，并声称以前的经济形式几乎没有动力将劳动力投入降到最低。如果你读过我引用的卡托关于大庄园管理的段落，你会发现他对劳动力的使用一点也不马虎。劳动时间对奴隶主和资本家来说都是昂贵的资源；奴隶只是偶尔便宜。将完成任务的奴隶数量降到最低是有意义的。

As table 5.5 shows, even at the earliest stage of capitalist industrialization Britain had a thousand times as much installed water power as that behemoth of antiquity, the Barbegal mill. At the same time we should avoid a tendency to prettify capitalism in comparison to prior forms of social relations, and claim that prior forms of economy had little incentive to minimize labor input. If you read the passage I quoted from Cato on the management of latifundia he is anything but sloppy about the use of labor. Labor time is an expensive resource to the slave owner as well as for the capitalist; slaves were only intermittently cheap. It makes sense to minimize the number of slaves you set to do a task.

任何社会关系都有减少劳动消耗的动机。每个自由农民或工匠都希望减少自己的劳动量，并会使用任何可用的技术来实现这一点。封建领主或奴隶主同样希望最大限度地提高奴隶或农奴的产量。马克思认为，资本主义由于雇佣劳动关系，只支付其真实价值的一小部分，因此倾向于低估劳动价值，这是不合理的。活劳动相对于死劳动的比例。因此，我们应该预期资本主义在实施节省劳动力的机器方面的进步与实际工资水平成反比。工人越贫困，工资越被大量农民剥夺，资本主义的机械化速度就越慢。相比之下，在无产阶级有机会移民到处女地的地方，比如十九世纪的美国，使用机器的动力就越大。

Any set of social relations has some incentive to reduce expended labor. Every free peasant or artisan wants to reduce their effort, and will use any technique available to them to do so. Feudal lords or slave owners likewise wish to maximize the output their slaves or serfs produce. If anything, Marx argues that capitalism, because of the wage labor relation that involves paying for labor at a fraction of its true value, is irrational in its tendency to undervalue living labor relative to dead labor. We should therefore expect capitalism’s progressiveness in terms of implementing labor-saving machinery to be inversely proportional to the level of real wages. The more that workers are impoverished and have their wages driven down by the flood of dispossessed peasantry, the slower capitalism will mechanize. In contrast, where proletarians had the opportunity to emigrate to virgin lands, as to the America of the nineteenth century, the greater was the incentive to use machinery.

已知的罗马式英国水车约有 60 座，但我们必须假设只有一小部分遗址被发现。1086 年英国的 6,000 多个磨坊中，有多少自罗马时代以来一直在使用也不清楚。许多水平的撒克逊或挪威磨坊的存在可能表明大多数磨坊是在随后的 600 年内建造的。我们不知道总装机功率，但假设每座磨坊的功率为 1.5 千瓦到 2 千瓦，这对于小型下冲磨坊或撒克逊水平磨坊来说似乎是合理的，我们得到中期封建英格兰的总装机功率约为 12MW，是已知最大的罗马工业机构所用功率的 460 倍。Lynne White [1964] 认为，水磨坊的传播是封建经济相对于奴隶经济的典型优势。

There are about sixty known Romano British water wheels, but we must assume that only a small proportion of sites have been discovered. It is also unclear how many of the 6,000 or more English mills in 1086 had been in use continuously since Roman times. The presence of many horizontal Saxon or Norse mills probably indicates most had been built in the subsequent 600 years. What we do not know is the total installed power, but allowing say 1.5kw to 2kw per mill, which seems reasonable for small undershoot or Saxon horizontal ones, we get a total installed power in mid-feudal England of about 12MW, or 460 times what the largest known Roman industrial establishment used. Lynne White [1964] argued that the diffusion of watermills was a characteristic superiority of the feudal as opposed to the slave economy.

1300 年代英国封建时期水磨的峰值使用量大约是这个数字的两倍。考虑到从 1086 年到 14 世纪中叶，人口增长了一倍多，这表明在此期间人工能源与人力能源的比率是稳定的。我们得到的比率是每人仅拥有约 7 瓦的水力发电。到那时，几乎所有村庄都会有一座磨坊，或者很容易就能找到一座。Langdon [1991] 指出，英国多达 90% 的封建庄园都有磨坊，在这种情况下，对这些重要生产资料的控制将成为上层阶级占据主导地位的关键因素。

Peak usage of water mills in the feudal period in England in the 1300s would have been about twice that. Given that in the period from 1086 to the mid-fourteenth century the population more than doubled, it would indicate that there was a stable ratio of artificial to human energy available during the period. We have a ratio of only around 7 watts of water power per head of population. By this point almost all villages would have had a mill or been within easy reach of one. Langdon [1991] indicates that up to 90 percent of feudal manors in England had mills, in which case control over these vital means of production would have been a critical factor in the dominance of the upper class.

所有这些都没有表明封建统治阶级在采用当时已知的节省劳动力的机器方面有所懈怠。如果我们假设农民农业中成年体力劳动者的持续产出不超过 75 瓦，而 1086 年人类劳动的峰值产出约为 70MW，那么在封建制度中期，人工能源供应了人类峰值能源的约 17%。如果我们看看 18 世纪中期，我们就会发现人工能源的安装基数约为 63MW，主要是水力，但也有一些风力和蒸汽。大约六百五十万的人口最多能提供 285MW 的人类劳动产出，因此到这个阶段，人工能源提供了人类努力的约 22%。比封建制度好一点，但也不多。

None of this indicates that the feudal ruling class was slack in its adoption of such labor-saving machinery as was known at the time. If we assume that the sustained output of an adult manual worker in peasant agriculture is no more than 75 watts and that in 1086 the peak output of human labor would have been around 70MW, then in mid-feudalism artificial energy supplied about 17 percent of the peak human energy. If we look at the mid-1700s we have an installed base of artificial power of about 63MW, mostly water, but some wind and steam. A population of around six and a half million gives a human labor output of at most 285MW, so that by this phase artificial power was providing around 22 percent of the human effort. A bit better than feudalism, but not much.

到 1870 年，英国人口为 2100 万，从事繁重体力劳动可以提供约 945 兆瓦的电力，但安装了人工发电能力达到 1700 兆瓦，几乎是人工输出物理功率的两倍。这是蒸汽动力带来的生产方式的阶段性变化，并强化了马克思的论点，即蒸汽机产生了工业资本家。

By 1870 we have a British population of 21 million, which doing heavy manual work could have delivered about 945 MW, but had an installed capacity of artificial power of 1700 MW or almost twice the manual output of physical power. This is a phase change in the mode of production brought about by steam power and reinforces Marx’s argument that it is the steam mill that gives rise to the industrial capitalist.

5.4.2 英雄的涡轮不够

5.4.2 Hero’s Turbine Not Enough

古罗马人在希罗的汽转球中已经拥有一台可以运转的蒸汽涡轮机。为什么他们不能将其用于工业，如抽水或转动磨石呢？

The ancient Romans already had a working steam turbine in Hero’s aeolipile. Why were they not able to turn this to use in industry, pumping water or turning millstones?

古代为什么没有工业革命？

Why no Industrial Revolution in antiquity?

关于奴隶制的社会关系阻碍了节省劳动力的技术的发展，有很多众所周知的论点，但这足以解释吗？

There are well-known arguments about the social relations of slavery impeding the development of labor-saving technology, but is this enough of an explanation?

我们知道古人利用水力来磨玉米和用于其他工业用途，因此他们对人工动力源并不是完全无动于衷的。

We know that the ancients harnessed the power of water for grinding corn and other industrial uses, so they were not completely indifferent to artificial sources of power.

他们难道不能用蒸汽涡轮机代替水车来磨玉米吗？

Could they not have used steam turbines instead of water wheels to grind corn?

毕竟，目前的核电站和燃煤电站都使用蒸汽涡轮机，它们肯定是理想的，对吧？

After all, steam turbines are used in current nuclear and coal power plants, surely they would have been ideal?

我认为不是。希罗的装置存在固有的局限性，主要是扭矩低和效率低。蒸汽涡轮机现在是首选的原动机，但它们的优势取决于产生高压蒸汽和高转速的能力。开启工业革命的实际技术——瓦特蒸汽机——的优点是它能够使用非常低的蒸汽压力在低速下产生非常高的扭矩。

I think not. There are inherent limitations to the usefulness of Hero’s device, basically its low torque and inefficiency. Steam turbines are now the preferred prime mover, but their superiority has depended on the ability to produce high-pressure steam and high-rotational velocity. The actual technology that started the Industrial Revolution—the Watt steam engine—had the virtue that it could develop very high torques at low velocity using very low steam pressures.

为了实现有效的化石燃料经济，你必须拥有一个原动机和一种为其提供燃料的方法。可用的主要燃料是煤，煤是从容易发生洪水的矿井中获得的。这几乎是一个先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题。蒸汽机需要煤，但要抽干煤矿中的水，就需要蒸汽动力。瓦特发动机最初是为抽干矿井水而开发的，这种应用需要很大的力量，但可以忍受相对较慢的发动机。英雄式涡轮机提供的扭矩 T 由以下规则给出：T = p × 2a × r，其中轮子p是蒸汽压力，a是每个排气喷嘴的面积，r是涡轮机的半径。

In order to get a functioning fossil fuel economy you had to have a prime mover and a way of providing fuel for it. The main fuel available was coal, which was obtained from mines, which were prone to flooding. It is almost a chicken and egg situation. You need coal for steam engines, but to drain coal mines you needed steam power. The Watt engine was originally developed for pumping out mines, an application that required a lot of force but tolerated a relatively slow engine. The torque T supplied by a Hero-style turbine is given by the rule: T = p × 2a × r, where wheel p is the steam pressure, a the area of each exhaust nozzle, and r the radius of the turbine.

瓦特光束发动机提供的扭矩由类似的规则给出：T = p × a × l。

The torque provided by a Watt beam engine was given by a similar rule: T = p × a × l.

这里p是锅炉和冷凝器之间的压力差，a 是圆柱体的面积，l是梁的长度。

Here p is now the pressure difference between the boiler and the condenser, a the area of the cylinder and l is the beam length.

早期的瓦特发动机体积巨大，横梁长度超过 3 米，而英雄涡轮机的长度只有几厘米。两者相差 100 倍。就孔径而言，实际的英雄涡轮机孔径不会超过 1 厘米，而瓦特发动机的孔径为半米。瓦特机器的面积大约大 2,500 倍。让我们假设两者在相同的蒸汽压力下运行，因为锅炉建造技术最初是限制因素。这意味着早期瓦特发动机的扭矩大约是汽转球的 25 万倍。

The early Watt engines were huge, with beam lengths of over 3 meters compared to the few centimeters for the length of hero turbines. This is a factor of 100 difference. In terms of diameter of bore a practical Hero turbine would not have exceeded 1 cm against half a meter for a Watt engine. This is a factor of about 2,500 greater area for the Watt machine. Let us assume both operate at the same steam pressure, since the technology of boiler construction was initially the limiting factor. That means that the torque of an early Watt engine was about a quarter of a million times greater than an aeolipile.

你能建造一个能产生类似扭矩的气转球吗？

Could you build an aeolipile that generated comparable torque?

是的，如果涡轮机的臂长几米，喷嘴直径为半米，那么扭矩就差不多了。但是汽转球的喷嘴是向空气开放的，因此直径为半米的喷嘴会消耗掉完全不切实际的蒸汽量。

Well yes, if you had arms a couple of meters long on the turbine and nozzles a half a meter in diameter, then the torque would be comparable. But the nozzles of the aeolipile are open to the air, so a nozzle half a meter across would use up an entirely impractical quantity of steam.

5.4.3 实用涡轮机

5.4.3 Practical Turbines

只有当每秒转速非常高时，汽转球才可用作发电装置。很小的扭矩乘以非常高的每秒转速即可产生有用的功率。

An aeolipile is only practical as a power-generating device if the revolutions per second are very high. A small torque multiplied by a very high number of revs per second can generate a useful amount of power.

图 5.3。1884 年，拉瓦尔的第一台涡轮机用于为奶油离心机提供动力。它在概念上采用了对希罗涡轮机的简单改进，但依靠精密工程和高压蒸汽。标记为a 的部分是改进后的汽转球。蒸汽从右侧进入。来源：Jude，1910 年。

Figure 5.3. Laval’s first turbine used to power a cream centrifuge in 1884. It used a simple modification of Hero’s turbine in concept, but relied on precision engineering and high-pressure steam. The part marked a is the modified aeolipile. Steam enters from the right. Source: Jude, 1910.

19 世纪 80 年代，拉瓦尔和帕森将汽转球改造成实用的涡轮机，在此之前，汽转球必须经过一系列步骤。反作用涡轮机的实际应用是拉瓦尔的奶油分离机。这需要非常快速的旋转，大约 1000rpm，以离心方式将奶油从牛奶中分离出来，因此需要高速设备。拉瓦尔的第一个原型基于汽转球，但齿轮减速，使用摩擦齿轮使其达到 1000rpm。他的第二个原型改用脉冲原理——将高压蒸汽喷射到一组旋转的涡轮叶片上。

The aeolipile had to go through a series of steps before it could be converted, in the 1880s into practical turbines by Laval and Parson. The first practical use of a reaction turbine was for Laval’s cream separator. This required very rapid rotation, around 1000rpm, to centrifugally separate cream from milk, so a high-speed device was desirable. Laval’s first prototype was based on the aeolipile but heavily geared down, using friction gear to get it to 1000rpm. His second prototype switched to the impulse principle—directing a jet of high-pressure steam against a rotating set of turbine blades.

表 5.4：拉瓦尔涡轮机生产性能

TABLE 5.4: Performance of Production of Laval Turbines

资料来源：Jude，1910 年的数据。

Source: Data from Jude, 1910.

转速非常高。表 5.4中的 300 马力涡轮机的圆周速度为 366 米/秒或 1317 公里/小时——超音速。如此高的速度需要高强度钢。

Rotation speeds were very high. The 300hp turbine in table 5.4 had a peripheral velocity of 366M/s or 1317Kmph—supersonic velocity. Such huge velocities needed high-tensile steel.

从蒸汽动力开始到反击式涡轮机首次投入实际使用，经过了一百多年的时间，在此期间，许多工程师提出了涡轮机的建议。但直到 19 世纪 80 年代，帕森和拉瓦尔的设计才真正投入使用。它们依靠高压蒸汽、精密工程和高强度钢才能工作。而这些对罗马人来说都是没有的。他们既没有高炉和锻炉来制造熟铁锅炉，也没有贝塞麦转炉来生产涡轮机钢。只有在工业社会全面发展后，蒸汽涡轮机才成为实用的动力来源。

Between the start of steam power and the first practical use of a reaction turbine over a hundred years elapsed, during which many engineers came up with suggestions for turbines. But it was not until the 1880s that Parson and Laval designs actually got into use. They depended on having high-pressure steam, precision engineering, and high-strength steels to work. None of these were available to the Romans. They had neither the blast furnaces and forges to make the wrought-iron boilers, nor Bessemer converters to produce turbine steel. Steam turbines only became practical as a source of power once industrial society was in full swing.

那么，即使涡轮机不实用，那么什么阻止了罗马人建造类似瓦特发动机的东西呢？

Well, even if turbines were not practical, what stopped the Romans building something like one of Watt’s engines?

基本上是缺乏科学知识。瓦特发动机的动力冲程依赖于大气压力。蒸汽以接近大气压力的压强供应，然后冷凝以产生真空。这又依赖于关键的先前概念——托里拆利发现的大气压力、格里克的演示以及瓦特在格拉斯哥的导师布莱克教授提出的热量作为守恒量的概念。

Basically a lack of scientific knowledge. The Watt engine depended for its power stroke on atmospheric pressure. Steam was supplied at near atmospheric pressure, and then condensed to create a vacuum. That depended in turn on key prior concepts—the discovery of atmospheric pressure by Torricelli, the demonstration of Guericke, and the concept of heat as a quantity to be conserved developed by Watt’s supervisor at Glasgow, Professor Black.

技术之间存在一定的依赖关系，不能随意跳过。如果没有与某一特定技术阶段相关的知识和技能，你就无法简单地继续开发下一个技术阶段。

Technologies have an order of dependence to them that cannot be arbitrarily skipped over. Without the knowledge and skills associated with a particular stage of technology, you cannot simply go on to develop the next.

图 5.4。拉瓦尔的第二台涡轮机改用脉冲原理并投入生产。涡轮机的原理由此变成了实用设备。您今天使用的电力是由拉瓦尔和帕森涡轮机衍生的机器产生的。来源：Jude，1910 年。

Figure 5.4. Laval’s second turbine switched to the impulse principle and went into production. With this the principle of the turbine was turned into a practical device. The electricity you use today is produced by a machine derived from the turbines of Laval and Parson. Source: Jude, 1910.

5.4.4 为何电力至关重要

5.4.4 Why Power Was Essential

为什么能源对于资本主义的发展如此重要？

Why was energy so vital to the development of capitalism?

从根本上讲，这是因为通过用无生命能量代替人类肌肉，人类制造物品所需的时间和精力减少了。动力机器取代了人类手和手臂的工作。这提高了速度、质量和平行度。

Fundamentally it is because by substituting inanimate energy for human muscle, the amount of human time and effort required to make things was reduced. A powered machine replaced the work of human hands and arms. This produced gains in speed, mass, and parallelism.

人类四肢的自然共振频率决定了锤子、锯子或针每分钟可以移动的最大次数。动力往复机构的运转速度要快得多。对比一下电动缝纫机每秒的针数和手持针的针数。当圆锯的完全旋转运动取代手锯的来回运动时，加速度更加明显。

The natural resonant frequency of human limbs sets a maximum number of strokes per minute with which a hammer, saw, or needle can be moved. A powered reciprocating mechanism can operate considerably faster. Contrast the number of stitches per second on an electric sewing machine with what can be done with a hand-held needle. When the completely rotary motion of a circular saw replaces the back and forth of a handsaw the acceleration is even more marked.

通过施加动力，每次敲击或移动可以移动的重量可以大大增加。水轮驱动的三锤重量远远超过任何铁匠所能挥动的重量，蒸汽锤和液压机将锤子的质量增加了几个数量级。同样的放大倍数也适用于铁锹和蒸汽挖掘机之间的比较。

The weight that can be moved with each stroke or motion can be hugely increased by applying power. Trip hammers turned by water wheels were vastly heavier than any blacksmith could wield, steam hammers and hydraulic presses increased the mass of the hammer by further orders of magnitude. The same magnification applies in a comparison between spades and steam excavators.

伴随巨型化而来的是平行化。水轮或蒸汽机每产生 1 马力，就可转动 100 个纺锤，而不是仅由一名妇女转动一个纺锤。1 兆瓦等于 1341 马力，因此 1800 年英国安装的 90 兆瓦左右的水力发电可以转动大约 1200 万个纺锤。当然，其中一些纺锤为其他机器提供动力，但这多少表明了生产相同产品所需的工人数量。但它低估了外部动力带来的生产率提升，因为动力纺锤的速度要快得多。

Alongside gigantism went parallelism. Instead of one woman turning one spindle, a water wheel or steam engine could turn 100 spindles for each horsepower it produced. A megawatt is 1341 horsepower, so the 90 megawatts or so of installed British water power in 1800 could have turned about 12 million spindles. Of course some of these were powering other machines, but this gives some indication of the equivalent number of workers who would have been needed to produce the same result. But it underestimates the gain in productivity from external power, since the speed of the power spindles is so much faster.

表5.6显示了 1760 年至 1871 年之间蒸汽动力带来的阶段性变化。假设从事体力劳动的工人持续输出的能量平均为 75 瓦，并且 58% 的人口能够从事体力劳动。我们假设中世纪的磨坊的输出功率为 2Kw 量级。

In table 5.6 note the phase change brought about by steam power between 1760 and 1871. Assume that the sustained energy output of a worker doing manual work averages 75 watts, and that 58 percent of the population was able to do manual work. We assume that mills in the Middle Ages had an output of the order of 2Kw.

一名手工纺纱工每周可以生产 2.5 磅至 6 磅纱线 [Humphries 等人，2016]。水力纺纱机是英国纺织业的标准设备，每个工人配备数百个纱锭，每个纱锭每周可以生产 25 磅至 120 磅纱线 [Leunig，2003]。76^因此，每个水力纺纱机的速度比人力纺纱机快 10 到 20 倍。这意味着用于纺纱的 90 兆瓦水力发电将产生相当于 2 亿名手工纺纱工的产量。相比之下，在应用动力纺纱之前，从事纺纱的女性劳动力呈指数级增长（见图5.5）。到 1770 年，需要大约 75 万名女性，占 25-59 岁英国女性的 62%。仅仅几十年后，就安装了相当于一亿多工人的机器力量，这给人以生产力飞跃的印象。

A hand spinner could attain a productivity of between 2.5lb and 6lb of yarn per week [Humphries et al., 2016]. A water-powered spinning mule, the standard device used in the British textile industry, would have hundreds of spindles per worker and each of these spindles could produce between 25lb and 120lb of yarn per week [Leunig, 2003].⁷⁶ In consequence, each water-powered spindle was of the order of 10 or 20 times faster than the human-powered one. This means that 90 megawatts of water power devoted to spinning would produce more like the output of 200 million hand spinners. By comparision, prior to the application of powered spinning female labor working on spinning had grown exponentially (see Figure 5.5). By 1770 it had required about three-quarters of a million women, or 62 percent of English women in the 25–59 age group. Only a few decades later machine power equivalent to over a hundred million workers had been installed, which gives some impression of the leap in productivity involved.

表 5.5：英国人工发电装机容量（兆瓦）

TABLE 5.5: Installed Artificial Power in Britain, in MegaWatts

来源：Crafts, 2004 计算得出的数据。

Source: Figures computed from Crafts, 2004.

表 5.6：英格兰人力与人工能源产出比较

TABLE 5.6: Comparison of Human and Artificial Energy Output in England

资料来源：1086 年和 1348 年的人口数据来自 Broadberry 等人，2010 年，表 1和表 2。1750年和 1870 年的人口数据来自 Chandler，2014 年。Mill 数据来自 Langdon，1991 年。

Source: Population for 1086 and 1348 from Broadberry et al., 2010, tables 1 and 2. Population for 1750 and 1870 from Chandler, 2014. Mill numbers from Langdon, 1991.

图 5.5。在英国工业资本主义兴起之前，需要作为纺纱工来支持纺织业的女性人口比例呈指数级增长。在采用图 5.6 所示的走锭纺纱机之前，纺纱工的数量已经接近其实际极限。来源：根据 Allen，2015 年的数据绘制的图表。

Figure 5.5. The proportion of the female population required to work as spinners to support the textile industry grew exponentially in the leadup to industrial capitalism in England. Prior to the adoption of the mules shown in figure 5.6 the number of spinners was already near its practical limit. Source: Graph drawn from data in Allen, 2015.

图 5.6. 罗伯特·欧文在新拉纳克的旧工厂中使用的水力纺纱机将人工能量应用于大量纺锤，同时自动排序机制在更大规模上复制了人类纺纱工手臂的运动。

Figure 5.6. Water-powered mules such as this one at Robert Owen’s old mill at New Lanark applied artificial energy to a huge number of spindles while an automatic sequencing mechanism replicated on a much larger scale the motions of a human spinner’s arms.

资本主义生产首先利用古代的水力技术扎根；在这方面，它的新颖性不在于动力源，而在于其使用的规模及其在高度并行机器中的应用。真正的新颖性，即蒸汽动力，最初在应用上相对专业化——专门用于抽水，特别是从矿井抽水。直到 19 世纪 30 年代，蒸汽动力在英国的装机容量才超过水力，在美国则更晚。有人认为 [Malm, 2013] 蒸汽最终在棉纺业中取代水力的原因更多的是阶级冲突，而不是技术合理性。水磨坊位于偏远的农村地区，工厂工人在那里组织罢工比在大城市更容易，因为大城市有大量潜在的失业工人。蒸汽动力使老板们能够从劳动力稀缺和强势的地方转移到劳动力丰富和弱势的地方。

Capitalist production first took root using the water power technologies available from antiquity; its novelty in this respect was not the power source but the scale on which it was used and its application to highly parallel machinery. The real novelty, steam power, was at first relatively specialized in its application—used exclusively for pumping water, particularly from mines. It was not until the 1830s that steam power overtook water in installed capacity in Britain, even later in the United States. It has been suggested [Malm, 2013] that the reason steam eventually replaced water in the cotton industry was more a matter of class conflict than technical rationality. Water mills were in isolated rural spots where it was easier for the mill workers to organize strikes than in big cities with their abundant potential scabs among the unemployed. Steam power enabled masters to move from where labor was scarce and strong to where it was abundant and weak.

资本主义能否以不同的方式发展，不依赖化石燃料？

Could capitalism have developed differently, in a way that did not rely on fossil fuel?

法拉第发电机和电动机的发明晚于瓦特发动机几十年，这只是一个偶然事件吗？

Was it just a contingent accident that Faraday’s dynamo and electric motor were invented decades after Watt’s engine?

如果电磁能早点被研究出来，那么电力就可以从湍急的河流输送到城市的发电厂，从而使老板比工人拥有蒸汽提供的优势。然而，这种转变必须等到十九世纪末的爱迪生、特斯拉和开尔文。但即便如此，水力也不足以与蒸汽相媲美。2000 年，英国的水力发电装机容量为 1400 兆瓦，低于 1870 年的蒸汽发电装机容量，仅为十九世纪末各类发电装机容量的四分之一左右。

Had electro-magnetism been investigated earlier, power could have been transmitted from fast-flowing rivers to power factories in cities, thus giving the masters the edge over their workers that steam provided. This transformation, though, had to await Edison, Tesla, and Kelvin in the late nineteenth century. But even then water power would not have been sufficient to rival steam. In the year 2000 the installed hydropower of the UK was 1400 MW, which is less than the installed steam power was in 1870, and only about a quarter of the total installed power of all types by the end of the nineteenth century.

表 5.7：英国煤矿热能当量平均产出（25GJ/吨）

TABLE 5.7: Average Output of Thermal Energy Equivalent in UK Coal Mines (25GJ per ton)

年

Years

兆瓦热能

MW Thermal

1760-1765

4,122

1800-1805

11,019

1830-1835

25,367

1853-1862

56,690

1873-1882

111,219

1883-1892

136,860

1893-1902

163,762

1903-1912

204,565

来源：数据来源于 Pollard，1980 年；以及英国能源与气候变化部《历史煤炭数据：煤炭产量，1853-2014》中 1873 年的数据。

Source: Figures from Pollard, 1980; and from 1873 in Historical Coal Data: Coal Production, 1853-2014, UK Dept of Energy and Climate Change.

我在上面推测了一种反事实的情况，即法拉第发电机的发明早于瓦特发动机。也许可以想象电磁学的发展早于蒸汽机，但科学和技术进步之间存在着真正的逻辑依赖关系。海尔布伦纳 [1967] 认为，正是这组依赖关系支撑了马克思坚持生产力在指导经济和历史发展方面具有首要地位。知识是累积的。你需要先了解一项技术，然后才能考虑改进它。如果没有纽可门发动机作为起点，瓦特就不会想到使用单独的冷凝器。然而，他认为使用单独的冷凝器是值得的，这取决于他有一个先验概念，即热量是一种可量化的“物质”，可以通过不像纽可门那样反复冷却气缸来节省热量。而这又得益于瓦特在格拉斯哥大学布莱克实验室接受的科学训练 [Cardwell, 1971]，当时该大学是热力学研究的领先中心。

I speculated above about a counterfactual situation in which Faraday’s generator had been invented before Watt’s engine. There might be conceivable circumstances in which electromagnetism was developed before steam power, but there are real logical dependencies existing between scientific and technological advances. Heilbroner [1967] argues that it is just this set of dependencies that lie behind Marx’s insistence on the primacy of the productive forces in giving direction to economic and historical development. Knowledge is cumulative. You need prior knowledge of one technology before you can think of improving it. Without the Newcomen engine as a starting point Watt would not have hit on his separate condenser. The possibility of him thinking that it would be worth using a separate condenser, however, depended on his having a prior concept that heat was a quantifiable “substance” that could be saved by not repeatedly cooling the cylinder the way Newcomen did. That in turn was only possible because of Watt’s scientific training in Black’s laboratory in Glasgow University [Cardwell, 1971], then the leading center for thermodynamic research.

反过来，纽科门和萨弗里的先驱发动机又依赖于托里拆利关于大气压的研究成果的传播，因为这些装置在当时被称为“大气发动机”。发动机的动力冲程由大气压驱动。机器的改进往往不是来自专业科学家，而是来自瓦特和古诺等技术人员，这一事实不应被理解为技术人员不了解机器的基本科学原理，或这些发现并不依赖于这些原理。例如，将直线运动转化为旋转运动是一个相当大的工程问题。77^曲柄或行星齿轮解决了这个问题，但这又留下了另一个问题。对于横梁发动机，你必须将活塞杆的垂直运动与横梁的摇摆运动结合起来，这往往会使活塞杆弯曲和脱位。瓦特用他的平行四边形连杆解决了这个问题 [Koetsier，1983；Ferguson，1962]。要得出这个结论，至少需要对古典几何有深入的理解，可能还需要掌握笛卡尔技术 [Dennis, 1997]，以证明其有效性。78^当我们现在在博物馆看到它时，它看起来确实笨重而粗糙，但实际上它所涉及的数学知识会让大多数当代学生感到吃力。

Newcomen and Savery’s pioneering engines in turn depended on the prior dissemination of Torricelli’s work on atmospheric pressure, since these devices were, in the language of the day, “atmospheric engines.” The power stroke of the engine was driven by atmospheric pressure. The fact that improvements to machines often came not from professional scientists but from technicians like Watt and Cugnot should not be taken to indicate either that the technicians were ignorant of the underlying scientific principles of the machines or that the discoveries were not dependent on these principles. For example, the conversion of rectilinear motion into rotary motion was a considerable engineering problem.⁷⁷ This was solved by cranks or planetary gears, but that left another problem. With a beam engine you had to combine vertical motion of the piston rod with rocking motion of the beam that would tend to bend and unseat the piston rod. Watt solved this with his parallelogram linkage [Koetsier, 1983; Ferguson, 1962]. The ability to come up with this requires at least a deep grasp of classical geometry and probably also of Cartesian techniques [Dennis, 1997] in order to prove its validity.⁷⁸ Something which, when we see it in a museum now, looks literally clunky and crude, actually involved math that would severely tax most contemporary students.

图 5.7. 英国资本主义发展过程中不同形式能源使用的增长情况。Y 轴采用对数刻度，直线表示指数增长率。资料来源：表 5.5和表 5.7。

Figure 5.7. Growth of different forms of energy use during the development of British capitalism. Given the log scale of the Y axis, a straight line represents an exponential growth rate. Source: From Tables 5.5 and, 5.7.

因此，资本主义文明及其所依赖的技术进步的一个条件就是科学的不断发展以及科学所依赖的教育和研究基础。这些并不是资本主义企业内部产生的。它们最初依赖于皇家和后来的共和国家的赞助，而这种赞助远早于实际资本主义机械工业的发展。鲁索 [2013] 表明，17 和 18 世纪的科学在多大程度上仍然依赖于锡拉库扎或亚历山大的希腊化时期皇家资助的研究。从 17 世纪开始，皇家对研究的赞助恢复了，欧洲的大学成为科学中心而不仅仅是宗教中心。

A condition therefore of capitalist civilization, and the technical advances on which it depends, has been the continuing development of science and the educational and research base on which science relies. These are not something generated internally by capitalist enterprise. They depended initially on royal and later republican state patronage which well preceded the growth of actual capitalist machine industry. Russo [2013] shows to what extent the science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still rested on royally funded research of the Hellenistic period in Syracuse or Alexandria. From the seventeenth century royal patronage of research resumed and the universities in Europe became centers of science rather than just religion.

科学知识一旦发表，就不再是财产。科学知识无法从中获利，因此它主要由社会研究而非私人研究产生。无论资本家创新的动力有多大，仅靠商品关系和雇佣劳动不足以产生资本主义生产方式。没有理论，仅靠反复试验驱动的创新是缓慢而有限的。只有与社会生产和积累的非商品化理论相结合，创新才会快速发展。专利和知识产权允许某些创新通过给予它们暂时的垄断权（通常为 25 年左右）为公司带来利润。但科学进步通常会在未来带来好处，因此如果基础研究是为了盈利而进行的，就必须使科学知识本身可获得专利，并且使这些专利持续更长时间（大约一个世纪或更长时间）。

Scientific knowledge, once published, is not property. There is no profit to be made from it, so it has in the main to be produced by social rather than private research. However great the incentive for capitalists to innovate may have been, the mere existence of commodity relations and wage labor would not have been sufficient to generate the capitalist mode of production. Innovations driven just by trial and error, without theory, are slow and limited. They only become rapid when coupled with socially produced and accumulated, non-commodified, theory. Patents and intellectual property rights allow certain innovations to be made profitable to firms by giving them a temporary monopoly—usually around twenty-five years. But scientific advances usually bring their benefit well into the future so that were basic research to be done for a profit it would be necessary to make scientific knowledge itself patentable, and also make these patents last for much longer—of the order of a century or more.

图 5.8. 将活塞杆的直线运动转换为梁的摇摆运动是瓦特平行四边形连杆机构解决的一个困难的几何问题。解决该问题需要良好的几何教育水平。

Figure 5.8. The conversion of the straight-line motion of the piston rod into the rocking motion of the beam was a difficult geometry problem solved by Watt’s parallelogram linkage. Solving the problem requires a good level of geometrical education.

但理性的资本主义企业会根据长期利率的猜测来贴现专利的未来收益。我们保守估计，他们会使用 5% 的贴现率。这意味着你需要从科学理论中获得的长期专利的未来收入的现值变得微不足道（见第 129 页）。

But a rational capitalist firm will discount future returns from patents by a guess at what the long -term rate of interest will be. Let us make the conservative estimate that they would use a 5 percent discount rate. This means that the present value of future revenue from the long-term patents you would need to take out on scientific theories becomes negligible (see page 129).

因此，资本主义的利润追求本身永远不会产生实质性技术变革所需的科学。资本主义会计的这一基本特性进一步削弱了布伦纳 [2001] 的论点，即商品工资劳动关系本身的存在是资本主义生产方式兴起的充分解释因素。麦克唐纳关于古典封建主义经济效率的数据进一步质疑了布伦纳的论点。

So capitalist profit seeking will itself never generate the science needed for substantial technical change. This basic property of capitalist accounting further undermines the Brenner [2001] thesis about the existence of commodity–wage labor relations themselves being a sufficient explanatory factor for the rise of the capitalist mode of production. McDonald’s data on the economic efficiency of classic feudalism casts additional doubt on the Brenner thesis.

5.4.5 铁的征服

5.4.5 An Iron Subjugation

如果我们考虑到动力只是化石能源的一种用途，而且长期以来只是辅助用途，那么资本主义工业对化石燃料的依赖程度就更加明显了。煤炭显然在家庭中用于烹饪和取暖，但这不是资本主义对能源的利用。但铁工业、砖工业、水泥生产、陶器、烘焙、酿造等都是煤炭的巨大消耗者。这要么是为了提供热量，要么是为了提供直接的化学能。如果没有碳作为还原剂的化学能，你就无法将氧化铁转化为金属铁。所有这些行业在十九世纪的迅速扩张都是因为煤炭开采提供的碳比林木栽培和木炭燃烧提供的碳多得多。

If we take into account that motive power was only one use of fossil energy, and for a long time only a subsidiary use, it becomes even clearer how much capitalist industry had to depend on fossil fuel. Coal was obviously used domestically for cooking and heating, but that is not a capitalist use of energy. But the iron industry, the brick industry, cement production, pottery, baking, brewing, etc., were all huge consumers of coal. This was either to provide heat or to provide direct chemical energy. You cannot convert iron oxide to metallic iron without the chemical energy of carbon as a reducing agent. The rapid expansion of all of these industries in the nineteenth century was only possible because coal mining provided far more carbon than coppicing and charcoal burning did.

专利有效期

Life of Patent

专利最后一年收入流的现值

Present Value of Revenue Stream for Last Year of Patent

95％

95%

60％

60%

二十五

28%

100

1％

200

0.01%

随着铁生产从生物燃料向化石燃料的转变，我们肯定经历了资源枯竭驱动的转变，类似于上一章讨论过的巨型动物灭绝假说。从铁器时代开始到十八世纪，铁生产一直依赖木炭作为燃料并提供化学能。在那段时期的大部分时间里，木材的消耗受到炉灶尺寸小以及气流来自手动操作风箱的限制^。79

With the transition from biological to fossil fuel in iron production we definitely have a resource depletion-driven transition, analogous to the megafauna extinction hypothesis, which was discussed in an earlier chapter. From the start of the iron age until the eighteenth century, iron production had relied on charcoal for fuel and to provide chemical energy. For the greater part of that period the consumption of wood was limited by the small size of the hearths and the fact that their airflow came from manually operated bellows.⁷⁹

最初的熔炉属于“方坯”型。它们生产出含有铁和炉渣混合物的固体方坯。然后必须用锤子敲打以排出炉渣并形成熟铁。早期的小型熔炉由手动风箱操作，产生的温度不足以真正熔化铁。现在，考虑一下熔炉的热量损失与其表面积成正比，而产热能力与燃烧燃料的体积成正比。因此，热量损失与熔炉线性尺寸的平方成正比，产生的热量与其尺寸的立方成正比。因此，如果你建造一个更大的熔炉，它能达到的温度就会上升。

The first furnaces were of the “bloomery” type. They produced a solid bloom containing a mix of iron and slag. This then had to be hammered to expel the slag and form wrought iron. The early small furnaces, operating by manual bellows, did not produce high enough temperatures to actually melt the iron. Now, consider that the heat loss of a furnace is proportionate to its surface area, whereas the heat-generating capacity is proportionate to the volume of burning fuel. Heat loss is consequently proportional to the square of the linear dimension of the furnace, and heat produced to the cube of its dimension. So if you build a larger furnace the temperature it can attain will rise.

但是，更大的熔炉需要更多的空气通过，比人力驱动的还要多。水力风箱使这些更大的熔炉成为可能。最初的目标是提供更大的钢坯，以便锻造更大的物体。但副作用是，通过足够的吹气，可以将它们加热到获得液态铁的程度，然后可以将其冷却为铸铁。

But a larger furnace requires more air to be driven through it, more than a man can drive. Water-powered bellows allowed these larger furnaces. Initially the aim was to provide larger blooms, from which bigger objects could be forged. But a side effect was that, with sufficient blowing, it became possible to heat them to the point at which they obtained liquid iron that could then be cooled as cast iron.

当作为方坯炉使用时，方坯太大，无法手工锻造，而是需要图 5.9所示的三锤。意大利在 15 世纪末和中欧在 16 世纪已经达到了这一阶段 [Williams, 2003] ^。80

When operated as bloomery furnaces, the blooms were too big to be hand forged, requiring instead the trip hammers shown in figure 5.9. This stage had been reached by the end of the fifteenth century in Italy and by the sixteenth century in central Europe [Williams, 2003].⁸⁰

图 5.9。水力锤的打击力度比人重得多。现代液压锤（右）的打击力度更大。来源：维基媒体，许可使用 Creative Commons，署名 Rainer Halama。

Figure 5.9. Water-powered trip hammers could strike much heavier blows than a person. Modern hydraulic ones (right) are even more powerful. Source: Wikimedia, license Creative Commons, attribution Rainer Halama.

水力使生产规模扩大，这意味着铁厂很早就转向了资本主义生产方式。生产规模超出了单个铁匠独自工作所能达到的水平，需要大量固定资本和大量雇佣劳动力。随着物理生产方式的发展，其社会形式也必须改变，但它仍然植根于自然封建经济。铁厂使用三种能源，依次为：木炭的化学能、流水的重力能和工人的代谢能。但化学能仍然来自有机源：在低氧条件下燃烧木材以生产木炭。因此，铁厂必须位于既有林地又有流水的地方，因此对贵族拥有的林地具有半农业依赖性。这一过程在第二种意义上融入了封建主义，即 15 和 16 世纪铁工业的主要产品是上层阶级在战斗中穿着的盔甲。此外，尽管水力被用来驱动风箱和铁锤，但大部分最终产品（剑、锁子甲、头盔等）的锻造仍由铁匠手工完成。在动力铁工厂的早期阶段，它们通常归贵族或教会机构所有——这是封建主义的上层建筑。后来，它们被出租给资本家主人，租金来自用作燃料的林地等。正式而言，铁匠及其工人可能必须承认拥有土地的领主是他们的封建上级——宣誓效忠，但实际上这种关系是一种租赁关系。

The larger scale of production, made possible by water power, meant that iron works moved over to a specifically capitalist mode of production at this quite early date. The scale of production was beyond what the individual smith working on his own could achieve, needing both substantial fixed capital and a larger employed workforce. As the physical mode of production developed, its social form had to change, but it still remained embedded in the natural feudal economy. The iron works used three energy sources in descending order: the chemical energy of charcoal, gravitational energy of flowing water, and metabolic energy of its workers. But the chemical energy was still provided from an organic source: wood that was burned in low-oxygen conditions to produce charcoal. As such, the iron works had to be situated where there were both woodlands and flowing water and thus have a semi-agricultural dependence on woodlands owned by the aristocracy. This process was integrated into feudalism in a second sense in that a major product of the iron industry in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the armor worn in battle by the upper class. In addition, although water power was used to drive bellows and trip hammers, forging of much of the final product—swords, mail, helmets, etc.—was still done manually by smiths. In the early stages of powered iron works they were often owned by the aristocracy or by church institutions—the superstructure of feudalism. Later they were rented out to capitalist masters, with rent being due on the woodlands used for fuel, etc. In formal terms the iron masters and their workers might have to acknowledge the lord who owned the land as their feudal superior—swearing the appropriate fealty oaths, but in practice the relationship was one of renting.

中世纪的高炉和铸造厂应该被视为工业还是制造业，这一直是一个争论点 [Myska, 1979]。如今，我们往往不会在概念上区分这两者，但马克思声称两者之间存在着重要的历史区别。他所说的制造业是一个以手工工具为主的体力劳动过程。81在他的概念中，工业需要使用动力机械。制造业可能将许多工人聚集在一个地点，他们可能^是雇佣劳动者，但他们仍然在手工工作。因此，他们对资本家的从属关系是“形式上的”，也就是说，只存在于雇佣劳动的社会形式中。这种意义上的制造业也存在于使用奴隶的古典时代。马克思认为，真正的资本主义生产方式，即工人“真正”地服从资本家，是随着现代动力工业而来的。在此之前，工人原则上可以成为独立的生产者——他们使用的工具仍然便宜而简单。事实上，个体经营者与制造业通常是共存的，因为制造业的技术优势还不足以迫使独立工人退出生产。

It has been a point of controversy as to whether blast furnaces and foundries of the Middle Ages should be considered industry or manufacture [Myska, 1979]. Nowadays we do not tend to conceptually differentiate between the two, but Marx claimed that there was an important historical distinction. What he termed manufacture was a process in which manual labor with hand-operated tools predominated.⁸¹ In his conception, industry required the use of powered machinery instead. Manufacture might group together many workers in a single site, and they might be wage laborers, but they were still working by hand. As such their subordination to the capitalists was “formal,” that is to say, only existing in the social form of wage labor. Manufacturing in this sense also existed in classical antiquity using slaves. What Marx considered the capitalist mode of production proper, where workers were subjected to a “real” subordination to the capitalists, came with modern powered industry. Prior to that the workers could in principle have set themselves up as independent producers—the tools they used still being cheap and simple. Indeed, one typically had a coexistence of self-employed workers and manufacturing, since the technical advantages of manufacturing were not yet sufficient to force the independent worker out of production.

因此，中世纪的铸铁厂实际上要求劳动者服从雇主。他们是自由的雇佣劳动者，而不是农奴，但除非他们能获得足够的资本购买吹铁炉、水车、水坝、水道等，否则他们没有真正可能与铁匠竞争。这些生产资料本身就太大，无法由一个铁匠和他的家人操作。因此，当地的铁匠被从最初的铁生产中取代，而是将最初由大型吹铁炉生产的小锭或块加工成最终产品。因此，最好将水力炼铁厂和帆船视为以封建农业为主的经济中的资本主义工业的口袋。资本主义航运商人和资本主义铁匠都依赖于利用人工动力源：风或水。在这两种情况下，投资规模及其允许的生产力增长都确保了他们真正的阶级地位。

On this account, the iron foundries of the Middle Ages involved real subordination of laborers to their employers. They were free wage laborers rather than serfs, but they had no real possibility to compete with the iron masters unless they could acquire sufficient capital to buy a blow-furnace, water wheel, dam, mill-race, etc. These means of production were inherently too big to be operated by one smith and his family. Local blacksmiths were, as a result, displaced from the initial production of iron, instead working up small ingots or chunks originally produced by large blow furnaces into final products. It is thus better to see both water-powered ironworks and sailing ships as pockets of capitalist industry within a predominantly feudal agricultural economy. Capitalist shipping merchants and capitalist iron masters both depended on the harnessing of an artificial source of power: wind or water. In both cases the scale of the investment, and the rise in productivity it allowed, secured their real class position.

先是水吹式方铁炉，然后是生产铁水的实际高炉，这一系列的连续发展减少了所需的劳动力投入。方铁炉是间歇性操作。装载、吹炼、取出方铁，然后必须开始新的装载和批次。高炉不停地工作，定期出铁。这减少了生产 100 公斤铁所需的劳动力，从 4 个工作日减少到 2000 公斤。15 世纪的 1 天工作日减少到 18 世纪的 2.7 个工作日。此外，铁水的可用性意味着可以用它铸造物品。铸造比锻造劳动密集程度低得多，并且可以轻松生产更复杂的标准化产品：烹饪锅、炉灶、栏杆以及后来的机器零件。长期以来，人们可以用铸铜制造这样的物品，但铁要便宜得多。市场的扩大和产品价格的下降意味着对燃料的需求增加。只要熔炉是手工吹制和手工锻造的，就可以在两种生物能量过程之间取得平衡。操作锻炉的人力能量依赖于玉米地的光合作用，而提供热量的化学能依赖于森林的光合作用。驱动风箱的人力能量有限，限制了熔炉的氧气供应，从而限制了对木炭的需求。然而，水力可以提供更多的氧气，以至于森林无法再满足对木炭的需求。除非找到替代的碳源，否则森林砍伐将威胁到炼铁业的持续运营。答案当然是焦炭，这是中国和英国独立发明的。煤的热解产生的几乎是纯碳，适合熔炉操作。

The sequential development, first of water-blown bloomery furnaces and then of the actual blast furnaces producing liquid iron, caused a reduction in the labor input needed. A bloomery furnace had an intermittent operation. It was loaded, blown, the bloom extracted, and then a new load and batch had to be started. Blast furnaces worked nonstop, being periodically tapped. This reduced the labor required to produce 100kg of iron from 4 working days in the fifteenth century to 2.7 working days in the eighteenth. In addition the availability of liquid iron meant that objects could be cast from it. Casting is much less labor-intensive than forging, and allows the easy production of more elaborate standardized products: cooking pots, stoves, railings, and later machine parts. It had long been possible to make such objects out of cast bronze, but iron is much cheaper. This widening of the market and cheapening of the product meant a greater demand for fuel. So long as furnaces were hand-blown and used hand-forging, one could have an equilibrium between two bio-energetic processes. The human energy to operate the forges depended on photosynthesis in cornfields, whereas the chemical energy to provide heat depended on photosynthesis in forests. The limited human energy to drive bellows constrained the oxygen supply to the furnaces which in turn constrained the demand for charcoal. Water power, however, could supply so much more oxygen that the forests could no longer keep up with the demand for charcoal. Deforestation threatened the iron industry’s continued operation unless an alternative source of carbon was found. The answer of course was coke, independently invented in China and England. Pyrolysis of coal produced almost pure carbon, suitable for furnace operation.

摆脱了生物碳生产的限制，通过使用蒸汽吹炼，摆脱了河流不稳定流动的影响，资本主义钢铁工业得以实现指数级增长。

Freed from the bounds set by biological carbon production and, by using steam blowing, freed from the vagaries of erratic river flows, the capitalist iron and steel industry was able to embark on exponential growth.

我以炼铁业为例来说明资本主义的发展有几个原因。炼铁业是资本主义的先锋产业，是最早应用人工能源和依赖化石燃料的产业之一。它说明了工人在现实中不可避免地处于资本家的从属地位的过程。它表明技术进步如何提高劳动生产率：扩大规模、提高热效率和劳动效率，并通过铸造实现新的、劳动密集程度较低的生产工艺。它也是一个战略性产业，其他大量产业都依赖于它，因为几乎所有产业都依赖于炼铁机器和设备。但所有这些特征都可以在不同程度上在其他产业中得到复制：运输、电力、食品加工。在所有这些产业中，动力机器和化石燃料的应用都提高了劳动生产率，使个体工匠无法参与整个生产部门。

I have given iron production as an example of capitalist development for several reasons. It was a pioneer capitalist industry, one of the first to apply artificial energy and one of the first to rely on fossil fuel. It illustrates the process by which employees came to be, in a real and inescapable sense, under the subordination of capitalists. It shows how technical advances improved the productivity of labor: expanding scale, improving thermal and labor efficiency, and, via casting, allowed new and less labor-intensive production processes. It was also a strategic industry, one on which a whole mass of others came to depend, since almost all of them came to depend on iron machines and fitments. But all of these features could, in varying degrees, be replicated in examinations of other industries: transport, power, food processing. In all of them the application of powered machines and fossil fuels allowed rising labor productivity that closed off whole branches of production from the self-employed artisan.

5.4.6 自动化或自我行动

5.4.6 Automation or Self-Action

帆船或水磨利用非生物力量产生连续运动。作为动物，我们只能通过执行重复的四肢运动序列。在水磨发明之前，谷物是通过跪着来回摩擦磨石来加工的，这种动作会导致膝盖过早退化 [Hedges, 1984]。下一个进步是手动旋转磨石，两块圆形石头，表面平坦，有一个中心轴，一块叠在另一块上面。一只手用一根棍子插入上石的一个洞中，通过摇动上石来转动。这大大减少了所需的力气，并允许坐着工作。水力磨坊是这种手动小型研磨装置的直接发展。但手工磨坊主必须反复进行相同的有节奏的手臂运动才能实现连续旋转。同样，在纺纱过程中，车轮的连续运动来自四肢的往复运动，手臂运动叠加在四肢上，首先拉出、扭转，然后卷绕纱线。

The sailing ship or the water mill harness a non-biological power to produce continuous motion. As animals we can only do the same by performing a repeated sequence of movements by our limbs. Before the invention of the water mill, grain was processed by rubbing a grinding stone backwards and forwards in a kneeling position, an action that produced premature degeneration of the knee [Hedges, 1984]. The next advance was the hand-operated rotary quern, two circular stones with flat surfaces and a central axis, one on top of the other. The upper stone is turned by a cranking motion of one hand using a stick poked into a hole in the upper stone. This greatly reduced the effort needed and allowed work to be done from a sitting position. The water-powered mill was a direct development of this sort of hand-operated small grinding device. But the hand miller had to repeatedly carry out the same rhythmic motions of his arm to achieve the continuous rotation. Similarly, with spinning, continuous motion of the wheel comes from reciprocation of the limbs, onto which is superimposed the arm motions necessary to first draw out, twist, and then wind on the yarn.

显而易见。但这种执行一系列动作的能力，即使是重复性的，最初也是人类和其他动物独有的。船帆只是传递连续的力，不需要排序。一艘模型帆船，只要把帆调整到合适的位置，就能自动滑过池塘。

So much, so obvious. But this ability to perform a sequence of actions, even if it is repetitious, is something that was initially unique to humans and other animals. The sails of a ship simply transmit a continuous force, there is no sequencing required. A model sailing boat, with its sails appropriately set, will glide autonomously across a pond.

相反，劳动过程不仅仅是能量的消耗，它是一种结构化的、连续的、通常是重复性的动作模式。使重复性动作机械化的关键发明是固定圆柱体，如图5.10所示。

A labor process, in contrast, is not simply an expenditure of energy, it is a structured sequential pattern of, typically repetitive, motion. The key invention enabling the mechanization of repetitive motion is the pinned cylinder, such as that shown in figure 5.10.

这种装置最早出现在 1201 年的音乐自动机中，由 Al Jazari Meneghetti 和 Maggiore [2011] 描述。在近代早期，它被广泛应用于音乐自动机、手摇风琴、音乐盒等，并从 18 世纪开始应用于工业自动机。使用走锭纺纱机实现的纺织业自动化，以及查尔斯·巴贝奇的早期计算机（称为“差分机”）都依赖于这种装置的变体。另一种遵循相同原理的设备是雅卡尔织机。这些设备可以实现任何劳动过程的自动化，用现代计算术语来说，这是一个由多个并行步骤组成的“永远做”的循环。它们不能做的是做出决定；它们没有与现代编程语言中的“if ... then ... else ...”结构等同的东西。正因为如此，它们只能被资本用来取代常规劳动，即整天重复执行完全相同的动作的工作。任何需要感官互动并在此基础上做出决定的工作都不在其范围之内。这显然包括大量的文书工作、会计工作或哈耶克著名的船运代理的工作。但许多其他任务在社会意义上仍然被视为卑微或低级的状态：采摘水果、分拣土豆、清洁等，也需要工人不断做出决策和判断。

The earliest known representation of this device dates from 1201 in a musical automaton, described by Al Jazari Meneghetti and Maggiore [2011]. It came to be extensively used in musical automata, barrel organs, musical boxes, etc., during the early modern period, and from the eighteenth century started to be applied to industrial automata. The automation of the spinning industry with the mule, as much as Charles Babbage’s early computer called the “difference engine” depended on variants of this device. Another device following the same principle would be the Jacquard loom. These devices allow the automation of any labor process that, in modern computing terms, is a “do forever” loop made up of multiple parallel steps. What these cannot do is make decisions; they have nothing equivalent to the “if … then … else …” construct in modern programming languages. Because of this they could only be used by capital to replace routinized labor, work that involved repetitively performing exactly the same actions all day long. Any kind of work that requires sensory interaction and decisions on this basis remained outside its scope. That obviously included the great mass of clerical work, accounting work, or activities like those of Hayek’s famous shipping agents. But many other tasks, which in social terms are still seen as menial or low status: fruit picking, sorting potatoes, cleaning, etc., also require the workers to make continual decisions and judgments.

固定圆筒自动化模型是库尔特·冯内古特（1952）在 20 世纪 50 年代初创作的反乌托邦小说《自动钢琴》中讽刺的。他描绘了 20 世纪末美国资本主义的形象，其中熟练工人的每一个动作都被复制到磁线上，并复制到自动机器上，比如标题中的钢琴。这部小说的创作时间很晚，这表明资本主义依赖这种自动化已有多长时间——纺纱机发明 170 年后。

The pinned cylinder model of automation is the one satirized by Kurt Vonnegut [1952] in his dystopian Player Piano dating from the early 1950s. He portrayed an image of a late twentieth-century American capitalism in which skilled workers have their every action copied to magnetic wire and replicated on automatic machines like the piano of the title. The late date of this novel indicates just how long capitalism had relied on this type of automation—170 years after the invention of the spinning mule.

机器能够做出决策，从而能够取代大量文书、计算和会计工作的原理早在十九世纪前三分之一就已出现 [Lardner, 1834]，但其实际应用却一直被推迟，直到电子开关设备 [Turing, 2004] 和适当的电子存储技术 [Williams, 1948] 出现。冯内古特的密涅瓦猫头鹰飞翔在计算机资本主义的黎明之前。

The principle of a machine able to make decisions, and thus able to replace a large part of clerical, computational, and accounting work, had already been arrived at by the first third of the nineteenth century [Lardner, 1834], but its practical application was delayed until the availability of electronic switching devices [Turing, 2004] and appropriate electronic memory technology [Williams, 1948]. Vonnegut’s owl of Minerva flew just before the dawn of computer capitalism.

决策机制的一种更原始的形式是瓦特的调速器，这是一种基于离心力的装置，用来调节工厂使用的固定蒸汽机的速度。但直到电子计算机发展起来之前，还不可能制造出能够根据外部条件做出复杂多变行为的机器。这意味着第一波资本主义自动化仅限于替代那些本身简单或已经通过分工简化的任务。然而，电子计算机有可能取代任何以前由人类执行的决策或指导任务 [Turing, 1950]。最初的影响是在文职职业、保险、银行等行业。但这些领域自动化带来的生产力增长很慢，不足以阻止这些部门吸纳越来越多的社会劳动力。

Decision making in a much more primitive form had been available in the form of Watt’s governor, a device based on centrifugal force that regulated the speed of stationary steam engines used in mills. But until the development of the electronic computer it was not possible to build machines that could deploy complex and varying behaviors in response to external conditions. This meant that the first wave of capitalist automation was restricted to the replacement of tasks that were either of inherent simplicity or those upon which the division of labor had already enforced a simplicity. The electronic computer, however, had the potential to replace any decision-making or guidance task that had previously been performed by humans [Turing, 1950]. Initially the effect was in clerical occupations, insurance, banking, etc. But the productivity gains from automation in these areas were slow, not enough to stop these sectors using up a growing part of social labor.

电子计算机的一个关键点是它是一种通用机器，是一种非常通用的技术。个人电脑的标准设计可以应用于各种计算或工业控制任务。第一代测序技术往往是针对特定机器的。你不可能把一个手摇风琴装置不加修改地装进织布机里。计算机的通用性意味着它开始接近人类工作的通用性。标准的、批量生产的 IBM 360 计算机在 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代能够取代各种不同的文书和会计任务，而 IBM 5150 型机器的各代衍生产品从 20 世纪 80 年代开始继续这一进程。使用通用计算机的这一过程是资本主义自动化的第二次浪潮——大约涵盖了 20 世纪下半叶。随着多用途机器人的发展，第三阶段开始了。这些机器人通常只有一只手臂，但也有双臂版本。它们与第一代自动化的区别在于用途广泛，与第二代自动化的区别在于应用于物理生产而非信息处理。然而，它们仍然不是小说中的通用工人，因为它们主要被固定在地板上。那些可以四处移动的机器人的机动性、耐力和态势感知能力目前非常有限。它们目前还无法成为人类工人的通用替代品。

A key point about the electronic computer is that it is a universal machine, a very general-purpose technology. The standard design of a PC can be applied to a whole range of computational or industrial control tasks. The first-generation sequencing technologies tended to be machine specific. You could not take a barrel organ mechanism and incorporate it, unmodified, into a weaving machine. The generality of the computer means that it begins to approximate to the generality of human work. Standard, mass-produced IBM 360 computers were able to replace a wide range of different clerical and accounting tasks during the 1960s and ’70s, and various generations of derivatives of IBM 5150 type machines continued the process from the 1980s. This process of using general-purpose computing machines was the second wave of capitalist automation—roughly covering the second half of the twentieth century. A third phase opens up with the development of multipurpose robots. Typically these had one arm, though two-arm versions are also available. They differed from first-generation automation in being multipurpose, and from second-generation automation in being applied to physical production rather than information processing. They are, however, still not the universal workers of fiction, since they are in the main screwed to the floor. Those that can move around have so far very limited mobility, endurance, and situational awareness. They are, as yet, quite unable to act as a general purpose replacement for human workers.

图 5.10。布鲁日古钟楼使用的固定式气缸机构。这种基本的定序器是第一代资本主义自动化的关键。摄影：贝弗利·阿姆斯特朗。

Figure 5.10. Pinned cylinder mechanism used in the ancient clock tower in Bruges. This basic sequencer device was the key to the first generation of capitalist automation. Photograph: Beverley Armstrong.

这并不是说未来某个时候不可能制造出这种通用机器人。

This is not to imply that such universal robots will be impossible to build some time in the future.

5.4.7 首次使用利润

5.4.7 Profit of First Use

技术以两种不同的方式提高利润。第一种方式影响引入创新的个体企业，第二种方式影响所有资本主义企业。

Technology boosts profits in two distinct ways. The first affects the individual business introducing the innovation, the second affects all capitalist businesses collectively.

第一种机制很容易理解。回想一下，商品价格与制造产品所需的劳动力密切相关。因此，很明显，一个行业采用节省劳动力的技术将倾向于降低其产品的相对价格。

The first mechanism is easy to understand. Recall that commodity prices are closely correlated with the labor required to make things. It is evident therefore that the adoption of labor-saving technology in a branch of business will tend to reduce the relative price of its product.

但技术采用通常并不均衡。一两家企业将是早期采用者。第一批采用者能够略微降低价格并增加市场份额。如表 5.8所示。初始情况是该产品总共需要 10 小时的劳动，每小时劳动的平均价值为 20 英镑，这意味着售价为 200 英镑。创新后，劳动成本下降了一半。创新前每单位利润为 50 英镑，新技术普及后降至 20 英镑。

But technology adoption is typically not even. One or two businesses will be early adopters. The first adopter is able to slightly drop their price and increase market share. This is illustrated in table 5.8. The initial situation is that the product requires a total of 10 hours’ labor, which, with the average value of an hour’s labor being £20 means a selling price of £200. After the innovation the labor content falls by half. Before the innovation the per-unit profit was £50, after the new technique becomes general it falls to £20.

我们假设一家公司原本销售 1,000 单位，现在可能能够销售 1,200 单位，因此他们的总利润不会像每单位利润那样下降。

We assume that a firm selling 1,000 units originally may now be able to sell 1,200, so their total profit does not fall as much as the per unit profit.

然而，在实际创新期间，该技术的第一个用户具有巨大的竞争优势。假设当其他人都在以 200 英镑的价格销售产品时，他们以 80 英镑的成本基础以 150 英镑的价格销售产品。他们增加了每单位利润，同时削弱了竞争对手。我们假设他们在此过渡期内将销售额翻一番，达到每年 2,000 件。因此，他们的利润在两个方面都增加了，利润率上升，产量也上升了。除非第一个采用者能够阻止新技术的普及，否则它将成为普遍现象，优势将是短期的。采用者和其他公司最终都会处于与表格第二列类似的境地。

However, during the actual period of innovation, the first user of the technology has a big competitive advantage. Suppose that while everyone else is selling a £200 unit, they sell at £150 per unit on a cost base of £80. They increase their profit per unit, while undercutting their competitors. We assume that they double their sales during this transition period to 2,000 per year. So their profit goes up on two accounts, the margin rises, and the throughput rises. Unless the first adopter can prevent access to the new technology it will become general and the advantage will be short term. Both the adopter and other firms will end up in a position similar to that in the second column of the table.

专利法的存在可能会使先使用者获得相对较长的优势期，从而促进行业的集中和垄断。但改进生产工艺的方法往往有多种。对其中一种工艺申请专利会增加其他公司设计尚未申请专利的替代方案的动力。在没有专利保护的情况下，竞争对手采用新技术的动力会更强。

The existence of patent laws may allow the first user a relatively extended period of advantage, promoting concentration and monopolization of the industry. But there are often multiple ways of improving a production process. Patenting one of them increases the incentive for other firms to devise alternatives not yet patented. In the absence of patent protection, the incentive for competitors to adopt the new technique will be even stronger.

5.4.8 工资水平与创新

5.4.8 Wage Levels and Innovation

因此，资本主义经济具有一种机制，可以刺激采用以前系统中不存在的节省劳动力的技术。由于生产单位的生存依赖于商品的销售，因此生产单位的生存取决于跟上技术改进的普遍率。布伦纳 [2001] 认为，这一机制是促进农业活动改进的关键因素，为资本主义工业的后续增长提供了剩余劳动力供应。

A capitalist economy thus has a mechanism that stimulates the adoption of labor-saving technology that was not present in previous systems. Dependent as they are on the sale of commodities for existence, the very survival of the productive units comes to depend on keeping up with the prevailing rate of technical improvement. This mechanism is argued by Brenner [2001] to have been a key factor in generating the improvements in agricultural activity that provided the surplus labor supply for the subsequent growth of capitalist industry.

但人们应该谨慎，不要过分强调资本主义的创新能力。一方面，近代早期的农业规模相对较小，竞争激烈，没有大量使用机械。另一方面，创新压力并不可靠，它可能会因极低的工资率或垄断而受到抑制。

But one should be cautious not to overstress capitalism’s ability to innovate. For one thing, agriculture of the early modern period was relatively small-scale, competitive, and did not make extensive use of machinery. For another, pressure to innovate does not work reliably, it can be stifled either by very low wage rates or by monopoly.

罗伯特·艾伦 [2011, 2015] 令人信服地指出，动力工业机械盈利的初始条件最早出现在 18 世纪末的英国。在其他国家，工资水平太低，以至于使用这种机器根本无法赚钱。图 5.11提供了艾伦编制的数据库中选定的信息，这些数据库中记录了不同国家随时间变化的实际工资。

Robert Allen [2011, 2015] has convincingly argued that the initial conditions for the profitability of powered industrial machinery first occurred in Britain in the late eighteenth century. In other countries, the level of wages was so low that it just did not pay to use such machines. Figure 5.11 provides selected information from the databases Allen has compiled of real wages over time in different countries.

虽然英国、法国和意大利在黑死病引发劳动力短缺之后实际工资大幅上涨，但可以看出只有英国的实际工资保持高位。因此，当文艺复兴时期动力工业所需的科学知识和工艺得到发展时，只有英国才值得使用它们。

While for England, France, and Italy the real wage rose sharply after the labor shortages of the Black Death, it can be seen that it was only in England that it stayed high. Thus when the scientific knowledge and arts necessary for powered industry had been developed in the Renaissance, only in England did it pay to use them.

在表 5.8中，技术改进涉及直接和间接劳动力的减少。假设我们考虑一种创新，它以使用更多机器形式的间接劳动力为代价来减少直接劳动力，就像工业革命初期发生的那样。

In table 5.8 the improved technology involved a reduction in both direct and indirect labor. Suppose instead that we consider an innovation that reduces direct labor at the cost of using more indirect labor in the form of machines, as occurred during the early Industrial Revolution.

表 5.9给出了一个技术变革的例子，与前一个示例不同，该技术变革通过使用机器形式的一些额外间接劳动力来节省直接劳动力。这项创新节省了总劳动力的 10%，但使用这项创新并不能获得任何利润。资本家必须全额支付从其他资本家购买的间接劳动力，但他只需支付从员工那里获得的劳动力的一半。因此，转向新技术不会带来额外的利润。

Table 5.9 gives an example of a technical change that, unlike the previous example, saves direct labor by using some additional indirect labor in the form of machines. The innovation saves 10 percent of the total labor, but there is no profit to be gained from its use. The capitalist must pay in full for the indirect labor that they buy in from other capitalists, but he only has to pay for half of the labor that he gets from his employees. Thus there is no additional profit to be had from making the switch to the new technique.

但如果工资从每小时 10 英镑上涨到每小时 15 英镑，如表格中高工资栏所示，那么相对盈利能力就会发生变化。创新现在变得有利可图。

But if wages rose from £10 an hour to £15 an hour, as shown in the High Wages columns of the table, then the relative profitability changes. The innovation now becomes profitable.

应该注意的是，这意味着拥有足够土地的自由农民应该比资本主义农民有更大的动力使用节省劳动力的机器。自由农民会对自己的劳动进行全额估价，因为所有的边际产量都会回到他手中，所以任何能带来劳动生产率整体提高的机器都值得采用。相比之下，资本主义农民则有表 5.9所示的反常激励。这可能与这样一种观点有关，即雇佣劳动的普及鼓励了创新，而回想起来，这被视为英国资本主义的兴起。

It should be noted that this implies that free peasants, with access to enough land, should have a greater incentive to use labor-saving machinery than capitalist farmers. The free farmer will value his own labor at full value since all the marginal produce returns to him, so any machinery that brings an overall improvement in labor productivity is worth adopting. Capitalist farmers in contrast have the perverse incentives shown in Table 5.9. This may have relevance to the idea that it was the spread of wage labor that encouraged innovation in what is, in retrospect, seen as the runup to capitalism in Britain.

表 5.8：首次使用利润

TABLE 5.8: Profit of First Use

表 5.9：资本家使用节省劳动力的发明的动机如何取决于工资水平

TABLE 5.9: How the Motivation of Capitalists To Use Labor Saving Inventions Depends on the Level of Wages

这是否合理取决于人们的比较标准。我们是在比较使用机械的激励，还是在比较投资农业固定投资的激励？

Whether this is plausible depends on what one’s standard of comparison is. Are we comparing the incentives to use machinery or the incentives to invest in agricultural fixed investment?

图 5.11. 18 世纪，英国的工资水平高于其他欧洲国家，这为工业化提供了动力。资料来源：RC Allen 数据库。

Figure 5.11. The higher rate of pay in England compared to other European countries in the 1700s provided the incentive for industrialization. Source: R. C. Allen database.

我们是在将资本主义农民与自由农民、农奴庄园经济或奴隶大庄园进行比较吗？

Are we comparing capitalist farmers to free peasants, to a manorial economy with serfs, or to slave latifundia?

与自耕农相比，表 5.9中的论点表明，向雇佣劳动的过渡将推迟机械的使用。

Vis-à-vis yeoman farmers, the argument from Table 5.9 implies that a transition to wage labor would delay the use of machinery.

如果我们考察农业中的其他“资本投资”形式——清理、排水、施肥、种植防风林、修筑堤坝等——情况就大不相同了。封建领主或奴隶主与自由农民一样，有同样的相对动机进行这些改进，因为这些并不是真正的资本投资。它们不是作为商品购买的。相反，领主会让已经被奴役或奴役的劳动力完成任务。计算再次是将劳动力与劳动力进行比较，并选择能够最大限度提高产量的投资。因此，美国南部的奴隶主非常愿意让他们的奴隶完成清理森林和耕种土地的任务。十九世纪初英国的大资本主义农场主在土地改良方面也会有同样的理由。同样，“固定资本”的价值与当前劳动力的价值相同；两者的周薪相同。事实上，可以说，奴隶主从事固定投资的动机可能比资本家更大。如果资本家按周雇佣劳动力，那么每增加一周就会增加成本。雇佣劳动力砍伐森林或修建排水沟的成本很高。

If we examine other forms of “capital investment” in farming—clearing, draining, manuring, planting windbreaks, building dykes, etc.—the situation is quite different. A feudal lord or slave owner has the same relative incentive to make these improvements as a free farmer since these are not really capital investments. They are not bought in as commodities. Instead the lord sets his already enserfed or enslaved workforce to the task. The calculation is again one in which labor is compared with labor, and the investment that maximizes increased output will be chosen. So the slave owners of the U.S. South were quite willing to set their slaves tasks of clearing forest and bringing land into cultivation. A large capitalist farmer in early nineteenth-century England would have the same rationale with respect to land improvements. Again the “fixed capital” is valued the same way as current labor; both are paid the same weekly wage. Indeed, it is arguable that the incentive for a slave owner to engage in fixed investment may be greater than that of a capitalist. If the capitalist employs labor by the week, each additional week costs him. Hiring labor to clear forest or put in drains is expensive.

对于领主来说，他的奴隶是一笔沉没成本。他还必须全年养活他们。他必须拥有的奴隶数量取决于一年中最繁忙的时期——耕作和收割——的劳动力需求。在在淡季，有剩余劳动力可用，如果将其用于改良土地，实际上不需要花费任何成本。这意味着，如果有的话，雇佣劳动力的出现会减缓固定农业改良的速度。

For the dominus, his slaves are a sunk cost. He also has to feed them all year-round. The number of slaves he must own is set by the labor requirements at the busiest times of the year—plowing and harvesting. During the slack periods, there is surplus labor available, which effectively costs nothing if it is set to improving the land. This would imply that, if anything, the advent of wage labor would slow down the rate of fixed agricultural improvement.

不应假定资本主义生产在固定农业改进方面具有优越性。在这个领域，资本主义农业和奴役农业至少在它们控制的劳动力的短期使用成本与长期使用成本的比较方面处于同等地位。资本主义相对于奴役关系的优越性只能存在于购买生产资料的背景下：机械或化学肥料。我们可以用一个具体的历史例子来说明这一点。假设一个十九世纪的奴隶主必须在两种维持产量的方式之间做出选择：

The superiority of capitalist production in terms of fixed agricultural improvements should not be assumed. In this domain both capitalist agriculture and servile agriculture are on at least the same footing with respect to the comparative costs of immediate versus longer-term use of the labor they control. The superiority of capitalism over servile relations could only exist in the context of bought-in means of production: machinery or chemical fertilizers. We can illustrate this with a concrete historical example. Suppose a nineteenth-century slave owner had to choose between two ways of maintaining output:

1. 在智利购买硝石来维持生育能力。

1. Buying in Chile saltpeter to maintain fertility.

2. 任由土壤枯竭，却用奴隶砍伐原始森林来代替。

2. Allowing the soil to become exhausted, but using his slaves to clear virgin forest to replace it.

第二种选择是合理的。硝石需要花钱，而奴隶的闲暇劳动时间是免费的。这会带来后果。正如 Cairnes 和 Smith [2003, pp. 52–54] 所述，奴隶种植园有动机不断向处女地扩张。这一过程使他们与同样迁徙到同一地区的自由农民发生了致命冲突。

Option 2 would be the rational course to follow. Saltpeter costs money; the spare labor time of the slaves was free. This had consequences. The slave plantations had an incentive to constantly expand onto virgin soil as Cairnes and Smith [2003, pp. 52–54] recounted. This process brought them into fatal conflict with a free peasantry also migrating to the same territories.

雇佣劳动相对于奴役劳动的优势只存在于购买资本品方面。在动力机械和农用化学品发明之前，单纯的雇佣劳动制度不会带来效率的大幅提升。事实上，考虑到当时可用的技术，麦克唐纳 [2010] 表明封建经济可以非常高效。

The superiority of wage labor over servile labor exists only with respect to bought-in capital goods. Before powered machinery and agricultural chemicals had been invented, the mere institution of wage labor would not tend to bring a big boost in efficiency. Indeed, allowing for the technology then available, McDonald [2010] showed that feudal economy could be very efficient.

回到机械问题，将这一论点扩展到合作社，这些合作社再次比资本主义企业有更高的动机使用现代机械。一般来说，工资水平越高，剥削程度越低，雇主引进节省劳动力的发明的动力就越大。相反，低工资和卑微的条件对使用现代机械起到了巨大的阻碍作用。

Returning to machinery and extending this argument to cooperatives, these again have a higher motivation to use modern machinery than capitalist firms. In general the higher the level of wages and the lower the degree of exploitation, the greater will be the incentive for the employers to introduce labor-saving inventions. Conversely, low wages and servile conditions act as a huge deterrent to the use of modern machinery.

这是通过对比前大英帝国的两个部分——印度和美国得出的结论。生产方式、制造物品的方式并不是孤立存在的。第 3 章和第4 章讨论了奴隶制和地主制，^但从历史上看，资本主义生产与这两者并存，在印度等世界某些地区，这种情况仍然存在。82人们很容易认为美国一直是一个资本主义社会，而把美国革命看作是典型的资产阶级革命。这不是我在这里所持的观点。我把内战前的美国南部描述为典型的奴隶生产方式。

This is brought out by contrasting two parts of the former British Empire, India and the United States. Modes of production, ways of making things, do not exist in isolation. Slaveholding and landlordism were discussed in chapters 3 and 4 but historically capitalist production has coexisted with both of these, and in some parts of the world like India, still does.⁸² It is easy to think of the United States as always having been a capitalist society, and to consider the American Revolution as an archetypal bourgeois one. That is not the standpoint I argue here. I have presented the antebellum U.S. South as a classic slave mode of production.

独立后的阶级结构与早期资本主义欧洲完全不同。你必须回溯 2000 多年才能找到类似的情况：奴隶共和国罗马，美国人有意识地刻意模仿它。最上层是奴隶主贵族，他们不直接从事生产工作，而是靠奴隶的劳动为生。贵族之下是靠工作谋生的自由公民阶级。这些人可能是小农或工匠。最底层是没有政治或公民权利的奴隶，是贵族的私有财产。主要的阶级冲突一方面是奴隶主与奴隶之间的冲突，另一方面是奴隶主与自由公民之间的冲突。由于奴隶在罗马或美国都没有政治权利，他们与奴隶主之间的冲突是残酷的肉体冲突，奴隶主的统治通过鞭子和锁链来加强。另一方面，自由公民拥有公民权利，而且他们的数量超过富裕的奴隶主，这意味着奴隶主的政治权力可能受到自由农民和工匠的威胁。奴隶主和自由农民之间的主要冲突通常是围绕土地所有权展开的。奴隶制的发展意味着越来越多的土地倾向于落入大型奴隶庄园的控制之下，威胁到自由公民的无产阶级化。在罗马和美国，自由公民农民和工匠都是奴隶主的盟友。与扩张主义的罗马一样，外部矛盾是共和国的有产阶级与周围的自由人民之间的矛盾。这两个国家的扩张性帝国主义都是由参议院阶层获得更多庄园的愿望驱动的，更重要的是，他们希望建立殖民地，让潜在的威胁无产阶级作为独立的农民定居下来。正如韦伯 [2013] 所说，罗马农民和美国农民之间的相似之处，甚至连土地所有权的几何形状都一样。在这两种情况下，土地都被划分成方形的农田网格，并修建了又长又直的道路——只有征服帝国才能实现这一目标。

The class structure after independence was unlike anything in early capitalist Europe. You had to go back more than 2,000 years to find something similar: the slave republic Rome on which the Americans consciously and deliberately modeled themselves. At the top was the slave-owning aristocracy that did no direct productive work, but lived off the labor of the slaves. Below the aristocracy was a class of free citizens who worked for a living. These would be small farmers or artisans. At the bottom were slaves with no political or civil rights, the private property of aristocrats. The main class conflicts were between the slave owners and the slaves on the one hand, and between the slave owners and the free citizens on the other. Since the slaves had no political rights either in Rome or the United States the conflict between them and the slave owners was brutally physical, with the owners’ dominance enforced by whips and chains. Free citizens on the other hand had civil rights, and the fact that they outnumbered the richer slave owners meant that the political power of the slave owners was potentially threatened by the free peasants and artisans. The main conflict between the slave owners and free peasants was typically over land ownership. The progress of slavery meant that more and more land tended to fall under the control of the big slave estates, threatening to proletarianize the free citizens. In both Rome and the United States, the free-citizen farmers and artisans were allies of the slave owners. As with expansionist Rome, the external contradiction was between the propertied classes of the Republic and the surrounding free peoples. The expansionary imperialism of both states was driven by both the desire of the senatorial classes to acquire further estates and, more significantly, to promote colonies in which a potentially threatening proletariat could be settled as independent farmers. As Weber [2013] argued, the parallels between Roman and American peasantry were exact right down to the geometry of landholding. In both cases the land was divided up on a square grid of farm plots with long straight roads—something that only a conquering empire could achieve.

奴隶制的结束并不意味着美国经济直接过渡到资本主义生产。大部分经济领域的物质生产模式仍然坚定地处于前资本主义阶段，依赖于没有动力机械的手工劳动。社会关系的特点是，南部是半封建半奴役关系，西部是自由农民，东北部是资本主义工业。20 世纪，美国经历了从半封建黑人农民和独立白人农民占主导地位的农村经济向主要是城市工薪人口。20 世纪 30 年代的农业萧条使银行得以收回农场，迫使农民迁入城市。在南方，地主利用机械化来驱逐和驱逐同样迁入城市的黑人佃农。

The ending of slavery did not mean a direct transition of the U.S. economy to capitalist production. The mode of material production across much of the economy remained firmly pre-capitalist, reliant on manual work without powered machinery. Social relations were characterized by a mix of semi-feudal and semi-servile relations in the South, free peasants in the West, and capitalist industry in the Northeast. The twentieth century saw the United States undergo a transition from a predominantly rural economy of semi-feudal black peasants and independent white ones to a predominantly urban waged population. The agricultural depression from the 1930s allowed banks to foreclose on farms driving farmers into cities. In the South, the landlords made use of mechanization to dispense with and evict their black sharecroppers who also moved into the cities.

到 19 世纪末，印度的农业机械化进展甚微，即使在通常是最先实现自动化的行业——纺织生产中，从制造业到机械工业的转变也远未完成（见表5.10）^。83

By the end of the nineteenth century in India mechanization had made little inroads into agriculture, and even in textile production, which is normally the first industry to be automated, the transition from manufacturing to machine industry was far from complete (see Table 5.10).⁸³

这是为什么呢？

Why was this?

重要因素似乎是印度的低工资和持续存在的半奴役性生产关系。尽管印度于 1843 年正式废除了奴隶制，但实际上奴隶制在 1900 年仍然存在，据估计，现代印度约有 4000 万契约劳工 [Narula, 1999]。1991 年，表列种姓部落占印度人口的 24%。但政府本身承认，86% 以上的契约劳工来自这些群体。尽管《宪法》第 23 条和 1976 年《废除契约劳工制度法案》禁止一切形式的强迫劳动，但这种情况仍然发生。

Important factors seem to have been a combination of very low wages with the persistence of semi-servile relations of production in India. Although slavery had been formally abolished in India in 1843, in practice it continued in 1900 and still exists, with estimates that there are around 40 million bonded laborers in modern India [Narula, 1999]. Scheduled caste tribes made up 24 percent of the Indian population in 1991. But the government itself accepts that more than 86 percent of bonded laborers are from these groups. This occurs despite the prohibition of all forms of forced labor under article 23 of the Constitution and the 1976 Bonded Labor System Abolition Act.

农业中低种姓成员的抵押劳工现象十分普遍，甚至在旁遮普等较发达地区也是如此 [Srivastava, 2005]。在砖窑行业，约有 300 万工人在相当于抵押劳工的条件下工作。砖窑戒备森严，工人的行动受到严格限制。工人通常欠雇主的债，而且这种债务关系会持续一季又一季 [Gupta, 2003] ^。84

Bonded labor by members of the lower castes is rife in agriculture, even in more developed regions like the Punjab [Srivastava, 2005]. In the brick kiln industry some three million workers are employed in conditions amounting to bonded labor. Brick kilns are heavily guarded and severe restrictions placed on workers’ movements. Workers are typically in debt to their employers and the debt relation persists from season to season [Gupta, 2003].⁸⁴

采石场、矿山、手工织布、盐田工作和建筑等其他需要大量体力劳动的行业也存在着类似的近乎奴隶制的条件。在泰米尔纳德邦，采石场的 75 万名工人中有三分之二是契约劳工，在许多情况下，整个家庭都被奴役。

Similar conditions of near slavery exist in other sectors where heavy manual labor is done in quarries, mines, hand loom weaving, salt pan work. and construction. In Tamil Nadu of 750,000 workers in the quarries two-thirds are bonded laborers, with, in many cases, whole families being enslaved.

鉴于奴隶制与种姓压迫之间存在着密切联系，值得考虑一下美国。即使在印度正式禁止奴隶制之后，奴隶制在美国仍然合法。迪利普·梅农 [2006] 讲述了 19 世纪印度低种姓的小说家如何看到自己的状况与美国黑人的状况相似。即使在内战和林肯废除奴隶制之后，这场社会动荡远比印度在独立道路上经历的任何动荡都要大，美国黑人仍然是一个特殊的种姓。直到 1960 年代，黑人才被剥夺公民权利，与白人隔离，被禁止从事许多工作和职业——甚至被禁止为自己的国家而战。

Given the close link that exists between slavery and caste oppression it is worth considering the United States. Slavery had remained legal there even after it was formally prohibited in India. Dilip Menon [2006] recounts how in the nineteenth century, novelists of the Indian lower castes saw the similarity between their own condition and that of the Negro in America. Even after the Civil War and Lincoln’s abolition of slavery, a social upheaval far greater than anything India went through in its path to independence, the Negroes in America remained a caste apart. Deprived of civil rights until the 1960s, segregated from the white population, denied entry into many jobs and professions—prohibited even from fighting for their country.

表 5.10：印度各行业的布料产量

TABLE 5.10: Cloth Production in India by Sector

来源：Clark 和 Wolcott，2003，7；Mazumdar，1984，36。

Sources: Clark and Wolcott, 2003, 7; Mazumdar, 1984, 36.

前奴隶或前奴隶的后代面临着与贱民奴隶和前奴隶相同的偏见。他们被迫使用单独的水源，难道不是因为害怕污染吗？达利特人被禁止使用为印度教徒供水的水箱，黑人则必须使用单独的饮水机。

Ex-slaves or descendants of ex-slaves faced many of the same prejudices as untouchable slaves and ex-slaves. What was it but a fear of pollution that forced them to use separate water supplies—Dalits being prohibited from using the tanks supplying Hindus and Negroes having to use separate drinking water fountains?

整个种族隔离体系是由一系列污染禁忌构成的，其目的是为了强化非人类地位。

The whole edifice of segregation was a series of pollution taboos meant to enforce a subhuman status.

一个制度被称为种姓，另一个制度被称为种族，但名字是什么？

One system was called caste and the other race, but what is a name?

两者都是真实剥削的虚构借口。鉴于人类基因库的根本混合性，以及我们都是非洲裔的事实，种族与种姓一样，都是虚构的社会结构。其功能意义相同，即划定人口中的奴役部分。这两个类别都从宗教中获取支持——黑人被白人基督教派称为该隐之子。

Both are imaginary justifications for real exploitation. Given the fundamental mixing of the human gene pool, and the fact that we are all of African descent, race was as much an imaginary social construct as caste. Its functional meaning was the same, to demarcate a servile section of the population. Both categories drew on religion for their support—with Negroes being labeled as children of Cain by white Christian sects.

种姓和种族的概念是阿尔都塞[1971]所说的剥削社会的意识形态国家机器的一部分。他指的是一套思想和制度，通过这些思想和制度，人类主体得以社会化，其功能是确保现有的统治和奴役关系不断再生产。

The notion of caste and the notion of race are part of what Althusser [1971] termed the ideological state apparatus of exploitative society. By this he means the set of ideas and institutions by which human agents are socialized, whose function is to ensure the continued reproduction of the existing relations of domination and servitude.

在我所说的经济落后在印度种姓制度维持中所起的作用的背景下，20 世纪中叶美国黑人斗争的经济背景是相关的。从废除奴隶制到 20 世纪 60 年代黑人赢得民权之间间隔了近一个世纪。为什么这件事发生在当时而不是 19 世纪 90 年代呢？

In the context of what I have said about the role of economic backwardness in sustaining caste in India, the economic background to the struggles of the Negroes in mid-twentieth century United States are relevant. There was nearly a century of delay between the abolition of slavery and the winning of civil rights by the Negroes in the 1960s. Why did it happen then and not in the 1890s, for example?

经历过这一变化的美国黑人无产阶级中的马克思主义者提出了一个理论，即在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代发生了一场关键的经济变化。当奴隶被释放时，他们仍然是一个半奴役的佃农阶级。他们继续从事与他们的昔日主人转变为地主时相同的农业劳动。前奴隶主继续从中获利奴隶制虽然不是奴隶的劳动，但现在已经是半封建的了。关键的是，物质生产方式没有改变。棉花生产仍然依赖体力劳动来耕种田地和收割庄稼。黑人在形式上是自由的，但他们仍然在做着和奴隶一样的体力劳动。直到 20 世纪 40 年代，联邦政府才介入，执行反对债役的法律。85除了半封建的分成制和农奴制外，奴隶生产在美国继续大规模使用监狱劳工。到 19 世纪⁷⁰年代，南部各州已经开始通过流浪法，其主要目的是允许将贫穷的、主要是黑人的男性围捕起来，并雇佣为奴隶劳工 [Blackmon, 2009]。

A theory put forward by Marxists among the black proletariat of the United States who lived through this change is that during the 1950s and ’60s a crucial economic change had occurred. When the slaves were freed, they had remained a semi-servile class of sharecroppers. They continued to carry out the same agricultural labor as their erstwhile masters transformed into landlords. The former slave owners continued to profit from the labor of the freed slaves, but now it was done with a semi-feudal relation. The crucial fact was that the mode of material production had not changed. Cotton production still depended on manual labor to tend the fields and harvest the crop. The Negroes were formally free, but they were still doing the same sort of physical labor as the slaves had done. It was not until the 1940s that the federal government stepped in to enforce legislation against bonded labor.⁸⁵ Alongside semi-feudal sharecropping and peonage, slave production continued on a large scale in the United States using prison labor. By the 1870s it had already started to be the case for Southern states to pass vagrancy laws whose main purpose was to allow poor, predominantly black, men to be rounded up and hired out as slave labor [Blackmon, 2009].

随着反对债务奴役的立法的实施，以及佃农向工业化北方的迁移，南方首次出现了农业机械化的动力。20 世纪 50 年代，引进了可以收割棉花的机器，除草开始通过喷洒化学除草剂来完成，整个农业生产过程从制造业转向了机器制造。物质生产方式变成了资本主义生产方式。随着物质生产方式的变化，社会生产关系也必须改变。半封建的佃农制度让位于资本密集型农业。佃农阶级从土地中解放出来，成为迁移到大城市制造业中心的无产阶级。远离南方农村的物质运动，以及摆脱佃农个人依赖的社会运动，为争取平等公民权利的政治斗争奠定了基础。黑人现在成为劳动力市场的参与者，与白人工人并肩在底特律的装配线上工作。在这种情况下，他们的种姓地位与资本主义市场所预设的劳动形式平等之间的冲突变得无法容忍。但获得公民自由的过程并不是自动的。只有通过长期而艰苦的斗争，才能实施合法权利。与任何国家机器一样，种族意识形态机器只有通过斗争才能被打破。美国的这场斗争显然还没有结束：

With the enforcement of legislation against debt slavery, and with the migration of sharecroppers to the industrial North there arose for the first time an incentive to mechanize Southern agriculture. In the 1950s machines were introduced that could harvest cotton, weeding came to be done by spraying chemical weed killers, and the whole process of agricultural production shifted from manufacture to machineofacture. The mode of material production became specifically capitalist. Consequent upon a change in the mode of material production, the social relations of production had to change too. The semi-feudal sharecropping system gave way to capital-intensive agriculture. The class of sharecroppers was freed from the land to become a proletariat who migrated to the great urban manufacturing centers. The physical movement away from the rural South, and the social movement from the personal dependence of sharecropping, laid the grounds for a political struggle for equal civil rights. Blacks were now participants in the labor market, working side by side with white workers on the assembly lines of Detroit. Under these circumstances the clash between their caste status and the formal equality of labor presupposed by the capitalist market became intolerable. But the process of gaining civil liberty was not automatic. It was only through a prolonged and bitter struggle that legal rights could be enforced. Like any state apparatus the ideological apparatus of race could only be broken by struggle. This struggle in the United States is clearly not complete:

• 黑人在无产阶级中占比过高，属于技术含量较低、收入较低的阶层

• blacks are disproportionately found in the less skilled and worse paid sections of the proletariat

• 作为无产阶级，他们现在仍然受到资本家的剥削，而他们的前几代人则受到地主和奴隶主的剥削。

• and as proletarians they are still very much exploited, now by capitalists, where previous generations were exploited by landowners and slaveholders.

但他们的斗争已经超越了反对印度种姓制度的斗争。

But their struggle has progressed further than that against untouchability in India.

在这个过程中，社会关系和技术之间产生了反馈。20 世纪中叶，白人农民和地主阶层将机械引入他们的农场，目的不是为了获得社会效益，而是为了赚取更多利润。黑人争取平等政治权利的斗争所带来的社会后果是无法预见的。一种新的技术改变了经济关系；这反过来又带来了政治冲突，进而改变了社会。但人们不应该由此就认为技术变革是不可避免的。如果奴隶制在南方各州继续存在，例如，如果同盟军赢得了内战，那么他们是否会有机械化的动机就值得怀疑了。

In this process there have been feedbacks between social relations and technology. The class of white farmers and landowners introduced machinery to their farms in the mid-twentieth century not with the view to its social effects but in order to make more profit. The social consequences that followed the black struggle for equal political rights were unforeseen. A new form of technology changed economic relations; this in turn brought political conflict which changed society. But one should not assume from this that technological change was inevitable. If slavery had persisted in the Southern states, had, for example, the Confederates won the Civil War, it is doubtful that there would have been the motive to mechanize.

二十世纪美国与印度的相似之处如下：

The points of similarity between the United States and India during the twentieth century are:

1. 存在一个受压迫的种姓，起初是公开的奴役关系，后来是半奴役关系；

1. The existence of a depressed caste subjected to at first openly servile and later semi-servile relations;

2.半奴役部门中体力劳动占主导地位；

2. The predominance of manual labor in the semi-servile sector;

3. 使用暴力和恐怖手段维持受压迫阶层的地位；

3. The use of violence and terror to maintain the depressed caste in its place;

4.严重的社会隔离。

4. Severe social segregation.

显著的差异是：

The significant differences are:

1. 20世纪60年代美国的资本主义工业化水平比现在的印度略高一些（见图5.12）；

1. The somewhat more advanced level of capitalist industrialization in the United States during the 1960s relative to India now (see Figure 5.12, p. 142);

2. 从历史上看，美国长期遭受劳动力相对于资本的短缺。

2. Historically the United States suffered from chronic shortages of labor relative to capital.

最终，印度农业将实现机械化，农民将分散。奴役达利特人的矿山、采石场、砖厂等将使用莱勃海尔和小松大型挖掘机，而不是人力。

Eventually, Indian agriculture will mechanize, and the peasantry disperse. The mines, quarries, brickworks, etc., within which Dalits are enslaved will use Leibherr and Komatsu mass excavators rather than human labor.

这是人们对资本主义的期望，但是这需要多长时间？

This is what one can expect from capitalism, but how long will it take?

我之前提到的一个基本观点是，一个社会的技术进步速度往往与剥削率成反比。劳动力廉价的地方，劳动力就会被浪费。马克思和凯恩斯·史密斯 [2003] 在谈到奴隶制时就指出，奴隶制不利于机械化进步。马克思强调，在资本主义制度下，工资低的地方，最落后的生产技术就会被使用。从这个角度来看，对达利特劳动力的过度剥削一定是印度农村经济技术落后的主要原因。否则，为什么一些行业的全面机械化会拖延这么久呢？

One of the basic points I made earlier is that the rate of technological advance in a society tends to be inversely proportional to the rate of exploitation. Where labor is cheap, it will be wasted. Marx and Cairnes Smith [2003] made this point with respect to slavery, that it was inimical to mechanical progress. Marx emphasizes that under capitalism, where wages are low, the most backward techniques of production will be used. From this standpoint, the very intensive exploitation of Dalit labor must be a major cause of technical backwardness in the Indian rural economy. Why else should the full mechanization of some industries have been so long delayed?

图 5.12。1873 年至 1998 年印度人均 GDP 与美国的关系。资料来源：Clark，2003 年。

Figure 5.12. Indian GDP per capita relative to the United States 1873 to 1998. Source: Clark, 2003.

在劳动力变得昂贵之前，几乎没有动力用机器来代替劳动力。这是印度和美国之间的一个关键区别，美国自成立以来就相对缺乏劳动力，无论是与可用的农业用地相比，还是与后来的资本存量相比。劳动力短缺既是最初从非洲捕获和运输奴隶的动力，也是 19 世纪欧洲移民潮的动力。当 1921 年配额法案切断这一局面时，北方对产业工人的需求使得前佃农迅速被吸收到产业工人阶级中。劳动力短缺是殖民经济的必然结果。当地人被驱散的土地可供定居，这不断减少城市地区可就业工人的数量。资本主义要求工人阶级被剥夺生产资料——但如果要从联邦当局免费获得土地，那么这个条件就不满足。留住工人取决于美国的工资是否远高于当代欧洲，而欧洲的土地长期以来一直被贵族垄断。这反过来又导致美国大量使用机器，劳动生产率较高。如图5.12所示，其结果是印度的生产力长期落后于美国。

Until labor becomes expensive there is little incentive to replace it with machinery. This is a crucial difference between India and the United States, which, from its founding, had a relative shortage of labor, both compared to available agricultural land and, later, compared to capital stocks. The shortage of labor had both been the drive behind the initial capture and transportation of slaves from Africa and the nineteenth-century flow of European immigrants. When this was cut off by the 1921 Quota Act, the demand for industrial workers in the North allowed the rapid absorption of former sharecroppers into the industrial working class. The labor shortage was a necessary consequence of colonial economy. Land from which the natives had been dispersed became available for settlement, acting as a constant drawdown on the pool of employable workers in urban areas. Capitalism demands a working class deprived of the means of production—but if land was to be had for free from the federal authorities, that condition was not met. Retaining workers depended on U.S. wages being substantially higher than in contemporary Europe, where land had long been monopolized by the aristocracy. This in turn led to intensive use of machinery and high productivity of labor in the United States. As Figure 5.12 shows, the result was a long-term tendency for India’s productivity to fall further and further behind that of the United States.

5.4.9 相对开发

5.4.9 Relative exploitation

马克思区分了两种剥削形式：绝对剥削和相对剥削。在绝对剥削中，他称之为绝对剩余价值，工人被迫工作更长时间。他描述了 19 世纪初英国工厂每天工作 12 或 14 小时的情况。86^在相对剥削中，虽然工作日保持不变，但由于技术进步，雇主所占比例有所增加。

Marx distinguished two forms of exploitation: absolute and relative. In absolute exploitation, which he called absolute surplus value, the workers are forced to work longer hours. He described working 12 or 14 hours a day in British factories in the early nineteenth century.⁸⁶ In relative exploitation, although the working day stays the same, the proportion of it going to the employer rises because of technical advances.

这里的机制与前面描述的首次使用利润不同。这是一种暂时现象，涉及竞争企业之间的利润再分配。剥削的普遍增加要求制造工人消费的商品的总社会劳动比例下降，而制造流向雇主阶级的商品的比例上升。显然，如果平均劳动力成本加价（按照第 5.1 节的意义）为 200%，并且价格与劳动含量之间存在一般比例，那么一半的社会劳动将用于满足劳动力的需求，并将成为剩余。

The mechanism here is not the same as the profit of first use described earlier. That is a transitory phenomenon and involved a redistribution of profit between competing firms. A general increase in exploitation requires that the proportion of total social labor making goods consumed by workers falls while the proportion making goods that go to the employing class rises. Clearly, if the average labor cost markup, in the sense of Section 5.1, is 200 percent, and if there is a general proportionality between prices and labor content, then half of social labor would be devoted to supplying the needs of the workforce and would be surplus.

这种比例变化可以通过简单地降低员工的生活水平来实现，从而使他们的总消费下降，或者因为生产工资商品所需的劳动力下降。因此，生产大众消费品的行业的劳动生产率必须提高。并非所有生产率的提高都会增加相对剥削。生产劳斯莱斯汽车的工厂生产率的提高不会导致整体剥削的增加。它不会减少支持工人阶级所需的劳动力比例。剥削率将保持不变，即使这意味着富人现在可以购买更多（略微便宜）的豪华汽车。

This change in proportion could come about by simply reducing the living standards of employees so that their total consumption fell, or it could happen because the labor required to produce wage goods had fallen. So labor productivity must rise in the industries producing articles of mass consumption. Not all rises in productivity increase relative exploitation. Higher productivity in factories making Rolls-Royce cars would not contribute to an overall increase in exploitation. It would not reduce the proportion of the labor force necessary to support the working classes. The rate of exploitation would remain the same, even if it meant the rich could now buy more—slightly cheaper—luxury cars.

相反，农业或石油开采的较高生产率往往会增加相对剥削。如果用更少的劳动力就能获得食物和取暖，那么为劳动人口种植粮食的劳动力就会减少。一些从农业中调配出来的劳动力最终可能会生产大量消费品，但其中一些最终会生产奢侈品或被雇佣为富人的私人仆人。净效应是从支持直接生产者的劳动力转向支持有产阶级的劳动力。这在 19 世纪英国私人仆人数量的大幅增加中非常明显。像石油这样的产品直接进入工人阶级的消费，但作为一种能源，它进入了几乎所有大众消费品。因此，转向廉价能源以及农业的改进一直是相对剩余价值增长的主要来源之一。

In contrast, higher productivity in agriculture or oil extraction tends to increase relative exploitation. If food and heating can be had with less labor, fewer millions will be working to grow food for the laboring population. Some of those redeployed from farming may end up making mass-produced consumer goods, but some of them will end up producing luxuries or being employed as personal servants of the rich. The net effect is a shift from labor that supported the direct producers to labor that supports the propertied classes. This was very evident in the big rise in the number of personal servants during the nineteenth century in England. Something like oil enters directly into working-class consumption, but also, as a source of energy, enters into almost every item of mass consumption. Thus shifts to cheap energy sources have been, along with improvements in agriculture, one of the main sources for the growth of relative surplus value.

重要的是要认识到，相对剥削机制并不依赖于资本-劳动关系中发生的机械进步。20 世纪 50 年代至 70 年代，法国农民农业生产率的大幅提高促进了相对剥削，尽管这种改进发生在非资本主义家庭农场。任何减少维持劳动人口所需劳动力的技术进步都很重要。

It is important to recognize that the relative exploitation mechanism does not depend on the mechanical advances occurring within a capital-labor relation. The big improvement in productivity in French peasant agriculture from the 1950s to the 1970s contributed to relative exploitation there even though the improvements took place on non-capitalist family farms. Any technical advance reducing the labor that goes to sustain the working population counts.

图 5.13. 以 1947 年为指标年，美国相对剩余价值的产量。来源：数据集来自 Fleck 等人，2011 年。

Figure 5.13. Production of relative surplus value in the United States using 1947 as index year. Source: Dataset from Fleck et al., 2011.

显然，要使这一机制发挥作用，实际工资的增长率必须低于产生实际工资的行业的技术创新率。但这一考虑超出了技术或生产力的发展。它取决于资本和劳动力的相对增长率，取决于人口统计和积累。然而，如果我们看看图 5.13，美国自 20 世纪 60 年代末以来的条件允许生产大量相对剩余价值。虽然生产率提高了，但其中只有极小的一部分转化为工资。越来越多的生产价值最终落入了 1% 的顶层人口手中，而下层阶级手中的价值则越来越少。事实上，如果我们看看美国底层 50% 人口（即大多数工人阶级）的税前收入，我们可以看到，半个世纪以来，他们的收入几乎保持不变（图 5.14）。

Clearly for this mechanism to work, the rate of growth of the real wage must be slower than the rate of technical innovation in the industries producing the real wage. But this consideration lies beyond the development of technology or productive forces. It depends on the relative rates of growth of capital and labor, on demographics and accumulation. However, if we look at Figure 5.13 the conditions in the United States from the late 1960s allowed lots of relative surplus value to be produced. Although productivity rose, very little of that gain went into wages. More and more of the value produced ended up in the hands of the top 1 percent of the population and less in the hands of the lower classes. Indeed if we look at the pretax incomes of the bottom 50 percent of the population of the United States, the bulk of the working classes, we can see that they have remained almost static for half a century (Figure 5.14).

因此，消费品生产中的创新将倾向于增加相对剥削，从而导致每个工人的总利润增加。每 1 英镑预付资本的年利润率是否会上升是一个更复杂的问题，同样，只有在第 5.9 节中对积累的动态分析的背景下才能正确理解，这将表明劳动生产率的发展确实倾向于提高利润率。

Innovation in the production of consumption goods will thus tend to increase relative exploitation and as a result the total profit per worker will increase. Whether or not the annual rate of profit per £1 of capital advanced will rise is a more complex question that, again, can only be properly understood in the context of the dynamic analysis of accumulation in Section 5.9, which will show that developments in labor productivity do tend to raise the rate of profit.

图 5.14. 美国底层 50% 成年人的收入份额和实际人均收入。来源： http: //wid.world/data/。

Figure 5.14. Income share and real per capita of the bottom 50 percent of U.S. adults. Source: http://wid.world/data/.

5.4.10 总结

5.4.10 Summary

第 5.4 节中的论点是动力机械对于资本主义至关重要。

The argument in Section 5.4 is that powered machinery is essential to capitalism.

• 资本主义机器工业更高的生产率使独立生产者陷入破产，并使他们受到资本的统治。

• The higher productivity of capitalist machine industry drove independent producers to ruin, and subjected them to the domination of capital.

• 从历史上看，这依赖于人工智能和自动控制机制的利用。

• This has historically depended on the harnessing of artificial power along with automatic control mechanisms.

• 竞争和创新带来的潜在利润将推动技术变革。

• Competition and the potential profits from innovation encourage technical change.

• 但创新的动力与现有的剥削程度成反比。工人阶级的地位越强，资本就越会寻求机器来取代他们。

• But the drive for innovation varies inversely with the existing level of exploitation. The stronger the position of the working classes, the more capital seeks machinery to replace them.

5.5 资本主义与人口

5.5 CAPITALISM AND POPULATION

资本主义发展初期的特点是，除了美国和澳大利亚这样的殖民地以外，劳动力相对充裕。资本。如果资本主义制度要以机器工业的形式完全扎根，资本存量的增长必须超过劳动力供应的增长。正是出于这个原因，亚当·斯密才如此热衷于强调生产性劳动和非生产性劳动之间的区别。斯密说，如果一个人雇佣了大量仆人，他就浪费了他的资本。另一方面，如果他在制造业雇佣工人，他的资本就会获得利润。斯密强调积累和不浪费马克思后来称之为剩余价值的东西的重要性。斯密的论战针对的是懒惰和挥霍无度的贵族造成的浪费。尽管按照现代标准，社会是贫穷的，技术相对原始，社会剩余有限，但生产积累和节俭是必不可少的。

The first phases of capitalist development are characterized, except in colonies like the United States or Australia, by an abundance of labor relative to capital. If the capitalist system is to fully take hold in the form of machine industry, the growth of capital stock must outrun the growth of the labor supply. It was for this reason that Adam Smith was so keen to emphasize the distinction between productive and unproductive labor. If a man employed a multitude of menial servants, Smith said, he dissipated his capital. If on the other hand he employed workers in manufacture, his capital returned with a profit. Smith emphasized the importance of accumulating and not wasting what Marx would later call surplus value. Smith’s polemic was directed at waste occasioned by an idle and profligate aristocracy. Though society was, by modern standards, poor, with relatively primitive technology and a more limited social surplus, productive accumulation and thrift were essential.

这也强调了法国、俄国或中国式的彻底土地革命的重要性。对地主和牧师等非生产性阶级的强力镇压释放了工业化资源。2006 年，中国将其国民生产总值的 50% 重新投资于新资本品。如果不是 1940 年代的土地革命阻止地主非生产性地消费农民的剩余产品，中国永远不可能达到这种积累水平。

This, too, emphasizes the importance of thoroughgoing agrarian revolutions of the French, Russian, or Chinese types. The forcible suppression of unproductive classes of landowners and priests freed resources for industrialization. China in 2006 was reinvesting 50 percent of its total national product in new capital goods. It could never have reached this level of accumulation were it not for an agrarian revolution in the 1940s that stopped the landlords from unproductively consuming the peasants’ surplus.

5.5.1 人口、食物和帝国

5.5.1 Population, food, and empire

资本主义是一种超城市文明。城市化意味着农业劳动生产率的提高，以养活城市人口。实现这一目标的历史问题因资本主义社会早期总人口呈快速指数增长而变得更加困难。事实上，我将在第 5.9 节中表明，人口的快速指数增长是资本主义盈利能力的先决条件。简单的城市化，即一定人口从农村迁移到城镇，只需要提高土地劳动生产率，这样每个农民就可以养活几个城镇居民。当城市化与人口快速增长相结合时，绝对农业产量也必须增加，同时每个农民的产量也必须增加。

Capitalism is a hyper-urban civilization. The urbanization implies a rise in the labor productivity in agriculture to support the urban population. The historical problem of achieving this was made harder by the fact that in its early phase capitalist societies show a rapid exponential growth in total population. Indeed I will show in Section 5.9 that rapid exponential growth of population is a precondition for the very profitability of capitalism. Simple urbanization, the move of a given population from country to town, only requires a growth in labor productivity on the land, so that each peasant can support several townsfolk. When urbanization is combined with rapid population growth, there must also be an increase in absolute farm production alongside an increase in production per farmer.

总产量的增加是如何实现的？

How can this increase in total production come about?

显然，要么扩大耕地面积，要么提高每平方米土地的产量。在前工业化农业中，即不大量依赖工业投入的农业，固定土地面积产量的提高取决于生物过程。通过更复杂的轮作制度以及人类和动物粪便的回收，可以提高土地肥力。然而，第一个过程需要留出一部分土地种植三叶草、豆类等，以恢复土壤氮。氮固定最终依赖于一种相当间接的能量途径：豆科植物叶子的光合作用，将多余的葡萄糖输送到根部，其中一部分葡萄糖被固氮细菌利用，然后固氮细菌利用一部分能量进行自身繁殖，另一部分用于固氮。因此，氮固定过程需要捕获耕地上总太阳能的四分之一。其中一些可以作为辅助蛋白质食物重新捕获：豆类或三叶草上放牧的牛的牛奶。 White [1964] 认为，封建制度下这些来源的蛋白质供应量提高，有助于人口比传统农业时期更健康、更稠密。然而，问题仍然存在，自然固氮与粮食生产争夺土地。

Obviously there either has to be an extension of the area of cultivated land or the output per square meter of ground has to go up. With pre-industrial agriculture, that is, agriculture that does not depend extensively on industrial inputs, increases in production from a fixed area of land are dependent on biological processes. Fertility can be raised by more sophisticated crop rotation regimes, and the recycling of human and animal waste. The first process, however, requires that part of the land be set aside for clover, beans, etc., to restore soil nitrogen. The nitrogen fixation is ultimately dependent on a rather indirect energy path: photosynthesis in legume leaves, transport of surplus glucose to the roots where some of it is made available to nitrogen-fixing bacteria, which then use a portion of that energy for their own reproduction and another portion for fixing nitrogen. As such the process of nitrogen fixation requires on the order of one-quarter of the total solar energy being captured on the arable land. Some of this may be recaptured as subsidiary protein foods: pulses or milk from cattle grazed on clover. White [1964] argues that the improved availability of proteins from these sources under feudalism contributed to a healthier and denser population than that achieved under classical agriculture. However, the point remains that natural nitrogen fixation competed for land with grain production.

图 5.15。英国小麦进口量，以可养活的人数与英国城市人口的比率表示。假设每人每年小麦消费量为 100 公斤。资料来源：Mathias，2013 年；Thompson，1993 年，第 1 章。

Figure 5.15. British wheat imports, expressed as the number of people they could feed, compared with English urban population. Assumption is that wheat consumption per head would be 100kg per year. Source: Mathias, 2013; and Thompson, 1993, chapter 1.

由于大量重复使用人力和动物肥料，中国前资本主义农业的每英亩产量远高于当代欧洲农业，但正如布罗代尔 [1992] 指出的那样，这是以大量劳动力为代价实现的；由于人口密度高，肉类蛋白质的供应量远低于欧洲。前资本主义欧洲人口密度较低，因此有更多的土地可用于放牧。这意味着有更多的肉类作为食物，也有更多的动物肌肉力量来补充田间的人力。

Chinese pre-capitalist agriculture achieved significantly higher outputs per acre than contemporary European systems, thanks to intensive reuse of human and animal fertilizers, but as Braudel [1992] points out this was achieved at the cost of a great deal of labor; and as a consequence of the high population density, the availability of meat protein was much poorer than in Europe. The lower population density in pre-capitalist Europe allowed more land to be set aside for grazing. This meant both more meat as food, and more animal muscle power to supplement human labor in the fields.

在拖拉机出现之前，提高土地的劳动生产率依赖于驾驭马和牛。19 世纪的农业机械设计为马拉，但马会争夺土地。它们需要放牧，在密集工作时需要燕麦等饲料谷物。因此，前工业化农业依赖于利用部分光合作用一部分能量用于固氮，另一部分用于提供动物动力。系统的劳动效率越高，从人类食物中转移的太阳能比例就越大。人口的指数增长和将高劳动生产率与动物动力相结合的农业生产方式只能通过以下方式实现：

Prior to the tractor, raising labor productivity on the land depended on harnessing horses and oxen. Nineteenth-century agricultural machinery was designed to be horse-drawn, but horses compete for land. They need grazing and, when working intensively, require forage grains like oats. So pre-industrial agriculture depended on using part of the photosynthetic energy for nitrogen fixation, and part to provide animal motive power. The greater the labor efficiency of the system, the greater the proportion of the captured solar energy that was diverted from human food. The combination of an exponential population growth and a mode of production in agriculture that combined high labor productivity with animal power could only be achieved by:

• 领土扩张到以前未开垦的土地。

• Territorial expansion into previously uncultivated lands.

• 发展改进的运输手段，将粮食从这些地区运送到大城市。

• The development of improved means of transport to bring grain from these marches to the great cities.

因此，新生的资本主义生产方式不可避免地具有帝国主义色彩。它通过消灭北美大草原和阿根廷潘帕斯草原的原住民来养活英格兰和新英格兰新兴城市，从而避免了马尔萨斯困境。如图5.15所示，到 19 世纪 50 年代，英国已经进口了足够的小麦来养活整个英格兰城市人口。在接下来的 75 年里，城市人口增长了三倍，但小麦进口量超过了这一增长速度。运河、铁路和快速帆船成为粮食生产的重要手段。到 1900 年，其他新兴资本主义强国有理由相信，工业发展取决于殖民地的获得 [Fischer，1967；Fischer and Fletcher，1986]。未来似乎掌握在那些主宰温带农业平原的大帝国手中：英国、美国和俄罗斯。德国和日本没有自己的帝国来提供粮食进口，也没有通过殖民移民来缓解早期资本主义的人口压力，工业发展似乎注定会停滞不前。于是开始了一段帝国主义之间的竞争时期，这场竞争撕裂了世界半个世纪，并催生了德国计划在草原上复制草原上已经实现的灭绝和殖民化。

Thus the nascent capitalist mode of production was inevitably imperialist. It evaded the Malthusian dilemma by extirpating the native inhabitants of the North American prairies and the Argentine pampas to feed the burgeoning cities of England and New England. As Figure 5.15 shows, by the 1850s Britain was already importing sufficient wheat to feed the entire urban population of England. In the next 75 years the urban population grew threefold, but wheat imports outstripped this. Canals, railways, and clipper ships became vital means of food production. By 1900 other growing capitalist powers were justifiably convinced that industrial development depended on the acquisition of colonies [Fischer, 1967; Fischer and Fletcher, 1986]. The future seemed to lie with those great empires that dominated temperate agricultural plains: Britain, the United States, and Russia. Without empires of their own to supply food imports and, by colonial emigration, to relieve the population pressures of early capitalism, industrial developments in Germany and Japan were, it seemed, bound to falter. So began a period of inter-imperialist rivalry that tore the world for half a century and gave birth to a German project to replicate on the steppes the extirpation and colonization already achieved on the prairies.

认为这种殖民竞争仅仅源于生产关系和资本输出的需要是错误的，正如经典马克思主义对帝国主义的批判 [列宁，1999；布哈林，1976] 中所述。这起了一定作用，但殖民主义有更深的根源。它的根源延伸到田野里实际的物质生产方式、生物能量学以及资本主义工业化的特定人口结构。

It is a mistake to see this colonial rivalry as just arising from the relations of production, from the need to export capital, as presented in the classical Marxian critique of imperialism [Lenin, 1999; Bukharin, 1976]. This played a part, but colonialism had deeper roots. Its roots extended down to the actual mode of material production out in the fields; roots in bio-energetics; and in the specific demography of capitalist industrialization.

1945 年之后，建立农业殖民地的热情消退了。德国和日本的资本主义现在似乎可以在没有这些殖民地的情况下繁荣发展。为什么会有这种变化？

After 1945 the drive for agricultural colonies died out. Capitalism in Germany and Japan could now, apparently, prosper without them. Why this change?

答案有三：生育控制、氨生产哈伯法和拖拉机。生育控制减缓了人口增长。人工氮肥使农业摆脱了轮作的束缚。拖拉机的出现意味着土地上的劳动生产率不再依赖于留出土地来喂养马匹。欧洲的农业生产率上升到谷物殖民地不再需要的水平。到 20 世纪末，甚至英国也种植了足够的小麦来养活自己。地缘政治的重大变化是由基本生产方式和人口动态的变化推动的。

Three things are the answer: birth control, the Haber process for ammonia production, and tractors. The first slowed population growth. Artificial nitrogen fertilizer freed agriculture from the constraints of crop rotations. Tractors meant that labor productivity on the land no longer depended on setting aside land to feed horses. Agricultural productivity in Europe rose to levels at which grain colonies became redundant. By the late twentieth century even England grew enough wheat to feed itself. A major change in geopolitics was driven by changes in the underlying mode of production and population dynamics.

5.5.2 家庭和人口

5.5.2 Family and population

在所有国家，资本主义都与家庭经济共存，或者更好地与家庭经济相联系。萨林斯 [1972] 发展了家庭生产方式的概念来描述早期经济，德尔菲 [1980；德尔菲和伦纳德，1984] 在对法国父权制家庭（特别是农民家庭）的研究中，发展了家庭生产方式与资本主义共存的概念。马克思主义人类学家克劳德·梅亚苏 [1981] 对家庭生产方式或家庭经济的概念进行了更深入的研究，他说：

In all countries capitalism coexists with, or better articulates with, the domestic or household economy. Sahlins [1972] developed the concept of the domestic mode of production to describe early economies, and Delphy [1980; Delphy and Leonard, 1984] develops the concept of the coexistence of the domestic way of making things with capitalism in her studies of French patriarchal families, particularly peasant families. The idea of the domestic mode of production or domestic economy is examined in greater depth by the Marxist anthropologist Claude Meillassoux [1981] who says:

无论是封建制度、奴隶制度，还是资本主义制度，都没有这种调节和纠正再生产过程的内在机制。相反，归根结底，我们发现，所有现代生产方式、所有社会阶层，在劳动力供应方面，都依赖于家庭社区。至于资本主义，它既依赖于殖民地国家的家庭社区，也依赖于其现代转型——家庭，家庭虽然失去了生产功能，但仍保留着再生产功能。从这个角度来看，家庭生产关系可以被视为封建制度、奴隶制以及资本主义或官僚社会主义的有机基础。这些社会组织形式中，没有一种不是以同质的生产和再生产关系为基础的，就不能说它们代表了一种综合的生产方式。（xiii）

Neither feudalism, nor slavery, even less capitalism, know such regulating and correcting built-in mechanisms governing the process of reproduction. On the contrary, in the last analysis, we find that all modern modes of production, all classes of societies depend, for the supply of labor-power, on the domestic community. As for capitalism, it depends both on the domestic communities of the colonized countries and on its modem transformation, the family, which still maintains its reproductive functions although deprived of its productive ones. From this point of view, the domestic relations of production can be considered as the organic basis of feudalism, slavery as well as capitalism or bureaucratic socialism. None of these forms of social organization can be said to represent an integrated mode of production to the extent that they are not based on homogeneous relations of production and of reproduction. (xiii)

封建时期的家庭生产是经济的真正基础。农民家庭种植粮食、碾磨谷物、烹饪、纺羊毛、编织，以此养活自己、穿衣养育下一代。由于这些工作通常每周只需劳动三天就能完成，因此他们还有三天时间可以在庄园经济中无偿工作。随着法国农民摆脱封建税赋，剩余时间可用于生产经济作物并在市场上出售。

Domestic production in the feudal period was the real base of the economy. Peasant households grew food, milled grain, cooked it, spun wool, wove it, and out of this fed themselves, clothed themselves, and raised the next generation. Since this could typically be done in, say, three days' labor a week, that left three other days during which they could work, unpaid, in the manorial economy. With the liberation of the peasantry in France from feudal dues, the surplus time could be devoted to producing cash crops to sell on the market.

德尔菲认为，在家庭经济内部，一边是族长，另一边是妻子，以及在一定程度上是年龄较大的孩子，存在着阶级对立。族长剥削他们的妻子和孩子。妻子和孩子提供劳动力，生产出的产品一部分在农场消费，一部分在市场上出售。财产关系确保这些商品销售所得属于男性户主。此外，族长每周的工作时间通常比妻子少。这不是从历史唯物主义的妇女压迫立场出发的，后者过于自由和模糊。这是内置于生产和财产关系中的剥削性阶级关系。

Inside the domestic economy there is, Delphy argues, a class antagonism between patriarchs on the one side and on the other side wives and to an extent older children. The patriarchs exploit their wives and children. The wives and children provide labor that yields goods that are partly consumed on the farms, and partly sold on the market. The property relations ensure that the product from the sales of these commodities belong to the male head of household. In addition, the patriarchs typically did fewer hours’ work a week than their wives. This is not from a historical materialist standpoint of women’s oppression, which is too liberal and vague. It is an exploitative class relationship built into the production and property relations.

在父权制商品生产阶段，男主人对妻子生育子女有直接的兴趣。在义务教育之前的时期，儿童是从小在农场被剥削的额外劳动力。天主教的生育主义意识形态及其对女孩婚前贞洁的强调，是这些生产关系相当直接的意识形态表达。

In the stage of patriarchal commodity production, the patriarchs have a direct interest in their wives bearing children. Children, in a period before compulsory schooling, are an additional labor force to be exploited on the farm from an early age. The pro-natalist ideology of Catholicism, with its accompanying emphasis on premarital chastity for girls, is a pretty direct ideological expression of these production relations.

随着资本主义工业的发展，家庭经济中生产的使用价值数量开始下降。首先消失的是磨粉，因为水力和风车取代了磨石。这在封建时代后期就已经开始了。接下来，纺织和织布作为工厂生产的布料在十九世纪中叶占据了主导地位。家庭服装制造，加上家用缝纫机的普及，一直持续到二十世纪中叶。但人口生产却没有减弱。以至于家庭经济产生了过剩人口，这些人口迁移到城镇成为雇佣工人。这一阶段构成了列宁的第二种经济形式：生产小商品的农民农场。这也是同一时期美国大部分农村地区的主导经济形式。

As capitalist industry developed the number of use values produced within the domestic economy started to decline. First to go was milling as water and windmills replaced querns. This was well underway in the late feudal period. Next, spinning and weaving as factory production of cloth took over by the mid-nineteenth century. Home manufacture of clothes, extended by home sewing machines, lasted until the mid-twentieth century. But production of people continued unabated. So much so that the domestic economy characteristically produced a surplus population that migrated to towns to become wage workers. This stage constituted Lenin’s second economic form: petty commodity–producing peasant farms. It was also the dominant economic form over much of the U.S. countryside at the same period.

不断扩张的资本主义工业需要越来越多的劳动力，而劳动力却很便宜。支付的工资率不必足以完全补偿生育下一代的成本，因为父权制家庭经济是劳动力的主要供应来源。例如，在印度，情况仍然如此。

Expanding capitalist industry required an ever greater labor force, and got it cheap. The wage rate paid did not have to be sufficient to fully recompense the cost of reproducing the next generation, since the patriarchal domestic economy was the main source of supply of labor. This is still the case in India, for example.

马克思将来自农村的劳动力供应称为潜在的劳动力后备军。之所以说是潜在的，是因为后备人口是隐藏的，但确实存在，当工业周期进入扩张阶段时，他们会被召集到战场上。但这支潜在的后备军最终会枯竭。一旦潜在后备军开始枯竭，实际工资就必须上涨，才能完全覆盖劳动力再生产的成本。库琴斯基 [1946] 认为，直到英国工业革命开始近一个世纪后，即 19 世纪 70 年代，这一阶段才达到。

Marx termed the supply of workers from the countryside the latent reserve army of labor. Latent, because the reserve population was hidden but present, to be called to the colors when the industrial cycle goes through an expansionary phase. But this latent reserve army eventually dries up. Once the latent reserve starts to be exhausted real wages have to rise to fully cover the cost of reproducing labor power. Kuczynski [1946] argued that it was not until almost a century after the start of the Industrial Revolution in Britain that this stage was reached in the 1870s.

5.6 家庭和资本主义经济

5.6 DOMESTIC AND CAPITALIST ECONOMY

工人阶级家庭是旧家庭经济的部分转变。他们仍然生产人口，但不再生产任何其他商品，他们所生的孩子对家庭的经济意义也大不相同。在农村父权制家庭中，孩子几年内就成为有用的工人，为家庭收入做出贡献。在工业化的第一阶段，家庭会将子女作为年轻的工厂工人雇佣出去。但很快资本主义工业就需要受过教育的劳动力。义务教育随之而来。孩子现在成为一种成本，而不是一种资产。抚养孩子的工作持续的时间更长，没有孩子曾经带来的实物或现金收入。

Working-class families are a partial transformation of the old domestic economy. They still produce people, but they no longer produce any other commodities, and the children they produce have a quite different economic significance to the family. In the rural patriarchal family the children were, within a few years, useful workers who contributed to the family income. In the first phase of industrialization, families would hire out their children as young factory workers. But soon capitalist industry required an educated workforce. Compulsory schooling followed. Children now became a cost not an asset. The work of child-rearing lasts longer, without the income in kind or cash that kids once brought.

图 5.16。典型的资本主义人口规律。发达资本主义将生育率抑制在再生产要求以下，正如德国出生率的历史趋势所示。资料来源：Michael J. Kendzia，2012 年。

Figure 5.16. Characteristic capitalist law of population. Developed capitalism suppresses fertility below reproduction requirements as shown in this historical trend of German birth rate. Source: Michael J. Kendzia, 2012.

孩子对社会来说仍然是必需的，作为未来的劳动力来源，孩子对雇主来说显然是必不可少的，但现在家庭养育孩子更多的是出于意识形态期望的社会责任，而不是内部经济需要。这种情况的必然结果是家庭规模缩小，出生率下降。如图5.16所示，出生率趋于低于再生产率水平。其他发达国家也有类似趋势。美国等资本主义国家，由于有大量来自农业国家移民，由于家庭形式转变较晚，生育率较高。

Children remain necessary to society, and as a future source of labor power they are an obvious necessity for employers, but the family now raises them in what amounts more to a social duty conditioned by ideological expectations rather than an internal economic necessity. The inevitable consequence of this has been a decline in family size, a falling birth rate. As Figure 5.16, shows, the tendency is for birth rate to fall below reproduction levels. Similar trends exist for other developed countries. Capitalist countries like the United States, with substantial immigration from predominantly agricultural countries, show higher fertility due to the delayed transformation of family forms.

在父权制家庭经济中，妻子和孩子的劳动直接受到丈夫的剥削。她们的劳动直接为丈夫的财产做出了贡献。资本主义社会的发展赋予了妇女平等的财产权，并消除了家庭中的大部分生产活动。现在，男女都被迫出卖自己的劳动力，而这在旧的父权制家庭中是没有的。对于男女来说，工作日被分为他们卖给雇主的工作时间和他们继续在家庭经济中工作的时间。如果我们以加拿大为例——它公布了关于时间使用的出色统计数据——我们可以在表 5.11中看到，虽然男女的总工作时间几乎完全相同，但这些时间在家庭经济和市场经济中的工作分配方式对男女来说是互惠的。对于男性来说，它以 3:2 的比例有利于市场经济，而对于女性来说，市场/家庭的比例仅为 2:3。然而，需要注意的是，虽然我们通常认为加拿大是一个资本主义经济体，但时间使用统计数据显示，它最多只有 50% 是资本主义的。每天一半的工作仍然在家里完成，而很大一部分有偿工作，尤其是女性所做的工作 [Morissette et al., 2013]，是为国家而不是为私营企业完成的，因此不产生利润。

In patriarchal domestic economy the labor of wives and children are directly exploited by the husband. Their labor contributed directly to his property. The development of capitalist society gives women equal rights to property and eliminates most of the productive activity in the household. Both sexes are now forced to sell their labor power, something that neither did in the old patriarchal family. For both sexes the working day is divided into working hours they sell to an employer, and hours they continue to work in the domestic economy. If we take Canada as an example—it publishes excellent statistics on time use—we can see in Table 5.11 that while total working hours for men and women are almost exactly the same, the way these hours divide between work in the domestic and market economies are in reciprocal proportions for men and women. For men it divides 3:2 in favor of the market economy, whereas for women the ratio market/ domestic is only 2:3. The important thing to note, however, is that while we would conventionally say that Canada is a capitalist economy, the time-use statistics show that it is only at most 50 percent capitalist. Half the work done each day is still done in the home, and a significant part of the paid work, particularly that done by women [Morissette et al., 2013], is done for the state not for private firms, and as such generates no profit.

5.6.1 性别薪酬不平等

5.6.1 Gender pay inequality

现在让我们看看家庭和资本主义生产方式的相互作用如何影响女性在有偿就业中的地位。

Now let us look at how the interaction of the domestic and capitalist modes of production affects the position of women in paid employment.

2005 年，即表 5.11所涵盖的年份，男性每小时平均工资为 23.41 美元，女性每小时平均工资为 19.96 美元 [Morissette 等人，2013]。考虑到工作时间的差异，这意味着加拿大女性平均每天的收入仅为男性的一半多一点（表 5.12）。

In 2005, the year that Table 5.11 covers, average male hourly pay was $23.41 and average female pay was $19.96 [Morissette et al., 2013]. Taking into account the difference in hours worked that means that on average a Canadian woman earned only a little over half as much money per day as men (Table 5.12).

显然，影响妇女日收入的最大因素是她们出卖劳动力的时间较短。但这也留下了工资差距的问题。让我们来看看一个为妇女发声的著名组织的说法。加拿大妇女协会⁸⁷给出了工资差距的以下原因：

It is obvious that the biggest factor affecting daily earnings of women was the shorter number of hours for which they sold their labor power. But that left a gap in pay rates to explain. Let us take what a prominent organization speaking for women says. The Canadian Womens’ Association⁸⁷ gave the following reasons for the gap:

1. 首先，传统的“女性工作”比传统的“男性工作”薪水低。正如一位研究人员指出的：“女性占主导地位的工作类别通常被认为不需要太多技能，因为这些工作与女性在家中免费从事的家务有关。” 2. 其次，大多数女性工人从事低工资职业和低薪行业。女性从事的职业范围比男性要窄，在 20 个最低薪资职业中女性的比例很高。约三分之二的女性劳动力集中在教学、护理和医疗保健、办公室和行政工作以及销售和服务行业。2009 年，25 至 54 岁的女性占加拿大最低工资工人的 22%，是同年龄段男性的两倍多。

1. First, traditional “women’s work” pays less than traditional “men’s work.” As one researcher notes: “Female-dominated job classes are often seen as not being skilled because the tasks are related to domestic jobs that women were expected to carry out for free in the home.” 2. Second, most women workers are employed in lower-wage occupations and lower-paid industries. Women work in a narrower range of occupations than men and have high representation in the 20 lowest-paid occupations. About two-thirds of the female workforce are concentrated in teaching, nursing, and health care, office and administrative work, and sales and service industries. Women aged 25 to 54 accounted for 22 percent of Canada’s minimum-wage workers in 2009, more than double the proportion of men in the same age group.

表 5.11：按性别计算的加拿大人的时间使用情况

TABLE 5.11: Time Use of Canadians, Calculated by Sex

男性每天的工作时间

Males hours per day

女性每天的小时数

Females hours per day

全部的

Total

总工作量

Total Work

7.8

7.9

有偿工作及相关活动

Paid Work and Related Activities

4.7

3.1

为雇主提供有偿工作

Paid Work for Employer

4.2

2.8

通勤

Commuting

0.4

0.3

家庭经济中的无偿劳动

Unpaid Work in Domestic Economy

2.7

4.2

家务及相关活动

Household and Related Activities

2.3

3.8

儿童保育

Childcare

0.3

0.5

公民和志愿活动

Civic and Voluntary Activities

0.3

0.4

教育及相关活动

Education and Related Activities

0.5

0.6

个人护理

Personal Care

10.4

10.8

晚上睡觉

Night Sleep

8.2

8.4

餐食（不包括餐厅餐食）

Meals (excl. Restaurant Meals)

其他个人活动

Other Personal Activities

1.2

1.4

空闲时间

Free Time

5.7

5.3

15 岁及以上人口一周七天的平均数据。来源：加拿大统计局，2005 年综合社会调查，目录号 12F0080XWE。最后修改日期：2009 年 9 月 8 日。

Figures averaged over a seven day week, for population age 15 and older. Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2005, Catalogue no. 12F0080XWE. Last modified: 9/8/2009.

表 5.12：2005 年加拿大平均工资

TABLE 5.12: Median Wages in Canada, 2005

3. 造成工资差距的另一个原因是女性比男性更多地从事兼职工作。2013 年，大约 70% 的兼职工人是女性，这一比例在过去 30 年中一直保持稳定。从事兼职或临时工作的女性获得晋升和培训的可能性远低于从事全职工作的女性。女性从事兼职工作有几个原因，包括缺乏负担得起的儿童保育和家庭休假政策，以及承担大部分家庭责任的社会压力。这些因素使女性更容易中断就业，从而对收入产生负面影响。

3. Another reason for the wage gap is that more women than men work part-time. About 70 percent of part-time workers in 2013 were women, a proportion that has remained steady for three decades. Women working part-time or temporary jobs are much less likely to receive promotions and training than those in full-time jobs. Women work part-time for several reasons, including lack of affordable child care and family leave policies, along with social pressure to carry the bulk of domestic responsibilities. These factors make it more likely for women to have interruptions in employment, which has a negative effect on income.

4. 很大一部分工资差距仍未得到解释，部分原因是歧视。据估计，10%-15%的工资差距是由于性别工资歧视造成的。

4. A large portion of the wage gap remains unexplained and is partly due to discrimination. An estimated 10–15 percent of the wage gap is attributed to gender-based wage discrimination.

这似乎很好地解释了这种差异，但它引发了一些问题。为什么传统女性的工作报酬较低？这难道不是在用性别工资差距来解释性别工资差距吗？

This appears as a good surface account of the difference but it begs some questions. Why does traditional women’s work pay less? Surely that is just using the gender wage gap to explain the gender wage gap?

第 2 点也存在同样的循环论证。如果存在性别工资差距，那么任何女性比例较高的行业与男性比例较高的行业相比，工资都会相对较低。所以这又是一个循环论证，无法找到差距的原因。

The same circular reasoning is present in point 2. If there is a gender wage gap, it follows that any industry with a high proportion of women will have relatively low wages compared to an industry with a high proportion of men. So this is again circular and cannot get to the cause of the gap.

第 3 点是唯一真正的因果解释，与女性在家庭经济中的角色以及她们难以摆脱这种经济的原因有关。第 4 点只是说存在一些无法解释的差异，根据这个定义，这一定是歧视。但是什么导致了这种歧视？雇主希望降低所有员工的工资。问题是为什么他们在压低女性工资方面更成功。

Point 3 is the only real causal explanation, related to the role of women in the domestic economy and a reason why they have difficulty getting out of that economy. Point 4 is merely saying that there is some unexplained difference and that by this definition must be discrimination. But what causes this discrimination? Employers would like to reduce the wages of all employees. The question is why they are more successful in holding down women’s wages.

图 5.17中清楚地表明，工资差距的历史趋势是下降的。从 20 世纪 80 年代中期开始的 20 年里，男性的工资保持不变，而女性的工资则有所上涨。我们需要首先解释为什么存在差距，然后解释为什么差距会随着时间的推移而变化。

In Figure 5.17 it is clear that the historical trend has been for the wage gap to decline. There was a 20-year period from the mid-1980s during which men’s wages were static and during which women’s wages rose. We need to explain first why a gap exists at all, and then why the gap has changed with time.

Morissette 等人 [2013] 通过对工会会员、婚姻状况、工作年限、教育和职业进行多因素分析来研究差距的变化。考虑到所有因素，他们可以解释工资差距下降的约 38%。三个最重要的解释变量是工会会员、教育状况和职业。男女工会会员的变化解释了工资差距下降的 11%（见表5.14）。

Morissette et al. [2013] examine the change in the gap by doing multi-factorial analysis against union membership, marital status, tenure of job, education, and occupation. Taking all factors into account they could explain about 38 percent of the decline in the wage gap. The three most significant explanatory variables were union membership, educational status, and occupation. Changes in union membership by men and women accounted for 11 percent of the decline in the wage gap (see Table 5.14).

图 5.17. 加拿大男性和女性的实际工资。来源：Morissette 等人，2013 年。

Figure 5.17. Canadian real wages for men and women. Source: Morissette et al., 2013.

加拿大女性现在比男性更能加入工会，受教育程度也更高，扭转了之前的局面。女性的工作时间通常比男性略长，再次扭转了过去的局面。男性和女性都更有可能在医疗或政府服务部门就业，而这些部门一直是经济增长的部门（表 5.13）。

Women in Canada are now more unionized and better educated than men, reversing the previous situation. Women typically have been in their job slightly longer than men, again reversing the situation that used to hold. Both men and women are more likely to be employed in health or government services, which have been growth sectors of the economy (Table 5.13).

Morissette 等人 [2013] 得出以下总结：

Morissette et al. [2013] have as summary conclusion:

尽管如今女性的平均收入仍低于男性，但过去 30 年来，性别每小时工资差距已显著缩小。与男性相比，女性提高生产率的特征提升速度比男性更快。

Although women today still earn relatively less than men on average, the gender hourly wage gap decreased significantly over the last three decades. Relative to men, women increased their productivity-enhancing characteristics at a faster pace than men did.

这种解释依赖于工资由生产力决定的理念。也就是说，它遵循教科书上的新古典主义理念，即工资由劳动的边际产量决定，工资合同是平等的非剥削合同。但即使我们接受这一点，而马克思主义经济学家显然不接受这一点，他们也只能解释 38% 的变化。还有 62% 无法解释。

This account depends on the idea that wages are determined by productivity. That is to say it follows the textbook neoclassical idea that wages are set by the marginal product of labor and that the wage contract is an equal non-exploitative one. But even if we accept this, which obviously Marxian economists do not, they are only able to account for 38 percent of the change. They are left with 62 percent unexplained.

表 5.13：加拿大男性和女性地位的变化

TABLE 5.13: Change in Statuses for Men and Women in Canada

来源：Morissette 等人，2013 年，表 3。

Source: Morissette et al., 2013, table 3.

表 5.14：工资差距变化的解释

TABLE 5.14: Explanation of Change in Wage Gap

改变

Change

差距百分比解释

Percent of Gap Explained

年龄

Age

0.002

-2.8

教育

Education

-0.006

10.5

省

Province

0.003

-4.6

工会地位

Union Status

-0.006

11.4

婚姻状况

Marital Status

-0.001

1.3

任职

Tenure

-0.004

7.3

职业

Occupation

-0.010

行业

Industry

0.002

-2.8

总部分解释

Total Portion Explained

-0.021

38.4

部分原因不明

Portion Unexplained

-0.035

61.6

资料来源：Morissette 等人，2013 年。

Source: Morissette et al., 2013.

表 5.14中的统计分析集中于男女之间仅有细微差异的方面，而忽略了两者之间的一个重大区别：女性在家庭经济中的参与度更高。

The statistical analysis in Table 5.14 focuses on things where there are only minor differences between men and women and leaves out the one big thing that differentiates them: women’s greater participation in the domestic economy.

现在看看图 5.18并将其与图 5.17进行比较，您会发现它们看起来非常相似。随着女性劳动力份额的上升，她们的工资率占男性工资的百分比也上升。事实上，这两个系列之间的相关性为 90.9%。这意味着只有 9.1% 的工资差距变化需要用其他因素来解释：例如工会会员身份。

Now look at Figure 5.18 and compare it with Figure 5.17, and you can see that they look pretty similar. As the women’s share of the workforce rises their wage rate as a percentage of men’s wages rises. In fact, the correlation between the two series is 90.9 percent. That means that only 9.1 percent of the change in the wage gap needs to be explained by other factors: for instance union membership.

这有力地表明，如果加拿大男女最终工作时间相同，考虑到女性的工会化程度更高且受教育程度更高，工资差距将会消除或略有逆转。

This strongly suggests that should men and women end up working an equal number of hours in Canada the wage gap will either be eliminated or slightly reversed; taking into account women’s higher unionization and better education.

5.6.2 缩小工资差距

5.6.2 Narrowing the wage gap

但是，提高女性就业率面临哪些障碍呢？

But what are the obstacles to a higher rate of women participating in the workforce?

关键在于，一些活动仍然在家庭经济中进行，其中女性比男性做得更多（表 5.11）。家庭经济仍然组织了社会再生产所必需的一部分工作。这项工作仍然需要完成。基本上有三种方法可以减少女性在家中的工作量：（1）男性必须承担更多家务劳动；（2）这些任务的劳动生产率必须提高；（3）同样的任务必须从家庭经济中转移出去。

The key point is that a set of activities are still performed within the domestic economy, and of these women do more than men (Table 5.11). The domestic economy still organizes a part of the work necessary for social reproduction. This work still needs to get done. Basically there are three ways that women’s workload in the home can be reduced: (1) a larger share of housework has to be done by men; (2) the productivity of labor in these tasks has to rise; (3) the same tasks have to move out of the domestic economy.

图 5.18. 1976 年至 2009 年加拿大女性和男性的就业率。资料来源：加拿大统计局，劳动力调查。

Figure 5.18. Canadian employment rates of women and men, 1976 to 2009. Source: Statistics Canada, Labor Force Survey.

5.6.3 家务分工

5.6.3 Division of domestic labor

我们一直以加拿大为例。加拿大和美国的女性家务劳动份额数据几乎相同，而且这两个国家在男女家务劳动分工相对平等方面都名列世界前茅（表 5.16）。Bianchi 等人 [2000] 使用美国的数据表明，从 1965 年到 1995 年，女性承担的家务劳动份额和绝对工作时间都显著下降。女性的无偿家务劳动从每周 30 小时开始下降到 17.5 小时，而男性的无偿家务劳动从 4.9 小时增加到 10 小时。但目前尚不清楚这种转变是否会持续。1998 年曾出版过一本《加拿大人的时间利用报告》。通过将其与 2008 年版进行比较，我们可以看到十年来男女所做的家务劳动是否发生了变化。如表 5.15所示，十年来男性承担的家务劳动份额确实略有增加，但这并没有减少女性的家务劳动，因为男性和女性都做了更多的家务劳动。

We have been using Canada as an example. Canada and the United States have almost identical figures for the share of housework done by women and both countries are near the top of the world ranking for having the comparatively equal divisions of domestic work between the sexes (Table 5.16). Bianchi et al. [2000] use data from the United States to show that there was a significant fall both in women’s share of housework and their absolute hours from 1965 to 1995. Starting at 30 hours a week, unpaid housework by women fell to 17.5 hours, while that of men rose from 4.9 hours to 10 hours. However, it is unclear if this shift is continuing. There was a previous edition of Time Use of Canadians in 1998. By comparing it with the 2008 edition we can see if, over a decade, there was a change in the housework done by men and women. As Table 5.15 shows the share of housework done by men did rise modestly over the ten years, but this did not reduce women’s housework, since both men and women did more of it.

如果 2008 年女性实际上比 1998 年做了更多的家务，那么她们参与有偿工作的人数如何增加？

If women were actually doing more housework in 2008 than in 1998, how did their participation in paid work rise?

因为他们的带薪工作时间也更长！一般来说，如图5.19所示，两性之间分担的无偿家务劳动总量越高，男性所占份额就越平等。

Because they worked longer paid hours too! In general, as Figure 5.19 shows, the higher the total amount of unpaid domestic labor shared between the two sexes the more equal the male share of it is likely to be.

表 5.15：1998 年和 2008 年加拿大家务劳动时间比较

TABLE 5.15: Comparison of Hours of Housework in Canada, 1998 and 2008

因此，只有当家务劳动总量保持不变时，男性承担更多的家务才能解放女性。

So men doing more housework only frees women of it if the total amount of housework remains constant.

5.6.4 减少整体家务

5.6.4 Reducing overall housework

图 5.19 . 男女在家庭经济中花费的平均小时数与男性无偿劳动份额呈正相关。资料来源：联合国性别统计，时间使用数据库，显示 188 个国家/年份组合。

Figure 5.19. There is a positive relationship between the average number of hours spent by both sexes in the domestic economy, and the share of unpaid labor done by men. Source: UN Gender Statistics, Time Use database, showing 188 country/year combinations.

乍一看，减少家务劳动的答案似乎是在家中使用更多机器：洗衣机、洗碗机、吸尘器、割草机等。然而，这些机器是否能有效减少家务劳动的总时间值得怀疑。Vanek [1974] 使用美国数据报告称，在这些机器面世的时期，女性所做的家务劳动并没有明显减少。随后对澳大利亚家庭进行的详细时间利用研究支持了这一结论。澳大利亚时间利用调查不仅收集了花在任务上的时间数据，还收集了每个家庭可用的电器数据。在基于这些数据的多元回归研究中，Bittman 等人 [2004] 得出结论：

At first sight it might seem that an answer to reducing domestic work would be more machinery in the home: washing machines, dishwashers, vacuum cleaners, mowers etc. However, it is questionable that these are effective in reducing overall hours spent in housework. Vanek [1974], using U.S. data, reported that over the period during which these sorts of machines became available there was no significant decline in the housework done by women. Subsequent detailed time use study of Australian households has backed this conclusion. The Australian time use surveys collected data not only on time spent on tasks but also what appliances were available in each household. In a multiple regression study drawing on this data Bittman et al. [2004] conclude:

图 5.19。男女在家庭经济中花费的平均小时数与男性无偿劳动的比例呈正相关。资料来源：联合国性别统计，时间使用数据库，显示 188 个国家/年份组合。

表 5.16：部分国家男性承担的无偿家务劳动份额

TABLE 5.16: Share of Unpaid Domestic Work Done by Men in Some Countries

男性无偿工作比例

Male Percent of Unpaid Work

更高

HIGHER

瑞典

Sweden

44.17％

44.17%

加拿大

Canada

39.81％

39.81%

爱沙尼亚

Estonia

39.30%

保加利亚

Bulgaria

34.28%

中等的

MEDIUM

莱索托

Lesotho

28.43%

中国

China

28.00％

28.00%

秘鲁

Peru

27.43%

以色列

Israel

26.80％

26.80%

降低

LOWER

突尼斯

Tunisia

11.27％

11.27%

印度

India

9.38％

9.38%

柬埔寨

Cambodia

9.09％

9.09%

巴基斯坦

Pakistan

8.89％

8.89%

马里

Mali

7.02％

7.02%

尽管微波炉能够在传统炉灶所需时间的一小部分内烹制食物，但即使外出就餐次数保持不变，拥有微波炉也不会对女性的时间利用模式产生显著影响。深度冷冻机在膳食生产中实现规模经济的能力也并没有显著减少女性用于备餐或做家务的平均时间。虽然数据没有将食物和饮料的准备过程与相关的餐后清理过程分开，但我们似乎有理由认为，洗碗机通过减少餐后清理所需的时间，可能会减少在厨房里花费的总时间。然而，与预期相反，洗碗机似乎对澳大利亚女性用于备餐和清理的时间，或用于家务的日常时间没有显著影响。

Despite its capacity to cook food in a fraction of the time needed by conventional stoves, owning a microwave has no significant effect on the time use patterns of women, even when the number of meals out is held constant. Nor does the deep freezer’s ability to harvest the economies of scale in meal production significantly reduce the average time that women devote to meal preparation or to housework overall. While the data does not separate the process of food and drink preparation and the associated meal cleanup, it would seem reasonable to expect that a dishwasher, by reducing the time required for meal cleanup, might lower the overall time spent in the kitchen. Contrary to expectations, however, dishwashers appear to have no significant effect on the time Australian women spend in food or drink preparation and cleanup or in the daily hours devoted to housework.

表 5.17：2011 年加拿大男性和女性的相对剥削率

TABLE 5.17: Relative Rates of Exploitation of Men and Women in Canada, 2011

注：s/v 表示剩余价值率。资料来源：加拿大统计局，收入和支出表；加拿大统计局，劳动力调查；以及图 5.17。

Note: s/v indicates rate of surplus value. Source: Statistics Canada, income and expenditure tables; Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey; and figure 5.17.

可能的解释是，洗衣机的普及与人们拥有更多衣服以及保持衣物干净的社会压力增加相吻合。节省时间不一定是购买洗衣机的动机。洗碗机可能比水槽清洗更令人愉快，即使它们的速度没有加快多少。总体结论似乎是，除非有通用家用机器人问世，否则家用机器对家庭女性劳动的影响将微乎其微。

Possible explanations are that the growing availability of machine washing coincided with people owning more clothes, and perhaps greater social pressures toward keeping them spotless. Time saving need not be the motive for buying machines. Dishwashers may be more pleasant than sink washing even if they give little speed-up. The overall conclusion would seem to be that short of general-purpose domestic robots becoming available, domestic machinery will have little further impact on women’s labor in the home.

5.6.5 将任务转移出国内经济

5.6.5 Moving tasks out of the domestic economy

过去，工业劳动生产率的提高不仅依赖于机器的使用，还依赖于规模经济。规模越大，分工就越细，经济措施就越合理。麦当劳制作汉堡和薯条所需的劳动力比在家制作要少，这不仅是因为麦当劳有更大的炸薯条锅和放置汉堡的架子，还因为更高的生产量使设备能够得到密集使用。国内生产规模小最终限制了其生产率。

Improvements in labor productivity in industry have in the past depended not only on the use of machinery but also on economies of scale. Greater scale allows greater division of labor and rationalized economical steps. Less labor is used to prepare a burger and fries at McDonald’s than if it is made at home, not just because McDonald’s has bigger fries fryers and racks to hold burgers, but because the higher throughput allows the intensive use of the equipment. It is the small scale of domestic production that ultimately limits its productivity.

但当然，在市场经济中，人们可以购买服务。他们可以去快餐店吃饭，而不是在家吃饭。他们可以把婴儿送去幼儿园，而不是自己整天照顾他们。在英国，如果他们足够富有，他们会在孩子七岁后就把大孩子送去寄宿学校。富人会雇佣管家来打扫卫生，把衣服送到洗衣店，等等。

But of course in a market economy people can buy services. They can go out to fast-food joints instead of eating at home. They can send their infants to preschool instead of looking after them all day themselves. If they are rich enough in the UK, they send older children off to boarding schools as soon as the kids turn seven. The rich hire housekeepers to clean, send clothes out to laundry, etc.

这些服务可以作为商品提供，但是谁能买得起呢？

These services are available as commodities but who can afford them?

一项任务要想脱离家庭经济，最低收入家庭成员每小时的工资必须足以购买原本可以在一小时内在家庭内完成的商品或服务。因此，如果一个家庭有一个学龄前儿童，那么他们只有当一小时的托儿费用低于家庭中最低收入者（通常是女性）一小时的收入时，才有能力购买托儿服务。

For a task to move out of the domestic economy, the hourly wage earned by the lowest-paid family member must be enough to purchase goods or services that could otherwise have been done within the household in one hour. Thus if a family has one child under school age, they can only afford to buy childcare if one hour of childcare costs less than the lowest-paid person in the house, usually a woman, earns in an hour.

但是，如果托儿服务是由盈利性企业提供的，那么其售价将与服务本身的价值相符。也就是说，托儿费将包括工资、利润、建筑租金、暖气费等。假设托儿工作者的工资为每小时 16 美元，另外 12 美元用于利润和租金，4 美元用于其他管理费用。那么，如果每个托儿工作者可以照顾三个孩子，那么每小时的总成本将约为 11 美元。在这个水平上，对于一个每小时工资只有 16 美元的工人来说，把一个孩子送到托儿所是件不值得的事，因为扣除税收和交通费用后，她几乎没有剩余。如果两个孩子都要送到托儿所，那就不可能了。

But the childcare, if provided by a profit-making business, will sell at the full value of the service. That is, the childcare fee will include wages, profits, rent on the building, heating, etc. Suppose that the salary of the childcare worker is $16 an hour, that a further $12 goes in profit and rent, and $4 in other overheads. Then if each childcare worker can look after three children the overall cost per hour will be on the order of $11. At this level it would not be worthwhile for a worker who was herself on $16 an hour to put a child into care since, allowing for tax deductions, travel costs, she would have almost nothing left over. If two children had to be put into care, it would be impossible.

因此，私人托儿服务最初只有工资水平较高的家庭才能负担得起，这并不奇怪。但从节约社会劳动力的角度来看，这显然是不合理的。家中一个孩子占用了一名成年人。幼儿园里一个孩子只占用了一名成年人的三分之一。但由于工人只能以工资的形式获得他们所创造价值的一部分，因此，社会效率高的东西在私人看来却无法负担。

It is no surprise then that private childcare has initially been only affordable by households on higher wage rates. But this is clearly irrational from the standpoint of economizing on social labor. A single child at home ties up one adult. A single child in a kindergarten ties up only one-third of an adult. But since workers only get part of the value they create back in wages, something that would be socially efficient becomes privately unaffordable.

这里有一个反馈机制。只要女性过多地依赖家庭育儿，她们在劳动力中的参与度就会较低，我们已经看到，这导致女性的平均工资较低。但这种较低的工资率使得育儿费用难以负担，并确保女性而不是男性更有可能留在家里。因此，消除性别工资差距至少取决于育儿的社会化。因此，婴儿护理的社会化，即婴儿从家庭中转移出来，取决于提供免费的公立托儿所或高补贴的私人托儿所。

There is a feedback mechanism here. So long as women are disproportionately tied to home childcare, their participation in the labor force is lower, and we have seen that this results in lower average wages for women. But this lower pay rate makes childcare unaffordable and ensures that it is women, not men, who are likely to stay at home. The elimination of a gender pay gap thus depends, at a minimum, on the socialization of childcare. The socialization of infant care, its move out of the household, is thus dependent on the provision of either free state nurseries or highly subsidized private ones.

我们将在第 7 章中回到这个主题。

We will return to this topic in chapter 7.

5.7 工资率分布

5.7 DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE RATES

但在工资性别差异问题背后还有一个更大的问题。总体上，是什么决定了工资的分配？因为男性和女性的工资并不只有一种。男性和女性的工资率存在差异。图 5.17显示了男性工资的一条线和女性工资的一条线。但这些是中位数线，因为许多男性的工资低于男性中位数线，也有许多男性的工资高于男性中位数线。

But behind the question of gender differences in wages is a bigger question. What determines the distribution of wages in general? For there is not just a single male and female wage. For men and women there are spreads of pay rates. Figure 5.17 shows a line for men’s wages and a line for women’s. But these are the median lines, as many men’s wages fall below the male median line as lie above it.

图 5.20中有两条线，一条表示男性工资，一条表示女性工资，但它们表示累积分布。横轴表示工资水平，纵轴表示收入低于给定工资的人数比例。横线分别表示各性别的 10%、25% 和 50%。圆圈和三角形表示美国劳工统计局 2016 年第一季度的原始数据。

In Figure 5.20 there are two lines, one for male and one for female wages, but these represent cumulative distribution. The horizontal axis is wage levels and the vertical axis measures the fraction of people earning less than a given wage. The horizontal lines represent 10 percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent of the respective gender. The circles and triangles represent raw data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the first quarter of 2016.

拟合数据的曲线形状就是所谓的对数正态累积分布。这是什么意思呢？读者们一定很熟悉钟形曲线形状的正态分布。正态分布是统计学中最常见的分布之一。当测量结果由一系列随机操作因素相加而产生时，就得到了正态分布。

The shape of the curve fitted to the data is what is called a log normal cumulative distribution. What does this mean? Well, readers will be familiar with the bell curve–shaped normal distribution. A normal distribution is one of the most commonly occurring in statistics. You get it where a measurement is the result of a collection of randomly operating causes that add together.

图 5.20。2016 年美国周工资率分布，分布下半部分符合对数正态曲线。实线是适合女性工资中位数和最低十分位数的对数正态分布，虚线是适合男性工资中位数和最低十分位数的对数正态曲线。请注意，对于第三四分位数和第九十分位数，经验分布与对数正态形式相比向右移动。资料来源：劳工统计局，《工薪阶层的正常周收入》，2016 年 4 月 19 日。

Figure 5.20. Distribution of weekly wage rates for the United States, 2016, fits for the bottom half of the distribution a log-normal curve. The solid line is a log-normal distribution fitted to the median and lowest decile of female wages, the dotted line is a log-normal curve fitted to the median and lowest decile of male wages. Note that for the third quartile and ninth decile the empirical distribution is shifted to the right compared to a log-normal form. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Earners, April 19, 2016.

如果我们考虑某个特定星期美国每个人的工资，这些工资将受到各种因素的影响，如果我们随机选择一个人，这个人看起来似乎是随机的。性别、他们从事的工作、他们从事这份工作的时间、他们的年龄、他们居住在哪个地区、他们当周是否请过病——因素的清单非常多。因此，我们是否应该期望工资率呈正态分布？

If we consider the wages of every person in the United States during a particular week, these wages will be affected by all sorts of factors, which, if we select someone at random that person will seem random. The gender, the job they do, how long they have done it, their age, the region of the country they live in, whether they had days sick that week—the list of factors is vast. Should we therefore expect wage rates to be normally distributed?

稍加思考，我们就会发现工资率不能这样分布。正态分布是对称于平均值的。平均值作为最常出现的值出现在中间。然后它向两边扩展。假设平均周薪为 900 美元。我们知道有很多人的收入是平均工资的两倍多，在本例中是 1,800 多美元。假设有 10% 的人收入超过 1,800 美元，或比平均水平高出 900 美元。如果工资呈正态分布，同样数量的人的收入必须低于平均水平 900 美元，也就是说低于 0 美元。必须有相当一部分人的工资为负数。但我们知道这种情况不会发生。

A little thought tells us that wage rates cannot be distributed this way. The normal distribution is symmetrical about the average. The average value occurs in the middle as the most frequently occurring value. It then spreads out on either side. Suppose the average weekly wage is $900. We know that there are plenty of people who earn more than twice the average wage, more than $1,800 in this case. Suppose 10 percent of people earn more than $1,800, or $900 above the average. If wages were normally distributed, the same number of people would have to earn less than $900 below the average, that is to say less than 0 dollars. There would have to be significant fraction of people earning negative wages. But we know this does not happen.

$图像$

图 5.21。经典正态分布，其中 μ 是分布的平均值。来源：Dan Kernler。

Figure 5.21. Classical normal distribution in which μ is the mean of the distribution. Source: Dan Kernler.

从逻辑上讲，工资不可能呈正态分布。如果工资率的分布非常狭窄，平均工资为 900 美元，标准差仅为 100 美元，那么任何人赚到平均工资两倍或低于零的概率就会非常小。经验事实是，工资差距在向上的方向上要大得多，这排除了工资分布呈正态分布的可能性。

It is not logically impossible for wages to have a normal distribution. If the distribution of wage rates was very narrow, so that with a mean of $900 the standard deviation was, say, only $100, then the probability of anyone earning either twice the mean wage, or less than nothing, would be vanishingly small. It is an empirical fact that wage dispersions are much bigger than this in the upward direction, which precludes the distribution being normal.

虽然正态分布是由随机的加法过程产生的，但随机因素相乘的过程具有对数正态分布。也就是说，如果你在对数刻度上绘制你测量的因素，你得到的频率曲线就是熟悉的钟形。关键是，对正态数的乘法变成了对数的加法，因此当我们在对数刻度上绘制时，就会得到钟形曲线。假设我所描述的一些影响工资的因素实际上是以乘法的方式起作用的。如果你是女性，平均工资乘以 0.8，如果你是黑人，平均工资乘以 0.85，如果你有学位，平均工资乘以 1.2，等等，那么你会认为分布是对数正态的。

While a normal distribution is generated by random processes that are additive, processes in which random factors are multiplied together have a log normal distribution. That is, if you plot the factor you are measuring on a logarithmic scale, the frequency curve you get is the familiar bell shape. The point is that multiplication on normal numbers becomes addition of their logarithms and so gives a bell curve when we plot it on a log scale. Suppose that some of the factors I described as working on wages actually work in a multiplicative way. If mean wages are multiplied by 0.8 if you are a woman and by a further 0.85 if you are black, 1.2 if you have a degree etc., etc., then you would expect the distribution to be log normal.

曼德布洛特（1962 年）对分形的研究后来使他声名鹊起，观察到，收入分布的下半部分可以用对数正态函数很好地描述，而上半部分则具有所谓的幂律分布，也就是说，高收入人群的数量超过对数正态分布的预测值。我们这里不讨论包括财产收入和管理收入在内的上层收入分配的问题，但 Cottrell 等人 [2009] 对其进行了详细研究。88^图 5.20证实了曼德布洛特的观察。男性和女性工资的第一个十分位数、第一个四分位数和中位数都很好地落在对数正态曲线上，但第三个四分位数和第九个十分位数表明分布的右尾比对数正态曲线更平坦。

Mandelbrot [1962], whose research into fractals later won him fame, observed that the lower part of income distributions is well described by a log normal function while the upper part has what is termed a power law distribution, that is, there are more people on higher incomes than a log normal distribution would predict. We will not discuss the problems of the upper income distribution, which includes property and managerial income here, but it is examined in some detail in Cottrell et al. [2009].⁸⁸ Figure 5.20 bears out Mandelbrot’s observation. All of the first decile, first quartile, and the median for male and female wages fall nicely on log normal curves, but the third quartile and the ninth decile indicate that the right tail of the distribution is flatter than log normal.

对于工资，我们需要确定的关键事项是：

The key things we need to determine for wages are:

• 平均工资是多少

• What is the mean wage

• 平均工资是多少

• What is the median wage

• 分布的散布或标准差是多少

• What is the spread or standard deviation of the distribution

• 这些论点能用来解释男女工人工资的差异吗

• Can these arguments be used to account for the difference in male and female workers’ wages

给定分布的标准差及其平均值，就可以确定中位数，因此，从本质上讲，我们必须了解这两个参数的驱动因素。对于对数正态分布，平均工资应该略高于中位数工资，这也是我们经常观察到的情况。

Given the standard deviation of the distribution and its mean, the median will be determined, so in essence we have to understand what drives these two parameters. For a log normal distribution the mean wage should be somewhat above the median wage, which is what we always observe.

在像市场经济这样本质上混乱的系统中，我们应该预期随机过程会分散工资分配，直到某些约束对其分散设置了界限。人们早就知道工资分配有一个下限：最低生活保障。89^这并不是过时的十九世纪概念，统计数据表明，即使在像美国这样的富裕国家，收入分配末端也有许多家庭挨饿。Coleman-Jensen 等人 [2015] 指出，8.4% 的美国家庭粮食保障水平低，5.6% 的粮食保障水平极低。2014 年，美国共有 4800 万人粮食不安全。工资处于低粮食保障类别的人，如果没有联邦或慈善粮食援助，他们的工资不足以维持生计。

In a fundamentally chaotic system like a market economy we should expect random processes to spread out the wage distribution until some constraint sets a bound on its spread. It has long been known that there is a lower limit to the wage distribution: a subsistence minimum.⁸⁹ That this is not some outdated nineteenth-century concept is borne out by the statistics that show that at the tail end of the income distribution even in a rich country like the United States many families go hungry. Coleman-Jensen et al. [2015] state that 8.4 percent of American households have low food security and 5.6 percent very low food security. Overall 48 million people in the United States were food insecure in 2014. People on wages that put them in the low food security category have a wage that is not enough to survive on without federal or charitable food aid.

被归类为低食品安全的家庭报告了多种迹象，表明他们存在食物获取问题和饮食质量下降，但通常很少（如果有的话）报告食物摄入量减少的迹象。被归类为极低食品安全的家庭报告了多种迹象，表明他们由于食物资源不足而导致食物摄入量减少和饮食模式紊乱。在大多数（但不是全部）食品安全极低的家庭中，调查受访者报告说，他或她一年中某个时候感到饥饿，但由于没有足够的钱买食物而没有吃饭。

Households classified as having low food security have reported multiple indications of food acquisition problems and reduced diet quality, but typically have reported few, if any, indications of reduced food intake. Those classified as having very low food security have reported multiple indications of reduced food intake and disrupted eating patterns due to inadequate resources for food. In most, but not all, households with very low food security, the survey respondent reported that he or she was hungry at some time during the year but did not eat because there was not enough money for food.

• 96% 的人报告说，由于没有足够的钱买食物，他们吃的饭比他们认为应该吃的少。

• 96 percent reported that they had eaten less than they felt they should because there was not enough money for food.

• 69% 的人报告说他们饿了但是因为买不起足够的食物而没有吃。

• 69 percent reported that they had been hungry but did not eat because they could not afford enough food.

• 45% 的人报告说由于没有足够的钱买食物而体重下降。

• 45 percent reported having lost weight because they did not have enough money for food.

• 30% 的人表示，由于没有足够的钱买食物，成年人一整天都没吃饭。[同上]

• 30 percent reported that an adult did not eat for a whole day because there was not enough money for food. [Ibid.]

现在被称为极低的粮食安全水平这一类别，过去在统计数字中被简单地描述为“饥饿”，但美国政府现在对同一事物使用了一个委婉的说法。但如表 5.18所示，随着美国变得更加富裕，饥饿现象非但没有减少，反而一直在增加。

The category that is now called very low food security used to be simply described in the statistics as “hunger,” but the U.S. government now uses a euphemism for the same thing. But as Table 5.18 shows, hunger, far from declining as the United States gets richer, has been increasing.

请记住，养活自己所需的工资（以美元计）因国家和生活方式而异。如果一个人仍然有能力自己种植一些食物，那显然会有所不同。如果一个人可以收集木柴或其他燃料，那么他的生活所需现金就比只能用电做饭的城市居民要少。此外，工资的一部分用于住房成本，而高租金的城市和贫穷的农村地区之间的住房成本差别很大。在农村，人们可以养活自己的工资可能会让他们在城市挨饿。最低生活保障规定了最低工资，但平均工资又由什么来规定呢？

Bear in mind that the wage in dollars necessary to feed oneself will vary between countries and in terms of mode of life. If a person is still in a position to grow some food of his own, that obviously makes a difference. If a person can collect firewood or other fuel, he needs less cash to live on than a city dweller who can only cook with electricity. In addition, part of the wage goes to housing costs, which vary enormously between high-rent cities and poor rural areas. A wage that allows people to feed themselves in the countryside can leave them hungry in a city. The subsistence minimum sets the lowest wage, but what then sets the average wage?

任何混沌系统在达到某种限制之前，熵都会趋于增加。对于正态分布或对数正态分布，熵的增加会导致方差的增加，即曲线的扩展。但如果曲线的左下限由最低生活工资固定，则扩展必然会增加平均工资。是什么阻止了这种熵压力？

Any chaotic system will tend to increase in entropy until it hits some constraint. For distributions like the normal or log normal ones, an increase in entropy involves a rise in the variance, a spreading out of the curve. But if the left-hand lower limit of the curve is fixed by the minimum subsistence wage, a spreading out necessarily increases the average wage. What stops this entropic pressure?

表 5.18：1995-2014 年美国家庭粮食不安全和极低粮食安全（饥饿）发生率趋势

TABLE 5.18: Trends in Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity and Very Low Food Security (Hunger) in U.S. Households, 1995–2014

粮食不安全家庭百分比

Food Insecurity % of Households

粮食安全水平极低的家庭百分比

Very Low Food Security % of Households

1995

11.94

4.14

2000

10.47

3.13

2005

11.00

3.87

2010

14.51

5.35

2011

14.94

5.72

2012

14.51

5.72

2013

14.28

5.58

2014

14.05

5.59

资料来源：Coleman-Jensen 等人，2015 年。

Source: Coleman-Jensen, et al., 2015.

图 5.22。1984 年英国利润率和剩余价值率的概率密度函数。来源：Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1998a。

Figure 5.22. Probability density functions for the rates of profit and surplus value in Britain, 1984. Source: Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998a.

显然，这个过程最终必须受劳动创造的附加值的约束。平均工资不能高于劳动创造的平均附加值；事实上，只要资本主义存在，它就必须比平均工资低一些。我们知道，在整个经济中，劳动增加了剩余价值，这些剩余价值又转化为财产收入。我们应该问的问题是，是什么阻止了平均工资上涨到如此之高，以至于剩余价值被降到最低水平？为什么剩余价值通常占国民收入的三分之一到二分之一，而不是仅占收入的 2% 或 3%？

Clearly the process must ultimately be bound by the added value produced by labor. The mean wage cannot be higher than the mean value added by labor; indeed, so long as capitalism persists it must fall some way short of that. We know that across the economy as a whole labor adds surplus value that feeds into property incomes. The question we should ask is what stops the average wage from rising so high that surplus value is reduced to a minimal level? Why does surplus value typically make up something between a third and a half of national revenue, rather than only 2 or 3 percent of revenue?

要回答这个问题，你必须意识到，一个经济体中不止一个剩余价值率。像所有经济变量一样，它有一个分布。不同企业和不同行业的剩余价值率各不相同。例如，图 5.22给出了 1984 年英国各行业之间的剩余价值率分布情况。行业内的一些生产者效率较低，使用的劳动力高于平均水平。支付的工资也因行业和企业而异，但工资率分布普遍向上移动的影响将特别影响剩余价值率较低的行业和企业。

To answer this you have to realize that there is not just a single rate of surplus value in an economy. Like all economic variables it has a distribution. There are different rates of surplus value from firm to firm and from industry to industry. As an example, Figure 5.22 gives the dispersion of rates of surplus value between British industries in 1984. Some producers within an industry are less efficient and use more labor than average. Wages paid also vary by industry and by firm, but the effect of a general upward shift of the wage rate distribution will particularly affect industries and firms with low rates of surplus value.

如果你看一下图 5.22中的分布，你就会发现它的下边缘刚好触及零剩余价值率。工资上涨往往会使企业的下尾陷入赤字。我们知道，只有一小部分企业随时都可能出现亏损。亏损的企业要么关闭，要么裁员以止损。图 5.20右侧所示的工资分布变化会导致图 5.22左侧所示的剩余价值分布变化。

If you look at the distribution in Figure 5.22 you can see that its lower edge just touches a zero rate of surplus value. A rise in wages will tend to tip the lower tail of firms into the red. We know that only a small portion of firms can be in the red at any one time. Firms making a loss either shut down or lay off staff to end the losses. A shift in the wage distribution of the type shown in Figure 5.20 to the right shifts a surplus value distribution like that in Figure 5.22 to the left.

图 5.23. 1881-1890 年英国商业周期。上图显示了 19 世纪经典商业周期的过程，当时政府的反周期政策并未掩盖其基本机制。这些基本周期大约持续 7 至 10 年。

Figure 5.23. The British busiensss cycle, 1881–1890. The above figures show the process for a classical nineteenth-century business cycle, one in a period when the basic mechanism was not obscured by government counter-cyclical policies. These basic cycles took on the order of 7 to 10 years.

如果我们看一下快照，似乎剩余价值率的分散阻止了工资分配的任何扩散趋势。工资率方差的增加使处于剩余价值率分布较低边缘的企业陷入危机。他们裁员工人的增加以及由此产生的失业和就业竞争再次迫使工资下降。

If we look at a snapshot picture, it seems that any tendency of the wage distribution to spread out is being prevented by the dispersion of the rate of surplus value. An increase in the variance of the wage rate pushes firms on the lower edge of the surplus value rate distribution into crisis. They lay off workers and the resulting unemployment and competition for jobs forces down wages again.

快照图表明存在良好的随机均衡，剩余价值分配率的分散压力限制了工资分配的熵值扩散。但这是误导性的。反馈关系不是瞬时的。没有均衡；相反，发生的是一个周期性过程。图 5.23显示了 19 世纪经典商业周期的过程，当时政府的反周期政策并没有掩盖基本机制。这些基本周期大约持续 7 到 10 年。

Snapshot pictures suggest a nice stochastic equilibrium with the dispersion pressure of the rate of surplus value distribution acting to limit the entropic spread of the wage distribution. But that is misleading. The feedback relations are not instantaneous. There is no equilibrium; instead what happens is a cyclical process. Figure 5.23 shows the process for a classical nineteenth-century business cycle, one in a period when the basic mechanism was not obscured by government counter-cyclical policies. These basic cycles took on the order of 7 to 10 years.

工资上涨导致裁员，进而导致失业，工资开始下降。后来公司以较低的工资水平再次招聘工人，失业率下降。随着失业率下降，公司不得不抬高新雇佣劳动力的价格，从而提高工资差距。然后这个循环重复进行。

Rising wages lead to layoffs, which lead to unemployment, and wages start to fall. Later firms take workers on again at lower wage rates and unemployment falls. With falling unemployment firms have to bid up the price of newly hired labor allowing the wage dispersion to rise. Then the cycle repeats.

然而，没有理由认为它会完全重复，因此随着时间的推移，剩余价值率可能会波动。资本主义是一个无政府、混乱的体系。国家管制可能会减少混乱，但如果没有这种干预，我们应该假设该系统将表现出最大程度的混乱。经济中是否存在与最大程度混乱相对应的剩余价值率？

There is, however, no reason to suppose that it repeats exactly, so over time the rate of surplus value may wander. Capitalism is an anarchic, disorderly system. State regulation may reduce disorder, but in the absence of such intervention we should assume that the system will show maximal disorder. Is there a rate of surplus value in the economy that corresponds to maximal disorder?

令人惊讶的是，经济最混乱的状态发生在没有剩余价值的时候。混乱程度可以用熵的概念来衡量 [Shannon，1948]。事物混乱程度越高，其熵就越高。这一思想起源于热力学研究，但后来扩展到信息论、统计学和许多其他科学领域。统计分布（如正态分布或对数正态分布）涉及熵或混乱程度

Surprising as it may seem, the most disorderly state of the economy occurs when there is no surplus value. Disorder is measured using the concept of entropy [Shannon, 1948]. The higher the disorder of something the higher its entropy. The idea originated in the study of heat, thermodynamics, but has subsequently been extended to information theory, statistics, and many other areas of science. There is an entropy or disorder involved with statistical distributions like the normal or the log normal

随着平均工资的上升，工资分配的熵也上升。但是工资上升会降低剩余价值率。为了使经济保持活力，只有极小一部分企业的剩余价值率为负，较小的平均 s/v 要求剩余价值分配更加压缩 — — 即方差更小。剩余价值分配的压缩使企业的状况更加有序。企业的工资与利润之比变得更加相似。特定行业中的企业开始使用更加标准化的技术。如果企业变得更加相似，它们的熵必然会下降。工资分配的扩散意味着工资混乱程度上升。工资混乱程度上升的速度是否快于企业混乱程度随之下降的速度？

As median wages rise, the entropy of the wage distribution rises. But wage rises reduce the rate of surplus value. For the economy to remain viable, with only a tiny fraction of firms being in the condition of having a negative rate of surplus value, a smaller mean s/v requires the surplus value distribution to become more compressed—to have a smaller variance. A compression of the surplus value distribution makes the conditions of firms more orderly. The firms become more alike in their ratio of wages to profits. Firms in a given industry come to use a more standardized technology. If firms become more alike their entropy must fall. A spread of the wage distribution means that wage disorder rises. Does the disorder of the wages rise faster than the consequential fall in firm disorder?

答案是肯定的。表 5.19显示，随着平均工资的上升，整个系统的混乱程度达到最大化。因此，即使我们假设资本主义从长远来看受混乱程度最大化原则的支配，这也将并不妨碍工资收入比例的长期上升。人们可以经历一系列商业周期，每个周期都导致竞争力最弱的公司被迫停业。当扩张再次发生时，剩余价值率的分散可能会降低，从而导致总体剩余价值率降低。但要实现这一乐观过程，就必须如此

The answer is yes. Table 5.19 shows that as the mean wage rises, the disorder of the whole system is maximized. So even if we assume that capitalism is in the long run governed by a principle of maximal disorder this would not preclude a long-term rise in the proportion of income going as wages. One could have a sequence of business cycles, each of which resulted in the least competitive firms being forced out of business. When expansion took place again the dispersion of rates of surplus value could be lower allowing a lower overall rate of surplus value. But for this optimistic process to occur it would have to be the case

• 经济衰退期间工资下降的幅度小于经济复苏期间工资上涨的幅度。

• That the fall in wages during the downswing was less than the rise in the upswing.

• 没有其他因素（例如增加劳动力后备军）导致长期工资下降。

• That no other factors, such as increasing reserve army of labor, forced down wages in the long term.

• 技术进步并没有增加企业内部的混乱程度，以抵消危机中生产率较低的企业的淘汰。

• That the internal disorder of the firms was not so increased by technical advances as to offset the culling of less productive firms in the crisis.

由于技术变革无时无刻不在发生，而且在竞争性资本主义经济中不均衡地发生，这将为剩余价值率的分散设定一个下限，从而为工资份额设定一个下限。工资上涨直至消耗掉整个社会产品这一理论可能性只有在企业之间没有混乱的情况下才会实现——实际上，它要求一个全面计划的经济，而不是资本主义经济。

Since technical change occurs all the time, and occurs unevenly in a competitive capitalist economy, this will set a lower limit on the dispersion of rates of surplus value, and thus on the wage share. The theoretical possibility of wages rising until they consume the entire social product could only happen if there was no disorder among firms—in effect, it demands a comprehensively planned economy not a capitalist one.

在表 5.19中，最低工资、平均工资和中位工资以工作日的劳动价值分数给出。H(w) 是工资分布的熵，H(s) 是剩余价值分布的熵。中位工资的上升对应于整个系统的无序性上升，因此从热力学角度来看并不禁止。假设工资分布服从对数正态分布，剩余价值分布服从正态分布。

In Table 5.19 the minimum, mean, and median wages are given as labor-value fractions of the working day. H(w) is the entropy of the wage distribution, H(s) the entropy of the surplus value distribution. Rising median wages correspond to rising disorder in the whole system, and thus are not prohibited on thermodynamic grounds. Wage distribution assumed to be log normal and surplus value distribution to be normal.

5.8 下一代

5.8 THE NEXT GENERATION

现在让我们回到男女工资分配差异的问题上。造成这一现象的一个工作假设如下：

Let us now return to the issue of the differences in male and female wage distributions. A working hypothesis for what causes this is as follows:

• 男性和女性的工资分布均服从对数正态分布。

• Male and female wage distributions are both constrained to be log normal.

• 每个分布的下限几乎相同，由单个人的生存工资设定。

• Lower bounds of each distribution are almost the same and are set by the survival wage of a single person.

• 稍高一点的是家庭最低生活工资。

• Slightly higher up is the subsistence minimum wage for a family.

• 由于家庭中唯一经济支柱是男性的数量多于女性，因此能够从事家庭最低生活水平以下工作的男性人数较少。

• Since a larger number of men than women are the sole earners in a household, a smaller number of men can be employed at levels below the family subsistence level.

表 5.19：随着中位数工资的上升，平均工资上升得更快

TABLE 5.19: As the Median Wage Rises, the Mean Wage Rises More Rapidly

表中，最低工资、平均工资和中位工资以工作日的劳动价值分数给出。H(w) 是工资分布的熵；H(s) 是剩余价值分布的熵。中位工资的上升对应着整个系统的无序性上升，因此从热力学角度来看并不禁止。假设工资分布为对数正态分布，剩余价值分布为正态分布。

In the table, the minimum, mean, and median wages are given as labor value fractions of the working day. H(w) is the entropy of the wage distribution; H(s) is the entropy of the surplus value distribution. Rising median wages correspond to rising disorder in the whole system and thus are not prohibited on thermodynamic grounds. Wage distribution assumed to be log-normal and surplus value distribution to be normal.

• 因此男性工资分配函数的标准差一定更大。

• Thus the standard deviation of the male wage distribution function must be greater.

• 因此男性工资分配的中位数也必须更大。

• Thus the median of the male wage distribution must also be greater.

注释中对此进行了更为正式的解释。90 因此^，男女工资差距将持续存在，直到男女成为家庭唯一收入来源的可能性相等。这与工资差距随着男女参与率差距的下降而下降的观察结果相一致。（见图5.17、5.18 。）

This is explained slightly more formally in a note.⁹⁰ It follows that the male-female wage gap will persist until it is equally probable that either sex is the sole earner of a family. This is compatible with the observation that the wage gap declines in proportion to the decline in the male-female participation rate gap. (See Figures 5.17, 5.18.)

过去，这一基本机制的提出依据是男性工资必须足以保证下一代工人的再生产。91^但这是一个相当目的论的论点。下一代是二十年后，那么他们的存在或不存在应该如何影响今天的工资？

In the past this basic mechanism has been cast in terms of the need of the male wage to be enough to ensure the reproduction of the next generation of workers.⁹¹ But this is a rather teleological argument. The next generation is twenty years in the future, so how is their existence or nonexistence supposed to affect wages today?

李嘉图工资定律提供了一种反馈机制。当它：

The Ricardian law of wages provided a feedback mechanism. It is when it:

劳动者的生活条件繁荣幸福，他有能力掌握更大比例的生活必需品和享受，从而养育一个健康多产的家庭，这才是超过其自然价格的。然而，由于高工资鼓励人口增长，人口数量劳动者数量增加，工资就会再次下降到其自然价格，有时甚至会因反应而低于自然价格。

exceeds its natural price that the condition of the laborer is flourishing and happy, that he has it in his power to command a greater proportion of the necessaries and enjoyments of life, and therefore to rear a healthy and numerous family. When, however, by the encouragement that high wages give to the increase of population, the number of laborers is increased, wages again fall to their natural price, and indeed from a reaction sometimes fall below it.

当劳动力的市场价格低于其自然价格时，劳动者的状况最为悲惨：贫困剥夺了他们习惯上绝对必要的舒适生活。只有在贫困减少了他们的人数，或者对劳动力的需求增加了之后，劳动力的市场价格才会上升到其自然价格，劳动者才会获得自然工资率所能提供的适度舒适生活。[Ricardo，1951，第 5 章]

When the market price of labor is below its natural price, the condition of the laborers is most wretched: then poverty deprives them of those comforts which custom renders absolute necessaries. It is only after their privations have reduced their number, or the demand for labor has increased, that the market price of labor will rise to its natural price, and that the laborer will have the moderate comforts which the natural rate of wages will afford. [Ricardo, 1951, chap. 5]

但我的提法源自马克思，并没有假设这一点。我和马克思一样，预计平均工资将大大高于最低生活水平，我也不认为资本主义社会一定能够成功地再生产劳动人口。事实上，证据恰恰相反。

But my formulation, derived from Marx, is not presuming that. I, like Marx, expect the mean wage to be significantly above the subsistence level, and I do not assume that a capitalist society is necessarily able to successfully reproduce its working population. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary.

我所假设的是，如果工资下限跨越了饥饿工资和饥饿工资之间的狭窄界限，工人的死亡率就会迅速上升。早在工资降至饥饿水平之前，营养不良就会导致疾病死亡率上升 [Harris, 2004]。资本主义公司和政府并没有因为道德顾虑而阻止人们以饥饿工资工作至死。在饥荒救济项目中，英属印度政府在公共工程项目中让数百万人工作至死 [Davis, 2002]，而在 1940 年代，德国公司也因强迫外国劳工而臭名昭著。这种做法不可持续的原因不是道德，而是死亡率极高。

All I am assuming is that if the lower limit of wages crosses the narrow boundary between hunger wages and starvation wages, mortality among the workers rises rapidly. Well before wages fall to starvation levels undernutrition results in increased mortality from disease [Harris, 2004]. Capitalist firms and governments have not been stopped by moral scruples from working people to death on starvation wages. In famine relief projects the government of British India worked literally millions to death on public works projects [Davis, 2002], and in the 1940s German firms notoriously did the same with forced foreign labor. It is not morals, but the very rapid death rate of such practices, that makes them unsustainable.

要得出这样的结论：这一现实迫使成年男性工资的下限略微上升到家庭饥饿水平以上，唯一必要的其他假设是：（a）家庭存在，（b）唯一养家糊口的男性多于女性，（c）许多贫困父母宁愿自己挨饿，也要给孩子提供食物。

In concluding that this reality forces the lower boundary of the adult male wage up a bit to be above family starvation levels, the only other assumptions necessary are: (a) that families exist, (b) that more men than women are sole breadwinners, and (c) that a great many poor parents will go hungry themselves to put food on their children’s plates.

随着越来越多的人口开始从事经济活动，即在资本主义部门就业，剩余产品的份额趋于上升。需要供养的人口数量不变，但需要的工人却更多。与此同时，食物的准备和烹饪等生活必需品也从家庭中转移出去。食物在超市出现之前是半成品，衣服则是成品。随着食物和衣服的准备从家庭中转移出去，所需的劳动力也更少。人口日常再生产所需的总时间减少，而工人数量却在增加。为了维持生计，人们建立了一种生活方式，这种生活方式依赖于家庭中所有成年人从事有偿工作。结果就是人们更加认为抚养孩子是一种负担。人们开始认为孩子是一种应该避免的生活方式。如果你负担不起这些费用，那么出生率就会低于生育率，劳动人口就会减少，经济就会陷入长期危机，盈利能力就会下降。

As a larger portion of the population becomes economically active, that is, employed in the capitalist sector, the share of the surplus product tends to rise. The same population has to be supported, but more workers are there to do it. At the same time, tasks essential to life, like the preparation and cooking of food, move out of the home. Food is semi-prepared before it appears in the supermarkets, clothes are ready-made. As food preparation and clothes preparation moves out of the house, it is done with less labor. The total time necessary for the day-to-day reproduction of the population shrinks while the number of workers grows. In order to get by a mode of life is established that becomes dependent on all adults in the household engaging in waged work. The result is to intensify the perception of child-raising as a burden. Children become seen as a lifestyle choice to be avoided if you cannot afford them. The birth rate falls below reproduction levels, the working population shrinks, and the economy goes into a long-term crisis expressed in declining profitability.

抛开目的论，资本主义经济依靠共存的父权制和自给自足社区来供应至少一部分下一代工人。来自其边界内农村或边界外殖民地的移民推动了大国的工业增长。同样的过程显然还在继续。单一移民劳动力的优势在于，他们能够以低于家庭工资的工资受雇。抚养工人的费用由他们出生的远方家庭承担。因此，资本主义就像奴隶经济一样，长期以来一直依赖于进口劳动力。在某些情况下，比如十九世纪从中国进口到美洲的苦力，社会形式仅比奴隶制略有进步。但通过将劳动力的再生产成本转嫁给周边社会来增加剥削的原则至今仍在大都市国家中发挥作用。如果这条途径受到限制，形式经济就会陷入结构性危机。

Teleology aside, capitalist economies have relied on coexisting patriarchal and subsistence communities to supply at least part of the next generation of workers. Migrants from the countryside within their boundaries, or colonies without, fed the industrial growth of the great powers. The same process clearly continues. Single migrant labor has the advantage that it can be employed at below a family wage. The cost of bringing up the worker was met by the distant household into which they were born. So capitalism, like slave economy, has long relied on importing labor. In some cases like the coolies imported from China to the Americas in the nineteenth century the social form was only marginally advanced from slavery. But the principle of increasing exploitation by offloading the reproduction costs of labor to surrounding societies remains in force in the metropolitan countries to this day. If this avenue is restricted the form economy goes into structural crisis.

5.9 盈利能力长期趋势

5.9 LONG-TERM TREND OF PROFITABILITY

资本主义是为了利润而生产。它以货币收益为目标。这种驱动力似乎与人口问题相去甚远，但从政治经济学的角度来看，它们密切相关。归根结底，货币收益是一个人口问题。货币数量由劳动决定。它们是劳动关系的抽象符号表示^。92

Capitalism is production for profit. It is run with the aim of monetary gain. This drive may seem far removed from issues of population, but, from the standpoint of political economy, they are closely related. Ultimately, monetary gain is a demographic question. Monetary quantities are determined by labor. They are the abstract symbolic representation of labor relations.⁹²

人口增长是利润的根本制约因素，因为人口增长会限制劳动力。利润以货币来衡量，但这只是名义上的衡量标准，因为货币价值会随着时间而变化。利润或任何其他货币金额的真正衡量标准是其将要交换的商品中所体现的劳动量。如果一家公司的货币利润上升，但其所要求的体现劳动量实际上下降，这对公司来说毫无益处。

Population growth is the fundamental constraint on profit because population growth constrains labor. Profits are measured in money, but this is only a nominal measure since the value of money changes over time. The real measure of profit, or any other sum of money, is the amount of labor embodied in commodities that it will exchange against. It is of no advantage to a firm if their money profit goes up, but the amount of embodied labor that this commands actually falls.

如果我们想问，从长远来看，从整个社会的层面看，什么决定了盈利的可能性，我们关心的是社会拥有的劳动量，而不是金钱量^。93

If we want to ask what, in the long run, and at the level of society as a whole, determines the possibility of making a profit, we concern ourselves with the amount of labor society has, not the amount of money.⁹³

我们可以用以下论点非正式地表达这一过程。假设最初利润占国民净收入的 50%，资本存量相当于国民收入的 200%。现在假设一半的利润被再投资，那么资本存量就会增长，利润率就会下降，如第 173 页表格所示。

We can express the process informally with the following argument. Suppose initially that profits make up 50 percent of net national income and that the capital stock is equal to 200 percent of national income. Now suppose half the profits are reinvested, then the capital stock grows and profit rate will fall, as show in the table on page 173.

这个简单的过程是利润率随时间下降的趋势背后的原因。要更详细地了解这一过程，我们需要看看人口增长和生产力将产生影响。要做到这一点，我们必须从受通货膨胀影响的货币国民收入的论点转向人年论点。那么，经济中的总利润将由

This simple process is behind the tendency of the profit rate to fall over time. Understanding the process in more detail requires that we look at how population growth and productivity will affect things. To do this we have to move from an argument in terms of money national income, which is affected by inflation, to one in terms of person years. The total profit in the economy will then be given by

在这里，工资份额表示为生产普通劳动者消费的商品所需的全职等效工作年限的分数。利润的维度是每年数百万全职人年，这显然与数百万全职等效人员相同。我们可以将其视为生产用利润购买的商品的人口。在金钱的掩护下，利润的现实是它所指挥的数百万人：奢侈品生产者、税务顾问、仆人以及为生产新资本商品而工作的人，他们的工资由再投资的利润支付。资本存量是过去劳动的积累；可以用生产所需的工作年限来计算。每年的利润率由以百万人年为单位的资本存量给出：

Here the wage share is expressed as the fraction of a full-time equivalent working year required to produce the goods consumed by the average laborer. The dimension of Profit is millions of full-time person years per annum, which is obviously the same as millions of full-time equivalent persons. We can view this as the population that produces those goods purchased out of profits. The reality of profit, behind the screen of money, is the millions of people it commands: the producers of luxury goods, tax advisers, servants plus the people working to produce new capital goods whose wages are paid out of reinvested profit. Capital stock is the accumulation of past labor; it can be accounted for in terms of the working years it took to produce. The rate of profit per annum is then given by the capital stock measured in millions of person years:

利润率的维度，即人/人年，是时间^-1，正如我们所预料的那样。如果资本增长率超过利润增长率，即资本存量增长速度快于生产利润商品的人口增长速度，利润率就会下降。

The dimension of Profit Rate, persons/person-years, is Time^-1 as we would expect. The profit rate will fall if the rate of growth of capital exceeds the rate of growth of profits, that is to say, if the capital stock grows faster than the population available to produce profit goods.

利润总额增长率的主要决定因素是劳动人口的增长。工资份额随时间的变动将是次要影响因素。为什么工资份额的变动是次要的呢？

The main determinant of the rate of growth of the mass of profit will be the growth of the working population. A secondary influence will be any change in the wage share over time. Why is movement of the wage share secondary?

假设劳动人口每年增长 5%。如果工资份额保持不变，那么总利润也将增长 5%。考虑一下工资份额减少的影响：如果工资份额最初为 0.6，那么实际工资的劳动内容减少 5% 将导致利润率增加 3%；但如果最初的工资份额仅为 40%，那么工资的劳动内容同样减少 5% 将使利润率提高 2%。工资份额下降得越少，工资份额减少一定百分比的影响就越小。

Suppose the working population grows by 5 percent a year. If the wage share remains constant then total profit will also grow by 5 percent. Consider the effect of a reduction in the wage share: if the wage share is initially 0.6 then a 5 percent reduction in the labor content of the real wage will produce a 3 percent increase in the profit rate; but if the initial wage share is merely 40 percent, the same 5 percent reduction in the labor content of the wage will raise the rate of profit by 2 percent. The lower the wage share falls the less significant is the impact a given percent reduction in the wage share.

图 5.24. 日本出生率和死亡率的演变。来源：扩展宾夕法尼亚世界人口表 (EPWT) Marquetti，2003 年。

Figure 5.24. Evolution of the birth rate and death rates in Japan. Source: Extended Penn World Tables (EPWT) Marquetti, 2003.

从长期来看，利润变化率受到劳动人口增长率的强烈影响：

In the long term the rate of change of profit is strongly affected by the rate of growth of the working population:

n = 劳动人口增长率 ≈ 利润增长率

n = rate of working population growth ≈ rate of profit growth

在资本主义发展的早期阶段，人口增长非常迅速。在十九世纪的欧洲，这是农业革命后粮食供应改善的结果。在二十世纪，许多第三世界国家也经历了同样的过程，部分原因是绿色革命，也是医学进步限制婴儿死亡率的结果。人口快速增长的这一阶段是社会从父权制农业转向资本主义或社会主义工业化过程中的第一次人口转变。

In the early stages of capitalist development it grows very rapidly. In nineteenth-century Europe this was as a result of improved food supply after the Agricultural Revolution. In the twentieth century the same process was experienced in many third world countries, as a result partly of the Green Revolution, and also as a result of medical advances limiting infant mortality. This phase of rapid population growth is the first demographic transition as societies moved from patriarchal agriculture to capitalist or socialist industrializations.

后来，随着妇女地位的提高，童工的废除，以及教育成本的提高，家庭规模缩小。在高度发达的资本主义国家，人口趋于稳定甚至开始下降，这是第二次人口转变。这意味着什么？

Later, with the elevation of the social status of women, the abolition of child labor, and with education becoming more costly, family sizes shrink. In highly developed capitalist countries the population stabilizes or even starts to decline, in a second demographic transition. What is the implication of this?

只要人口在增长，并且资本存量的增长速度不超过劳动人口的增长速度，就有可能实现正的均衡利润率。

So long as population was expanding there existed the possibility of a positive equilibrium rate of profit so long as capital stock grew no faster than the working population.

图 5.25. 日本实际利润率与动态均衡利润率的演变。来源：T. Tadjadinov 编写的软件生成的图像。

Figure 5.25. Evolution of the actual profit rate and dynamic equilibrium profit rate in Japan. Source: Image produced by software written by T. Tadjadinov.

资本存量的增长率由下式给出：

The growth rate of capital stock is given by:

其中，积累份额是作为积累而获得的利润份额。劳动生产率（g）的增长具有负面影响，因为它加速了现有资本的陈旧，折旧率（δ）也是如此。因此，利润率的动态吸引子，即均衡利润率是：

where the accumulation share is share of profit going as accumulation. The growth of labor productivity(g) has a negative effect since it accelerates the obsolescence of existing capital, as does the rate of depreciation (δ). It follows that the dynamic attractor for the rate of profit, the equilibrium rate of profit is:

利润率的第二个最重要的决定因素是累积的利润份额。

The second most important determinant of the rate of profit is the share of profit that is accumulated.

当大量利润被积累起来时，利润率就会下降。相反，如果大部分利润被非生产性消费，那么结果反而是利润率上升。

When a large portion of profit is accumulated this will depress the percent rate of profit. Conversely, if most of profit is consumed unproductively, then the effect is, paradoxically, to raise the rate of profit.

如果人口稳定，n = 0，利润率下降到仅足以弥补折旧加上劳动生产率提高带来的增长期的水平。媒体并没有广泛认识到这一点，但总体趋势是技术改进在资本主义经济发展过程中会放缓 [Eichengreen et al., 2012; Marquetti, 2003; Edgerton, 2011b]。人口稳定或下降的经济体（如日本）最终利润率会非常低，如图5.24所示。该图中的均衡利润率是上面给出的 r*。请注意实际利润率与根据劳动价值论第一原理预测的利润率有多么接近。实际利润率在几年后跟踪动态均衡利润率。

If population stabilizes, n = 0 and the rate of profit falls to a level only sufficient to cover depreciation plus a boost term due to improvement in labor productivity. It is not widely recognized in the media, but the general trend is for technical improvements to slow down over the course of the development of a capitalist economy [Eichengreen et al., 2012; Marquetti, 2003; Edgerton, 2011b]. Economies with stable or falling populations like Japan end up with very low rates of profit as shown in Figure 5.24. The equilibrium profit rate in that graph is r* given above. Note how closely the actual rate tracks the rate predicted on first principles from the labor theory of value. The actual rate of profit tracks the dynamic equilibrium rate after a couple of years delay.

由于利润率有下降的趋势，资本主义经济增长与高资本回报率并不呈正相关。像日本这样的国家，投资率高，可以实现快速增长，但高投资率的结果是资本回报率低，如图5.26所示。与预期相反，高资本回报率与快速增长并不相关。

Because of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, capitalist economic growth does not correlate positively with a high rate of return on capital. A country like Japan with a high investment rate can grow fast, but the effect of the high investment rate is a low rate of return on capital as shown in Figure 5.26. Contrary to expectations high rates of capital return do not correlate with fast growth.

日本利率不断走低的背后，是第二次人口转变后利润率趋于零的趋势。如果人口增长率降至零，动态均衡利润率也为零。如果人口增长率为负，利润率的吸引子也为负。

A tendency for the rate of profit to move to zero after the second demographic transition lies behind the ever lower rates of interest in Japan. If the rate of population growth falls to zero, the dynamic equilibrium rate of profit is also zero. If population growth is negative, the attractor for the rate of profit is negative.

日本劳动人口停滞的一个关键因素是许多资本主义国家普遍存在的出生率下降，加上严格的移民限制政策。

A key factor in the stagnation of the Japanese working population is that a declining birth rate—common to many capitalist countries—combines with a policy of strict immigration restriction.

图 5.26. 1900 年至 2006 年 16 个发达国家股票回报率与经济增长之间的关系。来源：Siegel，2002 年。

Figure 5.26. Relationship between return on stocks and economic growth for 16 developed nations between 1900 and 2006. Source: Siegel, 2002.

允许移民的国家可以抵消利润率降至零的趋势。移民通过三种方式增加劳动人口：

Countries that allow immigration can offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall to zero. Immigration boosts the working population in three ways:

1.对低生育率起到直接、迅速的补偿作用。

1. It directly and immediately compensates for a low birth rate.

2. 由于移民处于工作年龄，他们的活动率很高。

2. The activity rate of immigrants is high because they are disproportionately of working age.

3、移民家庭的生育率往往高于发达资本主义国家的定居人口，从而间接弥补了前者的低生育率。

3. Immigrants’ families tend to have higher birth rates than the settled population of developed capitalist countries, so that they indirectly compensate for the low birth rate of the former.

快速移民的最终结果是提高了剥削率（图 5.28）。对于英国来说，在 1970 年至 2008 年之间，剥削率和流入移民水平之间的相关性为 75％。从统计学上讲，这意味着 75％的剥削变化可以用移民的变化来解释。高移民率往往会产生更高的剥削率。当我们说 75％的剥削变化可以用移民的变化来解释时，这是在统计学意义上的，即将两者相互关联。实际上，移民和剥削都有时间趋势。两者都从 20 世纪 70 年代的低谷中回升。这对应于向普遍的新自由主义政策的转变，该政策规定劳动力和资本的自由流动以及对工会权利的限制。图 5.27的上图显示了从 1976 年开始的移民增长，在 20 世纪 80 年代初出现了短暂的下降。下图显示，均衡利润率 r* 从 1976 年开始稳步上升，没有中断。由于均衡利润率 r* 的变化主要受劳动力增长和积累份额变化的驱动，我们可以得出结论，r* 从 1978 年开始的快速上升是由于积累速度放缓和劳动力增长更快造成的。

The net result of rapid immigration is to raise the rate of exploitation (Figure 5.28). For the UK between 1970 and 2008 there was a 75 percent correlation between the rate of exploitation and the level of inward migration. Statistically this means that 75 percent of changes in exploitation can be explained by changes in immigration. A high rate of immigration tends to produce a higher rate of exploitation. When we say that 75 percent of changes in exploitation can be explained by changes in immigration, this is in a statistical sense if you correlate one against the other. In practice there are temporal trends in both immigration and exploitation. Both rose from a low in the 1970s. This corresponded to a move toward a general neoliberal policy of freer movement of both labor and capital and restrictions on the rights of trade unions. Figure 5.27, upper panel, shows the growth in immigration from 1976 with a short dip in the early 1980s. The lower panel shows that the equilibrium rate of profit r* starts to rise steadily from 1976 onward, with no interruption. Since changes in the equilibrium profit rate r* are driven mainly by changes in the growth of the workforce and by the accumulation share, we can conclude that the rapid rise in r* from 1978 was due to a slower rate of accumulation combined with the more rapid growth of the labor pool.

英国和日本的实际利润率通常落后于均衡利润率。它之所以落后，是因为资本存量需要时间来根据积累的变化进行调整。它还具有一定的独立性，因为在短期内剩余价值率的变化会影响利润率。劳动力增长率的变化——1965 年至 1975 年的放缓以及此后的逐渐加速，是解释利润率曲线长期形状的最大单一因素，而贸易周期中的积累波动则解释了十年来的波动。

The actual rate of profit generally lags the equilibrium rate for the UK as for Japan. It lags because it takes time for the capital stock to adjust in response to changes in accumulation. It also has some independence, in that over the short term changes in the rate of surplus value affect the rate of profit. Changes in the rate of growth of the labor force—the slowdown from 1965 to 1975 and the gradual acceleration from then on, are the single biggest factor explaining the long-term shape of the profit rate curve, with fluctuations in accumulation during the trade cycle explaining the decadal oscillations imposed on that.

积累率的变化会影响均衡利润率，因为积累下降会减少计算利润率的资本存量。此外，实际利润率也会受到积累放缓的影响，导致剥削增加，如表 5.20所示。

Variations in the rate of accumulation affect the equilibrium rate of profit because a fall in accumulation reduces the capital stock over which the rate of profit is calculated. In addition, the real rate of profit can be affected by slower accumulation tending to increase exploitation, as shown in Table 5.20.

图 5.27。英国人口增长（上）、实际利润率和动态均衡利润率（下）的演变。来源：T. Tadjadinov；扩展宾夕法尼亚世界表 (EPWT)，Marquetti 和 Foley，2002 年，版本 4.0。

Figure 5.27. Evolution of the population growth (top), actual profit rate and dynamic equilibrium profit rate (bottom) in UK. Source: T. Tadjadinov; Extended Penn World Tables (EPWT), Marquetti and Foley, 2002, ver 4.0.

图 5.28. 英国剩余价值率与移民水平的关系。

Figure 5.28. UK rate of surplus value as function of immigration levels.

人口增长与实际工资之间的联系是古典工资理论的一个关键组成部分。在古典工资理论中，工资是再生产劳动力所需的总和。工资的调节被视为通过人口增长来实现的。如果工资大幅上涨，超过再生产现有人口所需的工资，那么更多的孩子将活到成年，人口也会增长。然后，工人之间的竞争将努力将工资压低至维持生存的水平。

The connection between population growth and real wages was a key component of the classical theory of wages. In this, wages were the sum necessary to reproduce labor. The regulation of wages was seen as occurring via population growth. If wages rose substantially above what was needed to reproduce the existing population, then more children would survive to adulthood and the population would grow. Competition between workers would then work to drive down wages toward the subsistence level.

图 5.29。黑死病对英国农场工资的影响，每隔 50 年进行抽样。纵轴显示人口和实际农业工资指数，以 1860 年为基准年。资料来源：Clark，2007 年。

Figure 5.29. The effect of the Black Death on farm wages in England, subsampled at 50-year intervals. Vertical axis shows indices of population and real agricultural wages, with 1860 being the base year. Source: Data from Clark, 2007.

这一古典理论似乎与前工业时代几个世纪以来的长期工资变动非常吻合。在图 5.29中，我们可以看到实际工资的变动几乎与工资变动成镜像。1200 年至 1750 年期间的人口。在 1340 年（黑死病爆发前夕）插入了一个额外的数据点，以表明实际工资的增长与人口的下降相吻合。

This classical theory does appear to be a good fit to the long-term movement of wages over many centuries in the pre-industrial era. In Figure 5.29 we can see that real wages move in an almost mirror image to the movements of population for the period 1200 to 1750. An extra data point is inserted for 1340, just before the Black Death, to show that the rise in real wages coincides with the fall in population.

黑死病导致人口急剧下降，工资也急剧上升。瘟疫的连续爆发持续了一百年，导致人口下降，工资则相应上涨。

The Black Death produced a sharp fall in population and an equally sharp rise in wages. Successive outbreaks of the plague continued to drive population down for one hundred years, with corresponding wage rises.

从 1500 年开始，工资上涨加上对鼠疫耶尔森氏菌具有一定程度的免疫力，使得人口得以恢复。随着人口的增长，工资水平再次下降。然而，尽管到 18 世纪初人口已经恢复到鼠疫前的水平，工资水平并没有立即回落到鼠疫前的水平（上方水平线）。17 世纪末的大瘟疫再次使人口减少，在该国某些地区人口减少了 20%。这与 17 世纪末的工资上涨有关。即使在 18 世纪末，即古典工资理论发展起来的时候，人口增长与工资之间仍然存在某种反比关系，尽管这种反比关系没有以前那么强烈。直到 19 世纪资本主义生产方式起飞，这种强烈的反比关系才部分瓦解。机器工业带来的相对剩余价值率更高，使得实际工资在人口增长的同时也能上涨。但如果你看垂直线，你会发现，即使到了 1860 年，实际工资仍未恢复到中世纪晚期劳动力短缺时期的峰值。1450 年，农场工人的生活比 1850 年更好。

From 1500 a combination of better wages with some degree of immunity to Yersinia pestis allowed population to recover. With the growth in population the levels of wages fell again. They did not, however, fall right back to pre-plague levels (upper horizontal line) even though the pre-plague population was regained by the early eighteenth century. The great plague of the late seventeenth century again reduced population, by as much as 20 percent in some areas of the country. This is associated with a late seventeenth-century rise in wages. Even in the late eighteenth century the time when the classical theory of wages was developed, some inverse relation between population growth and wages still held, though less strongly than before. It was not until the takeoff of the specifically capitalist mode of production in the nineteenth century that the strong inverse relationship partially broke down. The higher rate of relative surplus value made possible by machine industry allowed real wages to rise even while population grew. But if you look at the vertical scale, you can see that even by 1860 real wages had not regained the peak attained during the labor shortage of the late Middle Ages. Farm laborers were better off in 1450 than in 1850.

人口增长速度加快通过两种不同的机制提高利润率。一方面，劳动力的快速增长增加了就业竞争，并提高了剥削率。人口增长率较高的年份，剩余价值率往往较高。94 其次^，不断增长的人口吸收了积累的资本，阻止或至少减缓了资本与劳动比率的上升。

More rapid population growth boosts the rate of profit by two distinct mechanisms. On the one hand a more rapid expansion of the labor force increases competition for jobs and allows the rate of exploitation to be increased. The rate of surplus value tends to be higher in years when the rate of population growth is higher,⁹⁴ Secondly, a growing population absorbs accumulated capital preventing, or at least slowing down, a rise in the capital-to-labor ratio.

表5.20表明，当出生率高、劳动力迅速扩张时，剥削率往往较高；当积累率高时，剥削率往往较低。这反映了劳动力和资本在市场上的相对竞争地位。

Table 5.20 shows that the exploitation rate tends to be high when the birth rate is high and the workforce expands rapidly and tends to be low if the rate of accumulation is high. These reflect the relative competitive positions in the market of labor and capital.

表 5.20：开发率的相关性

TABLE 5.20: Correlation of the Exploitation Rate

变量

Variables

相关性

Correlation

（二、三）

(b, s/v)

35％

35%

(分牛顿，标准/体积)

(dN, s/v)

13%

一个， s / v

a, s/v

-56％

-56%

注：相关性计算基于 30 个国家/地区抽取的 1220 个单年度样本向量；“b”表示出生率，“dN”表示就业劳动力的年度百分比变化，Cf 表示投资在盈余中的份额。来源：扩展的 PennWorldTables。

Note: Correlations were performed accross vectors of 1220 individual year samples drawn from 30 countries; “b” is the birthrate, “dN” is the annual percentage change of the employed workforce, Cf is the share of investment in surplus. Source: Extended PennWorldTables.

如果我们将南非这样的新兴资本主义经济体与日本这样的成熟经济体进行对比，人口快速增长的影响最为明显。如图5.30所示，南非的利润率不但没有下降，反而从 20 世纪 70 年代开始迅速上升。埃及等其他非洲国家也出现了类似的模式 [Zachariah，2008]。请注意就业人口增长加速如何导致利润率上升。与图 5.27相比，南非的资本存量绝对利润率约为英国的 4 倍。

The effect of a rapidly growing population is most strikingly seen if we contrast an emerging capitalist economy like South Africa with a mature one like Japan. As Figure 5.30 shows, instead of falling the South African profit rate rose rapidly from the 1970s. A similar pattern is seen in other African countries like Egypt [Zachariah, 2008]. Note how the acceleration of employed population growth allows a rising rate of profit. Compared to Figure 5.27 the absolute rate of profit on capital stock in South Africa is about 4 times as high as in the UK.

图 5.30. 南非就业人口（上）、利润率（下）。来源：扩展的 Penn 世界表，Marquetti 和 Foley，2002 年，版本 4.0。

Figure 5.30. South African employed population (top), profit rate (bottom). Source: Extended Penn World Table, Marquetti and Foley, 2002, ver 4.0.

在这些国家，每年积累的资本不足以跟上人口的增长，因此资本与劳动的比率下降。较低的资本与劳动的比率又会带来较高的利润率。归根结底，是性推动了资本主义的发展。南非资本主义利润率的飙升是由南非女性更高的性生产力推动的。2008 年南非的生育率仍为 2.5，而日本只有 1.3。但南非已经走上了资本主义成熟的道路。2008 年的生育率只有四十年前的一半。在其他非洲国家，人口结构转变才刚刚开始。在尼日利亚，2008 年的生育率高达每名妇女 5.7 个孩子，赞比亚为 5.8，坦桑尼亚为 5.6。在 21 世纪初，赤道非洲是资本主义实现盈利的最后希望。但在世界大多数地区，生育率正在下降（图 5.31）。它仅仅处于再生产水平。这对资本主义构成了长期威胁，因为资本积累的本质是无产阶级的增长^。95

In such nations the capital accumulated each year is insufficient to keep up with the rising population, so the capital-to-labor ratio falls. A lower capital-to-labor ratio then gives rise to a higher rate of profit. Ultimately it is sex that drives capitalism. The soaring profit rate in South African capitalism is driven by the much greater sexual productivity of South African women. South African fertility was still 2.5 in 2008 against only 1.3 in Japan. But South Africa is already on the path toward capitalist maturity. In 2008 the fertility rate was only half what it was forty years earlier. In other African countries the demographic transition is barely starting. In Nigeria, fertility in 2008 was a huge 5.7 children per woman, in Zambia 5.8, in Tanzania 5.6. Equatorial Africa is, in the early twenty-first century, capitalism’s last best hope of profitability. But across most of the world, fertility is falling (Figure 5.31). It is barely at reproduction levels. This poses a long-term threat to capitalism since the essence of the accumulation of capital is the growth of the proletariat.⁹⁵

这对全球盈利能力有何影响？

What are the implications of this for profitability worldwide?

如果世界人口增长停滞，那么世界范围内的动态均衡总利润率最终将刚好足以弥补现有资本存量的折旧。图 5.32中 Maito 等人 [2014] 提供的数据表明，核心资本主义国家的利润率已稳定在 10% 到 15% 之间。由于 Marquetti 和 Foley [2002] 给出了核心国家存量折旧的相同范围数字，因此这些国家的资本主义似乎已经达到稳定状态。Zachariah [2008] 在他的研究中发现，在核心国家，“总投资将越来越多地弥补折旧，即生产中消耗的那部分资本存量。”

If world population growth halts, the dynamic equilibrium gross rate of profit worldwide will end up just being sufficient to replace depreciation of existing capital stock. Data by Maito et al. [2014], given in Figure 5.32, indicate that the core capitalist countries have leveled out at a profit rate of 10 to 15 percent. Since Marquetti and Foley [2002] give figures in the same range for the depreciation of stock in the core countries it seems probable that capitalism is already reaching a stationary state in these countries. Zachariah [2008] found in his study that in the core countries “gross investments are increasingly going to cover depreciation, i.e. the part of the capital stock used up in production.”

图 5.31. 世界生育水平下降。来源：世界银行，2014 年。

Figure 5.31. The decline in world fertility levels. Source: World Bank., 2014.

图 5.32. 世界利润率以及核心国家和边缘国家的平均利润率（1869-2010 年）。来源：Maito 等，2014 年。

Figure 5.32. World rate of profit and average rate in core and peripheral countries (1869–2010). Source: Maito et al., 2014.

由于农村劳动力的持续可用性，边缘国家显示出更高的回报率，但如果考虑到图 5.31中的数据，整个世界的趋势将与核心国家已经发生的趋势一致。

Due to the continuing availability of labor from the countryside, the peripheral countries show a higher rate of return, but if data in Figure 5.31 is taken into account the trend for the world as a whole will be toward what has already happened in the core.

此时，世界资本存量的价值（以亿人年计算）将保持不变。投资仅足以弥补因生产力提高而导致的贬值和资本存量价值的逐渐贬值。但价值积累将停止。这相当于资本主义文明的生存危机。

At this point the value of the world capital stock in billions of person years would be stationary. Investment would only be sufficient to compensate for depreciation and the gradual cheapening of the capital stock in value terms due to productivity improvements. But accumulation of value will have ceased. This amounts to an existential crisis for capitalist civilization.

5.10 生产性和非生产性活动

5.10 PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES

在第 4.5 节中，我们叙述了亚当·斯密对封建挥霍无度的批判。这种批判的重点在于生产性工人和非生产性工人之间的区别。斯密通过这种区别表达了一个社会群体的观点——城市制造业资本家——他们在封建时期几乎不存在。作为大领主挥霍无度的批评者，他站在现代性的城墙上，从那里鄙视以前光荣的职业。从这样的高度看，教会的牧师和军官与 Punch and Judy 表演和仆人处于同一水平。

In Section 4.5 we recounted Adam Smith’s critique of the feudal profligacy. It was a critique that focused on the distinction between productive and unproductive workers. With this distinction Smith was expressing the viewpoint of a social group—the urban manufacturing capitalists—who had scarcely existed in the feudal period. As critic of the great lords’ profligate waste he stood on the ramparts of modernity, from whence to glower with disdain on previously honorable professions. From such heights, ministers of the church and army officers were down on the same level with Punch and Judy shows and menial servants.

历史的车轮转动，终于有一天，制造商们自己也渴望成为领主。他们购买头衔，订购豪宅，与旧贵族相媲美。工程巨头威廉·乔治·阿姆斯特朗的克拉格赛德豪宅（图 5.33）就是这种融合的缩影贵族和制造业价值观。工厂采用宏伟的都铎复兴风格建造，看起来像一座城堡，里面有维多利亚时代的最新发明：电灯、液压升降机、电动洗衣机；还有几十名仆人。随着制造商现在模仿贵族，史密斯的激进主义变得默默无闻。只有国际工人协会的理论发言人马克思仍然认为史密斯的思想值得铭记。制造业工人似乎并没有对他们的老板的挥霍视而不见^。96

The wheel of history turned and there came a day when the manufacturers themselves aspired to great lordship. They bought titles and ordered mansions to rival the old aristocracy. That of engineering magnate William George Armstrong, Cragside (Figure 5.33), epitomizes this fusion of aristocratic and manufacturing values. Built in a grand Tudor revival style, looking like a castle, it contained the latest inventions of the Victorian era: electric lights, hydraulic lifts, powered washing machines; and it was staffed by dozens of servants. With manufacturers now aping aristocrats, Smith’s radicalism passed into a decent obscurity. Only Marx, theoretical spokesman of the International Working Men’s Association, still thought Smith’s idea worth remembering. Manufacturing workers, it seems, were not blind to the profligacy of their masters.⁹⁶

回想一下，斯密曾提出，有偿工作要被视为富有成效需要两个条件：

Recall that Smith proposed two conditions for paid work in order to be considered productive:

1. 必须用资本而不是收入来雇用工人。

1. The workers must be employed out of capital not revenue.

2. 工作成果必须能够产生持久可销售的商品的实体生产。

2. The work must result in the physical production of lasting vendible commodities.

在马克思 [1999] 关于斯密的注释中，他最初弱化了这一定义，因此只需要第一个标准。他说，任何用资本进行的工作都应算作生产性工作。然而，他后来似乎意识到这个简单标准的不足，他认为商人雇用的劳动不能算作生产性劳动，因为买卖本身并不是一项生产活动 [Marx 1971, chap. 27]。实际上，他又回到了接受斯密的规则，即要算作生产性劳动，必须既具有体力生产性，又用资本进行。马克思的追随者对“非生产性”的定义很宽泛，所有用于收入分配（会计、银行、广告等）或维护社会秩序（警察、军队、教堂等）的工作都算作非生产性工作，生产性活动的定义与斯密类似，但前提是运输也是生产性的 [Deepankar, 2015]。也就是说，生产性工作必须生产或转移实物和可销售的商品。史密斯时代的歌剧演员或妓女没有生产任何持久的商品，因此没有生产力。但如果今天录制了普拉西多·多明戈的歌声，并将录音制成 CD 出售，或者如果今天女演员为色情电影表演，然后以 DVD 的形式出售，那么同样的实物行为就具有了资本主义生产力^。97

In his notes on Smith, Marx [1999] initially weakened the definition so that only the first criterion was needed. Any work that was employed out of capital should, he said, be counted as productive. However, he later seemed to have realized the inadequacy of this simple criterion, when he argued that labor employed by merchants could not count as productive, since buying and selling was not itself a productive activity [Marx 1971, chap. 27). In effect he shifted back to accepting Smith’s rule that to count as productive labor had to be both physically productive and employed out of capital. Marx’s followers use a broad definition of “unproductive,” where all work that is devoted either to the distribution of income (accountancy, banking, advertising, etc.) or to the maintenance of the social order (police, army, church etc.) counts as unproductive, and productive activity is defined similarly to the way Smith did, but with the proviso that transport is also productive [Deepankar, 2015]. That is, productive work must either produce or move a physical and vendible commodity. The opera singers or prostitutes of Smith’s time produced no persisting commodity and were unproductive. But if today Placido Domingo is recorded singing, and CDs are pressed and sold of the recording, or if today an actress performs for a sexually explicit film that is then sold as a DVD, the same physical acts become capitalistically productive.⁹⁷

非生产性部门依靠生产部门的剩余产品而存在。前者的扩张减少了后者可供再投资的剩余产品量，从而影响长期资本积累。如第 5.4.9 节所述，只有在生产部门，技术进步才会减少社会的必要劳动 [Cockshott and Zachariah, 2006]。对非生产性活动的任何批评都是比较性的。它说，如果社会组织方式不同，生产就会增加。所以斯密说，一旦大封建领主不再维持扈从，家臣就可以从事有利可图的生产性工作。马克思主义者说，如果社会是共产主义组织，那么许多目前为银行工作的人将被重新部署到制造产品或提供其他社会服务。新斯密主义者认为，如果目前受雇于国家提供公共服务的人被重新部署到私营部门，生产就会上升 [Bacon and Eltis, 1978]。

The unproductive sector exists by the support of the surplus product of the productive sectors. The expansion of the former reduces amount of surplus available for reinvestment in the latter, and thus affects long-run capital accumulation. As argued in section 5.4.9, it is only in the productive sector that technical advance reduces the necessary labor of society [Cockshott and Zachariah, 2006]. Any critique of unproductive activity is comparative. It says that if society were organized differently, production would increase. So Smith was saying that once great feudal lords no longer maintained retinues, the retainers could be put to profitable and productive work. Marxians say that if society were communistically organized, then many of those currently working for the banks would be redeployed to making things or providing other social services. Neo-Smithians argue that if those currently employed by the state to provide public services were redeployed to the private sector, production would rise [Bacon and Eltis, 1978].

图 5.33。克拉格赛德庄园，为纽卡斯尔军火制造商威廉·乔治·阿姆斯特朗（后来的阿姆斯特朗勋爵）建造。照片：戴夫·桑普纳，英文维基百科。

Figure 5.33. Cragside House, constructed for the Newcastle armaments manufacturer William George Armstrong, later Lord Armstrong. Photo: Dave Sumpner, English Wikipedia.

值得我们研究一下经济中的一些部门，看看它们被指定为非生产性部门意味着什么。我们很快就会发现，从私人和社会角度看，事情可能会有明显的反差。

It is worth looking at a number of sectors of the economy to see what is meant by designating them as unproductive. We will soon discover that there can be a marked contrast between how things appear from private and social perspectives.

5.10.1 暴力

5.10.1 Violence

首先，让我们回顾克拉格塞德的哥特式辉煌和它的主人阿姆斯特朗勋爵，他在英格兰北部的工程中雇佣了数百名工人。这些工人无疑是生产劳动者的典型。但他们在做什么呢？

First let’s return to the Gothic splendor of Cragside and its owner, Lord Armstrong, who employed hundreds of workers in his engineering works in the north of England. These, surely, were the very archetype of the productive laborer. But what were they making?

他们主要制造大炮。阿姆斯特朗最伟大的发明是一种后装炮，它发射的是爆炸炮弹，而不是老式的实心炮弹（图 5.34）。皇家海军用这些炮弹装备了一支新的“铁甲舰”舰队。但这有用吗？⁹⁸

In the main they were making cannons. Armstrong’s greatest invention had been a breech-loading gun that fired explosive shells rather than the old solid cannon balls (Figure 5.34). With these, the Royal Navy equipped a new fleet of “ironclads.” But was this productive?⁹⁸

毫无疑问，这些枪支是实物和可出售的商品，符合史密斯的标准之一。制造枪支的工人的工资来自阿姆斯特朗勋爵的资本，而不是他的收入。事实上，他因此变得足够富有，可以像男爵一样退休。从他个人的角度来看，答案肯定是肯定的。他听从了史密斯的建议，雇佣工人从事制造业，获得了巨额利润。但从社会的角度来看，这种活动怎么能算作生产活动呢？

There is no doubt that the guns were physical and vendible commodities, meeting one of Smith’s criteria. And the workers who made them were paid out of Lord Armstrong’s capital, not his revenue. Indeed, he grew rich enough as a result to retire in baronial style. From his private standpoint the answer was surely yes. He had followed Smith’s advice and employed workers in manufacture to great profit. But from the standpoint of society how could this activity count as productive?

斯密最初作出这一区分的重点在于说明如何部署劳动力来增加国家财富。制造毁灭性武器永远无法达到这一目的。1914 年，阿姆斯特朗、施耐德和克虏伯积累的发动机投入使用时，造成了数十年才恢复的破坏。表 5.21表明，在斯密写作的时期，战争频繁发生。1702 年至 1815 年间，英国几乎有一半的时间处于战争状态。战争吸收了当时尚未实现机械化的经济中的劳动力和资源，吸收了如此多的剩余产品，必定大大减缓了资本的积累。随着 20 世纪全面战争经济的到来，高达 70% 的产出被浪费在武器上，对经济的破坏作用是巨大的。

The whole point of the original distinction by Smith was to show how labor could be deployed to increase the wealth of nations. The manufacture of instruments of destruction can never do this. Once, in 1914, when the accumulated engines of Armstrong, Schneider, and Krupp were set to work, they wrought a destruction that took decades to recover from. Table 5.21 shows that in the period Smith was writing, wars were frequent. Between 1702 and 1815, Britain was at war almost half the time. The absorption of labor and resources in war, from an as yet largely unmechanized economy, must, by absorbing so much of the surplus product, have significantly slowed the accumulation of capital. With the advent of a full war economy in the twentieth century, with up to 70 percent of output being wasted on weapons, the destructive effect on the economy was huge.

图 5.34。威廉·乔治·阿姆斯特朗制造的 7 英寸口径线膛后装枪。照片：公共领域。

Figure 5.34. A 7-inch-caliber rifled breech-loading gun manufactured in the works of William George Armstrong. Photo: public domain.

从工业资本主义早期到二十世纪末，英国的军备生产都是在皇家兵工厂和皇家造船厂以及阿姆斯特朗的埃尔斯维克工厂等私人公司进行的。显然，如果这项工作是在皇家造船厂进行的，那么那里的工人就不能算作生产性劳动者，就像英国海军舰船上的水手一样。

From the early days of industrial capitalism until the late twentieth century armaments production in the UK was carried out both in Royal Arsenals and Royal Dockyards, and by private firms like Armstrong’s Elswick works. It is clear that if the work was done in a Royal Dockyard, the laborers there could no more count as productive laborers than could the sailors who manned the British navy’s ships.

表 5.21：1702 年至 1918 年英国战争期间的额外支出

TABLE 5.21: Additional Expenditures in Time of War for Britain 1702-1918

年

Year

战争

War

用于战争的 GDP 峰值百分比

Peak Percent of GDP Devoted to Wa r

1702-1713

西班牙继承权

Spanish Succession

5.1

1740-1748

奥地利王位继承

Austrian Succession

5.7

1756-1763

七年

Seven Years

16.1

1775-1783

美国独立

American Independence

9.8

1793-1815

法国和拿破仑

French and Napoleonic

9.4

1854-1856

克里米亚

Crimean

0.7

1899-1902

布尔

Boer

2.7

1914-1918

第一世界

First World

49.3

这些支出超出了正常国家支出，平均占同期 GDP 的 6.7%。摘自 Barro，1987 年。

These are expenditures over and above normal state expenditure which averaged 6.7% of GDP over the period. From Barro, 1987.

对于皇家造船厂建造的船舶，政府的成本仅仅是工人的工资加上造船厂无法制造的机器和钢材的成本。对于私营公司建造的船舶，成本将包括这些成本加上利润率。如果私营造船厂要盈利，它可以通过以下两种方式之一实现：

For a ship built in the Royal Dockyard, the cost to the government would simply be the wages of the workers plus the costs of machinery and steel that the dockyards could not make. For a ship built by a private firm it would include these costs plus a profit margin. If the private yard was to make a profit it could do so in either of two ways:

表 5.22：1939-1944 年大国战争支出占 GDP 的百分比

TABLE 5.22: Percent of GDP of the Great Powers Going to War Expenditure, 1939-1944

来源：Harrison，2000 年。

Source: Harrison, 2000.

1. 它在皇家造船厂建造同一艘船的成本之上加价。但要发生这种情况，我们必须假设政府存在某种程度的勾结，政府故意愿意补贴私营公司，而私营公司可以利用自己的设施以更低的成本完成这项工作。

1. It levied a markup over and above the cost of building the same ship in a Royal Dockyard. But for this to occur we have to assume some degree of collusion by the state, with the government being deliberately willing to subsidize the private company when it could have the work done more cheaply using its own facilities.

2. 私人船厂以与皇家造船厂建造成本大致相同的价格出售船舶，但要么使用更好的机器来降低劳动力成本，要么支付更低的工资率，因此仍然可以赚取利润。只有当私人工厂的管理或资本设备比政府设施好得多时，这种情况才会发生。

2. It sold the ship at about the same price as the cost of construction in a Royal Dockyard but either used better machinery to reduce labor costs or paid lower wage rates, and as a result could still skim a profit. This would only operate if the management or the capital equipment of the private works was substantially better than the government facility.

显然，同样的成本论点适用于任何由国家直接提供或由国家招标的活动。

Clearly the same costing argument applies to any activity that can be provided directly by the state or put out to tender by the state.

Buxton 和 Johnston [2013] 研究了私人和公共造船厂进行的类似工作的成本。他们的研究表明，政府每吨船舶的成本（以英镑计算）相同。皇家造船厂的效率与私人造船厂的效率并无不同。

Buxton and Johnston [2013] examined the costs of comparable work done in the private and public shipyards. Their work indicates that the costs of ships to the government in terms of pounds sterling per ton were the same for both. The efficiency of the Royal Dockyards was no different from that of the private yards.

表 5.23的第三列表示姊妹舰是否从公有造船厂订购。第二列给出了所有舰船的平均值，第三列仅给出了公有姊妹舰的平均值。表 5.23显示，私人船厂与公有造船厂直接竞争的舰船的平均加价非常低，仅为 1.8%。考虑到舰船加价幅度之大，许多舰船都是亏本出售的，这意味着私人船厂必须报出海军的盈亏平衡价格。

The third column of Table 5.23 indicates if a sister ship was ordered from a publicly owned shipyard. The means are given for all ships in the second column and for only those ships with publicly built sisters in the third column. Table 5.23 shows that the average markup on ships where private yards were in direct competition with publicly owned shipyards was very low at only 1.8 percent. Given the spread of markups on ships, with many selling at a loss, it means that private yards had to quote the Navy break-even prices.

图 5.35。19 世纪 80 年代，国有皇家兵工厂正在建造重型火炮，可能是 13.5 英寸线膛后装炮。阿姆斯特朗和维克斯等私人军火公司与这些以及类似的国有工厂展开竞争。照片：公共领域。

Figure 5.35. Heavy cannons, probably 13.5-inch rifled breech loaders, being constructed at the state-owned Royal Arsenal in the 1880s. Private arms firms like Armstrong and Vickers were in competition with these and similar state works. Photo: public domain.

表 5.23：私人建造的皇家海军主力舰样本的主要成本加价

TABLE 5.23: Markup on Prime Costs on Sample of Privately Built Royal Navy Capital Ships

船

Ship

加价 %

Mark-up %

皇家船坞姊妹船

Royal Dockyard Sister Ship

复仇

Vengeance

-4.2

是

统治

Dominion

是

阿伽门农

Agamemnon

-6

无敌

Invincible

2.9

缺乏灵活性

Inflexible

11.1

高超

Superb

-15.3

是

先锋

Vanguard

4.9

是

巨人

Colossus

是

澳大利亚

Australia

2.4

是

阿贾克斯

Ajax

是

大胆

Audacious

-5.1

是

征服者

Conqueror

5.3

是

新西兰

New Zealand

是

长公主

Princess Royal

11.2

是

本葆

Benbow

-5.7

是

印度皇帝

Emperor of India

1.4

是

老虎

Tiger

4.8

英勇

Valiant

-5.6

是

意思是

Mean

2.1

1.8

95% 置信区间为平均值

95% CI for the Mean, FROM

-1.9

-3.3

到

6.2

6.9

第三列表示姊妹船是否由公有造船厂订购。第二列给出了所有船舶的平均值，第三列仅给出了公有姊妹船的船舶的平均值。来源：Buxton and Johnston，2013 年，第 11 章。

The third column indicates if a sister ship was ordered from a publicly owned shipyard. The means are given for all ships in the second column and for only those ships with publicly built sisters in the third column. Source: Buxton and Johnston, 2013, chapter 11.

阿姆斯特朗和维克斯等军备公司的大部分利润似乎都来自向没有自己造船厂的外国海军出售产品。

Armaments firms like Armstrong and Vickers seem to have made most of their profits from selling to foreign navies who lacked their own shipyards.

海军建造的数据似乎表明，对于国家直接与私人承包商竞争的活动，他们很难盈利（图 5.36）。然而，如果国家失去了直接竞争的能力——正如 20 世纪末私有化所导致的那样，私营企业以纳税人的钱来抬高成本的机会肯定会大得多。

The data for naval construction seems to indicate that for an activity where the state directly competed with private contractors, it was very hard for them to make a profit (Figure 5.36). If, however, the state loses its ability to compete directly—as has happened as a result of privatizations in the late twentieth century, the opportunity for private firms to mark up costs at the taxpayer’s expense is bound to be much higher.

阿姆斯特朗的船只和枪支换取了税收。他的公司赚取的每一英镑利润都是从别人那里征税的，无论是在英国还是在海外。古典经济学家认为，税收必须落在土地所有者和资本家的剩余收入上——工人太穷了，不值得征收所得税。因此，阿姆斯特朗的利润直接从其他资本家的利润中扣除。制造商党，即以格莱斯顿为首的自由党，对昂贵的海军预算的抵制源于这一事实 [Friedman, 2012]。99^因此，根据马克思反对车间工人生产力的论点^100，我们必须将阿姆斯特朗大炮工厂及其所有雇员视为非生产性工厂。

Armstrong’s ships and guns exchanged against tax revenue. Every £ of profit his firm earned had been taken in tax from someone else, whether in England or overseas. The classical economists had argued that taxes had to fall on the surplus revenue of the landowners and capitalists—the workers being too poor to be worth levying an income tax on. So Armstrong’s profit was a direct deduction from the profits of other capitalists. The resistance of the manufacturers’ party, the Liberals led by Gladstone, to expensive naval budgets stemmed from this fact [Friedman, 2012].⁹⁹ So by the argument used by Marx against the productivity of shop workers¹⁰⁰ we must rule the Armstrong cannon works and all they employed as unproductive.

图 5.36. 从工业产出角度来看，非生产性战争工业与生产性经济之间的差异。生产部门之间存在相互支持的反馈，而战争生产则充当资源吸收器。

Figure 5.36. Difference between the unproductive war industry and the productive economy when outputs of industries are examined. There is a mutually supportive feedback between the productive sectors, whereas war production acts as resource sink.

更普遍地说，任何本身不具生产力的活动都不会因为其所处的社会形态的改变而变得具有生产力。私有化并不能使不具生产力的活动变得具有生产力。

More generally, no activity which is itself unproductive becomes productive by a mere change in the social form under which it takes place. Privatization does not make an unproductive activity productive.

5.10.2 副职

5.10.2 Vice

货币和货币支付的存在产生了一种错觉，即任何能赚钱的东西本身就一定是有生产力的，这种错觉是由那些从被神圣化的活动中获得收入的人积极培育的。一个当代的例子是，由于20 世纪 80 年代的新自由主义兴起后，人们开始将卖淫重新定义为“性工作” [Jeffreys, 2008]，将赌博重新定义为“产业”。由于资本主义社会中，工作的主要组成部分是雇佣劳动，劳动似乎在与金钱交换，因此任何涉及金钱易手的交易都看起来像是劳动。同样，由于商业社会中大多数产业都是为了盈利而经营的，因此任何以盈利为目的的事物，包括赌场和妓院，看起来都像是一个产业。这就是马克思所说的商品拜物教，熊彼特所说的“金钱面纱” [Klausinger, 1990]。它使我们看不到现金交易背后的实际社会关系。稍加思考就足以发现，赌博只是重新分配现有货币，并没有产生任何新的价值。谈论赌博业和谈论扒窃业一样毫无意义。事实上，1960 年之前，英国法律将两者都视为犯罪。

The existence of money and monetary payments gives rise to the illusion that anything that garners money must itself be productive, an illusion actively fostered by those who derive their incomes form activities thus sanctified. A contemporary example is how, since the ideological dominance of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, there has been a move to re-label prostitution as “sex-work” [Jeffreys, 2008] and gambling as an “industry.” Since in capitalist society a major component of work is waged labor, where it appears that labor is being exchanged for money, any transaction in which money changes hands is made to seem like labor. Again, since in commercial societies most industry is run for a profit, then anything run for a profit, including casinos and brothels, looks like an industry. This is what Marx termed commodity fetishism, and Schumpeter called the “veil of money” [Klausinger, 1990]. It blinds us to the actual social relations behind cash transactions. A moment’s thought is enough to see that gambling merely redistributes existing money, and produces nothing new of value. It makes as little sense to talk of a gambling industry as of a pickpocket industry. Indeed, prior to 1960 the law in Britain regarded the one as criminal as the other.

我们从军舰建造中看到了如何将一种最终具有破坏性的活动表现为一种生产性行业。如果将建造航空母舰的英国航宇系统公司戈万造船厂与建造集装箱船的韩国大宇造船厂进行比较，就会发现它们有明显的相似之处：雇佣工人、使用类似的技能、生产一艘实体的船。只有通过观察最终的船只的作用，我们才能看出前者是破坏性的，而后者是生产性的。经营妓院处于中间层次的面纱：不像赌场那样明显不生产，也不像英国航宇戈万那样隐晦地不生产。妓院的经营目的不是生产实体产品，它们是史密斯所说的不生产性服务之一，在它们工作时就会消失，但性工作倡导者问道，它们不雇佣工人吗？妓女的工作有什么特别之处，使它与众不同？她们不应该像其他工作一样被对待，并被给予一种公认的就业形式所带来的安全感吗？

We saw with warship building how an ultimately destructive activity can be presented as a productive industry. If one compares the BAE Systems yard in Govan that is building aircraft carriers, with the Daewoo shipbuilding yard in Korea building container ships there are obvious similarities: the employment of waged workers, the use of similar skills, the production of a physical ship. It is only by looking at what the resulting ships do, that we can see that the first is destructive and the second productive. Brothel-keeping sits at an intermediate level of veiling: not as obviously unproductive as casinos nor so obscurely unproductive as BAE Govan. Brothels are not in business to turn out a physical product, they are one of Smith’s unproductive services vanishing at the moment of their performance, but the sex work advocates ask, Do they not employ waged workers; what is special about the work of prostitutes that makes it different? Should they not be treated like any other job and given the security that comes with a recognized form of employment?

一种回应是指出妓院作为一种制度起源于奴隶社会，在国际上仍然在很大程度上依赖于所谓的“白奴贸易”，现在被称为人口贩卖。另一种回应是揭开金钱的面纱，指出最终的犯罪行为。正如军舰建造掩盖了海盗和谋杀的阴谋，购买面纱掩盖了强奸的阴谋[Jeffreys，2008]。科伦泰[1921]早在性工作被发明之前就发表了讲话，而且是在早期的社会主义经济而非资本主义经济中，他非常清楚地理解了为什么性工作存在于资本主义国家，以及为什么性工作在社会主义经济中没有生产力：

One response is to point out that as an institution, brothels originated in slave society and, internationally, are still to a substantial degree dependent on what was called the “white slave trade” and is now termed human trafficking. Another response is to pull away the money veil and point to what would ultimately be criminal actions. Just as warship building hides a conspiracy to commit piracy and murder, procuring veils conspiracy to rape [Jeffreys, 2008]. Kollontai [1921], speaking well before the cant about sex work had been invented, and in an early socialist, rather than capitalist, economy, understood very clearly why it exists in capitalist countries and why it was unproductive in a socialist economy:

妇女肉体交易是相当公开进行的，当你考虑到整个资产阶级生活方式都是建立在买卖的基础上时，这并不奇怪。不可否认的是，即使是最合法的婚姻，也需要考虑物质和经济因素。卖淫是无法找到永久养家糊口者的女人的出路。在资本主义制度下，卖淫为男性提供了发生性关系的机会，而不必承担在物质上照顾女性直至生命的终点的责任。

The trade in women’s flesh is conducted quite openly, which is not surprising when you consider that the whole bourgeois way of life is based on buying and selling. There is an undeniable element of material and economic [sic] considerations even the most legal of marriages. Prostitution is the way out for the woman who fails to find herself a permanent breadwinner. Prostitution, under capitalism, provides men with the opportunity of having sexual relationships without having to take upon themselves the responsibility of caring materially for the women until the grave.

毕竟，职业妓女是什么？她是一个不为集体付出精力的人；一个靠别人生活、从别人那里获取配给的人。这种事情能在工人共和国被允许吗？不，不能。这是不能被允许的，因为它减少了创造国家财富和公共福利的精力储备和工人数量，[并且]从国民经济的角度来看，职业妓女是劳动逃兵。因此，我们必须无情地反对卖淫。为了经济利益，我们必须立即开始减少妓女数量和消除一切形式的卖淫的斗争。

And what, after all, is the professional prostitute? She is a person whose energy is not used for the collective; a person who lives off others, by taking from the rations of others. Can this sort of thing be allowed in a workers’ republic? No, it cannot. It cannot be allowed, because it reduces the reserves of energy and the number of working hands that are creating the national wealth and the general welfare, [and] from the point of view of the national economy the professional prostitute is a labor deserter. For this reason we must ruthlessly oppose prostitution. In the interests of the economy we must start an immediate fight to reduce the number of prostitutes and eliminate prostitution in all its forms.

在社会条件发生变化的情况下，卖淫为何不具有生产性，这是常识性的显而易见。在一个商品按配给分配的社会中，妓女被视为夺取他人的配给，不为国家财富和公共福利做出贡献。当经济关系不再被金钱所掩盖，而是以物质形式出现时，这是一个常识性的实际观察，如果这在一个不公开的经济中显然是正确的，那么在以前的资本主义经济中，在金钱面纱背后，它一定已经是正确的。在金钱的镀金下，商业经济中非生产性的活动看起来是生产性的，性交变成了“性工作”。

There is a commonsense obviousness under the changed social conditions about why prostitution is unproductive. In a society where goods were allocated on ration, a prostitute was seen to be taking the rations of others and not contributing to national wealth and general welfare. When economic relations were no longer disguised by money but seen in physical terms, this was a commonsense practical observation, and if it was obviously true in an unveiled economy, it must already have been true behind the money veil in the previous capitalist economy. Gilded by money, unproductive activities in a commercial economy appear productive, intercourse becomes “sex work.”

当然，从某种意义上说，性是工作，是生产。双方在性行为中消耗新陈代谢能量，而生产性问题导致母亲在妊娠和分娩过程中消耗更多的能量。事实上，这种劳动是所有其他生产的基础。但这并不是妓院辩护者的意思。对他们来说，工作就是金钱易手的地方。别忘了，自罗马时代以来，商业性行为的目的就是让男人逃避对所生孩子的任何责任。他们既不能指望从父亲那里继承遗产，也不能指望从父亲那里得到赡养费。她们的命运往往是被遗弃、被抛弃，或者被送进育婴院，这或许是她们的不幸：

In one sense of course, sex is work, and productive. Both parties involved expend metabolic energy in the act, and the productive issue causes the mother to expend far more energy in the gestation and birthing. Such labor is, in reality, the foundation of all other production. But this is not what apologists for brothels mean. To them, work is where money changes hands. Never mind that since Roman times the aim of commercial sex has been for men to avoid any responsibility for the children who result. They could expect neither inheritance nor sustenance from the fathers. Exposure, abandonment or the dubious mercy of the foundling hospital was often their fate:

许多城市都有此类儿童被遗弃的数据，这确实令人震惊。在法国，一年有 127,507 名儿童被遗弃。1833 年。所有出生的婴儿中，有 20% 到 30% 被遗弃。巴黎的数据表明，在 1817-1820 年间，“弃儿”占所有出生婴儿的 36%。在意大利的一些医院，死亡率（一岁以下）高达 80% 或 90%。在巴黎，Maison de la Couche 报告称，在 1818 年接收的 4,779 名婴儿中，有 2,370 名在头三个月内死亡，另有 956 名在第一年内死亡。[Langer，1963 年，第 9 页]

The figures for this traffic, available for many cities, are truly shocking. In all of France fully 127,507 children were abandoned in the year 1833. Anywhere from 20 to 30 percent of all children born were left to their fate. The figures for Paris suggest that in the years 1817–1820 the “foundlings” comprised fully 36 percent of all births. In some of the Italian hospitals the mortality (under one year of age) ran to 80 or 90 percent. In, Paris, the Maison de la Couche reported that of 4,779 babies admitted in 1818, 2,370 died in the first three months and another 956 within the first year. [Langer, 1963, p. 9]

这些机构的死亡率如此之高，以致马尔萨斯[1872]评论道：

So notorious was the mortality rate of these institutions that Malthus [1872] remarked:

考虑到这些机构中发生的高死亡率，以及它们明显养成的放荡习惯，也许可以这样说，如果一个人想控制人口，又不关心手段，他所能想到的最有效的措施就是建立足够数量的育婴院，不受限制地接收儿童。[152]

Considering the extraordinary mortality which occurs in these institutions, and the habits of licentiousness which they have an evident tendency to create, it may perhaps be truly said that, if a person wished to check population, and were not solicitous about the means, he could not propose a more effective measure than the establishment of a sufficient number of foundling hospitals, unlimited as to their reception of children. [152]

卖淫作为一种制度，对劳动力具有双重破坏性；它不仅导致妓女的婴儿早死，而且顾客在妓院里花的钱也是从他们合法后代的嘴里拿走的。

As an institution prostitution was doubly destructive of labor power; not only did it condemn to an early death the prostitutes’ infants but the money that patrons spent in the brothels was taken from the mouths of their legitimate offspring.

5.10.3 财务

5.10.3 Finance

现在所谓的金融业是另一个生产力低下的大行业。银行的辩护者说，这种斯密分类具有误导性。银行是否具有生产力的真正标准是在其资产负债表中。他们会说，斯密将生产力与物质生产联系起来是一种过时的加尔文主义偏见。但银行生产任何有价值的东西吗？它们生产“金融服务”吗？如果是，这些服务是什么？

What is now called the finance industry is another big unproductive sector. Apologists for the banks say this Smithian classification is misleading. The real criterion of whether the banks are productive is to be found in their balance sheets. It was, they would say, an archaic Calvinist prejudice on Smith’s part to tie productiveness to physical production. But do banks produce anything of value? Do they produce “financial services,” and if so what are these services?

金融服务的一个例子是收取支票结算费或向其他账户付款的费用。然而，当人们观察英国银行业时，就会发现这些费用甚至不足以支付银行的工资。对于公众来说，这是银行的主要用途，但这不是他们的主要收入来源。他们的收入来自金融合同的利润。随着时间的推移，银行和其他金融机构通过交易越来越复杂和抽象的金融合同来赚取部分收入。

One instance of a financial service is charging for clearing checks or for making payments into other accounts. However, what one sees when one looks at the UK banking sector is that such charges are insufficient even to meet the wage bills of the banks. For the general public, this is the main use of banks, but it is not their main source of revenue. That comes instead from profits on financial contracts. Over time the banks and other financial institutions have come to make a part of their revenue by trading in financial contracts of ever greater complexity and abstraction.

银行发挥生产性作用的正统理由是它们提供经济所需的资金。101按照亚当·斯密的说法，货币就是指挥他人劳动的能力。102^{信贷的提供使资本家有权力或许可}^指挥部分社会劳动力用于他的项目。

The orthodox justification for the banks playing a productive role is that they provide the finance that the economy needs.¹⁰¹ Money, according to Adam Smith, is the ability to command the labor of others.¹⁰² The provision of credit gives a capitalist the authority or permission to commandeer part of the pool of social labor to his project.

银行提供信贷额度只是一种给予许可的行为。它与建筑许可证等的区别在于，建筑许可证是由私人机构颁发的。如果你想扩建你的房子，你需要两份许可证，一份来自城市办公室，负责检查设计的合理性，另一份来自银行，负责检查你的信用是否合理。有人可以发放许可证，但这并不意味着这些许可证是有效的。

The provision of a line of credit by a bank is simply an act of giving permission. What makes it seem different from, for example, a building permit, is that the permit is allocated by a private body. If you want to extend your house you need two permits, one from an office of the city who checks the soundness of the design, and one from the bank who checks the soundness of your credit. The fact that somebody can hand out permissions does not make them productive.

如果我们看看实际情况，就会发现建造房屋的是建筑工人、泥水匠和水管工。签署许可证的城市或银行官员并没有建造房屋，就像哈德良建造以他的名字命名的城墙一样。社会将一种真正属于他们指挥的人的创造天赋投射到权贵身上。当许可证需求旺盛时，发放许可证的人可以从中分一杯羹。如果城市官员这样做，我们称之为贿赂，如果银行这样做，我们称之为利息。曾经，收取利息（高利贷）被视为官员收受贿赂的道德等同物。随着银行家在政治上占据主导地位，他们以这种方式获得的财富被视为社会体面的象征^。103

If we look at what actually happens, it is builders, plasterers, and plumbers who actually make houses. The city or bank official who signs a permit no more makes the house than did Hadrian in building the wall that bears his name. Society projects onto the powerful a creative genius that really pertains to those they command. When permits are in demand, those handing them out can take their cut. If a city official does this we call it a bribe, when a bank does it we call it interest. At one time the charging of interest (usury) was regarded as the moral equivalent of an official taking a bribe. With the rise of bankers to political dominance, their very wealth, obtained in this way, comes to be seen as a token of social respectability.¹⁰³

贷款似乎与市政厅的许可证不同，它能使人们获得建造房屋所需的实际资源。但这只是一种假象。工人用砖块和木材建造房屋，贷款使房主能够控制这些资源。如果建筑业受国家控制，或者像 20 世纪 40 年代的英国一样，砖块只是由国家定量配给，那么获得砖块和劳动力也需要获得官方许可证。私人公民不能印制自己的货币或颁发普遍接受的工作许可，这是现行法律秩序的产物。另一方面，银行处于特殊地位，可以不受法律约束地发行货币。第 3.5 节解释了货币关系是如何从国家将实物税转换为货币税的行为中产生的。这迫使每个纳税人获得货币并进入商品经济。货币指挥劳动力的权力是一种委托权力，源自国家对其公民的先前直接指挥。如今，这种直接命令仅限于征兵，通常只有年轻人才受此命令。其余的，国家接受金钱作为公民债务的清偿。

It may seem that a loan, unlike a permit from the town hall, gives access to the real resources to build the house. But this is an illusion. Workers build houses using bricks and timber, the loan gives the homeowner command over these resources. If the building industry was under state control, or even when, as in the 1940s in the UK, bricks were simply rationed by the state, access to the bricks and labor would also depend on an official permit. It is an artifact of the current legal order that private citizens cannot print their own money or issue generally acceptable authorization for work. Banks, on the other hand, are in the special position that they can issue money without legal constraint. Section 3.5 explained how monetary relations arose from the action of states in commuting taxes in kind into money taxes. This forced everyone subject to tax to acquire money and to enter the commodity economy. The power of money to command labor is a delegated power, derived from a prior direct command that the state has over the persons of its citizens. Nowadays, such direct command it limited to military conscription, and usually only young men are subject to it. For the rest, the state accepts money in settlement of citizens’ debts.

对国家的债务是原罪。它们独立于我们的意志或行动而存在。现代的创新是赦免的方式：通过支票或信用卡。

Debts to the state are the original sins. They exist independent of our volition or actions. The innovation of the modern age is the way that absolution is offered: by check or credit card.

国家接受私人支票纳税，因为清算银行在国家银行有存款账户。当人们寄出以 X 银行开具的国库支票时，X 银行在国家银行的账户就会相应地被扣除。国家银行与私人银行的结合产生了特定的资本主义货币体系。资本主义经济所需的商业交易量早已超出了用贵金属硬币现金结算的可能性。104^用信用取代货币对资本主义的发展至关重要，但在此过程中，它赋予了私人金融机构巨大的权力。

The state accepts private checks for tax payments because the clearing banks have deposit accounts with the state bank. When people sent the exchequer checks drawn on bank X, the account of bank X with the state bank is debited correspondingly. The combination of state banks with private banks gives rise to the specifically capitalist monetary system. The volume of commercial transactions required by the capitalist economy long outgrew the possibility of cash settlements in precious metal coins.¹⁰⁴ The replacement of money by credit has been essential to the growth of capitalism, but it has in the process given immense power to private financial institutions.

在英国央行、欧洲中央银行等银行开立账户的私人清算银行的存款通常与现金一样可接受，但银行本身可以随意创造这些存款。银行不会像人们天真地认为的那样，将资本从储蓄转移到投资。105^相反，当银行向一家公司提供投资信贷额度时，这实际上授权该公司为其私人目的提取和动员社会劳动力。在公司的账户中创建信用是一种即时簿记操作，不依赖于任何先前的实际资源储蓄。相反，信贷的发放不需要为任何当前的社会劳动提供资金。如果一家银行向一家公司提供信贷以雇用显然需要劳动力的员工，但如果信贷是作为现有房屋的抵押贷款或收购投机性金融资产而发放的，则没有相应的劳动力配置。前者在非常有限的意义上是生产性的——因为它授权实际生产——而后者在任何意义上都是非生产性的。认为银行充当中介机构，将食利阶层的存款借给工业部门是一种错觉。银行的运作并非两步走：首先吸收存款，然后发放贷款。相反，这两步操作是同时进行的，而且说贷款创造存款至少和贷款创造存款一样现实。

Deposits with private clearing banks holding accounts with the Bank of England, European Central Bank, etc., are in general as acceptable as cash, but the banks themselves can create them at will. The banks do not, as is naively supposed, channel capital from savings to investment.¹⁰⁵ Instead, when a bank gives a line of credit to a firm for investment, this in effect authorizes the firm to draw on and mobilize social labor for its private purposes. The creation of credit in the account of the firm is an instantaneous bookkeeping operation and does not depend on any prior saving of real resources. Conversely, the advance of credit need not fund any current social labor. If a bank advances credit to a firm to employ staff that obviously does use labor, but if credit is advanced as mortgages for already existing houses, or the acquisition of speculative financial assets there is no corresponding allocation of labor. The former is productive in a very limited sense—in that it authorizes real production—the latter is unproductive in every sense. It is an illusion to see the banks as acting as intermediaries, lending out the deposits of the rentier classes to industry. It is not a two-step operation: first take deposit; then make loan. Instead the two operations occur simultaneously, and it is at least as realistic to say that the lending creates the deposits as vice versa.

假设德意志银行向宝马提供透支额度。然后，宝马从蒂森克虏伯股份公司订购钢板用于其工厂。交货一个月后，宝马向蒂森克虏伯支付 5,000,000 欧元，动用其透支额度。接下来发生的事情是，在一次原子交易中，德意志银行的计算机从宝马的账户中扣除款项，并贷记蒂森克虏伯的账户。该软件操作被设计为不可分割的，其效果是创建一笔存款，正好抵消了宝马的贷款。

Suppose Deutsche Bank advances an overdraft facility to BMW. BMW then orders steel plate for its plants from ThyssenKrupp AG. A month after delivery BMW pays ThyssenKrupp 5,000,000 euros, drawing on its overdraft facility. What happens next is that in a single atomic transaction the Deutsche Bank computers debit the account of BMW and credit that of ThyssenKrupp. The software operation is designed to be indivisible, and its effect is to create a deposit that exactly counterbalances the loan to BMW.

由于第 5.9 节中描述的利润率下降，有利可图的投资机会减少，用于生产目的的融资份额也减少。金融部门现在将其大部分贷款用于为政府债务、房地产或纸质或电子资产投机提供融资。这些纯粹的符号操作，即对计算机记录的操作，仍然可以对实际资产产生间接索取权。资源，因为除了清算交易和吸收存款外，银行还充当基金经理。在担任基金经理时，他们收取的管理费约为其积极管理的基金价值的 1%。信贷的持续扩张意味着所有资产都会随着时间的推移而升值，因此总费用会变得非常高。2009 年至 2014 年间，支付给伦敦个人银行家的管理费份额超过 1000 亿英镑 [Kollewe，2015 年]。

As a consequence of the falling rate of profit described in Section 5.9 opportunities for profitable investment shrink, and the share of financing provided for productive purposes becomes less. The financial sector now directs most of its loans to financing the government debt, real estate, or speculation in paper or electronic assets. These purely symbolic operations, operations on computer records, can still effect an indirect claim on real resources since, in addition to clearing transactions and taking deposits, banks act as fund managers. In the latter role they levy a management fee of perhaps 1 percent of the value of the funds they actively manage. The ongoing extension of credit means that all assets tend to appreciate over time so the total fees become huge. Between 2009 and 2014 the portion of management fees paid out to individual bankers in London amounted to more than £100 billion [Kollewe, 2015].

5.10.4 现代租金

5.10.4 Modern rents

即使银行按照理论上的设想运作，为实际生产性投资提供信贷，发放贷款的工作仍然没有成效——行政管理费用与发放建筑许可证类似。但至少它促进了生产活动。今天的金融，就像资本主义早期一样，更像是一个收租机构。由于很少有金融用于增加实际生产，这些租金只能通过压低大部分人口的实际生活水平来维持。

Even when banks operated as they are theoretically supposed to, extending credit for real productive investment, the work that went into granting the loans remained unproductive—and administrative overhead was analogous to issuing building permits. But at least it enabled productive activity. Finance today, as in the early years of capitalism, operates more as a rent collection agency. Since so little finance goes to increasing real production, these rents can only be sustained by depressing the real living standards of much of the population.

这一过程在住房方面尤为明显。房价分为两个部分，一个是建造房屋的实际成本，另一个是底层土地的资本化租金。随着封建租金逐渐转化为货币租金，农田获得了由以下规则确定的价格：

This process is particularly evident in housing. The price of houses breaks down into two components, one being the actual cost of building a house, and the other being the capitalized rent of the underlying ground. As feudal rents gradually converted into money rent, farming land acquired a price that was set by the rule:

假设 1800 年爱尔兰的一处庄园每年从农民那里获得 1000 英镑的租金，利率为 5%。106^那么这处庄园的价格将是 [1000/0.05]=20,000 英镑，因为这是投资者必须借给政府才能获得与土地相同的收入的金额。从工业资本主义的最初阶段开始，租金收取、债务和暴力就紧密结合在一起。十九世纪初的大部分有息证券都是国家发行的，用于资助购买船只和大炮。这些贷款的最大资金来源是大贵族家庭，他们的收入最初来自地租。银行系统以及土地和政府债券市场允许这个阶级在直接剥削佃户和间接剥削纳税人之间平衡其收入。

Suppose that in 1800 an estate in Ireland yielded £1000 a year in rent from the peasantry and the interest rate was 5 percent.¹⁰⁶ The price of the estate would then be £ [1000/0.05]=£20,000 as this is the sum that an investor would have to lend to the government to obtain the same revenue as from the land. From the earliest stage of industrial capitalism there has been a close unity between rent collection, debt, and violence. The great bulk of the interest-bearing securities in the early nineteenth century were ones issued by the state to finance the purchase of ships and cannons. The biggest source of funding for these loans were grand aristocratic families whose incomes came initially from ground rent. The banking system, and the markets in land and government bonds, then allowed this class to balance its revenues between direct exploitation of their tenants and indirect exploitation of the taxpayers.

但什么决定了可以获得的租金呢？

But what determines the rent that can be obtained?

李嘉图 [1951] 认为，租金水平取决于最差土地与支付租金的土地之间的差异肥力。107如果最差的土地不产生租金，那么地主就可以收取几乎全部较好土地的差异肥力作为租金。如果他收取的费用超过肥力差异，农民就会转移到更差的、免租金的土地上。这是否现实值得怀疑，因为即使是在一个省份最差的土地上，地主也不可能让农民免费耕种。108、109^但^无论最差土地的零点租金是多少，李嘉图的原则仍然适用。地主可以自由调整租金，^他们收取的租金将抵消土壤肥力差异带来的任何收益。单单以停止生产土地为威胁就足以让地主阶级占有资本主义经济中生产的部分剩余产品 [Campbell, 2002]，因为除航运之外的所有经济活动都在陆地上进行，因此都依赖于对陆地的使用。

Ricardo [1951] argued that rent levels depended on the differential fertility between the worst land in use and the land on which the rent was paid.¹⁰⁷ If the worst land yielded no rent, then the landlord could charge almost the entire differential fertility of the better land as rent. Were he to charge more than the difference in fertility the peasants would shift to the worse, rent-free land. Whether this is realistic is questionable, since even on the worst land in a province, the landlords were unlikely to allow peasants to till scot-free.¹⁰⁸, ¹⁰⁹ But whatever the zero-point rent on the worst land, Ricardo’s principle will still apply. Landlords, free to alter rent, will charge rents that cancel out any gains from differences in soil fertility. The mere threat to withhold land from production is sufficient to allow the landlord class to appropriate part of the surplus produced in capitalist economy [Campbell, 2002], since all economic activities other than shipping take place on land and as such are dependent on access to it.

在农业中，地主不仅能够占有由于土壤干旱、多石和坡度不同而产生的自然肥力差异，还能占有过去几个世纪以来改良的累积成果。地主和资本主义农场主之间就这些改良一直存在着斗争。地主的利益在于通过佃户的任何改良来提高租金。相反，佃户作为一个阶级，对长期租约感兴趣，租约期间租金固定，使他们能够从投资于改良的资本中获益。佃户的任何投资最终都会落入地主的口袋，这种威胁不可避免地会阻碍投资和改良。

In agriculture the landlord is able to appropriate not only natural differences in fertility—due to differences in aridity, rockiness, and slope of the soil—but the accumulated result of past improvements carried out over centuries. A constant struggle exists between the landlord and the capitalist farmer over these improvements. The interest of the landlord is to rack up rents as a consequence of any improvement made by the tenant. The tenants as a class, in contrast, have an interest in long leases during which rents are fixed to allow them to benefit from capital invested in improvements. The threat that any investment by the tenant will end up in the landlord’s pocket inevitably acts as a disincentive to investment and improvement.

租金对过去资本投资的依赖在城市租金中表现得更加明显。这些租金是基于建筑环境的，而建筑环境完全是过去劳动的结果。从表面上看，城市租户支付的租金似乎是对一件物品——房子的支付。因此，在房东看来，房租也是他购买房产所投资资本的回报。实际的因果关系，即房产价格是资本化的租金，因此被颠倒了。两套类似的公寓，一套位于大城市中心，另一套距离该城市 50 公里，租金会有很大差异。市中心公寓的租金会更高，因为市中心的租户节省了 50 公里通勤的金钱和时间成本。土地私有财产会给所有租户带来相当于远距离通勤者所承担的旅行成本的经济损失。随着资本主义将工作集中在大城市，工人要么被迫花费数小时通勤，并购买通勤所需的汽车，要么向房东阶级支付同等的租金。在经济发展中的城市，随着通勤圈的扩大，租金呈上涨趋势。买来出租的房屋的价格由资本化的租金决定，因此房地产价格同样上涨。对出租房屋的资本收益预期使这种投资获得双倍的利润——既有租金回报，又有以后以更高价格出售房屋的投机利润。

This dependence of rent on past capital investment is even more pronounced with urban rents. These are rents on a built environment that is entirely an effect of past labor. On the surface, the rent that an urban tenant pays appears as a payment for an artifact—the house. As such, it seems to the landlord too that house rent is a return on the capital he invested in buying the property. The actual causal relation, that the property price is capitalized rent, is thereby inverted. The rent that can be obtained for two similar flats, one in the center of a big city and one a 50km commute from that city, will be very different. The city-center flat will rent for more, because the city-center tenant saves the travel cost in money and time of the 50km commute. Private property in land then imposes on all tenants a financial loss equivalent to the travel cost met by the distant commuter. As capitalism concentrates jobs in huge cities, workers are either forced to spend hours traveling, and to buy the cars needed to do this, or to forfeit an equivalent cost in rent to the landlord class. In economically developing cities rents trend up, as the commuting circle expands. The price of a house bought to rent is determined by the capitalized rent, so property prices similarly escalate. Expectations of capital gains on rented houses make such investment doubly profitable—there is the rent return, plus the speculative profit to be had from selling the house at a higher price later.

年租金

Rent perYear

资本回报率

Return on Capital

公寓价格底线

Price Floor of Flat

5,000英镑

£5,000

6.0％

6.0%

83,333.33英镑

£83,333.33

5,000英镑

£5,000

4.0％

4.0%

125,000.00 英镑

£125,000.00

租金推动的房地产价格上涨随后与另一个过程相伴而生：生产性投资利润率普遍下降。假设生产性投资回报率从 6% 降至 4%，那么，尽管一般租金水平没有任何变化，但一套年租金为 5,000 英镑的公寓的价格将如上所示上涨。

The rent-driven appreciation of property prices then becomes coupled with another process: the generally declining rate of profit in productive investment. Suppose the rate of return on productive investment falls from 6 to 4 percent, then, quite apart from any change in general rent levels, the price of a flat returning a rent of £5,000 a year will appreciate as shown above.

图 5.37说明了这两个过程在伦敦地区的运作方式。它显示了伦敦和东英吉利亚的公寓价格，后者实际上处于伦敦通勤距离的边缘。由于租金差异效应，伦敦的公寓价格始终更贵。伦敦的房东可以收取比诺维奇房东更高的租金，因为在伦敦工作和从诺维奇通勤的成本太高了。因此，伦敦的公寓价格要高得多，因为公寓价格由买房出租市场主导。但在这两个地区，以年薪中位数为单位的长期趋势都是上升的。这可能是利率长期下降的结果，而利率本身是利润率下降的必然结果。随着资本回报率普遍下降，主要国家的中央银行有动力压低利率，以试图鼓励投资，尽管工业资本回报率普遍较低。廉价抵押贷款的出现使得房东可以抬高公寓价格，同时仍能从租金中获利。由于私人买家必须在住房市场上与房东竞争，他们也必须支付更高的价格。

Figure 5.37 illustrates how these two processes have operated in the London area. It shows prices for flats in London and in East Anglia, the latter area being effectively on the margin of the London commute distance. London flats are consistently more expensive due to differential rent effects. Landlords in London can charge higher rents than landlords in, say, Norwich, because the cost of working in London and commuting from Norwich is so prohibitive. Flat prices, which are dominated by the buy-to-let market, are in consequence much higher in London. But in both areas the long-run trend, in units of the median annual wage, has been up. It is plausible that this is a consequence of the long-term fall in the rate interest, which itself is an enforced result of the falling rate of profit. As the rate of return on capital generally falls, the central banks of leading countries are motivated to drive interest rates down to try and encourage investment despite the generally low rate of return on industrial capital. The availability of cheap mortgage finance then allows landlords to bid up the price of flats and still turn a profit on the rent they earn. Since private buyers must compete with landlords in the housing market, they too have to pay a higher price.

20 世纪的英国提倡房屋所有权，将其作为实现财产所有制民主的途径。即使大多数人不再指望经济上自给自足，拥有自己的房子至少可以使他们摆脱房东的束缚。这个梦想被用来证明向现有租户出售公有廉租房是合理的。随着原来的现有租户去世，他们的房子被出售，这些原本由城市建造以提供廉价住房的公寓落入了新的地主阶级手中，他们拥有现成的资本或信贷渠道，使他们能够以高于年轻工薪阶层家庭的价格购买上市的公寓。那些在大城市里买得起公寓或房子的人面临着如此高昂的价格，以至于他们承担的银行债务使他们的生活状况与过去的租户相比好不了多少。如图5.37所示，到 2016 年，一套伦敦公寓（更不用说房子）的价格相当于十二年的工资。房屋所有权是表面的，而非实质的，因为从法律上讲，银行对出售房屋所得有优先权，银行支付的利息几乎与房东收取的利息一样多。银行成为间接的房东，他们的收入虽然以利息的形式出现，但实际上是租金。资本主义社会的地租总是低效的代价。根据李嘉图的说法，随着低效土地的开垦，经典的级差租金趋于上升。随着城市效率的降低，城市租金也会上升；无计划的发展迫使工人承担更高的运输成本或更高的租金。银行和地主阶级是这种低效的受益者。

Home ownership was promoted in Britain in the twentieth century as the path to a property-owning democracy. Even if the mass of the population could no longer hope to be economically self-sufficient, owning their own house would at least make them independent of landlords. This dream was used to justify the selling of publicly owned low-rent housing to sitting tenants. As the original sitting tenants died and their homes were sold, these flats, originally built by the cities to provide cheap housing, fell into the hands of a new landlord class, which had either the ready capital or the access to credit that allowed them to outbid young working-class families for flats coming on the market. Those who are able to buy flats or houses are, in big cities, faced with prices so high that the bank debts they assume leave them little better off than tenants once were. As Figure 5.37 shows, by 2016 a London flat, let us not speak of houses, cost the equivalent of twelve years’ wages. Home ownership is more apparent than real, since legally the banks have first call on any proceeds of the sale, and the payments in interest to the bank will be almost as much as a landlord would have charged. The banks become indirect landlords, and their revenues, although taking the form of interest, are, in effect, rent. Ground rent in capitalist society is always a payment for inefficiency. Classical differential rent tended to rise, according to Ricardo, as less efficient land was brought into cultivation. Urban rents rise as cities become more inefficient; unplanned development forces workers to bear either higher transport costs or higher rents. The banks and the landlord classes are then the beneficiaries of such inefficiency.

图 5.37. 伦敦及伦敦通勤区外围地区的公寓价格变动情况，以购买公寓所需的平均工资年限来衡量。

Figure 5.37. Movement in flat prices, measured in terms of years of median salary needed to purchase the flat, for London and an area at the outer limit of the London commute zone.

什么决定了土地财产与生产资本的相对价值？

What governs the relative value of landed property versus productive capital?

地产的价值是作为租金流入的收入的推定资本化。如果用资本的平均回报率来计算其价值，那么地产所代表的财富份额将与资本的总租金与总利润之比保持相同的比例。然而，在利润率下降的情况下，土地的表观回报率将高于资本的回报率，因为地产的市场价值稳步升值。

The value of landed property is an imputed capitalization of the revenue that flows as rent. If the average rate of return on capital is used for calculating its value, then the share of wealth represented by landed property will stand in the same ratio as the ratio of total rents to total profits on capital. Under conditions of falling profit rates, however, the apparent rate of return on land will be greater than that on capital, since landed property steadily appreciates in market value.

表5.24：信贷危机爆发前美国银行贷款的结构

TABLE 5.24: Structure of U.S. Bank Loans Just before the Onset of the Credit Crisis

金融工具

Financial Instrument

2008 年 10 月 1 日

1 October 2008

住宅抵押贷款

Residential Mortgages

$2,103

商业地产

Commercial Real Estate

$1,721

消费贷款

Consumer Loans

$860

非生产者贷款

Non-Producer Loans

$4,684

75％

75%

商业和工业

Commercial and Industrial

$1,586

25％

25%

单位：十亿美元。资料来源：美国联邦储备委员会。

Figures in $billions. Source: U.S. Federal Reserve.

假设一个国家的劳动人口固定为 2000 万，工作年中有一半是盈余。那么盈余的价值固定为 1000 万人年。假设初始资本存量为 4000 万人年，租金收入为 200 万人年。这笔租金必须从盈余中扣除，才能给资本带来利润。那么资本回报率为 [(10-2)/40]=20%，土地的市场价值为 1000 万人年。

Assume that the working population of a nation is fixed at 20 million and that half the working year goes as surplus. The value of the surplus is then fixed at 10 million person years. Suppose that the initial capital stock is 40 million person years, and the rent revenue is 2 million. This rent has to be deducted from the surplus to give the profit to capital. The rate of return on capital is then [(10-2)/40]=20%, and the market value of the landed property will be 10 million.

现在假设在1000万的盈余中，有500万用于投资，明年资本存量将为4500万，回报率将下降到[(10-2)/45] = 17.8%。

Now suppose that of the surplus of 10 million, 5 million goes in investment. Next year the capital stock will be 45 million and the rate of return will have fallen to [(10-2)/45] = 17.8%.

按照这一新的回报率，200 万租金的资本化价值现在为 1125 万。因此，地主获得了 200 万租金回报，加上 125 万资本收益，因此地产的市场盈利能力将为 [(2+1.25)/10]=32.5%，这比生产资本的回报率要高得多。只要资本存量增长速度快于人口增长速度，这种情况就会持续下去。以每年 500 万的相同速度投资，二十年后的结果是资本存量已达到 1.4 亿，回报率降至 5.7%。地产现在的资本化价值为 3500 万，包括升值在内的地产市场盈利能力为 9.6%。在晚期资本主义中，地产似乎始终比生产性投资更有利可图。因此，银行提供的资金不成比例地流向了房地产。

At this new rate of return the capitalized value of 2 million in rent is now 11.25 million. The landlords have thus had a return of 2 million in rent, plus capital gains of 1.25 million, so the market profitability of landed property will be [(2+1.25)/10]=32.5%, which is much better than the return to be had on productive capital. So long as the capital stock grows faster than the population this will go on. Investing at the same rate of 5 million per year the effect after twenty years is that the capital stock has reached 140 million and the rate of return is down to 5.7 percent. Landed property now has a capitalized value of 35 million, and the market profitability of landed property, including appreciation, is 9.6 percent. Landed property will, in late capitalism, seem to be consistently more profitable than productive investment. As a result the funding provided by the banks goes disproportionately to real estate.

这笔现金流入最终流向何处？

Where does this inflow of cash end up?

其中一些用于建造新房产。更高的地价使更高的建筑成为理所当然，因此城市中心不断被摧毁和重建，以便在每平方米土地上塞入最大面积的住宅和商业地产。另一部分贷款只是用于融资购买现有房产或以高价重新抵押房产。由于流入该行业的资金必须平衡流出的资金，而且只有一部分流入资金用于满足实际的新建筑成本，那么其余的资金最终流向何处呢？

Some of it goes to build new properties. Higher land prices justify higher buildings, so city centers are continually in the process of being destroyed and reconstructed to pack the maximum square meters of residential and commercial property onto each square meter of land. Another part of the loans simply go to finance purchase of existing properties or to remortgage properties at inflated prices. Since the flow of funds into the sector must balance the flow of funds out, and only part of the inflow goes to meet real new building costs, where does the rest end up?

大部分利润被转用于消费支出。上层中产阶级的房主在城市出售房屋，搬到其他地方消费利润。商业房地产公司以股息的形式分配以更高价格出售房产所获得的利润。这也最终为食利阶层的消费提供资金。任何承诺带来稳定未来收入的房产都存在类似的现象。一般利润率下降意味着不扩大资本基础的公司的股票会升值。这些股票的持有者，无论是个人食利者还是基金经理，都可以将资本增值的一部分作为收入。在这个过程中，整个资本家阶级越来越像以前的统治阶级：寻租和消费收入。周期性的银行危机揭示了该系统的资本基础是如何在奢侈消费的狂欢中消失的。现在，所有自由市场对国家干预的反对意见都在一夜之间消失；纳税人被要求弥补损失。

In the main it gets diverted into consumption expenditure. Upper-middle-class home owners sell houses in the cities, move elsewhere to consume the profits. Commercial real estate firms distribute, in dividends, profits gained by selling properties at higher prices. This too ends up funding the consumption of the rentier classes. A similar phenomenon applies to any property title that promises to bring a stable future income. A declining general rate of profit means that shares in companies that do not expand their capital base appreciate. Holders of these shares, whether individual rentiers or fund managers, can then appropriate a portion of the capital appreciation as revenue. In the process the capitalist class as a whole takes on more and more the aspect of former ruling classes: rent seeking and revenue consuming. Periodic banking crises reveal how the capital base of the system has vanished in an orgy of luxury consumption. Now, all free market objections to state intervention vanish overnight; the taxpayer is called in to make up the loss.

第六章

CHAPTER 6

社会主义经济

Socialist Economies

6.1 社会主义意味着什么？

6.1 WHAT DOES SOCIALISM MEAN?

米塞斯[1951] 指出，社会主义者对于社会主义没有统一的认识。每个社会主义者，或者至少每个社会主义者群体，都宣称只有自己的社会主义观点是正确的，其他观点都是误导者、人民的敌人等等。他声称，每个社会主义者都暗中认为未来的社会主义国家将由他领导。真正的社会主义就是社会主义者所颁布的法令。所有其他观点都是危险的异端邪说，最好用枪决来处理。

Mises [1951] noted that socialists have no uniform idea of what socialism is. Each socialist, or at least each group of socialists, proclaims that only its view of socialism is right and that all others are misleaders, enemies of the people, etc. Each socialist, he claims, implicitly assumes that the future socialist state will be headed by himself. True socialism is what that socialist will decree. All other views are dangerous heresies best dealt with by the firing squad.

这似乎是对社会主义运动中相当一部分人的相当准确的讽刺。虽然共产党往往对自己想要实现的目标有着相当清晰的认识，这在很大程度上是基于对苏联的模仿，但其他社会主义政党却不愿对社会主义应该如何组织给出具体的看法。各方都不愿意研究组织社会主义经济的实际问题。

This seems to be a fairly accurate caricature of a substantial fraction of the socialist movement. While the communist parties tended to have a fairly clear idea of what they wanted to achieve, based for the most part on an emulation of the USSR, other socialist parties have been loath to give a concrete view of how socialism should be organized. On all sides there has been a reluctance to examine the practical problems of organizing a socialist economy.

社会主义最初是十九世纪初欧文和傅立叶等思想家发起的哲学运动。当时，社会主义思想家愿意提出非常详细的乌托邦社会重组计划。后来，它成为工人阶级寻求公正社会的政治运动。马克思和恩格斯是工人运动中影响最深远的思想家，他们赞扬早期乌托邦主义者在建立社会主义运动方面所做的工作。他们尤其对欧文赞不绝口。但他们严厉批评了蒲鲁东和杜林等后期哲学家的乌托邦。他们声称后期乌托邦主义者是早期先驱者的苍白反映，他们的乌托邦在很大程度上存在内在矛盾。

Socialism arose first as philosophical movement by thinkers like Owen and Fourier in the early nineteenth century. At that stage socialist thinkers were willing to advance quite detailed utopian plans for the reorganization of society. Later it became a political movement of the working classes seeking a just society. Marx and Engels, the thinkers with the most lasting influence in the workers’ movement, applauded the work of the early utopians in establishing the socialist movement. They were in particular full of praise for Owen. But they were severely critical of the utopias of later philosophers like Proudhon and Dühring. They claimed that the later utopians were pale reflections of the earlier pioneers and that their utopias were for the most part internally inconsistent.

马克思认为，作为一名科学家，他无法提出关于社会主义的详细理论，因为社会主义是一种尚未存在的社会形式。经济和社会研究必须以现实社会提供的数据为基础。他愿意找出当代资本主义的特征，揭示未来社会化生产体系的潜力，但不会在没有数据的情况下构建详细的社会主义理论。他愿意说，资本主义产生了阶级斗争，这将不可避免地导致无产阶级专政，从而导致无阶级社会。至于这个社会会是什么样子，他只愿意给出粗略的预测——它将基于计划生产而不是市场，它不会使用货币，等等。

Marx took the view that as a scientist he could not put forward detailed theories about socialism, a form of society that did not yet exist. Economic and social research had to base itself upon the data provided by real society. He was ready to identify features of contemporary capitalism that revealed the potential for a future socialized production system but not to construct a detailed theory of socialism in the absence of data. He was willing to say that capitalism had generated a class struggle that would lead ineluctably to the dictatorship of the proletariat and thence to a classless society. As to what this society would be like, he was only willing to give sketchy predictions—that it would be based on planned production rather than the market, that it would not use money, etc.

俄国革命后，特别是 1930 年代中期以后，共产党人认为马克思的观点在实践中得到了充分的证实。无产阶级专政占据主导地位，经济按照单一计划运行，阶级正在被废除。他们不得不边走边发明。他们不得不即兴发挥，而他们所做的许多事情在马克思的著作中无法详细预测。但这是意料之中的，社会主义是现实生活和历史的产物，而不是哲学家梦想的结晶。对于 1930 年代到 1960 年代的共产党人来说，如果你想知道社会主义是什么，你只要看看俄罗斯就知道了。

After the Russian Revolution, and in particular after the mid-1930s, the Communists held that Marx’s views had been amply born out in practice. The dictatorship of the proletariat held sway, the economy was operated under a single plan and classes were being abolished. They had had to invent things as they went along. They had had to improvise and much of what they did could not have been predicted in detail from Marx’s writings. But this was to be expected, socialism was something born out of real life and history not the crystallization of philosophers’ dreams. For the Communists, from the ’30s to the ’60s, if you wanted to know what socialism was you just had to look at Russia.

对于其他非共产主义社会主义者来说，这个问题更加棘手。110尽管从 20 世纪 30 年代到 50 年代，绝大多数社会主义者都相信俄罗斯是社会主义国家，但总有少数人不这么认为，而在西欧^，过去 50 年来，这种观点可能代表了大多数社会主义者的意见。

For other, non-communist socialists the issue was more problematic.¹¹⁰ Although the great majority of socialists during the period from the ’30s to the ’50s took things at face value and accepted that Russia was socialist, there was always a minority who did not, and in Western Europe during the last fifty years such views have probably come to represent a majority of socialist opinion.

从俄国共产主义革命初期开始，欧洲的社会民主党就认为，布尔什维克所采用的独裁统治方式无法建立社会主义。他们认为，工人运动在过去几十年中为争取选举权、结社自由和新闻自由而进行了艰苦的斗争。建立一党专政、实行审查制度以及监禁和处决政治对手违背了工人运动所代表的一切。

From the early days of the communist revolution in Russia the Social Democratic parties in Europe argued that socialism could not be established by the methods of dictatorship that the Bolsheviks were using. They argued that the workers’ movement had during the previous decades struggled hard to win the franchise, for freedom of association and the press. To establish a one-party dictatorship, impose censorship, and to imprison and execute political opponents went against everything the movement had stood for.

他们辩称，社会主义只能建立在新闻自由、政党自由和公开的议会选举的基础上。否认这一点的社会主义要么不是社会主义，要么不值得拥有。这是一个明确而有原则的论点，社会民主党坚持了几十年。它的弱点是共产党人可以简单地反驳：“谁说你不能用独裁统治来建立社会主义？那只是议会制“白痴病。我们试过独裁，而且管用。你试过议会，你的社会主义在哪里？”

Socialism, they argued, could only be established on the basis of a free press, free political parties, and open parliamentary elections. A socialism that denied this was either not socialism or not worth having. This is a clear and principled argument and the Social Democrats stuck to it for decades. Its weakness was that the communists could simply retort: “Who says you can’t build socialism using a dictatorship? That’s just parliamentary cretinism. We have tried dictatorship and it works. You tried parliament and where is your socialism?”

从经济角度看，社会民主党对共产主义的反对较少。社会民主党对社会主义的定义是自由主义的，既有松散性的含义，也有曼彻斯特式的含义。混合经济加上社会福利立法和一些工业计划的元素肯定符合条件，因此他们对苏联共产主义的经济批评是，没有必要走得这么快。经济方向没有问题，而是温和的建议。生产资料公有制、计划、福利权利和平等的收入分配被共产党和社会民主党都视为社会主义目标。后者自诩为民主社会主义者，并不挑战后者的社会主义，只挑战他们的极权主义。

On economic grounds, the Social Democrats had less to say against communism. Social democracy has a liberal definition of socialism both in the sense of looseness and in the Manchester sense. A mixed economy with social welfare legislation and some elements of industrial planning would certainly qualify, so their economic criticism of Soviet Communism was that it is not necessary to go so far so fast. The economic direction was not in question, rather, it was the counsel of moderation. Public ownership of the means of production, planning, welfare rights, and an egalitarian income distribution were accepted as socialist objectives by both Communists and Social Democrats. The latter presented themselves as the democratic socialists without challenging the socialism of the latter, only their totalitarianism.

尽管托洛茨基主义与社会民主主义之间有相当大的重叠，所有值得称道的社会民主党都有托洛茨基主义派别，但其创始人是一位著名的共产党政治家，因此他们关于苏联为何不是社会主义的论点是从不同的前提出发的。两个关键论点是：

Although there has been considerable overlap between Trotskyism and social democracy, with all Social Democratic parties worth their salt having Trotskyist fractions, their founder had been a prominent Communist politician, and in consequence their arguments as to why the Soviet Union was not socialist started from different premises. The two key arguments were:

1.一国社会主义：

1. Socialism in one country:

（1）在一个国家内建成社会主义，从原则上讲是不可能的。

a. It is in principle impossible to build socialism in a single country.

b.苏联是一个国家。

b. The USSR is one country.

c.由此可见，苏联不可能是社会主义国家。

c. It follows that the USSR could not be socialist.

2. 充足论证[Mandel, 1985]：

2. The argument from plenty [Mandel, 1985]:

a.只有在富足的条件下，当人类从必然王国走向自由时，社会主义才有可能实现。

a. Socialism is only possible in conditions of abundance when mankind passes from the realm of necessity to freedom.

b. 苏联深陷物资短缺的泥潭，而这又是由于苏联是一个孤立的国家。

b. The USSR was plagued by shortages, which in turn stem from it being an isolated country.

c.因此苏联不可能是社会主义国家。

c. Hence the USSR could not be socialist.

关于一个国家的社会主义，似乎存在着不止一个而是好几个可能的问题。

There seems to be not one but several possible questions relating to socialism in one country.

1.一个国家能实现社会主义吗？

1. Is socialism possible in one country?

2.社会主义有可能在多个国家实现吗？

2. Is socialism possible in more than one country?

3.从长远来看，社会主义在以下方面更加稳定：

3. In the long term is socialism more stable in:

a. 单一国家。

a. A single country.

b. 许多国家。

b. Many countries.

简而言之，我的答案是 1) 是的，2) 是的，3) a。这似乎有点自相矛盾，但随着论证的进展，我的意思将变得更加清晰。

In short, my answers to this would be 1) Yes, 2) Yes, 3) a. This may seem a bit paradoxical but my meaning will become clearer as the argument progresses.

在我看来，问题 1 和 2 部分是经验性的。只是部分如此，因为问题的含义仍然依赖于人们对“国家”一词的解释。这个词通常用来指民族国家，但民族和国家并不相同。苏联是一个国际组织，而不是旧意义上的民族国家。如果我们所说的“国家”明确是指一个民族，那么必须说，我们缺乏经验证据来判断社会主义是否可能在一个国家实现。如果我们所说的“国家”是指一个单一的国家政权，那么我们就有从 30 年代初到 40 年代末存在一个单一社会主义国家的历史经验。给出的时间段取决于社会主义经济的显著特征形成的点。

From my perspective questions 1 and 2 are partly empirical. Only partly, because the meaning of the question still relies upon the interpretation one makes of the word country. This is commonly used to refer to a nation-state, but nations and states are not coterminous. The USSR was an international organization not a nation-state in the old sense. If by country we mean explicitly a nation then it must be said that we lack empirical evidence to decide if socialism is possible in a single country. If by a country then we mean a single state power, then we have historical experience of the existence of a single socialist state from the early ’30s to the late ’40s. The time period given is determined by the point at which the distinguishing characteristics of a socialist economy came into being.

不管是国家、民族还是单一制国家政权，自 1950 年代末以来，多个社会主义国家可以共存，这一点已经很明显了。我认为 50 年代末是这里的关键时期，因为在此之前，东欧的人民民主国家只是名义上的独立国家政权。那里的共产党是国家权力的有效代表，各党派之间保持着紧密的协调，以至于人们怀疑这些国家是否真的可以被视为独立国家。中国共产党独立于莫斯科，在 1950 年代初尚未建立社会主义经济。

On either definition of a country, nation or unitary state power, then since the late 1950s it has been clear that a plurality of socialist countries can coexist. I give the late ’50s as the crucial period here, since until then the People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe were only nominally independent state powers. Communist parties there were the effective agents of state power and the parties remained so tightly coordinated that it was doubtful that the states could really be considered as independent. China, where the Communist Party was independent of Moscow, had not established a socialist economy in the early 1950s.

关于社会主义在一个国家还是在几个国家更稳定的问题，看起来，在一个国家更稳定，这里所说的“国家”是指单一制的国家政权。

On the question of whether socialism is more stable in one country or several, it appears that it is more stable in one, provided that by “country” one means a unitary state power.

单一制国家政权更适合与敌对的资本主义世界形成统一战线，也更适合协调不同发展水平国家之间的经济发展。我们只需考虑一下，如果苏联没有成立，而是在其历史领土上存在多个主权民族国家，社会主义生存的机会有多大。1919 年的帝国主义列强很可能会一个接一个地征服它们。二战后，社会主义国家之间的分裂，如苏联/南斯拉夫、苏联/中国或中国/越南，被美国等对手战略性地利用，并因经济发展而受到阻碍。从矛盾的意义上讲，可以说，共产主义运动在 40 年代末至 50 年代初放弃了一国社会主义政策，即一元化国家政策，导致了 1990 年共产主义国家的垮台。

A unitary state power was better placed to present a united front to the hostile capitalist world, and best placed to coordinate the economic development of nations at different levels of development. One only has to consider what the chances of socialism’s survival would have been had the USSR not been formed, and had there existed instead a multiplicity of sovereign nation-states on its historic territory. The great imperial powers of 1919 would likely have subordinated them one by one. In the post–WWII period, splits between socialist states, USSR/Yugoslavia or USSR/China or China/ Vietnam, were exploited to strategic effect by opponents like the United States and hamstrung by their economic development. In a paradoxical sense, it can be said that the abandonment of the policy of socialism in one country in the sense of a monolithic state by the communist movement in the late ’40s to early ’50s contributed to their collapse in 1990.

诺夫 [1983b, 15–20] 令人信服地处理了用富裕来反对社会主义的论点，但我们可以在这里简要总结一下它的问题。想想马克思甚至列宁写作时欧洲工人阶级的生活水平。现在想想当时富裕的概念是什么：充足而有营养的食物，温暖的衣服以及干燥的鞋子、有良好供暖和卫生设施的房屋、接受教育、文化、文学和休闲的机会、八小时工作制、免费医疗。考虑到十九世纪英国无产阶级或沙皇俄国工人的生活条件，这似乎已经很富足了。对世界上大多数人口来说，这仍然是富足的。生活在西欧的人很容易忘记，世界资本主义经济的标准是墨西哥城而不是柏林，是拉各斯而不是斯德哥尔摩。汽车、电视、家用摄像机、电脑不会出现在十九世纪社会主义者的议程上。按照工人运动最初设想的标准，东德、捷克斯洛伐克以及苏联的工人在 80 年代就已经进入了富足时代，而对于相当一部分人口来说，即使是像 80 年代的美国这样富裕的自由市场经济体也未能提供充足的这些必需品。尽管如此，这些经济体显然仍然深陷稀缺的泥沼。

The argument from plenty against socialism is convincingly dealt with by Nove [1983b, 15–20], but we can give a brief summary of its problems here. Consider the standards of life of the working classes of Europe when Marx or even Lenin were writing. Now consider what the conception of abundance would have been then: adequate and nutritious food, warm clothing and good dry shoes, houses with good heating and sanitation, access to education, culture, literature, and leisure, an 8-hour workday, free medical treatment. Given the conditions of life of the nineteenth-century British proletariat, or the workers in czarist Russia, this would have seemed abundance. It would still be abundance to most of the world’s population. It is easy to forget, living in Western Europe, that the norm for the world capitalist economy is Mexico City rather than Berlin, Lagos rather than Stockholm. Cars, televisions, home video cameras, computers would not have featured in the agenda of nineteenth-century socialists. By the standards that the workers movement originally had in mind, the workers of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to large extent the USSR were already entering into an age of abundance by the ’80s, while for significant sections of the population even a rich free market economy like the United States in the ‘80s failed to provide abundance of such necessities. Despite this, these economies were still clearly in the thrall of scarcity.

不管衡量稀缺程度的标准是排队现象、政府的预算约束，还是民众对东方奢侈品的渴望，情况都是如此。技术的进步引发了新的渴望，而这些渴望尚未得到满足。在任何技术进步的世界里，情况都必然如此。新开发的技术开辟了无法立即无限满足的可能性。在市场经济中，广告可能会人为地刺激这些需求（这是反对广告的理由），但即使在没有广告的情况下，苏联黑市对索尼产品的需求也不乏其人。除此之外，在资源有限的情况下，例如法国目前的消费模式是否可以扩展到全世界，这仍是一个悬而未决的问题。

This was true whether the measure of scarcity was the presence of queues, the budgetary constraints faced by the government, or the aspirations of the population for oriental luxuries. The advance of technology had given rise to new aspirations that had yet to be met. In any technically advancing world this is bound to be the case. Newly developed technologies open up possibilities that cannot immediately be met in unlimited quantities. It may well be the case that in market economies advertising artificially stimulates these needs (which is a case against advertising), but even in the absence of ads there was no lack of black market demand for Sony products in the USSR. Beyond this, it is an open question as to whether the current consumption pattern of, for example, France could be extended to the whole world population given ultimately limited resources.

此外，建立社会主义世界经济是否有助于缓解苏联的匮乏问题也值得怀疑。尽管苏联的人均国民收入低于主要资本主义国家，但按世界标准来看，仍远高于平均水平。因此，苏联必须向第三世界社会主义国家提供大量援助。上世纪 50 年代，苏联就不得不向中国提供援助。苏联向越南、古巴、安哥拉等国提供的援助，已经引起了一些民众的不满。

It is, moreover, doubtful that the establishment of a socialist world economy would have been helpful in alleviating scarcity in the USSR. Although its national income per head was below that of the leading capitalist countries, it was still well above average by world standards. As such, it would have had to make substantial aid contributions to socialist countries in the Third World. It had to do this for China in the ’50s. The contributions it made to Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, etc., were already a subject of some popular resentment.

另一个社会主义思想流派是共产主义左派。他们最有口才的理论家是意大利共产党的创始人阿马德奥·博尔迪加，他实际上一直活跃于政治直到 20 世纪 60 年代。1952 年，斯大林出版了一本小书《社会主义的经济问题》，为共产主义正统派关于苏联经济的辩论奠定了基础。此后不久，博尔迪加的出版物以获得了国际共产党的认可，名为《与斯大林对话》 [1954]。在这篇文章中，博尔迪加反对苏联是社会主义的观点，而是认为苏联经济是一种国家资本主义。他的一些论点与托洛茨基主义者的论点相似，即社会主义不可能在一个国家实现，而且需要富足。此外，他还提出了苏联仍然是一个商品生产社会的论点。他认为，马克思主义的社会主义愿景一直是废除商品生产。但在苏联，工人们仍然为了货币工资而工作，并支付卢布购买商店中的商品。

Another school of socialist thought was the Communist left. Their most articulate theorist was Amadeo Bordiga, the founder of the Italian Communist Party, who actually remained politically active down to the 1960s. In 1952 Stalin published a short book, Economic Problems of Socialism, which set the terms of communist orthodox debate about the Soviet economy. Shortly thereafter a publication by Bordiga appeared under the imprimatur of the International Communist Party, called Dialogue with Stalin [1954]. In this Bordiga argued against the idea that the USSR was socialist, holding instead that its economy was a form of state capitalism. Some of his arguments parallel those of the Trotskyists, that socialism was not possible in one country and that it demanded abundance. To this he added the argument that the USSR continued to be a commodity-producing society. The Marxist vision of socialism had always been one in which commodity production was abolished, he argued. But in the USSR workers still worked for money wages and payed rubles for goods in the shops.

从形式上讲，他是对的——货币确实存在。但是，1990 年反革命之后，东欧建立真正的市场经济所面临的困难表明，这些国家货币和价格背后的社会现实与西方有所不同。在消费品市场中，价格与生产或需求所需的社会劳动量只有微弱的关系。在生产资料中，实际上根本没有市场，因为如果计划中没有为企业分配某种商品，那么仅靠货币不足以确保该商品的供应。博尔迪加正确地指出了货币和商品形式的存在是一个潜在的问题，但与大多数其他左翼作家一样，他并没有明确指出应使用哪种替代形式的经济计算。

At a formal level he was correct—money did exist. But the difficulties involved in establishing a genuine market economy in Eastern Europe after the counterrevolution of 1990 indicate that the social reality behind money and prices in these countries was somewhat different from that in the West. In the consumer goods markets, prices bore only a weak relation to the amount of social labor required to produce them or to demand. In producer goods there was not really a market at all, since money alone was not enough for an enterprise to ensure supply of a good, if this good had not been allocated to it in the plan. Bordiga was right in raising the existence of money and the commodity form as a potential problem, but like most other leftist writers he was none too specific as to what alternative form of economic calculation to use.

20世纪60年代，中共领导人开始争论苏联已经倒退回资本主义，声称赫鲁晓夫、柯西金走上了资本主义道路，苏联已经由社会主义国家变成了社会帝国主义国家。

During the 1960s the leaders of the Communist Party of China started to argue that the USSR had reverted to capitalism. It was claimed that Khrushchev, and then Kosygin, had taken the road to capitalism and that the USSR had passed from being a socialist state to being a social-imperialist one.

鉴于赫鲁晓夫引入的经济改革相当有限，这一论点很难站得住脚。然而，如果人们把它们看作是对中国内部关于正确前进道路的政治辩论的寓言评论，那么它们就更有意义了。在中国，毛派与刘少奇和邓小平的追随者之间发生了激烈的斗争。刘少奇被污蔑为中国的赫鲁晓夫。或者，这可以看作是把赫鲁晓夫贴上俄罗斯刘少奇的标签。

Given that the economic changes introduced by Khrushchev were fairly minimal this argument was hard to sustain. If, however, one views them as allegorical comments on an internal Chinese political debate about the appropriate way forward, then they make a lot more sense. Within China there was a fierce struggle between the Maoists and the followers of Liu Shaoqi and Deng. Liu was stigmatized as China’s Khrushchev. Alternatively this can be seen as labeling Khrushchev as Russia’s Liu.

如果邓小平上台后采取的经济政策反映了 60 年代党内秘密辩论中提出的建议，那么“资本主义道路主义”的指控似乎在中国的背景下具有一定的现实性。但在戈尔巴乔夫之前，那些在俄罗斯提倡类似措施的人远非政治权力中心。

If the economic policies followed by Deng after he came to power are indicative of what was being proposed in secret party debates during the ’60s then the charges of “capitalist roadism” seem to have had some reality in the Chinese context. But until Gorbachov, those advocating similar measures in Russia were far from the centers of political power.

距离马克思的著作已经过去了一个半世纪，今天我们拥有比他更多的历史证据。我们有充分的机会观察那些通常被称为社会主义的社会。我们说“通常”是指知道有些人对此持不同意见，但无论是考虑到这些社会的宪法（宣称它们是社会主义的）、其公民认为它们是社会主义的普遍观点、还是国际媒体宣称它们是社会主义的普遍观点，这似乎都是一致的看法。

It is now a century and a half since Marx was writing, and today we have much more historical evidence to go on than he had. We have had extensive opportunities to observe societies that were by common understanding called socialist. We say “by common understanding” being well aware that some people dissent from this, but whether one takes account of the constitutions of these societies, which proclaimed them to be socialist, the common view of their citizens who believed them to be socialist, or the common view of the international press which declared them to be socialist that appears to have been the consensus view.

社会主义运动中的许多思潮对这一共识持不同意见，理由是“迄今为止”的社会主义国家的状况违反了许多社会主义理想。

Many currents of thought in the socialist movement have dissented from this consensus, on the grounds that the conditions in countries of “hitherto existing” socialism violated numerous socialist ideals.

这或许是对的，但作为社会科学家，我们不能用理想世界的标准来评判现实世界。实现我们的理想并不是现实的任务。现实就是如此，有其辉煌、恐怖和矛盾。当我们将社会主义的现实与其早期倡导者所提出的理想进行比较时，我们采用了一种不同寻常的标准。我们不会用理想的标准来评判封建主义或资本主义，如果我们这样做，我们很快就会发现，没有一个真正的资本主义社会完全符合这一理想。人们可能会注意到，社会主义的反对者经常说，由于福利国家的英国在许多方面与十九世纪资本主义的理想类型不同，它不再是真正的资本主义。

This may well be true, but as social scientists we cannot judge the real world by the standards of an ideal one. It is not the job of reality to materialize our ideals. Reality just is in all its glories, horrors, and contradictions. When judging the reality of socialism in comparison with ideals advanced by its early advocates, we adopt an unusual criterion. We do not judge feudalism or capitalism by the standards of an ideal, and were we to do that we would soon find that no real capitalist society corresponded in whole to this ideal. One may note that it was a common argument by opponents of socialism to say that since welfare-state Britain differed in many respects from the ideal type of nineteenth-century capitalism, it was no longer really capitalist.

如果一个思想家在某种社会尚未形成之前就提出了该理论，那么该理论的科学地位就很低。如果该理论的预测与后来的观察结果相冲突，那么人们要么认为该理论需要修改，要么认为现实表现不佳。如果人们采取后一种政策，说社会主义从未在世界上任何地方存在过，人们可能希望（也许是徒劳的）摆脱当前政治上的不受欢迎，但人们几乎没有提高实际处理导致这种不受欢迎的问题的能力。理想可以保持纯洁，但其与现实的距离削弱了其实际的政治力量，而左派正处于马克思在《乌托邦主义》中批评的困境中。

If a thinker advances a theory about a kind of society before it ever comes into existence, the scientific status of the theory is weak. If the predictions of the theory come to conflict with later observation one can either decide that the theory needs modification or that reality has been misbehaving. If one adopts the latter policy and says that socialism has never existed anywhere in the world, one may hope (perhaps vainly) to escape some current political unpopularity, but one has hardly advanced one’s ability to deal practically with the problems that led to this unpopularity. An ideal can be kept pristine but its very distance from reality vitiates its practical political force and the left is in precisely the predicament that Marx criticized in Utopianism.

因此，我们采取实证的方法来确定社会主义社会的显著特征是什么。

We therefore take an empirical approach to determining what the distinguishing characteristics of socialist society have been.

• 电能的广泛使用。

• Widespread use of electrical energy.

• 农业生产力足以满足大量城市人口的需求。

• Agricultural productivity sufficient for a large urban populations.

• 农业或工业领域缺乏富裕的私营业主阶层。

• The absence of a class of wealthy private proprietors in agriculture or industry.

• 机械和应用科学的广泛使用。

• Widespread use of machinery and applied science.

• 经济的大部分为公有制或合作制。

• Public or cooperative ownership of most of the economy.

• 国家计划体系通过分配给消费品与其他商品的相对优先权来确定剩余产品的规模，并通过国家指令系统分配生产工具。

• A system of state planning that determines the scale of the surplus product by the relative priorities it assigns to consumption versus other goods, with allocation of instruments of production by means of a system of state directives.

• 由此导致缺乏资本货物或原材料市场。（事实上，人们可能会质疑这些社会中“资本货物”一词的含义。）

• A consequent absence of capital goods or raw materials markets. (Indeed one may question the meaning of the term “capital goods” in these societies.)

• 家庭经济作为准备和消费食物以及养育子女的场所的延续，从而产生了

• The continuation of household economy as a site for the preparation and consumption of food and the raising of children, which gives rise

到：

to:

• 消费品市场的正式存在受到以下限制：

• The formal existence of a consumer goods market subject to the constraints that:

• 很大一部分消费品是通过购买或销售以外的方式分销的。

• A significant portion of consumer goods were distributed by means other than purchase or sale.

• 消费品市场价格机制总体不畅。

• The price mechanism in the consumer goods market was generally non-operative.

• 缺乏土地市场，也缺乏租金这一经济类别。

• The absence of a market in land, and the absence of rent as an economic category.

• 与处于同等工业发展阶段的资本主义国家相比，收入与平均水平的差异较小。

• A lower variance of incomes from the mean than was the case in capitalist countries at an equivalent stage of industrial development.

• 一种独特的剩余产品的提取方式，即在当前消费、积累和非生产性消费之间对社会产品的具体形式进行政治决定的划分。

• A distinct mode of extraction of the surplus product, that is, the politically determined division of the concrete forms of the social product between the categories of current consumption, accumulation, and unproductive consumption.

• 将剩余产品正式征收为税收，但将税收从提取剩余产品的手段降级为确保货币稳定的手段。

• Formal appropriation of the surplus product as tax but the relegation of taxation from a means of extraction of a surplus to means of securing monetary stability.

• 货币和雇佣劳动的存在。

• The existence of money and wage labor.

• 缺乏失业后备大军，这往往与长期劳动力短缺有关。

• The absence of a reserve army of unemployed, often associated with chronic labor shortages.

这些是社会主义世界区别于资本主义世界的重大结构性特征，也是这些国家资本主义拥护者所希望废除的特征。

These are the significant structural features that marked off the socialist world from the capitalist. These are also the features that the advocates of capitalism in these countries wish to abolish.

那些否认社会主义曾经存在过的社会民主主义左翼社会主义者通常不会具体说明其中哪些与社会主义不相容。人们不得不假设他们所倡导的社会主义制度具有大多数这些特征^。111

Those socialists to the left of social democracy who deny that socialism has ever existed do not generally specify which of them are incompatible with socialism. One has to assume that the socialist systems they advocate would share most of these features.¹¹¹

社会主义经济的基本生产方式与资本主义相同：机器工业和农业。它们的区别在于财产形式和剩余产品的确定方式。

Socialist economies have the same basic mode of production as capitalism: machine industry and agriculture. What distinguishes them are the forms of property and the way in which the surplus product is determined.

现实国家表现出社会主义与其他生产关系的混合。社会主义可能作为子系统存在于以资本主义为主的国家中，资本主义或国内小农经济也可能存在于以资本主义为主的国家中。在以社会主义为主的经济体中，生产方式作为子系统存在。虽然政治革命可以允许改变财产关系，但至少在短期内，它们无力改变生产方式。1917 年革命未能建立社会主义生产方式，正如 1776 年或 1789 年革命未能建立资本主义生产方式一样。俄国社会主义的建立，与北美和法国资本主义的建立一样，后来也伴随着一系列生产技术和经济关系的变化。法国直到 1900 年，即革命后一个多世纪，才达到俄国在 1917 年后不到四分之一世纪就达到的城市工业发展水平。112^可以说，法国向资本主义的过渡和俄国向社会主义的过渡直到 20 世纪 60 年代才完成。俄国生产方式的这些变化发生得更快，但这并不掩盖生产方式的变化需要时间的事实。如果资本主义和社会主义的共享生产方式已经基本存在，如1945年以后的德国或捷克斯洛伐克，那么向社会主义的转变就会发生得更快。

Actual countries have shown mixtures of socialist and other production relations. Socialism may exist as a subsystem within countries that are predominantly capitalist, and capitalism or domestic peasant economy may exist as subsystems in predominantly socialist economies. Though political revolutions may permit changes in property relations, they are, at least in the short term, powerless to effect a change in the mode of production. The 1917 Revolution was no more able to establish the socialist mode of production than the revolutions of 1776 or 1789 were able to establish the capitalist mode of production. The establishment of socialism in Russia, as with the establishment of capitalism in North America and France, came later with a sequence of changes in production technologies and economic relations. It took France until 1900, over a century after the revolution, to achieve the degree of urban industrial development that Russia achieved in less than a quarter-century after 1917.¹¹² Arguably the transition to capitalism in France and that to socialism in Russia was not complete until the 1960s. That these changes in the mode of production took place much faster in the Russian case does not obscure the fact that changes in the mode of production take time. If capitalism and socialism’s shared mode of production already largely exists, as in Germany or Czechoslovakia post-1945, the change to socialism can occur much faster.

社会主义诞生于工人阶级和农民运动的政治成功，而不是自发的经济发展。

Socialism was born from political successes by working-class and peasant movements, not spontaneous economic development.

它是由以社会主义为目标的运动产生的。但这与世界上大多数国家的资本主义并无太大区别。社会主义运动有其经济理论家，他们的思想反过来又影响了社会主义政府。但这与资本主义政府并无太大区别。他们也受到倡导理想资本主义社会类型的经济学家的影响。自由市场资本主义理论早在资本主义建立为国际体系之前就已发展起来。它通过英国的刺刀和武装直升机传播开来，让毛泽东之前的几代中国人看到了社会转型所需的政治力量来自何处。

It was produced by movements that had socialism as an objective. But this is not so different from capitalism in most of the world. The socialist movement had its economic theorists, whose ideas in their turn influenced socialist governments. But this is not so different from capitalist governments. They too have been influenced by economists advocating an ideal type of capitalist society. The theory of free-market capitalism developed well before capitalism was established as an international system. Its spread, by British bayonets and gunships, showed the Chinese in the generations before Mao where the political power needed for social transformation came from.

6.2 电源

6.2 POWER

共产主义就是苏维埃政权加上全国电气化。

Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.

— 列宁 1965B 卷第 34 卷

— LENIN 1965B, VOL. 34

政治权力来自枪杆子，但真正的权力又如何呢？

Political power grew from the barrels of guns, but what about real power?

资本主义从水力和风力发展到蒸汽作为动力，但共产主义者从一开始就选择电力。德国作家李卜克内西（1901）在 19 世纪 90 年代写道，他在 19 世纪 50 年代见过卡尔·马克思，当时他看到了一辆电动火车模型。马克思热情洋溢地认为，就像蒸汽创造了资本主义一样，电力也将创造一种新的经济和社会秩序。李卜克内西讽刺道，在随后的四十五年里，电力尚未占据主导地位。火车仍然是蒸汽机，为数不多的有轨电车也毫无意义。

Capitalism progressed from water and wind power to steam for motive power, but communists, from the outset, plumped for electricity. German author Liebknecht [1901], writing in the 1890s, described having met Karl Marx in the 1850s after he had seen a model electric train. Marx enthused that just as steam had created capitalism, electric power would create a new economic and social order. Liebknecht remarked sardonically that in the ensuing forty-five years there had been no signs of electricity taking over yet. The trains were still steam, and the few electric tramcars were of no significance.

从二十一世纪回望，马克思似乎对电力的前景有更敏锐的认识。看技术的发展必须放长远的眼光。

Looking back from the twenty-first century, Marx appears to have had the more acute sense of the promise of electric power. You have to take the long view when looking at the development of technology.

革命不是靠花招就能实现的。只有政治上的轰动性表演才会被那些行之有效的乡村信仰称为革命。凡是预言革命的人，总是会搞错日期。[Liebknecht, 1901]

Revolutions are not accomplished in a sleight-of-hand fashion. Only the sensational shows in politics are called revolutions by the wonder-working rustic faith. And whoever prophesizes revolutions is always mistaken in the date. [Liebknecht, 1901]

我们知道，正如马克思所猜测的那样，电力已经变得非常重要，但是为什么电力被认为如此重要，以至于列宁将它列为苏联工业化的关键呢？

We know that electricity has turned out to be quite important, as Marx suspected, but why was it seen as so crucial that Lenin should have singled it out as the very key to Soviet industrialization?

人类劳动是一种普遍的、抽象的生产能力。我们的能量输出可能不足 100 瓦，但可以应用于任何行业或职业。人类劳动的第一个可用替代品是我们的畜力仆人——牛和马。这些伙伴虽然强壮，但技能有限。它们帮助我们拉车或犁，但不能帮助我们驾驶船只、砌砖或纺羊毛。蒸汽机与我们一起出海，取代了一半的船员，取代了我们的牲畜牵引力，转动纺纱机，为我们的城市切割石头。但蒸汽机很重，不灵活，只能产生动力。它不能唱歌、洗涤或为我们看东西。有了电，我们第一次利用了一种在灵活性上可与人类劳动相媲美的力量，而在强度上却远远超过人类劳动。电为我们写字，为我们说话，然后在电报、电话和电视中为我们看东西。它的发动机大小和功率从我们的小手指到 50,000 匹马不等。它照亮我们的黑暗，为我们的家园供暖，存储我们的记录，进行推理和计算。它成为抽象的能量，即瓦特将军。

Human labor is a universal, abstract productive capacity. Our energy output may be modest at under 100 watts, but it can be applied in any trade or profession. The first available alternative to human effort was that of our brute servants the ox and horse. Strong as these companions are, their skills are limited. They helped us draw vehicles or pull plows, but they could not help crew ships, lay bricks, or spin wool. Steam went to sea with us, supplanting half a crew, replaced our beasts in traction, turned spinning mills and cut stone for our cities. But the steam engine was heavy, inflexible, and produced only motive force. It could not sing, wash, or see for us. With electricity we harnessed for the first time a power that rivaled that of human labor in flexibility, while vastly surpassing it in magnitude. Electricity wrote for us, then spoke for us then saw for us in telegraphs, telephones, and televisions. Its motors range in size and power from our little fingers to that of 50,000 horses. It lights our darkness, heats our homes, stores our records, reasons and calculates. It becomes power in the abstract, the General Watt.

我们已经习惯了电力，很难将其与实际努力联系起来，因此值得将其与人力联系起来。一名训练有素的人类自行车手，用力蹬车，产生的电量仅够点亮一盏白炽灯（见图6.1）。

We have become so accustomed to electric power that we have difficulty relating it to real effort so it is worth relating it to human power. A trained human cyclist, peddling hard, generates only enough power for one incandescent light (see Figure 6.1).

要成为抽象的通用电力，电力需要供应网络，最初是城市网络，然后是全国网络、大陆网络，将来是全球网络。在建设这些网络时，多家私营公司的竞争适得其反。最初，由于供应商相互竞争，电压或连接器没有标准化，这减缓了任何比简单的电灯更复杂的东西的普及。为一个城市或地区提供电力干线的成本很高，因此多家竞争公司在每条街道上铺设自己的电线是不经济的。电力趋向于垄断。即使在资本主义国家，国家也必须在电力供应中发挥指导或所有权作用。因此，国家要么建设国家电网和发电站，要么至少为私人供应商制定技术标准和管制价格。由于其综合性以及所需的前瞻性投资，电力成为制定长期国家计划的首批行业之一。即使在英国撒切尔政府将电力私有化之后，事实证明国家也不可能放弃其在管制价格和推动风能和核能发电发展方面的指导作用。当英国需要新的核电站时，它不得不求助于法国国有电力垄断企业来供应。

To become abstract general power, electricity requires networks of supply, initially urban, then national, continental, and in the future, world girdling. In the construction of these networks, competition of multiple private firms was counterproductive. Initially, with competing suppliers, there was no standardization of voltages or connectors, which slowed the uptake of anything more complicated than simple electric lighting. Providing power mains to a city or region is expensive, making it uneconomic for multiple competing companies to lay their own wires down every street. Electricity trends to monopolies. Even in capitalist countries the state had to take on a directing or ownership role in its supply. Thus the state either built the national grids and power stations or at the very least set technical standards and regulated prices for private suppliers. Because of its integrated character and because of the forward investment it required, electricity became one of the first industries for which long-term national plans were made. Even after the Thatcher government in Britain privatized electricity, it proved impossible for the state to relinquish its directive role in regulating price and enforcing the development of wind and nuclear generation. When the British state required new nuclear power stations it had to turn to the state-owned French electricity monopoly to supply them.

图6.1 人体功率输出与常用电器用电量比较。

Figure 6.1. Comparison between human power output and the electricity used in common appliances.

因此，苏联领导人不仅将电力视为实现工业化和农村发展的有利技术，而且将其视为中央国家计划能够抢在竞争性资本主义前面的典范，这并不令人意外。1945 年，当英国选出社会主义政府时，它也立即着手建立国有电力供应系统，包括国家水力发电委员会。

It is no surprise then that the leaders of Soviet Russia saw electricity not only as an enabling technology for industrialization and the development of the countryside, but also as the paradigmatic example of where central state planning could steal a march on competitive capitalism. When a socialist government was elected in Britain in 1945, it too immediately set about the establishment of a nationalized system of electricity supply, including a state Hyroelectric Board.

作为国际上的一般规则，国家需要开展大型资本密集型电力项目，例如在主要河流上修建水坝。

As a general rule internationally, the state was needed to embark on huge capital-intensive electricity projects like building dams across major rivers.

图 6.2. 尽管在第聂伯河和长江上修建水坝的这项技术的初始成本很高，但社会主义经济体仍然接受了水力发电。

Figure 6.2. Socialist economies have embraced hydropower despite the high initial costs of this technology in dams over the Dnieper and Yangtze rivers.

图 B.1 表明，在资本主义国家，不同行业的利润率差异很大。劳动力成本只占预付资本一小部分的行业往往利润率较低，这是劳动价值论的预期结果。私营企业不愿开展水电或潮汐等资本密集型项目，甚至不愿使用核能，除非得到国家财政激励。美国电力行业在一定程度上例外，因为资本密集型行业回报率较低。自然垄断和公共监管相结合，确保其利润率略高于其资本结构所预测的利润率 [Cockshott and Cottrell, 2003b]，尽管仍远低于美国的平均回报率。因此，即使在美国，大规模的水电开发也是由国有田纳西流域管理局在 20 世纪 30 年代进行的。

Figure B.1 shows that, in a capitalist country, the rate of profit is widely divergent between different industries. The industries in which labor costs are a small fraction of the advanced capital tend to have a lower rate of profit, which is what one would expect from the labor theory of value. Private industry is reluctant to embark on capital-intensive projects like hydropower or tidal and are even reluctant to use nuclear energy unless given state financial incentives. The U.S. electricity industry was a partial exception to the general trend for highly capitalized industries to have a lower rate of return. The combination of a natural monopoly and public regulation ensured that it earned a rate of profit somewhat above what its capital composition would predict [Cockshott and Cottrell, 2003b], though still well below the average rate of return in the United States. So even there, the large-scale development of hydropower was undertaken by the government owned Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s.

苏联政府的第一个经济规划机构是俄罗斯国家电气化委员会，负责制定全面的电气化计划。从 20 世纪 20 年代中期开始，三座大型水电站迅速建成，到 1932 年，第聂伯河水电站的发电量达到 560 兆瓦，是当时世界上最大的发电机。中国共产党政府对水力发电也表现出了类似的热情。长江上的三峡大坝成为世界上最大的发电厂，但规模要大得多，达到 22,000 兆瓦。到 1990 年苏联时期结束时，水力发电占发电量的 18%，核能占 12%，其余则来自化石燃料 [Rudenko，1993]。

The Soviet government’s first economic planning body was GOELRO, responsible for drawing up the comprehensive electrification program. Construction of three large hydropower plants rapidly took place from the mid-1920s, and by 1932 the Dnieper hydro-station was producing 560MW, for its day the biggest electric generator in the world. The Communist government in China showed similar enthusiasm for hydroelectricity. The Three Gorges Dam across the Yangtze becoming in its turn the world’s largest power plant, but at a vastly greater scale, 22,000MW in this case. By the end of the Soviet period in 1990, hydropower made up 18 percent of electric generation, nuclear 12 percent, with the remainder being from fossil fuel sources [Rudenko, 1993].

为了了解本文撰写时成熟的苏联、中国和其他国家等经济体可用的电能规模，请参见表6.1和6.2。

To get some sense of the scale of the electric energy available to economies like the mature USSR, China and other countries around the time of writing, see Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

首先要注意的是，当代中国的人均能源使用量与二十五年前的苏联几乎处于同一数量级，而且这两个数字都与 2014 年欧洲的人均能源使用量相近。这些表格还复制了 1907 年英国的能源使用数据（来自表 5.5），以供比较。这表明在二十世纪的电气革命期间，能源使用量出现了多么巨大的增长。1907 年的英国是世界上最富有和机械化程度最高的三个国家之一。英国海岸线上每个男人、女人或孩子所拥有的蒸汽动力相当于 7 名人类工人的努力。到 2014 年，这一数字已上升到 24 人。但在 25 年前，苏联人均使用电量就已相当于 27 个人^。113

The first thing to note is that contemporary China has access to almost the same order of magnitude of energy per head as the USSR had twenty-five years earlier, and that both of these were similar to the per capita energy use of Europe in 2014. The tables also reproduce the data for energy use for Britain in 1907 (from Table 5.5) for comparison. This shows what a huge increase in energy use took place during the electrical revolution of the twentieth century. Britain in 1907 was one of the three richest and most highly mechanized countries in the world. For each man, woman, or child within its coastline it had steam power equivalent to the efforts of seven human workers. By 2014 that had risen to the equivalent of 24 people. But a quarter of a century earlier, the USSR was already using the electrical equivalent of 27 humans for each citizen.¹¹³

表 6.1：不同经济体可用电力比较

TABLE 6.1: Comparison of Power Available to Different Economies

国家

Country

年

Year

平均孕育量

Average GW

中国

China

2014

663.3

我们

U.S.

2014

494.6

欧盟

2014

361.4

苏联

USSR

1990

197.3

英国

2014

38.6

英国

1907

7.0

除了 GB 1907 的数据（来自表 5.5）外，其余数据都是根据每年生产的十亿千瓦小时数计算得出的平均电力使用量。除了 GB 1907 外，这些数据都是一年中每小时的平均电力输出量，略低于装机容量。英国 1907 年的数据与图 5.7保持一致。来源：最新数据见《全球能源统计年鉴 2016》；苏联数据来自 Rudenko，见参考书目，1993 年。

For all but the GB 1907 figure, which comes from Table 5.5, these are figures for average electrical power use computed from the annual number of billion KW hours produced. The figures, except for GB 1907, are for average power delivered for each hour in the year, and will be somewhat below the installed capacity. The figure for the UK in 1907 is given for continuity with Figure 5.7. Source: For recent data, Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2016; Soviet data from Rudenko, see bibliography, 1993.

表 6.2：不同经济体可用电力折算成人均人力劳动当量的比较

TABLE 6.2: Comparison of Power Available to Different Economies Converted into Human Labor Effort Equivalents per Head of Population

假设一名体力劳动者每年可工作 216 千瓦时。

Assumption is that a manual worker could do 216 KWh per year of work.

利用热能发电不可避免地会以废热的形式造成能量损失，既包括烟气中的废热，也包括用于冷凝涡轮机蒸汽的温水中的废热。效率以生产一千瓦时电力所消耗的热量来衡量。从这个角度来看，苏联在 1963 年就超过了英国，使用 12,200 BTU/KWh而英国为 12,400 [Anon., 1965]，但仍落后于美国，美国仅使用了 10,500。社会主义国家和资本主义国家发电厂之间的一个显著区别是前者广泛使用热电联产 [Diskant, 1979]。在这些系统中，热电厂的废热通过管道输送到整个城市地区供热。莫斯科有 1,800 英里的此类管道。因此，能源使用的整体效率远远高于简单的 BTU/KWh 数字所暗示的效率。

Production of electricity from heat inevitably involves energy losses in the form of waste heat, both in the flue gases and in the warm water that has been used to condense steam from the turbines. Efficiency is measured in amount of heat used to produce a kilowatt hour of electricity. In these terms the USSR had overtaken the UK by 1963, using 12,200 BTU/KWh against 12,400 in the UK [Anon., 1965], but was still some way behind the United States, which used only 10,500. A significant difference between the power plants in the socialist and capitalist countries was the widespread use of combined heat and power in the former [Diskant, 1979]. In these systems the waste heat from thermal power plants was taken in pipes to heat whole city districts. Moscow had 1,800 miles of such piping. The overall efficiency of energy use was thus considerably higher than the simple BTU/KWh figures would imply.

苏联的做法是利用当地的热力供暖厂为新建住宅区供暖，其热量输出由室外气温决定。一旦住宅区达到足够的规模，热量就会从热力发电厂通过管道输送到主热水网络中。此后，原有的当地热力发电厂将作为备用。苏联通过使用标准化的模块化热力发电厂实现了规模经济，尽管这种标准化可能略微减缓了热效率的提高。

The Soviet practice was to heat new housing developments using local thermal heating plants, whose heat output was thermostatically determined by the outside air temperature. Once the development had reached a sufficient size, heat would be piped into the main hot water network from thermal power plants. After this, the original local thermal plant was kept as a backup. The USSR achieved economies of scale by using standardized modular thermal power plants, though such standardization may have slightly slowed down the improvement in thermal efficiency.

美国媒体认为，这种区域供暖不计量，是效率低下的糟糕例子 [Paddock, 1997]。据说，如果房间太热，俄罗斯人会直接打开窗户，而不是调低恒温器。这忽略了一个事实：在纽约市，电力公司将莫斯科的供暖热能直接排入哈德逊河。

That this district heating was supplied unmetered was held up by the American press as a terrible example of inefficiency [Paddock, 1997]. Russians would, it was said, simply open their windows rather than turn down a thermostat if their room got too hot. This ignored the fact that in New York City the heat that would, in Moscow, have heated flats, was simply dumped into the Hudson River by the power company.

电力不是一次能源。它依赖于其他一次能源，如河流流动、石油燃烧或原子分裂。在第 5.4.4 节中，我指出单靠水力无法提供足够的能量来维持维多利亚晚期的资本主义。由于苏联的河流比英国大得多，因此更广泛地使用了水力发电。然而，如果他们只使用这种能源，人均可用的机械动力将比维多利亚晚期英格兰的要少。相反，经济严重依赖化石燃料，在苏联后期主要是天然气和石油。根据 Allen [2003] 的说法，苏联经济增长从 1970 年代开始放缓的一个原因是，只有通过从西伯利亚获取石油和天然气才能实现能源使用的持续扩大，而这比从里海盆地获取石油和天然气要昂贵得多。

Electricity is not a primary energy source. It depends on other primary sources such as the flow of rivers, burning oil, or splitting atoms. In Section 5.4.4 I argue that water power alone could not have provided sufficient energy to sustain even late-Victorian capitalism. With much bigger rivers than Britain, the USSR made more extensive use of hydropower. If, however, they had only used this source of energy, the amount of mechanical power available per head would have been less than was used in late-Victorian England. Instead the economy relied heavily on fossil fuels, in the late USSR mainly gas and oil. According to Allen [2003], one reason for the slowdown in Soviet economic growth from the 1970s was that the continued expansion of energy use could only be achieved by accessing oil and gas from Siberia, a much more costly task than getting it from the Caspian Basin.

迄今为止存在的工业生产方式，无论是历史上的资本主义还是社会主义都拥有这种生产方式，这种生产方式依赖于长期以化石形式储存的阳光。任何这样的生产方式都是自我限制的，会破坏其自身的生存条件。从某种意义上说，这种限制甚至低于我们已经分析过的资本主义的人口限制。它们对资源的依赖，从人类历史的尺度来看，很快就会耗尽，这标志着它们的生产方式是暂时的。它不会是第一个耗尽资源的生产方式。中石器时代的狩猎似乎也做了同样的事情，引发了新石器时代农业革命。相比之下，农民封建经济相对来说可以自我维持，尽管停滞不前。如果需要再次证明发明之母，那么一场类似的革命将发生在更可持续的生产方式上。其中的一个关键因素是从化石燃料转向其他能源生产方式。

The hitherto existing industrial mode of production, variants of which both historical capitalism and socialism have shared, depends on sunlight long sequestered in fossil form. Any such mode of production is self-limiting, destroying its own conditions of existence. This limitation lies, in a sense, below even the demographic constraints we already analyzed for capitalism. Their dependence on resources which, by the scale of human history, will quickly be exhausted, marks out their mode of production as transitory. It will not be the first mode of production to exhaust its resources. Mesolithic hunting seems to have done the same, precipitating the Neolithic Revolution in agriculture. Peasant feudal economy, in contrast, was relatively self-sustaining, if stagnant. If necessity again proves the mother of invention, a similar revolution to a more sustainable mode of production will take place. A key element of this will be the shift from fossil fuels to other modes of energy production.

表 6.3：2015 年中国电力来源及“十三五”规划预测

TABLE 6.3: Chinese Electricity Sources in 2015 and as Projected in the 13th 5-Year Plan

中国迄今为止主要依靠煤炭为发电站提供燃料，其核能使用量远低于苏联。尽管得益于四分之一世纪的技术发展，到 2015 年，中国使用的可再生资源要多得多。但即使考虑到 2020 年五年计划中太阳能、风能和核能的快速增长，化石燃料发电量仍然很大，因此仍将占到发电量的 60% 以上。

China, which up to now has relied preponderantly on coal to fuel its power stations, uses far less nuclear than the USSR did. Benefiting though from a quarter-century of technical development it was by 2015 using much more recyclable sources of energy. But even allowing for a very rapid growth in solar, wind, and nuclear energy in the 5-year plan to 2020, fossil fuel generation is so big that it will still produce over 60 percent of electricity.

中国的核电与苏联一样，都是采用水冷设计。可以说，这种反应堆本质上比气冷反应堆更危险，因为水冷反应堆过热时存在爆炸风险。切尔诺贝利和福岛的严重事故都是由不同类型的水冷反应堆引起的。开发更安全的高温气冷反应堆已被中国列为优先技术目标。

Chinese nuclear power, like that of the USSR, has been based on water-cooled designs. It is arguable that such reactors are inherently more dangerous than gas-cooled ones, since there are inherent explosion risks on overheating with water cooling. The serious accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima were with different variants of water-cooled reactors. Development of safer high-temperature gas reactors has been set as a high-priority technical goal in China.

快中子反应堆技术也正在开发中，该技术可以大大提高核燃料的利用效率 [新闻，2010]。114^目前已有安装数百吉瓦快中子反应堆的宏伟计划，但中国经济在 21 世纪能否比英国、法国和日本过去失败的快中子反应堆计划取得更大成功，还有待观察。过去，这项技术被证明很难掌握，但中国可能拥有实现该技术所需的规模和人口资源。

Fast neutron reactor technology, which makes far more efficient use of nuclear fuel, is also being developed [News, 2010].¹¹⁴ Ambitious plans to install hundreds of GW of these exist, but whether the Chinese economy in the twenty-first century is any more successful with them than the aborted plans that the UK, France, and Japan had for fast reactors in the past, remains to be seen. The technology has in the past proven very difficult to master, but China may have the resources of scale and population needed to make it work.

6.3 再生产与劳动分工

6.3 REPRODUCTION AND DIVISION OF LABOR

我们现在正面临一场社会革命，在这场革命中，一夫一妻制迄今存在的经济基础必将消失，正如它所补充的卖淫经济基础一样。一夫一妻制的产生，是由于大量财富集中在一个男人的手中，并且需要把这些财富传给这个男人的子女，而不是其他人的子女。为此，需要的是女人的专一，而不是男人的专一，所以女人的专一丝毫不妨碍男人公开或隐蔽的一夫多妻制。但是，通过把永久的、可继承的财富——生产资料——的大部分——转化为社会财产，即将到来的社会革命将把所有这些关于传授和继承的忧虑减少到最低限度。一夫一妻制的产生是由于经济原因，那么，当这些原因消失时，它会消失吗？

We are now approaching a social revolution in which the economic foundations of monogamy as they have existed hitherto will disappear just as surely as those of its complement prostitution. Monogamy arose from the concentration of considerable wealth in the hands of a single individual man—and from the need to bequeath this wealth to the children of that man and of no other. For this purpose, the monogamy of the woman was required, not that of the man, so this monogamy of the woman did not in any way interfere with open or concealed polygamy on the part of the man. But by transforming by far the greater portion, at any rate, of permanent, heritable wealth—the means of production—into social property, the coming social revolution will reduce to a minimum all this anxiety about bequeathing and inheriting. Having arisen from economic causes, will monogamy then disappear when these causes disappear?

有人可能会不无道理地回答说：一夫一妻制非但不会消失，反而会完全实现。因为随着生产资料转化为社会财产，雇佣劳动、无产阶级也将消失，因此一定数量（可统计）的妇女为金钱而献身的必要性也将消失。卖淫消失了；一夫一妻制非但没有瓦解，反而最终成为现实——对男性也是如此。

One might answer, not without reason: far from disappearing, it will, on the contrary, be realized completely. For with the transformation of the means of production into social property there will disappear also wage-labor, the proletariat, and therefore the necessity for a certain—statistically calculable—number of women to surrender themselves for money. Prostitution disappears; monogamy, instead of collapsing, at last becomes a reality—also for men.

— ENGELS 和 HUNT，2010 年

— ENGELS AND HUNT, 2010

社会具有由其经济结构构建的典型家庭意识形态和家庭法。这是恩格斯和亨特 [2010] 的基本论点，他们利用这一前提试图预测后资本主义社会中的家庭将如何变化。妙处在于，这种家庭历史理论本身成为社会主义家庭关系的意识形态基础的一部分。

Societies have characteristic family ideologies and family laws structured by their economies. This was a basic thesis of Engels and Hunt [2010], who used this premise to try to predict how the family would change in a post-capitalist society. The nice point is that this theory of the history of the family then itself became part of the ideological foundation of socialist family relations.

共产党人公开宣称的目标是按照恩格斯倡导的路线改革两性关系。妇女普遍参与公共产业将导致一夫一妻制家庭作为社会基本经济单位的废除。私人家务劳动将转变为社会产业，整个社会将负责照顾和教育所有子女，无论是婚生子女还是非婚生子女。

The professed aim of the Communists was to reform the relations between the sexes along the lines advocated by Engels. The universal participation of women in public industry would have as a consequence the abolition of the monogamous family as the basic economic unit of society. Private household work would be transformed into a social industry and society as a whole would take responsibility for the care and education of all children whether born in or out of marriage.

消除财产考量后，婚姻将完全基于相互的爱。包办婚姻将不复存在。我们往往认为包办婚姻是东方特有的，但婚姻的根本原则是传承和积累财产，这种原则在当时非常普遍。即使在十九世纪的英国，上流社会的婚姻也以财产为中心：“这是普遍的真理人们普遍承认，一个拥有很多财富的单身男人一定是想要一个妻子的” [Austen, 1994]。

With considerations of property removed, marriage would be based on mutual love alone. Arranged marriage would vanish. We tend to think of arranged marriages as something oriental, but the underlying principle, of the marriage being a matter of passing down and accumulating property, was widespread. Even in nineteenth-century England, marriages among the upper class centered on the property motive: “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife” [Austen, 1994].

恩格斯认为，只有穷人才能为爱情结婚。但在社会主义的未来，爱情将成为婚姻的唯一基础。

Only the poor, Engels maintained, could afford to marry for love. But in the socialist future, love would become the sole basis for marriage.

在激进法学理论家的影响下 [Pashukanis, 1989]，苏联人最初设想婚姻法和其他合同法一样，将在社会主义社会中逐步废除。国家对人们同居的唯一兴趣就是将其与出生和死亡一起登记，用于统计目的 [Berman, 1946]；因此，1926 年的《俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国家庭法典》将性、婚姻和离婚视为国家不干涉的私事。这种自由主义态度延伸到不禁止乱伦、重婚、同性恋或与青春期后未成年人结婚。重婚或一夫多妻制虽然在婚姻法中没有被禁止，但只要这些涉及对妇女的经济剥削，就可以以剥削的名义受到刑事起诉。虽然当代西方评论家大多赞同早期苏联国家对同性恋的自由主义态度，但他们对苏联对乱伦、重婚和其他现在会被反对的行为的自由主义态度保持沉默。

Under the influence of radical legal theorists [Pashukanis, 1989], the Soviets at first envisaged that marriage law, like other contractual law, would be phased out in socialist society. The only interest the state would have in people’s cohabitation would be to register it for statistical purposes along with births and deaths [Berman, 1946]; so the RSFSR 1926 Family Code treated sex, marriage, and divorce as a private matter in which the state did not interfere. This liberal attitude extended to not prohibiting incest, bigamy, homosexuality, or marriage with post-puberty minors. Bigamy or polygamy, though not prohibited in marriage law, insofar as these involved economic exploitation of women, could be criminally prosecuted under the heading of exploitation. While contemporary Western commentators largely approve of the liberal attitude of the early Soviet state to homosexuality, they are more silent on its liberalism toward incest, bigamy, and other practices that would now be frowned on.

1920 年，俄罗斯开始实行免费堕胎政策，导致城市地区的出生率迅速下降。20 世纪 20 年代，莫斯科的出生率从 30.6/1000 下降到 21.7/1000，而堕胎率则从 5.7/1000 上升到 35.2/1000 [Berman，1946]。考虑到 20 世纪 20 年代中期俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国的总体死亡率为 21/1000，这似乎意味着出生率可能会降至替代水平以下 [Engelman，1932]。莫斯科的出生率不具代表性。在没有提供堕胎服务的国立医院的农村地区，即大多数俄罗斯人，俄罗斯大部分人口的出生率要高得多，为 44/1000。显然，20 世纪 20 年代的生育没有普遍威胁，但预测 20 世纪 30 年代中期城市人口的迅速增长，或 20 世纪 40 年代中期因战争而大量减少的人口，前景可能有所不同。这种预测没有考虑到随着生活水平的提高，死亡率可能会下降。另一方面，考虑到国际环境，可能已经预见到因敌方行动而导致的死亡人数急剧上升。随后的 1936 年法律严格限制堕胎，仅限于对母亲健康有危险或有遗传疾病的情况，同时为大家庭妇女提供大量补贴。对于第六个及以后的每个孩子，每年可获得 2,000 卢布的津贴，按官方汇率相当于 2,300 美元。考虑到当时的平均年薪为 2,700 卢布 [Petroff, 1938]，这是一笔很大的福利。引入了 112 天的带薪产假和生育福利。人们既可以把这些措施看作生育主义，也可以把它们看作旨在保护母亲和儿童。他们引入了恩格斯所倡导的原则（尽管只是部分原则）：抚养孩子的费用应由整个社会承担。如果这是一项社会义务，那么它适用于所有社会成员。没有孩子的人必须承担有孩子的人的费用，并通过支付罚款来鼓励自己生孩子。

In 1920 free abortion had been introduced, which produced a rapid decline in the birth rate in urban areas. During the 1920s the Moscow birth rate fell from 30.6/1000 to 21.7/1000, while abortions rose from 5.7/1000 to 35.2/1000 [Berman, 1946]. Given that the overall death rate in the mid-1920s for the RSFSR was 21/1000 this appeared to represent a potential fall to below replacement birth rates [Engelman, 1932]. The birth rate in Moscow was unrepresentative. In rural areas where state hospitals providing abortion did not exist, that is, for the majority of Russians, the birth rate was much higher at 44/1000 for the greater Russian population. Clearly there was no general threat to reproduction in the 1920s, but projecting forward for a rapidly urban population in the mid-1930s, or a population vastly depleted by war in the mid-1940s, the outlook may have seemed different. Such a projection failed to take into account the fall in the death rate that could be anticipated to follow rising living standards. On the other hand, given the international environment, a sharp rise in deaths due to enemy action may have been anticipated. The subsequent 1936 law severely restricted abortion to cases of danger to maternal health or genetic disorder, and at the same time introduced substantial subsidies to women with large families. For the sixth and each subsequent child a stipend of 2,000 rubles a year, equivalent at the official exchange rate to $2,300, was introduced. Given that the average annual wage at that time was 2,700 rubles [Petroff, 1938], this was a large benefit. Paid maternity leave of 112 days was introduced along with birth benefits. One could either see these measures as natalist, or alternatively as being to protect mothers and children. They introduced, albeit partially, the principle that Engels had advocated: that the cost of raising children should be borne by society as a whole. If it is a social obligation then it applies to all members of society. Those who have no children have to support the costs of those with children, and by paying a penalty, be encouraged to have kids themselves.

1941 年的一项法律 [Nakachi, 2006] 试图通过对苏联单身、独身和无子女公民征税来明确这一经济义务。儿童保育费用的社会化仍不充分，因为直到 1960 年，常规儿童福利金仅支付给未婚母亲或大家庭的母亲 [Lantsev, 1962]。因此，对于小家庭，子女由父母共同收入抚养的原则没有受到质疑，即使在考虑到夫妻之间的家务分工之前，婚姻仍然发挥着经济作用。

A 1941 law [Nakachi, 2006] sought to make this economic obligation explicit by introducing a tax on bachelors, single, and childless citizens of the USSR. The socialization of childcare costs was still partial because even as late as 1960 the regular child benefit was paid only to unmarried mothers or mothers with large families [Lantsev, 1962]. The principle that children were to be supported by the joint earnings of the parents for smaller families was thus not questioned, and marriage continued to have an economic role even before the division of domestic labor between husband and wife was taken into account.

图 6.3。1941-45 年德苏战争导致苏联人口出现巨大倒退。来源：Pockney，1991 年。

Figure 6.3. Soviet population suffered a huge demographic setback due to the German-Soviet war of 1941–45. Source: Pockney, 1991.

1941 年至 1945 年的德苏战争造成了巨大的人口短缺——最初约为 4000 万，到苏联时期结束时上升到 7000 万左右，如图6.3所示，该图预测了战前苏联人口的增长趋势。但在整个苏联时期，人口持续增长，这可能是社会政策的结果。战争对性别比例的影响是巨大的，农村地区育龄男女比例下降到 19:100 [Nakachi, 2006]。这导致了家庭政策的变化，其导向是：鼓励只有两个孩子的家庭至少生育一个更重要的是，使单身母亲合法化，并为这些女性提供福利。

The German-Soviet war of 1941 to 1945 caused a huge demographic shortfall—initially of the order of 40 million, rising to around 70 million by the end of the Soviet period, as can be seen in Figure 6.3, which projects what the Soviet population would have been on prewar growth trends. But throughout the Soviet period the population continued to grow, probably as a result of social policy. The effect of the war on the sex ratio was drastic, with the ratio of men to women of reproductive age falling as far as 19:100 in rural areas [Nakachi, 2006]. This led to changes in family policy oriented toward: encouraging families with only two children to have at least one more, legitimizing single motherhood, and making benefits available to those women.

这些目标都写入了 1944 年的家庭法。单身税增加了，对只有一个孩子的夫妇也征收 1/3 的税率。115^那些没有向父亲索要子女抚养费的单身母亲也获得了子女抚养福利。单身母亲包括数百万战争寡妇和未婚母亲。由于战争导致年轻男性短缺，单身母亲预计将占所有母亲的很大一部分。

These goals were encoded in the 1944 Family Law. The bachelor tax was increased and also levied at a rate of 1/3 on couples with only one child.¹¹⁵ Child support benefits were also made available to those single mothers who were not claiming child support from the father. Single mothers included both millions of war widows and unmarried mothers. Given a shortage of young men brought about by the war, single mothers were expected to be a significant fraction of all mothers.

苏联在 20 世纪 30 年代末至 50 年代末经历了主要的人口结构转变。这一转变的主要内容是婴儿死亡率从 30 年代末的每 1,000 个活产婴儿约 200 人的高位降至 50 年代末的约 50 人，再降至 60 年代中期的 25 人 [Shkolnikov and Meslé，1996]。死亡率的下降主要是由于传染病的减少，特别是食源性和水源性感染。因此，从 20 世纪 30 年代末到 60 年代中期，男性的预期寿命增加了 24 岁，女性增加了 27 岁。在人口结构转变期间，总体出生率和死亡率急剧下降，死亡率在 60 年代中期达到最低值，出生率在 1970 年左右达到最低值（图 6.4）。此后，两种比率均有所上升。艾伦 [2003] 认为，出生率下降对于确保人均粮食产量上升至关重要，而且人口增长速度明显低于工业化国家通常预期的速度。

The USSR underwent its primary demographic transition between the late 1930s and late ’50s. The main component of this was a shift from the high infant mortality rate of around 200 per 1,000 live births at the end of the ’30s to around 50 in the late 1950s and down to 25 in the mid-1960s [Shkolnikov and Meslé, 1996]. The decline was largely due to reductions in infectious diseases, particularly food and water-borne infections. As a result life expectancy at birth rose by 24 years in males and 27 years in females between the end of the 1930s to the mid-1960s. Overall birth rates and death rates declined sharply during the transition, reaching a minimum for death rate in the mid-1960s, and for birth rate around 1970 (Figure 6.4). After that both rates increased. Allen [2003] argues that the fall in the birth rate was critical to ensuring that food production per head rose, and that the growth in population was significantly slower than would normally have been expected in an industrializing country.

图 6.4. 苏联时期和后公开化时期俄罗斯出生率和死亡率的变化。资料来源：Pockney，1991 年；联合国人口年鉴。

Figure 6.4. Evolution of Russian birth and death rates in Soviet and post-Glasnost periods. Source: Pockney, 1991; and UN Demographic Yearbooks.

自 20 世纪 70 年代以来，死亡率的增长在男性中最为明显。很大程度上是由于心脏病、事故、自杀和人际暴力的增加。导致 20 世纪 60 年代末男性死亡率最低的一个因素是，在 50 年代和 60 年代，人口年龄结构偏向年轻男性。30 年代和 40 年代初成年的许多人都是战争伤亡者，因此达到患心脏病年龄的人数异常低。

The increase in death rate from the 1970s was most marked in men. It was largely due to a rise in heart disease, accidents, suicide, and interpersonal violence. A factor producing the minimum in male death rate in the late 1960s was that during the ’50s and ’60s the age structure of the population was skewed toward younger men. So many who reached maturity in the ’30s and early ’40s had been war casualties, that the number reaching the age when heart diseases strike was unusually low.

在第一次人口转变期间，出生率一直远远超过和平时期的死亡率，从而导致人口稳步增长。

The birth rate remained well in excess of peacetime deaths throughout the first demographic transition giving a steady increase in population.

20 世纪 80 年代末 90 年代初，苏联从社会主义向资本主义转型，引发了第二次更为剧烈的人口转变。出生率急剧下降，降至发达资本主义国家的典型范围。不过，尽管许多资本主义国家的出生率低于死亡率，但两者通常都呈下降趋势。俄罗斯的死亡率急剧上升（图 6.4和表 6.7）。在和平时期，死亡率出现如此大幅上升在当时的发达国家是前所未有的。没有大学教育的人群，即体力劳动者和农民，死亡率增加 [Shkolnikov et al., 2006]。知识分子的死亡率并没有下降。随后，Case 和 Deaton [2015] 指出，美国白人工人阶级男性也遭遇了同样的情况，原因类似：大规模失业和去工业化 [Stuckler et al., 2009]。如图6.5所示，这一人口危机是影响前社会主义国家的普遍现象。资本主义的出现和随之而来的社会条件的恶化意味着整个地区人口数量下降。

The transition from socialism to capitalism in the USSR in the late 1980s early 1990s induced a second, far more drastic demographic transition. The birth rate fell sharply into the range typical for developed capitalist countries. But, whereas in many capitalist countries the birth rate falls below the death rate, both are normally on a downward trend. In Russia the death rate rose sharply (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.7). A rise of this scale in peace was at the time unprecedented in a developed country. Those without university education, that is to say the manual workers and farmers, suffered increased mortality [Shkolnikov et al., 2006]. The intelligentsia experienced no decline in mortality. Subsequently Case and Deaton [2015] have pointed out that the same has been happening to white working-class men in the United States with similar causes: mass unemployment and de-industrialization [Stuckler et al., 2009]. As Figure 6.5 shows, this demographic crisis was a general phenomenon affecting the ex-socialist countries. The onset of capitalism and the deterioration of social conditions that followed meant that the region as a whole went into demographic decline.

图 6.5. 欧洲整个社会主义地区人口稳步增长，直至向资本主义过渡，之后人口急剧下降。资料来源：联合国世界人口电子表格，2015 年。

Figure 6.5. The whole socialist area of Europe experienced steady population growth until the transition to capitalism, after which population declined sharply. Source: UN World Population Spreadsheet, 2015.

图 6.6. 德国女性生育率。资料来源：德国联邦统计局。

Figure 6.6. German fertility rate per woman. Souce: German Federal Statistical Office.

资本主义和社会主义家庭政策的对比可以通过东德和西德的比较来最好地说明。自 20 世纪 60 年代现代避孕技术面世以来，两个德国的生育率都出现了下降。到 20 世纪 70 年代初，东西德的生育率都已降至更替水平以下（图 6.6）。但在 1976 年出台将相当一部分育儿负担社会化的政策之后，东德的出生率在 20 世纪 70 年代末恢复到了更替水平左右 [Salles, 2006]。单身母亲有优先入园资格。如果没有空位，她们可以休病假并获得半薪，只要有空位，她们就可以保证重返工作岗位。单身女性在生下第一个孩子时可以享受一年的带薪育儿假。对于已婚女性，这笔钱只能用于后续的孩子。除了免费托儿所外，生育奖金、工作场所托儿所和工作场所食堂都为父母们提供了帮助。

The contrast between capitalist and socialist family policy is best illustrated by a comparison of East and West Germany. Both Germanys experienced declines in fertility following the availability of modern contraceptive technology in the 1960s. By the early 1970s fertility had fallen below replacement levels in both East and West (Figure 6.6). But the birth rate in East Germany recovered to around replacement level by the late 1970s following the 1976 introduction of policies to socialize a considerable part of the burden of child raising [Salles, 2006]. Single mothers had priority access to kindergarten places. If no place was available they could go on sick leave at half pay, with the return of their job guaranteed as soon as a place became available. One year of paid parental leave was available for single women on the birth of their first child. For married women this was available only for subsequent children. Along with free nursery schools, birth bonuses, workplace childcare and workplace canteens all helped parents.

这些政策显然奏效了（图 6.6）。总体效果是，东部的生育率高于西部同期的生育率。单身母亲可以享受产妇福利，这增加了她们生育婴儿的比例，也使社会更加接受她们的处境。租金很低，但公寓的等候名单上单身母亲和已婚夫妇优先。出现了一种常见的家庭模式，即女性在结婚前生第一个孩子，结婚后生第二个孩子 [Salles，2006]。

These policies clearly worked (Figure 6.6). The overall effect was to increase the birth rate in the East above the contemporary rate in the West. The availability of maternal benefits to single mothers increased the proportion of babies born to them, and led to greater social acceptance of their situation. Rents were low, but waiting lists for flats gave priority to single mothers and married couples. A common family pattern emerged of women having their first child before marrying and a second one after marriage [Salles, 2006].

随着与西德合并，这项福利制度被取消，随之而来的人口冲击导致东德生育率一度降至 0.7，随后趋近于全德平均水平 1.4。这仍然远低于更替水平。

With the union with West Germany, this benefit system was withdrawn and the consequent demographic shock led to East German fertility rates falling as low as 0.7 before converging on the all-Germany average of 1.4. This is still well below replacement level.

5.6 和 5.8 节中讨论了资本主义经济和家庭经济的结合是相互对立的。资本主义大规模生产取代了家庭经济职能不断发生变化：纺纱、编织、种植粮食、缝制衣服、烘焙等。对熟练和受过教育的成年工人的需求使儿童从家庭劳动力的一部分转变为经济依赖者，从而产生了限制家庭规模的动机。化学工业发展避孕技术使这成为可能。对更多劳动力的持续需求吸引了越来越多的女性进入资本主义就业，这使得劳动力在几十年内不断增长。父母双方都必须工作，私人托儿的费用成为养育大家庭甚至根本不养育家庭的不利因素。

It was argued in Sections 5.6 and 5.8 that the combination of capitalist and domestic economies is antagonistic. Capitalist mass production replaces one economic function of the household after another: spinning, weaving, growing food, sewing clothes, baking, etc. The demand for skilled and educated adult workers converted children from being part of the domestic labor force to economic dependents, creating an incentive to limit family size. The development, by the chemical industry, of contraceptive technology then made this possible. The continuing demand for more labor then drew an increasing fraction of women into capitalist employment, which for a few decades allowed the workforce to go on growing. It then became necessary for both parents to work and the cost of private childcare becomes more of a disincentive to have large families or even have families at all.

社会主义国家一直致力于通过妇女参与社会经济来提高妇女的地位。因此，它们可能面临同样的自发生育率低于替代水平的趋势。它们避免了这种情况，因为妇女参与社会主义部门的同时，还制定了一项刻意的社会化育儿政策。

Socialist states have had the aim of improving the status of women through their participation in the social economy. As such they could have been faced with the same spontaneous tendency toward below-replacement fertility. They avoided this because women’s participation in the socialist sector went alongside a deliberate policy of socialization on childcare.

社会主义经济不会像资本主义那样面临人口因素导致的利润率下降问题。即使回报率下降到资本家会停止投资的水平，国家也可以选择继续投资。但极低的出生率意味着，在迅速减少的人口中，老年人的比例不断上升，无论哪种经济制度都是一个问题。

A socialist economy does not face the same problem of a demographically induced falling rate of profit that affects capitalism. The state can choose to continue to invest even if the rate of return falls to levels at which capitalists would stop investing. But the rising share of old people in a rapidly shrinking population, as implied by very low birth rates, is a problem whatever the economic system.

从欧洲转向亚洲，我们看到了一个相反的问题。社会主义政府没有试图控制生育率，而是试图降低生育率。在整个欧洲大陆，20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代开启了两次人口转变过程：

Turning from Europe to Asia we see an inverse problem. Socialist governments, instead of trying to hold the birth rate up, tried to reduce it. Across the continent, the 1950s and ’60s launched a process of two demographic transitions:

图 6.7。印度、中国、俄罗斯和越南的预期寿命。资料来源：世界银行。

Figure 6.7. Life expectancy in India, China, Russia, and Vietnam. Source: World Bank.

1. 从高出生率高死亡率社会转变为高出生率低死亡率社会。

1. From a high birth rate high-mortality society to a high birth rate low-mortality one.

2、由高出生率、低死亡率社会转变为出生率、死亡率都较低的社会。

2. From a high birth rate low-mortality society to one where both birth rates and mortality were low.

如果我们看看亚洲大型发展中国家，就会发现社会主义国家在实现人口结构转变方面最为成功。在预期寿命方面（图 6.7），亚洲社会主义国家非常成功，在苏联解体前赶超苏联，并远远领先于非社会主义的印度。越南从 1960 年代末开始预期寿命下降，恰逢越南-美国战争最激烈的时期。在中国，预期寿命提高最快的时期是在毛泽东时代，当时推出了大规模培训医疗辅助人员以改善农村医疗保健等举措。

If we look at big developing Asian countries, we see that the socialist ones were the most successful in bringing about the demographic transitions. On life expectancy (Figure 6.7), Asian socialist countries have been very successful, overtaking the USSR just before that state collapse, and being well ahead of non-socialist India. The decline in life expectancy in Vietnam from the late 1960s coincided with the most intense period of the Vietnamese-American war. In China the most rapid improvement in life expectancy was during the Maoist period when initiatives like the mass training of medical auxiliaries to improve rural health care were rolled out.

预期寿命的提高导致中国有限的耕地无法养活更多的人，因此政府从 20 世纪 70 年代开始实施积极的生育控制计划 [Banister, 1984]。这一计划非常有效。预期寿命在 20 世纪 60 年代迅速上升，随后在 20 世纪 70 年代生育率也出现了同样急剧的下降（图 6.8）。政府的人口政策最终限制大多数家庭只生一个孩子，这一限制从 20 世纪 70 年代末开始持续了 35 年。如图6.8所示，目前的生育率低于再生产水平。到 2010 年，生育率下降到^1.5。116

A consequence of the rising life expectancy was to create a danger that there would be more people than could be fed on China’s limited arable land, so from the 1970s the government had an active birth control program [Banister, 1984]. This was remarkably effective. The rapid rise in life expectancy in the 1960s was followed by an equally dramatic fall in fertility during the 1970s (Figure 6.8). The government population policy culminated in restricting most families to have only one child, with the restriction lasting thirty-five years from the end of the 1970s. As Figure 6.8 shows, current fertility falls below the reproduction level. By 2010 the fertility rate was down to 1.5.¹¹⁶

图 6.8。印度、中国和越南的生育率。资料来源：世界银行数据库。

Figure 6.8. Fertility in India, China, and Vietnam. Source: World Bank database.

有效女性生育率，即每名妇女所生育的女儿数量，决定了长期人口动态。有效女性生育率必须至少为 1，才能稳定的生育率。在中国，重男轻女的观念通过多种机制扭曲了人口结构：选择性堕胎女婴、因忽视导致女婴死亡率较高 [Banister, 2004]，如果第一个孩子是男孩，生第二个孩子的可能性较低。因此，中国的男女比例为 117/100。因此，到 2010 年，中国每位女性平均只生下 1.5 × [100/217] = 0.69 个女孩。

The effective female fertility rate, the number of daughters per woman, is what determines long-term population dynamics. It must be at least 1 for steady reproduction. In China, preference for boys has skewed the population by several mechanisms: selective abortion of female infants, higher mortality of girls due to neglect [Banister, 2004], and a lower likelihood of having a second child if the first is a boy. As a result the male/female ratio in China is 117/100. So each woman in China was, by 2010 giving birth to on average only 1.5 × [100/217] = 0.69girls.

官方放弃独生子女政策表明政府认为出生率已下降太多。

The official abandonment of the one-child policy indicates that the government considers that the birth rate has fallen too far.

从 1980 年代到 2010 年代，中国享受到了一些经济学家所谓的人口红利 [Fang, 2010]。出生率下降，因此每个成年人抚养的孩子数量较少，而婴儿潮时期出生的大量年轻成年工人和 1960 年代的低婴儿死亡率仍然很多。这加速了工业城市经济的扩张 [Cockshott, 2006a]。与人口总体增长相比，生产性劳动力的增长速度异常快。

Between the 1980s and the 2010s China enjoyed what some economists call a demographic dividend [Fang, 2010]. The birth rate had fallen so the number of children supported by each adult was lower while there were still plenty of young adult workers born during the baby boom and low infant mortality of the 1960s. This accelerated the expansion of an industrial urban economy [Cockshott, 2006a]. The productive workforce grew disproportionately fast compared to the overall growth of population.

图 6.9. 德国、美国和中国相对单位劳动力成本的变动。2000 年全国劳动力成本取为 100。

Figure 6.9. Movement in relative unit labor costs in Germany, United States, and China. National labor cost in year 2000 is taken as 100.

到 2010 年代中期，中国人口的生产性份额开始下降 [Banister 等，2012]。由于农业机械化持续推进，城市人口将继续增长，但总体而言，人口抚养比将上升。鉴于中国人口与农业用地的比例很高，人口缓慢、有控制地下降或许是有道理的。从长远来看，人口密度略低应该更容易实现可持续的经济形式。但这种有控制的下降意味着女性有效生育率接近 0.9，而不是 0.7。如果人口要达到 0.7，那么人口增长速度将比 0.6 更快。中国将不得不采取类似于1976年东德实行的有利于母亲的改革，并开展一场大规模的文化运动来提高人们对女婴的认知价值。

By the middle of the 2010s the productive share of the Chinese population startsed to decline [Banister et al., 2012]. Some growth of the urban population will continue as a result of the continued mechanization of agriculture, but overall the dependency rate will rise. Given that China has a high ratio of population to agricultural land, there may be some justification for a slow and managed decline in its population. In the long term a somewhat lower population density should make a sustainable form of economy easier to achieve. But that sort of managed decline would imply an effective female fertility rate closer to 0.9 than 0.7. If population is to be either stabilized or allowed to shrink more gradually China will have to adopt mother-friendly reforms similar to those introduced by the DDR in 1976 and to carry out a big cultural campaign to raise the perceived worth of baby girls.

20 世纪 80 年代，中国发展了混合经济，将国有工业、半私有农业和私营资本主义企业结合在一起。无论是在国有企业还是私营资本主义企业，工人的地位都差不多。他们受雇领取工资，缺乏长期的就业保障。工资水平由劳动力市场的供求关系决定。在这种情况下，独生子女政策有利于劳工利益。它减少了进入劳动力市场的年轻工人数量，到 2010 年代，工人的谈判地位得到了加强。再加上中国投资速度的加快，工资上涨非常快（图 6.9和6.10）。一项在社会主义经济占主导地位时出台的政策在出台后的一代半时间里发挥了作用，加强了工人的地位，而当时私营部门才刚刚成为经济的主导因素。任何人口反馈都会产生长期滞后，这意味着在反馈生效之前，社会关系可能会发生很大变化^。117

China in the 1980s developed a mixed economy that combined state-owned industry alongside semi-private agriculture and private capitalist firms. The position of workers, whether in state firms or private capitalist firms, was similar. They were employed for a wage and lacked long-term security of employment. The level of wages was determined by supply and demand on the labor market. In these circumstances the one-child family policy acted to favor the labor interest. It reduced the number of young workers entering the labor market and, by the 2010s, was strengthening the bargaining position of workers. When combined with the rapid rate of investment in China this allowed wages to rise very fast (Figures 6.9 and 6.10). A policy introduced when the socialist economy was dominant operated a generation and a half after its introduction to strengthen the position of workers at a time when the private sector was just becoming the dominant element of the economy. The long lags associated with any demographic feedback means that social relations may change considerably before the feedback takes effect.¹¹⁷

图 6.10. 印度、印度尼西亚、泰国和中国月工资变动情况。货币工资以美元等值表示。

Figure 6.10. Movement in monthly wages in India, Indonesia, Thailand, and China. Money wages in equivalent $USD.

任何经济体系的社会关系都必须确保社会年复一年地再生产。我在上一部分写到了任何经济的最基本功能：人类再生产。现在让我们看看经济非人类方面的再生产。

The social relations of any economic system have to ensure the reproduction of the society from year to year. I have written in the last part about the most fundamental function of any economy: human reproduction. Let us now look at the reproduction of the non-human aspect of the economy.

任何经济体都必须安排定期的生产活动，并确保非人类环境为这些活动做好准备。其中一些准备工作是由大自然、季节循环以及生态系统中元素和生命的流动完成的。其中一些准备工作是由人类活动本身完成的，如耕地除草、留出玉米种子、为未来生产准备燃料、原材料和工具。

Any economy must schedule regular productive activities and ensure that the non-human environment is prepared for these activities. Some of this preparation is carried out by nature, by the cycle of the seasons, and the flow of elements and life through the ecosystem. Some of it is prepared by human activity itself, plowing and weeding land, setting aside seed corn, preparing stocks of fuel, raw materials, and tools for future production.

即使是相对简单的农民经济也需要有一个专门的分工部门来负责组织这种调度。新石器时代日历祭司的兴起就是这种时间协调分工部门的一个例子。随着埃及等地人口密度的上升，这种祭司的职能已不再仅限于指示何时播种和耕种土地，而是维护和分配粮食的缓冲储备^。118

Even a relatively simple peasant economy needs to have a specialized branch of the division of labor responsible for organizing such scheduling. The rise of calendar priesthoods in the Neolithic is an example of such a temporal coordination branch of the division of labor. With rises in the density of population in places like Egypt, the functions of such priesthoods went beyond saying when crops should be sown and land plowed to maintaining and distributing buffer stocks of grain.¹¹⁸

随着工业生产的发展，准备便携式生产条件变得非常重要。土地每年都留在那里耕种，但原材料和工业工具必须运送到使用的地方。运送又取决于对野兽的驾驭、对风的征服和对蒸汽的驯服。这些力量的主人，首先是商人阶级，然后是商业资本家，最后是工业资本家，随后控制了生产条件。工业资本家必须组织工厂所需的人力和无生命资源。他必须为他雇用的工人订购和安排机器、建筑物和原材料的交付。与只需适应阿波罗的规律运动和维纳斯的螺旋上升的牧师不同，资本家必须侍奉更多、更反复无常的神。里希迈基-圣彼得堡铁路的经理必须从苏格兰斯普林伯恩的尼尔森公司订购机车，从威尔士的矿山订购蒸汽煤，从当地木材上切割枕木等。在所有情况下，他都必须确保货物符合技术规格，并按时交货，送到正确的地方。这需要发达的商业通信。供应商和用户必须交换信件、电报，后来还有电子邮件，以告知彼此技术规格、可能的交货时间、数量、报价和商定价格。我将把有关商品物理属性的所有信息称为此信息流中的“使用价值渠道”，将有关价格的信息称为“交换价值渠道”。任何工业系统都需要使用价值渠道，无论是大量独立公司、零部件遍布全球的大型跨国公司、战时生产的国家还是社会主义计划经济。交换价值渠道的相对重要性一直存在争议。

With the development of more advanced industrial production, the preparation of the portable conditions of production won importance. The land stays there to be plowed each year, but the raw materials and tools of industry must be delivered to where they are used. Delivery depended in turn on the harnessing of beasts, the conquest of the wind, and the taming of steam. The masters of these forces, the classes first of merchants, then merchant capitalists, and finally industrial capitalists, then assumed control of the conditions of production. The industrial capitalist had to organize both the human and the inanimate resources needed for his factory. He had to order in and schedule the delivery of the machinery, buildings, and raw materials for the workers he hired. Unlike the priest who had only to adapt to the regular movement of Apollo and the helical rising of Venus, the capitalist had to attend more numerous and capricious gods. The manager of the Riihimaki-Saint Petersburg Railway had to order his locomotives from Neilson and Company in Springburn, Scotland, his steam coal from the mines of Wales, sleepers cut from local timber, etc. In all cases he had to be sure that the goods met his technical specification and that they would be available on time, delivered to the right place. This presupposes a developed commercial correspondence. The suppliers and users have to exchange letters, telegrams, and later emails that inform one another about technical specifications, likely delivery times, quantities, prices offered and prices agreed. I will call all the information about the physical properties of the goods the “use-value channel” in this information flow, and the information about prices the “exchange-value channel.” The use-value channel is needed in any industrial system, whether it is a mass of independent firms, a big multinational with component parts spread around the world, a state organizing in wartime production, or a socialist planned economy. The comparative importance of an exchange-value channel has been disputed.

哈耶克（1945 年和 1955 年）非常重视交换价值渠道的重要性，几乎不承认其他渠道的存在。119^他的同胞诺伊拉特（1919 年、1917 年和 2004 年；尤贝尔，2005 年）声称，真正的产业协调主要取决于使用价值渠道。根据自己在战时工业规划方面的实际经验，他强调战争的胜利不是通过计算债券价格，而是通过食品、弹药和补给的后勤。战时经济的效率取决于实物计算以及实物产品和劳动力的控制和配给。通过应用这些方法，同盟国有可能克服短缺和障碍，例如英国的封锁，否则这些在战争初期将是致命的。诺伊拉特认为，战后战时经济使用的组织结构将很容易适应和平时期的社会主义经济。诺伊拉特曾试图在 1919 年短暂的巴伐利亚社会主义共和国中将这些原则付诸实践，但后来因镇压而被监禁。列宁 [1965a] 也表达了类似的观点，即和平应用战时计划，诺伊拉特称之为国家资本主义，¹²⁰

Hayek [1945 and 1955] laid great store on the importance of the exchange-value channel, scarcely acknowledging the existence of the other channel.¹¹⁹ His fellow countryman Neurath [1919, 1917, and 2004; Uebel, 2005] claimed that real industrial coordination depended overwhelmingly on the use-value channel. Basing himself on his practical experience of wartime industrial planning, he emphasized that wars were not won by calculations about bond prices, but by the logistics of food, munitions, and supplies. Efficiency in war economy depended on calculations in physical terms along with controls and rationing of physical products and labor. By applying these methods, it was possible for the Central Powers to overcome shortages and obstacles such as the British blockade that would otherwise have proven fatal at an early period of the war. Neurath believed that after the war the organizational structure used by the war economy would be readily adapted for a peacetime socialist economy. Neurath briefly attempted to put these principles into practice in the short-lived Bavarian socialist republic of 1919, before being imprisoned on its suppression. Similar sentiments about the peaceful application of wartime planning, which Neurath termed state capitalism, were expressed by Lenin [1965a],¹²⁰

战争是社会主义转型的关键，无论是古巴、中国、越南的革命内战，还是二十世纪的世界大战。世界大战通过入侵或叛乱摧毁了许多资本主义国家，并催生了半途而废的战时经济。

War was key to the transitions to socialism, whether the revolutionary civil wars in Cuba, China, Vietnam or the great world wars of the twentieth century. The world wars disrupted many capitalist states through invasion or mutiny and fostered war economies which were halfway to socialism.

6.4 剩余产品的确定

6.4 DETERMINATION OF THE SURPLUS PRODUCT

在资本主义战争经济中，生产大体上仍然在私有企业中进行。有国家军火工厂，如皇家兵工厂（图 5.35）或橡树岭和洛斯阿拉莫斯原子武器工厂，但这些都是例外。国家通过征召劳动力入伍，以及征召关键行业的男女参与必要的战争工作来指挥劳动力。它还对关键材料、燃料和食品的供应进行配给。公司必须经过谈判，只生产军火或有限范围的实用产品 [Edgerton, 2011a]。钱仍然被用来支付运送的军火和支付工人的工资。购买食物需要钱和配给卡。光有钱是不够的，无论是对消费者还是对公司来说都是如此。在和平时期，作为普遍配给的货币制约着一切。货币短缺制约着工人阶级的消费者，未来收入的不确定性甚至制约着那些拥有良好现金储备的公司。由于生产约束来自交换价值渠道，而不是使用价值渠道，和平时期的资本主义经济通常以略低于满负荷的方式运转。在战争中，国家生存要求充分利用所有可用资源。经济的运转受到材料、人力和机器等物质资源的限制。

In capitalist war economies, production, by and large, still took place in privately owned firms. There were state munitions factories like the Royal Arsenal (Figure 5.35) or the Oak Ridge and Los Alamos atomic weapons plants, but these were exceptions. The state directed labor by conscripting it into the army, and by conscripting women and men in key trades into essential war work. It also rationed the supply of key materials, fuels, and foodstuffs. Firms were subject to negotiated direction to produce only munitions, or restricted ranges of utility products [Edgerton, 2011a]. Money was still used to pay for the munitions delivered, and to pay workers. Buying food required both money and ration cards. Money alone was not enough, either for the consumer or for firms. In peace, money as the universal ration constrains everything. Shortage of it constrains the working-class consumers and uncertainty about future revenue constrains even those firms who have good cash reserves. Because the constraint on production comes via the exchange-value channel, not the use-value one, peacetime capitalist economies typically operate somewhat below full capacity. In war, national survival dictates that every available resource be put to use. The economy operates at the limits of its physical resources in materials, people, and machines.

作为主要购买者，国家不仅要考虑其订购的舰船、飞机等的预计成本，还要考虑各种物质约束。在决定订购哪种类型的驱逐舰时，海军首先要考虑其海军上将对舰船携带不同类型的火炮、鱼雷和反潜武器的要求——所有这些都是技术问题而非财务问题。然后，他们必须考虑该国能够建造不同大小舰船的造船厂数量、不同类型的预计武器和舰船机械的交付时间表、不同重量和强度的金属和合金的可用性。然后，他们必须考虑对熟练劳动力的需求是否需要取消或推迟其他订单。121^金钱是一个相对次要的问题。至少在国内经济中，国家信贷的可用性实际上是无限的，消除了货币作为制约资源的局限性 [Keynes, 2010]。关于货币的同一观点更适用于社会主义经济。

The state as primary purchaser has to look not just at the projected costs of ships, aircraft, etc. it is ordering, but at all sorts of material constraints. In deciding what type of destroyers to order the navy first takes into account the requirements of their admirals for the ships to carry guns of different types, torpedoes, and anti-submarine weapons—all technical not financial issues. They then had to take into account the number of shipyards in the country able to build ships of different sizes, the delivery schedules for different kinds of projected weapons and ship machinery, the availability of metals and alloys of different weights and strengths. They then have to ask whether the demands on skilled labor would require the cancellation or postponement of other orders.¹²¹ Money was a relatively secondary concern. The availability of state credit, at least within the domestic economy, that was effectively unlimited removed money as a constraining resource [Keynes, 2010]. The same point about money applied a fortiori to the socialist economies.

凯恩斯 2010 年发表的关于战争经济的论文非常重要，它让英语读者深入了解了战争经济和社会主义经济面临的共同问题。他首先提出了一个基本问题：

Keynes’s [2010] essay on war economy is extraordinarily important for giving English-language readers an insight into the common problems facing both war economies and socialist ones. He starts by posing the basic question:

我认为，我们将把我们的产量提高到我们的资源和组织所允许的最高水平。我们将出口所有我们能节省的东西。我们将进口所有我们能负担得起的东西，同时考虑到可用的船舶吨位和使用我们外汇储备的合理最高速度。从我们自己的产量和进口的总和中，我们必须减去出口和战争需求。国内的民用消费将等于剩余的量。显然，其数量将取决于我们在其他方面的政策。只有当我们减少战争努力或用尽外汇储备时，它才能增加。

We shall, I assume, raise our output to the highest figure which our resources and our organization permit. We shall export all we can spare. We shall import all we can afford, having regard to the shipping tonnage available and the maximum rate at which it is prudent to use up our reserves of foreign assets. From the sum of our own output and our imports we have to take away our exports and the requirements of war. Civilian consumption at home will be equal to what is left. Clearly its amount will depend on our policy in the other respects. It can only be increased if we diminish our war effort, or if we use up our foreign reserves.

确保许多不同政策的结果是正确无误的，这是极其困难的。这取决于权衡一个优点与另一个优点。在供应服务范围内，几乎不可能做出任何不影响它的决定。陆军部应该有大量制服储备，还是应该将布料出口以增加国库的外汇储备？雇用我们的造船厂建造战舰或商船更好吗？让一个 20 岁的农业工人留在农场还是让其参军更好？我们应该考虑扩充军队到什么程度？减少工作时间和提高工作效率是否符合 ARP 的利益？人们可以提出十万个这样的问题，而每个问题的答案都会对留给平民使用的时间数量产生重大影响。

It is extraordinarily difficult to secure the right outcome for this resultant of many separate policies. It depends on weighing one advantage against another. There is hardly a conceivable decision within the range of the supply services which does not affect it. Is it better that the War Office should have a large reserve of uniforms in stock or that the cloth should be exported to increase the Treasury’s reserve of foreign currency? Is it better to employ our shipyards to build war ships or merchant-men ? Is it better that a 20-year-old agricultural worker should be left on the farm or taken into the army? How great an expansion of the Army should we contemplate? What reduction in working hours and efficiency is justified in the interests of A.R.P.? One could ask a hundred thousand such questions, and the answer to each would have a significant bearing on time amount left over for civilian consumption.

凯恩斯认为，在战时条件下，消费品供应长期短缺。虽然这种情况的正常影响是引发通货膨胀，但超额利润税等战时立法的影响是在短期内抑制通货膨胀。在战时，平民收入的规模是固定的。更努力地工作会增加战争生产的剩余，但不会增加消费。“如果我们更努力地工作，我们就能打得更好。但我们不能消费更多。”

Keynes argued that under wartime conditions there was a permanent shortfall of supply of consumption goods. While the normal effect of this was to induce inflation, the effects of wartime legislation such as Excess Profits Taxes were to suppress the inflation in the short term. In wartime the size of the civilian cake was fixed. Working harder increased the surplus for war production but not for consumption “If we work harder, we can fight better. But we must not consume more.”

假设人们工作时间更长，工资支出就会更多。从长远来看，通货膨胀压力将会爆发。如果政府没有共同计划，其结果是价格会上涨以吸收额外的工资。因此，所有为延长工作时间而支付的额外资金最终都会进入资本家阶级的账户，工人的实际工资不会增加。资本家随后会将他们增加的利润借给政府以资助战争，或者将其中一部分用于个人消费，从而进一步减少工人可获得的份额。如果他们把钱借给政府，他们最终将拥有更多的国债，从而让他们有权索取战后资源。

Assuming people worked longer hours, there would be more going out in wages. In the long term inflationary pressures would break through. In the absence of a common plan by the government, the effect would be that prices would rise to absorb the additional wages. So all the extra money paid out for the longer hours worked would end up in the accounts of the capitalist class and workers would experience no rise in real wages. The capitalists would then lend their increased profits to the government to finance the war, or perhaps spend some of them on personal consumption, further reducing the share available to workers. If they lent the money to the government, they would end up owning even more of the national debt, giving them thereby a claim on postwar resources.

但当然，短缺的不仅仅是商品，还有劳动力。这使得工会可以讨价还价，争取更高的战时工资率。但考虑到消费品的实际固定产出，实际工资不会增加，只会加剧通货膨胀。因此，为了避免通货膨胀，有必要将战争支出的额外资金从流通中撤出并转移回政府。如果仅仅通过增加所得税和间接税来实现这一点，资金将被撤出，但工人不会从他们的额外工作中得到任何好处。相反，凯恩斯提出了延期支付工资的方案。将实施类似于累进所得税的强制储蓄的分级制度。工人将获得战争债券，战后可以兑换成现金。

But of course not only goods were in short supply. So was labor. This put trade unions in a position to bargain for higher wartime wage rates. But given the actual fixed output of consumer goods, no increase in real wages would result, simply more inflation. To avoid inflation it was therefore necessary to remove from circulation and transfer back to the government the extra money that it was spending on the war. Were this done simply by increasing income taxes and indirect tax, the money would be removed, but workers would see no benefit from their extra work. Instead Keynes proposed a scheme of deferred pay. A graduated scale of enforced savings, analogous to progressive income tax, would be imposed. Workers would get war bonds that could be redeemed for cash after the war.

凯恩斯指出，在战争期间，面对物价上涨，英国面临着巨大的压力，既要补贴基本食品，又要引入之前在苏联和德意志民主共和国讨论过的那种家庭福利。他警告说，这些旨在实现更大平等的政策只有在延期工资计划的背景下才可行，否则它们将导致进一步的通胀压力。

Keynes notes that in war, in the face of rising costs, there was strong pressure both to subsidize essential foodstuffs and to introduce to the UK family benefits of the sort discussed earlier in the context of the USSR and the DDR. He warns that such policies, aimed at greater equality, would only be viable in the context of the deferred wages scheme, since otherwise they would have led to further inflationary pressures.

6.5 社会主义经济增长

6.5 SOCIALIST ECONOMIC GROWTH

和平时期的社会主义经济具有许多与战时经济相同的特征：资源和劳动力约束严格，货币不再是制约因素，通货膨胀受到抑制，对物质资源分配进行控制。抑制通货膨胀在社会主义经济体中更为有效，因为消费品市场的大部分由国有企业提供服务，这些企业的产出按计划价格出售。凯恩斯主义抑制通货膨胀的解决方案实际上并不可行。人们的储蓄账户余额不断增加，但强制储蓄以购买债券并在以后赎回用于消费的想法从长远来看是不可行的。只有在劳动产出增加和消费受限的时期相对较短的情况下，这种方法才有效。必须有合理的前景，即以后的情况会更加宽松。费尔德曼[1964]的社会主义增长理论具有这种特点。它提出，在牺牲的时期，国民收入的更大份额将用于生产生产资料。这将导致消费品的可能产量增加，因为扩大的机器生产部门可以为消费品部门提供增加产量的手段。

Peacetime socialist economy shares many of the attributes of a war economy: tight resource and labor constraints, money no longer a constraint, suppressed inflation, controls over the allocation of physical resources. The suppression of inflation was more effective in socialist economies, since the large bulk of the consumer goods market was served by state enterprises whose output was sold at planned prices. The Keynesian solution to suppressed inflation was not really available. People ran up balances in their savings accounts, but the idea of forced saving into bonds that would be redeemed for consumption at a later date was not feasible in the long term. It only works if the period of increased labor output and restricted consumption is going to be relatively short. There has to be a reasonable prospect that at a later date circumstances will be more relaxed. The socialist growth theory of Feldman [1964] had something of this character. It proposed that there would be a period of sacrifice while a larger share of national income went into the production of means of production. This would lead to a larger possible output of consumer goods since the expanded machine producing sector could supply the consumer goods sector with the means to increase its output.

收入增长率随着国家工业化水平的提高而提高，这是因为工业在当代经济中的重要性不断提高，因此 Ku/Kp 比率无疑是衡量国家工业化水平的主要指标之一。因此，增长率的提高需要相当大的工业化。为了将收入的持续增长从 10% 提高到 15.7%，Ku/K-p 比率必须几乎翻一番。

The rate of growth of income increases as a function of the industrialization of the country at every stage of its development, for the ratioKu/Kp is undoubtedly one of the primary indicators of the level of industrialization of the country, by virtue of the constantly increasing significance of industry in the contemporary economy. Thus an increase in the rate of growth demands considerable industrialization. In order to raise the constant increment of income from 10 percent to 15.7 percent it is necessary to almost double Ku/K - p.

因此，收入增长率的提高需要工业化、重工业、机械制造和电气化。[194]

Thus an increase in the rate of growth of income demands industrialization, heavy industry, machine building, electrification. [194]

在上面的引用中，Ku/Kp 指的是生产生产资料的第一部门与生产消费品的第二部门的资本比率。

In the quote above, Ku/Kp refers to the ratio of capital in Sector I producing means of production to Sector II producing consumer goods.

费尔德曼增长模型的基本方程是

The basic equation of the Feldman growth model is

D' Sf = Du/D

其中：D'为总经济增长率；Sf为资本效率指数或产出资本比率（用下标f来区别于马克思的变量S）；D为当期总产出经济的；Du是资本货物部门的净产出，类似于马克思的第一部门，但也扣除了第二部门的资本消耗^。122

where: D ' is the overal rate of economic growth; Sf is the index of capital effectiveness or the output to capital ratio (using the subscript f to distinguish it from Marx’s variable S); D is the overall output in the current period of the economy; Du is the net output of the capital goods sector, analogous to Marx’s sector I, but net also of the capital consumption in sector II.¹²²

鉴于马克思将再生产定义为

Given Marx’s labeling of reproduction as

后缀 1 表示生产资料，后缀 2 表示消费资料，Ci 表示第 i 部门消费的资本资料，Vi 表示第 i 部门消费的工资资料。

Where suffix 1 indicates producer goods and suffix 2 consumption goods, Ci is capital goods consumed in sector i and Vi wage goods consumed in sector i.

我们可以得到费尔德曼的Du _，因为Du = O ₁ - (C ₁ + C ₂ ) = S ₁ + V ₁ - C ₂。

We can obtain Feldman’s Du as D_u = O₁ - (C₁ + C₂) = S₁ + V₁ - C₂.

尽管马克思的再生产方案仅涉及工资品和生产资料的流动，但费尔德曼模型使用了一个变量S，即每卢布生产资料的年产量（以卢布为单位）。因此，它具有时间^-1维度，这是任何增长率所必需的（另见第 5.9 节中的讨论）。

Although Marx’s reproduction schemes only deal with flows of wage goods and producer goods, the Feldman model uses a variable S which is the annual output, in rubles, produced per each ruble of producer goods in use. It thus has dimension time^-1 as is required of any rate of growth (see also discusssion in Section 5.9).

马克思的变量 C 指的是生产资料的流动，但在讨论资本构成和利润率时，通常使用另一个变量 K 来代表资本品的存量。马克思指出，资本的有机构成与利润率成反比，因此为 [K/V]；费尔德曼的资本效率可以定义为S f [(S + V + C)/K]。

Marx’s variable C refers to flows of producer goods, but it is common to use another variable K to stand for the stock of capital goods when discussing capital composition and the rate of profit. The organic composition of capital which Marx showed to be inversely related to the rate of profit is then [K/V]; Feldman’s capital effectiveness can then be defined as Sf [(S + V + C)/K].

如果我们假设社会主义经济中没有资本家的奢侈消费，那么所有的剩余都会被用于增加生产资料的储备。此外，由于这是一个扩张中的社会主义经济，马克思的基本静态均衡条件C ₂ =V ₁ +S ₁不成立。首先是因为积累，其次是因为这两个部门不是财务上独立的财产，它们之间的贸易相互平衡。相反，它们被视为同一统一财产的两个部分。因此，它们之间的转移不必采取等价交换的形式。

If we assume that in a socialist economy there is no luxury consumption by capitalists, then the entire surplus is directed into building up the stock of means of production. Further, since this is a socialist economy in expansion, Marx’s basic static equilibrium condition that C₂=V₁+S₁ does not hold. First because of the accumulation, and second because the two sectors are not financially independent properties balancing their trade with one another. They are instead seen as both parts of the same unified property. Transfers between them therefore do not have to take the form of equivalent exchange.

在马克思的分析中，有一个假设，即由于商品交易，同一个变量符号可以代表不同的事物。因此，他的符号 V 最初代表一笔预付的购买劳动力的钱。但后来它代表了制造工人购买的工资商品所需的劳动时间，前提是工资商品的价值与为它们支付的货币价值相同^。123

In Marx’s analysis there is an assumption that the same variable symbol can stand for different things as a consequence of commodity trade. So his symbol V stands initially for a sum of money advanced to buy labor power. But later it stands for the labor time required to make the wage goods bought by the workers under the assumption that the value of the wage goods will be the same as the value of the money paid for them.¹²³

但我们如何将其与费尔德曼模型联系起来呢？费尔德曼模型在历史上似乎是苏联工业政策背后的原始指导理论 [Clark, 1984]？增长用什么单位来表示？答案很简单，单位是货币，但这些货币数量与实物产出和劳动时间有何关系？

But how are we to relate this to the Feldman model, which historically appears to have been the original guiding theory behind Soviet industrial policy [Clark, 1984]? What are the units in which the growth is expressed? The simple answer is that the units are monetary, but how do these money quantities relate to physical output and to labor hours?

增长理论本质上谈论的是随着时间的推移而发生的发展。对于快照视图，如马克思的再生产理论，我们可以从货币价值的变化中抽象出来；在几年的时间段内，这不再安全。我们预计，在工业化经济中，劳动生产率将上升，因此以下比率之一或两者：

By its nature a growth theory is talking about development over time. For a snapshot view, as in Marx’s reproduction theory, we can abstract from changes in the value of money; over periods of several years this is no longer safe. We would expect that in an industrializing economy the productivity of labor will rise, so that either or both of the ratios:

或者

会发生变化。但目前让我们假设我们观察的间隔足够小，这些变化微不足道。那么将费尔德曼模型中的所有数量视为劳动时间的衡量标准将是有效的。让我们看看这意味着什么。

will change. But for the moment let us assume that we are looking at a sufficiently small interval for these changes to be insignificant. It would then be valid to treat all of the quantities in the Feldman model as measures in terms of labor time. Let us see what this implies.

1. 变量 D' 是货币国民收入增长率。国民收入以每年百万卢布 (P) 为单位，因此其单位为 [P/yr]，国民收入 AD 的增长率为 [((P/yr))/yr] = [P/ (yr ² )]。然后，用该值除以国民收入 DG [P/yr]，即可得到比例增长率。

1. The variable D’ is rate of growth of money national income. National income is in millions of rubles (P) per year so its units would be [P/yr], and the growth of national income AD would be in [((P/yr))/yr] = [P/ (yr²)]. The proportionate rate of growth is then obtained by dividing through by national income D G [P/yr].

为了论证方便，我们假设当时 1 卢布是 1 人小时劳动的产物，那么国民收入的增长换算成的就是 [(人 × 小时)/(年2)]。但是由于年和小时都是时间，它们相互抵消，最终的衡量标准相当于 ΔD [人/年]。

Assume for the sake of argument that in those days a ruble was the product of one person hour of labor, what the growth of national income converts to is a measure of [(Persons × hrs)/(yr2)]. But since years and hours are both time, they cancel out, and the final measure is equivalent to ΔD [Persons/yr].

这告诉我们什么？

What does this tell us?

它说，如果我们假设短期内劳动力价值不变，费尔德曼方程实际上就是在衡量每年新增经济人口的数量，也就是工业劳动力的增长。费尔德曼关心的增长是劳动力的比例增长，因为他用 Δ D 除以现有的国民收入，D是价值流，从维度上讲，价值流等于人数——更严格地说，它等于平均全职工作时间的人数。124^因此，用国民收入除以 D 在维度上等同于说D表示劳动力的增长率。我们可以通过查看他的公式的其他项来检查这个公式的合理性。

It says that if we assume that over the short term labor values do not change, the Feldman equation is actually giving us a measure of the number of new people added to the economy each year, that is, the growth of the industrial labor force. The growth Feldman is concerned with is the proportionate growth of the labor force since he divides Δ D through by existing national income, D which is a flow of value, and in dimensional terms a flow of value is equal to a number of persons—more strictly it is equal to a number of people working average full-time hours.¹²⁴ So dividing through by national income is dimensionally equivalent to saying the D expresses the rate of growth of the workforce. We can check the rationality of this by looking at the other terms of his formula.

2. 术语 [(D _u )/D]，根据价值流是一定数量的人，表示用于生产资料净生产的劳动力比例。

2. The term [(D_u)/D], by the rule that a flow of value is a number of persons, expresses the fraction of the workforce devoted to the net production of means of production.

3. “资本效率”指数 S 衡量的是单位生产资料投资所能实现的产出价值流。如果我们的生产资料单位是人年，价值流的单位仍是人，那么这表示一名工人需要工作多少年才能生产出一名工人所需的生产资料。

3. The “effectiveness of capital” index S measures the flow of output value made possible by a unit investment in means of production. If our unit of means of production is one person year, and the units of value flow are persons as before, this expresses how many years a worker would have to work to produce the means of production needed for one more worker.

4. 我留给读者去检查，在翻译成劳动价值论的语言之后，两边仍然有维度[1/yr]。

4. I leave it to the reader to check that after translation into the language of the labor theory of value, both sides still have dimension [1/yr].

因此，一旦剥离了费尔德曼公式的货币形式，它就通过比例常数将生产劳动力的增长率与劳动力生产资料的份额联系起来。人们可以将费尔德曼公式视为一个主方程，它控制着社会主义经济的动态和资本主义的动态。接下来让我们看看它在短期、中期和长期的一些影响。

So Feldman’s formula, once you strip it of its monetary form, is relating the rate of growth of the productive labor force to the share of the labor force making means of production, via a constant of proportionality. One can view Feldman’s as a master equation governing the dynamics of socialist economy for the dynamics of capitalism. Let us next look at some of its implications in the short, medium, and longer term.

上式表明，投入新生产资料的产出比例越大，增长率就越快。要转向高增长模式，社会主义经济必须提高第一部门相对于第二部门的相对规模。一旦实现这一转变，这两个部门都可以更快地增长。

The equation above indicates that the larger the proportion of output devoted to new means of production the faster will be the rate of growth. To move to a high growth mode a socialist economy had to raise the relative size of Sector I compared to Sector II. Once this shift had been achieved, both sectors could grow more rapidly.

Allen [2005, 2003] 提供的证据表明，苏联计划经济的早期相当符合费尔德曼模式。如图6.11所示，在第一个五年计划（1928 年至 1932 年）期间，人均实际消费下降。这与机械制造业受到的压倒性重视以及消费品行业的投资很少相一致。这导致第一部门和第二部门的相对比例发生了变化。但在后续计划中，机械制造业的产出可以用于增加消费行业的资本存量，人均实际消费迅速上升。125可以看出，在重叠时期，两种趋势非常相似，这验证了 Allen 的数据。根本观点是，儿童成长的速度将^与生活水平密切相关，特别是可用的饮食。

Allen [2005, 2003] presents evidence that the early years of the Soviet planned economy fitted this Feldman pattern rather well. As Figure 6.11 shows, over the first 5-year plan (which ran 1928 to 1932) real consumption per capita fell. This is consistent with overwhelming emphasis being devoted to the machine-building industries, and little investment going into consumer goods industries. This produced a shift in the relative proportions of Sectors I and II. But in the subsequent plan, where the output of the machine building could be directed into increasing the capital stock of consumption industries, there was a rapid rise in real per capita consumption.¹²⁵ It can be seen that in the period of overlap the two trends are very similar, which validates Allen’s data. The underlying point is that the rate at which children grow will be closely dependent upon living standards, particularly the available diet.

这并不一定意味着城市实际工资率迅速上升；相反，更大比例的人口从农村迁往城市，城市生活水平大大高于农民生活的原始水平。因此，从整个人口的平均水平来看，实际消费上升，其必然结果是消费品生产迅速增加。关键点在于，如果不首先提高相对规模，部门I不可能实现较高的增长率，因为部门I的净产量（D _u）制约了整个过程。

This did not necessarily mean that urban real wage rates rose rapidly; rather, a larger portion of the population moved from the countryside to the cities, and urban living standards were substantially above the primitive levels of peasant life. Thus, averaged across the whole population, real consumption rose, and the corollary of this is that production of consumer goods rose rapidly. The critical point is that without first raising the relative size of Sector I it would be impossible to have ever achieved a rapid growth rate, since it is the net product of Sector I (D_u) that constrains the whole process.

费尔德曼模型发挥作用的先决条件是什么？

What is the precondition for the Feldman model working?

因为，至少在瞬间，作为一个导数，它是一个方程，一旦转化为劳动理论，它就与劳动力的增长有关，它必须依赖于这种增长是否可能。更具体地说，它是一个关于工业经济增长的理论——它所基于的双部门模型假设一个具有资本品和消费品行业的工业化结构。

Since, at least instantaneously as a derivative, it is an equation that, once translated to the labor theory, is about the growth of the workforce, it must depend on such growth being possible. It is, more specifically, a theory about the growth of the industrial economy—the two-sector model on which it is based assumes an industrialized structure with capital goods and consumer goods industries.

图 6.11。（上）：1928 年苏联计划工业化第一阶段人均实际消费的变化。来源：Allen，2005 年。（下）：上图数据叠加在苏联儿童增长率的时间序列上。来源：Pelkonen 和 Cockshott，2017 年。

Figure 6.11. (top): Movement in real consumption per capita in the USSR during first phase of planned industrialization, as of 1928. Source: Allen, 2005. (bottom): Data from above are superimposed on time series of Soviet child growth rates. Source: Pelkonen and Cockshott, 2017.

工业经济可以通过多种方式增加劳动力：自然人口增长，通过从其他国家移民，或通过农村内部迁移。所有这些都发生在资本主义工业化时期，只有第一次和最后一次发生在社会主义工业化时期。上一节讨论了欧洲社会主义国家为确保人口继续增长而采取的措施。但自然人口增长相对较慢——苏联每年约为 2%。这只能支持适度的经济增长。

The industrial economy can grow its workforce in several ways: through natural population growth, through immigration from other nations, or by internal migration from the countryside. All of these occurred during capitalist industrializations, only the first and the last during socialist ones. A previous section discussed the measures taken by European socialist countries to ensure that they continued to have a growing population. But natural population growth was relatively slow—of the order of 2 percent a year in the USSR. This would only support a modest rate of economic growth.

图 6.12显示了苏联等经济体的费尔德曼增长路径，其起始工业人口占 18%。最初，我假设所有投资的 90% 都流向了第一部门，这不足以弥补第二部门的贬值，因此人均消费在第一个计划期间下降——事实确实如此。在后续计划中，我假设 60% 的投资流向了第一部门。关于初始人口分布的假设是现实的。第一部门的相对规模在第一个计划结束时增长到峰值，然后在后续计划中下降并趋于平稳。显然，这将是一个增长非常迅速的经济体。同样明显的是，这种增长路径不可能持续下去，因为到 20 世纪 40 年代末，城市化率将接近 100%。在模型中，假设一旦城市化率达到 80%，向城市的迁移就会停止。这导致人均消费增长率急剧放缓。事实上，放缓并没有出现那么急剧的趋势，而是随着城市化的实际极限逐渐达到而逐渐下滑。

Figure 6.12 shows a Feldman growth path for an economy like the USSR starting out with an industrial population of 18 percent. Initially I assume that 90 percent of all investment was channeled into Sector I, which is not enough to compensate for depreciation in Sector II, so consumption per capita falls during the first plan period—as it actually did. In subsequent plans I assumed that 60 percent of investment went to sector I. Assumptions about initial population distribution are realistic. The relative size of sector I grows to a peak at the end of the first plan and then falls and levels off during the subsequent ones. Clearly this would have been a very rapidly growing economy. Equally clearly, this growth path could not have continued, since urbanization would have approached 100 percent by the end of the 1940s. In the model, it is assumed that migration into the cities stops once urbanization reaches 80 percent. This has the effect of sharply slowing the rate of growth of per-capita consumption. In reality the slowdown did not occur that sharply, but slid in gradually at the practical limit of urbanization was gradually reached.

图 6.12. 1928 年应用于苏联的费尔德曼模型模拟。

Figure 6.12. Simulation of a Feldman model applied to USSR from 1928.

我们知道，苏联的实际经济史与此类似，只是城市化进程更为缓慢，战争造成了近十年的延迟。随着时间的推移，随着以人均年人均计算的生产资料存量上升，那么进一步投资的可能性就被封锁了。如果厂房和机器的使用寿命是固定的，比如说二十年，那么部门 I 的产出中越来越多的部分必须用于简单地更换现有机器。如果部门 I 占经济的一半，那么就不可能长期维持超过十人年的 K/cap。在这个水平上，即使全力以赴，部门 I 也只能弥补每年厂房的磨损。图 6.12中的所有测量值都是以劳动价值（人年）为单位的。

We know that the real economic history of the USSR was much like this, modified by the effects of urbanization being more gradual, and with an almost ten-year delay produced by the war. As time went on, and as the stock of means of production measured in person years per capita rose, then even the possibility of further investment became blocked off. If plant and machinery has a fixed life, say twenty years, then more and more of the output of Sector I has to be devoted to simply replacing existing machinery. If Sector I makes up half the economy, then it would be impossible to sustain a long-term K/cap of more than ten person years. At that level, even when working flat out, sector I could only make good the annual wearing out of plant. All the measurements in Figure 6.12 are in terms of labor value—person years.

显然，利润率递减规律只是一种更普遍的规律的一种特殊资本主义社会形式，这种规律影响着无论是社会主义还是资本主义的工业生产方式，因为随着时间的推移，实体劳动与活劳动的比例不断上升。然而，社会主义经济避免了这一过程的某些最坏影响，但容易受到其他影响。它避免了自 1970 年代高资本有机构成成为普遍问题以来，资本主义世界时不时受到的经济衰退、失业和实际工资下降压力的影响。另一方面，社会主义世界经济增长率的放缓引发了比 1970 年代和 2008 年后西方经济危机更为严重的意识形态和政治危机。

It is evident that the law of the declining rate of profit is just a particular capitalist social form of a more general law that affects the industrial mode of production, whether socialist or capitalist, as the ratio of embodied to living labor rises over time. Socialist economy, however, avoids certain of the worst effects of this process while being susceptible to others. It avoided the recessions, unemployment, and pressure to drive down real wages that affected the capitalist world on and off since the 1970s when the high organic composition of capital became a general problem. On the other hand, the slowdown in the rate of economic growth in the socialist world produced a much more severe ideological and political crisis than that which hit the West in the economic crises of the 1970s and post-2008.

劳动价值的计算与利润率下降的规律是相同的。价值的趋于平稳可能仍然与使用价值的增加相一致，但它确实能让你表明最终状态必须是价值方面发生简单再生产的状态。

Calculations in terms of labor values are the same basis that one uses to arrive at the law of the falling rate of profit. The leveling off in value terms may still be compatible with an increase in use-value terms, but it does enable you to show that the end state must be one in which simple reproduction occurs in value terms.

与劳动价值计算相比，使用价值的衡量比较困难。你比较的是可测量收入，即不同时间的不同使用价值的数量。虽然劳动价值的增长使用的单位是人体消耗的时间，而这个单位每年都不会变化，但苏联在 1930 年和 1980 年生产的产出物组合却大不相同。1930 年没有喷气式客机、没有电视、没有核电站、没有电脑，1980 年没有马拉收割机。每年的产出可以用每种商品产量的清单来表示：60×2 发动机喷气式飞机、8×4 发动机喷气式飞机、1,600,000 GHhrs 电力、1,506,000 辆拉达汽车等。问题不仅在于以后几年会生产出早些年从未想过的物品；即使是在五年这样的较短时间内进行比较也很困难。假设在 5 年计划中，产品有预先定义的分类，我们可以将其设置为电子表格中的一列标签。1975 年，我们以一列数字的形式列出苏联每种产品的产量，1979 年也做同样的事情。那么，苏联在 1975 年至 1979 年间增长了多少？

In contrast to labor value calculations, measurement in use-value terms is difficult. You are comparing incomensurables—quantities of different use-values at different times. While growth in terms of labor values uses a unit—time expended by a human body—that does not vary from year to year, the physical mix of outputs produced by the USSR in 1930 and 1980 was very different. There were no jet airliners, no TVs, no nuclear power plants, no computers in 1930, no horse-drawn reapers in 1980. Output in each year can be represented by a list of how much of each type of good was produced: 60×2 engined jets, 8×4 engine jets, 1,600,000 GHhrs electricity, 1,506,000 Lada cars, etc. The problem is not just that there will be items produced in later years that were never thought of in the earlier years; even over shorter periods like five years comparison is hard. Suppose that over a 5-year plan there is a predefined categorization of products, which we could set up as a column of labels in a spreadsheet. In 1975 we list how much of each product was produced in the USSR as a column of figures, and do the same for 1979. How much did the USSR then grow between 1975 and 1979?

图 6.13. 苏联时期世界部分地区的人均 GDP 数据。来源：Maddison，2001 年。

Figure 6.13. GDP per capita figures for some world regions over lifetime of USSR. Source: Maddison, 2001.

除非所有行业都以相同的速度增长，否则没有明确的答案。如果每种产品代码的 1979 年产量都比 1975 年高出 24%，那么经济增长率毫无疑问为 24%。但如果汽车产量增长 50%，飞机产量增长 20%，电力产量增长 17%，情况会怎样？

There is no definite answer unless all industries grew at the same rate. If for every product code, output in 1979 was 24 percent greater than in 1975 then the economy unambiguously grew at 24 percent. But what if car production grew 50 percent, aircraft production 20 percent, and electricity by 17 percent?

可以肯定地说，增长率在 17% 至 50% 之间。

All you can definitely say is that growth was between 17 and 50 percent.

你可以尝试通过赋予所有产出一个名义卢布值并将它们相加来附加一个更精确的数字，但最终的增长率将在很大程度上取决于你使用的相对价格，以及 1975 年至 1979 年之间卢布价值的变化^。126

You can try to attach a more precise figure to it by giving all outputs a nominal ruble value and adding these up, but the resulting growth rate will depend heavily on the relative prices you use, and the change in the value of the ruble between 1975 and 1979.¹²⁶

如果你不采用可变货币单位，而是用劳动价值来衡量每年的产出，那么就可以避免价格通胀问题，但又回到了总体经济增长率等于工作时数增长率的情况，就像我们在简单的费尔德曼模型中看到的那样。如果技术随着时间的推移而进步，这意味着工作时数可能会下降，而大多数行业的实物产出则会上升。从劳动价值的角度来看，经济将会萎缩，即使从实物角度来看经济在增长。从旨在展示经济增长的国家宣传的角度来看，这可能是不受欢迎的。

If, instead of inconstant monetary units, you value the output in each year in terms of labor values, you avoid the problem of price inflation, but you are back to the situation of the overall economic growth rate being equal to the growth rate of the hours worked that we have in the simple Feldman model. If technology improves over time, this means that hours worked might fall while the physical output of most industries rose. In terms of labor values the economy would be shrinking even if, in physical terms, it was growing. From the standpoint of state propaganda aimed at showing economic growth, this might be unwelcome.

GDP 增长数据结合了三个过程。首先是劳动力在家庭生产方式和工业生产方式之间的流动。其次是绝对人口增长的影响。第三，新技术提高了每个人的物质生产率。如果以人均 GDP 来衡量产出，这至少可以弥补人口增长的影响，但它仍然将技术创新与生产方式之间的转变混为一谈。

GDP growth figures combine three processes. First is the movement of labor between the domestic and industrial modes of production. Second, there is the effect of absolute population growth. Third, new technology increases the physical production by each person. If one measures output in terms of GDP per head, this at least compensates for population increase but it still conflates technological innovation with shifts between modes of production.

人们普遍认为，苏联解体时，其人均国内生产总值远低于英国。苏联专业阶层的生活水平与英国和其他西方同行相比存在巨大反差，这被认为损害了社会主义经济的声誉。尽管西欧是苏联的近邻，但从经济史的角度来看，拉丁美洲或日本是更好的参考点。图 6.13使用经合组织发布的数据 [Maddison，2001] 显示，在 19 世纪末，日本、拉丁美洲和当时的俄罗斯帝国的人均收入与世界平均水平相当。它们属于中等收入国家，远远领先于中国和印度，但比英国穷得多。与世界平均水平相比，苏联的计划经济体制表现相当不错。计划经济始于 1920 年代末，结束于 1980 年代末。苏联开始实行计划经济时，人均收入为世界平均水平的 4/5，与拉丁美洲持平。苏联人均收入最终仅为世界平均水平的 1.1/3。拉丁美洲则一直追随世界平均水平。1928 年，苏联人均收入为英国水平的 25%，但到 1960 年已攀升至 45%。在接下来的三十年里，苏联人均收入大致与英国增长水平持平，最终为英国水平的 43%。

It is widely believed that at the time the USSR broke up, its GDP per capita was substantially below that of the UK. The contrast between the living standards of the Soviet professional classes compared to their British and other Western counterparts is thought to have discredited the socialist economy. Although Western Europe was an immediate geographical neighbor, in terms of economic history, Latin America or Japan would have been better reference points. Figure 6.13 shows, using data published by the OECD [Maddison, 2001], that in the late nineteenth-century Japan, Latin America, and the then Russian Empire were clustered around the world average in terms of income per head. They fell into a middle-income group, well ahead of China and India, but were far poorer than the UK. Compared to the world average, the Soviet planned system did pretty well. Planning started at the end of the 1920s and finished at the end of the 1980s. The USSR started the period of planned economy with 4/5 the world average income per head, level with Latin America. It ended it 1 1/3 world average. Latin America had tracked the world average. Soviet income per head was 25 percent of the UK level in 1928 but had climbed to 45 percent by 1960. In the next thirty years Soviet incomes roughly tracked UK growth ending at 43 percent of UK levels.

根据经合组织的数据，苏联的长期收入增长率在苏联的大部分时间里都高于英国，但在 20 世纪 80 年代略有回落。从国际上看，日本和中国才是真正的成功典范。尽管战时轰炸摧毁了日本大部分城市，给日本造成了严重挫折，但日本在 20 世纪 70 年代还是从中等收入国家一跃成为英国的超额收入国家 [O'Brien，2015]。

According to the OECD, Soviet long-run rates of income growth were better than those of the UK for most of the USSR’s life, slipping back slightly in the 1980s. Internationally the really big success stories were Japan and China. Japan moved from being a middle-income country to overtake the UK by the 1970s despite the severe setback caused by wartime bombing that had razed most of its cities [O’Brien, 2015].

对苏联长期增长的估计或对 20 世纪 80 年代美国和苏联经济规模的比较的估计不可避免地存在争议，不同政治观点的支持者根据他们选择采用的定价模型给出不同的估计。因此，图 6.13中的贝塞尔曲线应被解释为给出了所发生情况的大致形状。这些问题没有完全客观的答案。对不同国家或不同时期的总体国民生产总值进行精确比较的想法本身就是一种货币幻觉。

Estimates of the long-term growth of the USSR or estimates of the comparative sizes of the U.S. and Soviet economies in, say, the 1980s are inevitably controversial, with proponents of different political views giving divergent estimates depending on the pricing models that they choose to adopt. Thus the Bezier curves in Figure 6.13 should be interpreted as giving the rough shape of what happened. There are no totally objective answers to these questions. The very idea of precise comparisons between the overall national products of different countries, or different periods, is a monetary illusion.

如果不看人均产出的货币估计，而是看实物生产和消费的统计数据，我们就会得到完全不同的图景。让我们首先看看粮食生产。图 6.14（顶部）显示了苏联四大食品类别在连续几十年的基准年产量增长情况。从 1950 年到 1970 年，所有类别都迅速增长。谷物和牛奶产量随后趋于平稳，而肉类和蛋类产量继续快速增长。谷物生产的趋于平稳最初似乎是一种失败，但如果我们将苏联的表现与美国粮食产量的长期趋势非常相似（图 6.14，底部）。随着国家变得更加富裕，它们倾向于将农业从淀粉生产转向更高质量的蛋白质食品。我们看到苏联的优质食品产量在 1970 年后持续增长。

If instead of looking at monetary estimates of output per head we look at statistics for physical production and consumption we get a rather different picture. Let us look first at food production. Figure 6.14 (top) shows the growth in Soviet production of four big food categories for benchmark years in successive decades. From 1950 to 1970 all categories expanded rapidly. Grain and milk production then leveled off while meat and egg production continued to grow rapidly. The leveling off of grain production appears initially to be a failing, but if we compare the Soviet performance with the United States the long-term trend of grain production is very similar (Figure 6.14, bottom). As countries become richer they tend to shift their agriculture from starch production to higher-quality protein foods. We see that Soviet output high-quality foods continued to grow after 1970.

但是请稍等。图 6.14仅给出了产量的成比例增长。从非常低的基数开始的快速增长仍然可能使苏联的粮食供应相对不足。苏联的人均粮食产量与国际标准相比如何？

But hold on. Figure 6.14 gives only the proportionate growth of output. A rapid growth from a very low base could still leave the USSR with a relatively poor supply of food. How did Soviet food production per person stack up by international standards?

图 6.13显示，按货币计算的人均产出与早期苏联的人均产出水平相当，而不是与英国或美国。苏联解体时，实际情况如何？

Figure 6.13 shows that monetary estimates of output per head put the early USSR level with South America rather than the UK or the United States. How did things compare in real terms by the end of the USSR?

如果我们看看 1988 年巴西和苏联的人均蛋白质食品产量（表 6.4），我们会发现苏联在肉类、牛奶和鸡蛋方面遥遥领先。这并不奇怪。令人惊讶的是，鉴于苏联农业在西方的形象不佳，苏联的这些食品供应量也超过了英国和美国。

If we look at production of protein foods per head in Brazil and the USSR in 1988 (Table 6.4) we see that the USSR was substantially ahead for meat, milk, and eggs. That is not surprising. What is surprising, given the poor image that Soviet agriculture had in the West, is that Soviet supplies of these foods had also overtaken the UK and the United States.

图 6.14. 尽管苏联以粮食短缺而闻名，但农业产量实际上增长迅速。粮食的增长趋势与美国相似。资料来源：Pockney，1991 年；以及美国农业部数据库。

Figure 6.14. Despite the USSR having a reputation for food shortages, agricultural output actually grew rapidly. The growth trend for grain was similar to that of the United States. Source: Pockney, 1991; and USDA database.

表 6.4：苏联末期与英国、巴西、美国主要蛋白质食品人均年产量比较

TABLE 6.4: Comparison of Late Soviet with UK, Brazil, and U.S. Annual per Capita Output of Major Protein Foods

请注意，在所有类别中，前苏联的数据都更好。资料来源：Pockney，1991 年；FAOSTAT 和 USDA 数据库。

Note that for all categories, the late USSR had better figures. Sources: Pockney, 1991; FAOSTAT and USDA databases.

苏联在耐用消费品生产方面也取得了相对的成功。20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代，电视、洗衣机和冰箱的产量呈指数级增长，增长了数百倍或数千倍。然后从 60 年代末开始，耐用品稳定在每年几百万的水平。但对于新产品来说，这并不奇怪。它们从零开始，稳定在足以弥补磨损的水平。苏联一系列产品的生产水平稳定在可以让大多数家庭拥有电视、收音机、洗衣机等的水平。与西方相比，最大的缺口是汽车的生产。汽车的生产水平稳定在每年 130 万辆，这个水平太低了，无法让汽车普遍拥有。在苏联时期末期，他们每 200 名居民仅生产 1 辆汽车。

The Soviets were also relatively successful in the production of consumer durables. Production of TVs, washing machines, and refrigerators increased exponentially in the 1950s and ’60s, expanding hundredfold or thousandfold. Then from the late ’60s durables stabilized at levels of several millions a year. But that is not surprising with new products. They start out from a base of zero, and stabilize at a level sufficient to replace wear and tear. Soviet production levels of a range of products stabilized at levels that would allow the majority of households to have a TV, a radio, a washing machine, etc. Compared to the West, the biggest shortfall was in the production of cars. This leveled off at a production level of 1.3 million a year, which was far too low to allow car ownership to be general. At the end of the Soviet period they were producing only about 1 car per 200 inhabitants.

20 世纪 60 年代汽车工业相对落后，这可以归因于意识形态的需要——私家车是资产阶级的交通工具，唯一可接受的社会主义汽车形式是公共出租车。在全球变暖时代，反对广泛使用汽车可能再次显得合理，但在化石燃料仍然充足的 20 世纪 70 年代，人们决定大规模生产汽车。随着意识形态的反对意见消失，人们默认的假设是，适时每个家庭都会拥有一辆汽车。汽车的漫长等待名单随后成为不满的根源，证明社会主义无法像资本主义那样大规模生产汽车。

The relative underdevelopment of the car industry in the 1960s can be ascribed to ideological imperatives—the view that private cars were a bourgeois form of transport and that the only acceptable socialist form of car was the public taxi. In the age of global warming, an opposition to widespread car use may again come to seem rational, but in the 1970s with fossil fuels still plentiful, the decision was taken to mass-produce cars. With the ideological objection gone, the default assumption became that in due course every family would have one. The long waiting lists for cars then became a source of discontent, evidence that socialism could not mass-produce cars the way capitalism could.

苏联未能实现普遍的汽车所有权是事实，如果你承认汽车所有权值得称赞，那么这一失败就有理由抱怨。但这并不能解释为什么面包而不是拉达成为人们最大的不满。苏联人的人均粮食产量实际上比西方高，那么为什么会有不满呢？

The failure of the USSR to provide general car ownership was real, and if you accept that car ownership is praiseworthy then the failure was a legitimate ground for complaint. But that does not explain why loaves, not Ladas, loomed large as a grievance. The Soviets actually produced more food per head than in the West, so why the discontent?

归根结底是钱和价格。食品价格被系统性地低估，其后果我们将在下文中描述。

It comes down to money, and prices. Food was systematically under-priced, with consequences we will describe below.

图 6.15。苏联主要消费品生产情况。资料来源：Pockney，1991 年。

Figure 6.15. Soviet production of major consumer goods. Source: Pockney, 1991.

6.6 为什么社会主义经济仍然使用货币

6.6 WHY THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES STILL USED MONEY

这让我们不禁要问，为什么苏联这样的社会主义经济体仍然使用货币。货币是一种

This leads us on to the question of why socialist economies like the USSR still used money. Money was a

• 整合国民账户的方式。

• way of integrating national accounts.

• 编制各个工厂帐目的方法。

• a means of preparing the accounts of individual factories.

• 一种向工人分配收入的手段。

• a means of distributing income to workers.

从普列奥布拉任斯基[1973]到斯大林[1952]，官方的理论是货币应该被废除，货币只作为国家预算和与尚未社会化的经济部门进行贸易的辅助机制而存在。127^很容易看出，整个国家预算需要某种标量计算单位。如果你想决定在消费和投资、民用和军用生产、健康和教育之间分配资源的总体比例，你需要某种单位来表达这些比例。货币提供了这一点。原则上，社会主义经济可能会遵循马克思[1970]的建议，直接使用劳动力作为其会计单位，但普列奥布拉任斯基[1973]否认了这种可能性：“在混合经济体制下，货币具有很大的优势，不能被任何‘劳动单位’或其他人工设想的计算方法取代。”

The official doctrine from Preobrazhenski [1973] to Stalin [1952] was that money was due to be abolished and that it remained only as an auxiliary mechanism of use in state budgeting and trade with the as yet unsocialized sections of the economy.¹²⁷ It is easy to see that the overall state budget required some sort of scalar unit of calculation. If you want to make decisions about the overall proportions in which resources are to be distributed between consumption and investment, between civilian and military production, between health and education, you need some unit in which these proportions could be expressed. Money provided that. In principle a socialist economy might have followed Marx’s suggestion [1970] and used labor directly as its unit of account, but Preobrazhenskii [1973] was dismissive of this possibility: “Under the mixed system of economy money had a great advantage, and could not be replaced by any ‘labor-units’ or other artificially conceived methods of calculation.”

这并不完全令人信服，因为很难理解为什么劳动单位会比印有卢布数量的纸币更加人为。国家同样可以发行印有劳动小时数的纸币（见图5.20）。

This is not entirely convincing, since it is hard to see why labor units would have been more artificial than printed paper sheets with numbers of rubles written on them. The state could equally well have issued notes with hours of labor written on them (see Figure 5.20).

马克思曾发表过这样一段略带神秘色彩的言论：这些纸币只不过是一张剧院门票而已：

Marx had made the slightly enigmatic statement that such notes were no more money than a theater ticket:

为什么货币不直接代表劳动时间，而一张纸片可以代表例如x小时的劳动，这个问题本质上与为什么在商品生产的情况下，产品必须采取商品形式的问题相同。这是显而易见的，因为它们采取商品形式意味着它们分化为商品和货币。或者，为什么私人劳动——为私人而劳动——不能被视为它的对立面，即直接的社会劳动？我在其他地方彻底考察了以商品生产为基础的社会中的“劳动货币”的乌托邦思想[1847]。在这一点上，我只想进一步说，例如，欧文的“劳动货币”并不比一张剧院门票更“货币”。欧文以直接关联的劳动为前提，这种生产形式与商品生产完全不一致。劳动证明只是个人在共同劳动中所占份额的证据，以及他对用于消费的共同产品的一定份额的权利的证据。但是，欧文从来没有想过，在假定商品生产的同时，又通过玩弄金钱来逃避商品生产的必要条件。[1954，第 3 章]

The question: Why does not money directly represent labor-time, so that a piece of paper may represent, for instance, x hours’ labor, is at bottom the same as the question why, given the production of commodities, must products take the form of commodities? This is evident, since their taking the form of commodities implies their differentiation into commodities and money. Or, why cannot private labor—labor for the account of private individuals—be treated as its opposite, immediate social labor? I have elsewhere examined thoroughly the Utopian idea of “labor-money” in a society founded on the production of commodities [1847]. On this point I will only say further, that Owen’s “labor-money,” for instance, is no more “money” than a ticket for the theater. Owen presupposes directly associated labor, a form of production that is entirely inconsistent with the production of commodities. The certificate of labor is merely evidence of the part taken by the individual in the common labor, and of his right to a certain portion of the common produce destined for consumption. But it never enters into Owen’s head to presuppose the production of commodities, and at the same time, by juggling with money, to try to evade the necessary conditions of that production. [1954, chap. 3]

马克思这段话的含义是，他认为劳动票据在生产“直接关联”的情况下是实用的，在苏联背景下，这意味着一旦整个经济被国有化：一旦私人企业和集体被国营农场取代，私人手工业不再存在。普列奥布拉任斯基和后来的斯大林的论点是，这些条件在 20 世纪 20 年代或 50 年代都不存在，尽管这并没有解决这个问题。我们需要问，为什么与私人或半私人生产者进行商品贸易会排除使用劳动单位。

The implication of this passage from Marx was that he thought that labor notes were practical in the situations where production was “directly associated,” which in the Soviet context would mean once the whole economy was nationalized: once private firms and collectives had been replaced by state farms and private handicraft no longer existed. The argument of Preobrazhenskii, and later Stalin, was that these conditions did not exist in either the 1920s or the 1950s, though that does not dispose of the issue. We need to ask why the existence of commodity trade with private or semi-private producers excludes the use of labor units.

马克思在与蒲鲁东的辩论中回答道 [1847]，在一个没有总体指导和规划的商品生产社会中，没有理由认为每种商品的总体供需会平衡。因此，即使裁缝花了 4 个小时做一条裤子，也不能保证它会在 4 小时内卖出去。如果需求疲软，他可能不得不接受较低的价格^。128

Marx’s answer [1847] in his polemic against Proudhon had been to argue that in a commodity-producing society without overall direction and planning there was no reason to suppose that overall supply and demand for each commodity will balance. Hence even if a tailor expended 4 hours on a pair of trousers, there is no guarantee that it will sell for 4 hours. If demand is slack he may have to accept a lower price.¹²⁸

这足以说明为什么供需波动必然导致价格围绕其劳动价值波动，但事实确实如此马克思没有解释为什么苏联在 1970 年代之前或更早一些时候（例如东德）不能使用劳动单位。更有趣的是，马克思的论证也没有解释为什么东德和苏联国家发行的纸币上标有马克和卢布，而不是小时。从某种程度上说，纸币上的符号是任意的。如果制定了适当的货币和价格政策，就有可能重新发行以小时为单位的新货币，这样，从整个经济的平均水平来看，商店里以一小时的纸币出售的商品实际上平均需要一小时才能制造出来。

This is fair enough as an argument as to why fluctuations in supply and demand must lead to prices oscillating around their labor values, but it does not say why labor units could not have been used in the USSR by the 1970s or somewhat earlier in, for example, East Germany. Nor, more interestingly, does Marx’s argument explain why the paper notes issued by the East German and Soviet states were labeled marks and rubles, not hours. At one level the signs on the pieces of paper are arbitrary. With an appropriate monetary and price policy it would have been possible to reissue new currency marked in hours such that, taken on average across the economy, goods sold in the shops for one hour of notes actually had, again on average, required one hour to make.

这仍然是货币，它会流通，并可以支持私人或黑市。没有什么可以阻止它像任何其他纸币一样从一个人手中流转。因此，它不完全符合马克思的标准，即作为向个人颁发的证明其参与共同劳动的证书，但会计单位至少不再是任意的，经济的社会关系也会变得更加清晰。但普列奥布拉任斯基和斯大林并不欢迎这种清晰。前者制定了“原始社会主义积累”政策，根据该政策，重工业的快速增长将通过强迫农业部门以低于价值的价格出售其产出来资助。工业产品将以高于价值的价格出售。如果货币以小时为单位，集体农民就会清楚地意识到国家在欺骗他们。他们只用种植粮食所花费时间的一小部分就得到了报酬。

This would still be money, it would have circulated and could have supported a private or black market. There would have been nothing to prevent it passing from hand to hand like any other paper money. It would thus not have fully met Marx’s criterion of being certificates issued to individuals certifying their part in common labor, but the unit of account would at least have ceased to be arbitrary, and the social relations of the economy would have become a bit clearer. But clarity would have been unwelcome to Preobrazhenskii and Stalin. The former developed the policy of “primitive socialist accumulation” under which the the rapid growth of heavy industry was to be funded by forcing the agricultural sector to sell its output at below value. Industrial products were to be sold back above value. If the currency had been denoted in hours it would have been blatantly clear to collective farmers that the state was cheating them. They were being paid for only a fraction of the time expended growing grain.

马克思对蒲鲁东的反对表明，即使你用小时来计量货币，你仍然必须为价格波动留出一些余地。但这只是苏联理论家所说的集体农场或农民部门的盛行迫使他们使用货币时所暗示的一部分。真正的问题是劳动单位会暴露集体的剥削。

Marx’s objection to Proudhon showed that even were you to denominate the currency in hours, you would still have to leave some leeway for prices oscillating. But that was only part of what the Soviet theorists were alluding to when they said that the prevalence of a collective farm or peasant sector forced them to use money. The real problem was that labor units would have exposed the exploitation of collectives.

劳动证的概念还存在其他一些技术性问题。马克思显然设想过在私人贸易完全消失的经济中使用劳动证，但如果劳动证只是可转让的纸张，它们仍然可以用于私人交易。马克思似乎一直在考虑某种个人不可转让的劳动证。有了现代信息技术，不难看出如何做到这一点。智能卡、终端、保存记录的数据库和禁止私人账户间转账的软件都可以做到这一点。但要想象这样一个系统如何与纸笔技术以及尚未 100% 掌握数字的人口一起工作，则要困难得多。

There were other more technical problems with the idea of labor certificates. Marx clearly envisaged them being used in an economy in which private trade had been totally eliminated, but if the certificates had just been transferable sheets of paper, they could still have been used for private transactions. Marx seems to have been thinking in terms of some sort of individual nontransferable labor certificate. With modern information technologies it is not hard to see how to do this. Smart cards, terminals, databases keeping the records and software that prohibits transfers between private accounts would do it. But it is quite a lot harder to see how such a system could have been made to work with paper and pencil technologies and a population that was not yet 100 percent numerate.

类似于支票账户的东西也可以发挥作用，发放劳动支票簿，并根据他们的购买情况向公共商店开支票，同时根据他们所做的工作小时数记入他们的账户。但是，维持这种每周使用纸质账簿和纸质账户对账的系统所需的劳动力将是巨大的。纸质支票只有在以下情况下才适用于资本主义世界：a) 它们用于大额购买，小额购买以现金支付；b) 只有少数人拥有银行账户。在计算机和数据库出现之前，每个人都可以拥有账户，甚至用电子银行支付一杯咖啡的费用。

Something similar to checking accounts would have worked, with people being issued labor checkbooks and writing checks to public stores against their purchases while having their accounts credited by the hours work they had done. But the labor associated with maintaining such a system with paper ledgers and paper reconciliation of accounts each week would have been massive. Paper checks only worked in the capitalist world so long as a) they were used for large purchases, small ones being in cash; b) only a minority of the population had bank accounts. It took computers and databases before it became practical for everyone to have accounts and to pay even for a cup of coffee with an electronic bank payment.

社会关系总是受到技术的制约。在历史上的社会主义经济中，可能的社会关系受到当时信息技术现状的制约。硬币和纸币是一种更简单的低技术解决方案。

Social relations are always constrained by technology. In the historical socialist economies, possible social relations were constrained by the then existing state of information technology. Coins and banknotes were a much simpler low-tech solution.

我们很容易忘记建立防止资源被欺诈性挪用的会计系统有多么重要。社会主义经济体必须实行列宁所称的最严格的会计和控制，以防止公共资源被挪用到私人口袋。以苏联大型商店极其复杂的支付系统为例：顾客挑选想要的商品，售货员给他们一张收据，他们把收据带到商店其他地方的收银台。在这里，他们支付商品费用并获得收据，然后带着收据到取货点用收据兑换实际商品。与 20 世纪 80 年代英国或美国商店的经营方式相比，苏联似乎使用了一种拜占庭式复杂的系统。你不仅必须与工作人员互动三次，而且计算似乎经常使用算盘。为什么要有这样的系统？

It is easy to forget how important it is to have systems of accounting that prevent fraudulent diversion of resources. Socialist economies had to operate what Lenin termed the strictest accounting and control to try to prevent public resources being diverted into private pockets. Take the horrendously complicated payment system in large Soviet shops: the customer picked items they wanted, and the sales assistant gave them a chit, which they took to a cashier’s booth elsewhere in the shop. Here they paid for the goods and in return got a receipt which they took to the pickup point and exchanged the receipt for the actual goods. Compared to the way business was done in British or American shops by the 1980s, the USSR seemed to use a system of Byzantine complexity. Not only did you have to interact with staff three times, but the calculations often seemed to use an abacus. Why have such a system?

这种系统在西方并不为人所知；英国的一些高级屠夫就使用过这种系统，其动机很明显。它是为了卫生，因为它可以防止柜台工作人员同时接触肉和钱。但在苏联，它是为了提供纸质记录，以便检查收银员的诚实程度。一天结束时，收据和收据可以与收银员抽屉中的现金进行核对。算盘的低技术水平和复杂的文书工作是相关的。

Such systems were not unknown in the West; some high-class butchers in the UK used it, and the motive in that case was clear. It was for hygiene, since it prevented the counter staff from handling both meat and money. In the USSR, though, it was to provide a paper trail whereby the honesty of the cashier could be checked. At the end of the day the chits and receipts could be reconciled with the cash in the cashier’s drawer. The low technology of the abacus and the complicated paperwork were related.

在收银机出现并大规模生产之前，检查收银员的诚实度是一个普遍的问题。在较小的商店中，店主会确保自己或近亲属负责收银。大型资本主义百货商店使用莫斯科系统。在更先进的系统下，顾客不必走到收银台；相反，收据和现金会通过气动管道送到地下室的收银员那里。收银机的发明让公司能够信任他们的收银员，因为机器会自动累积所有交易结束后才打开收银机抽屉。一天结束时，通过比较机器登记簿上的总额与收银机中的金额，即可发现任何欺诈行为。

Prior to the development and mass production of cash registers, checking on the honesty of cashiers was a universal problem. In smaller shops, the owner would make sure that he or a close family member worked the till. Large capitalist department stores used the Moscow system. In more advanced ones, the customers did not have to walk up to the till; instead the chit and the cash were dispatched to cashiers in the basement using pneumatic tubes. It was the invention of cash registers that allowed firms to trust their cashiers, since the machine automatically accumulated all transactions, and only opened the till drawer at the end of the transaction. Any dishonesty was revealed at the end of the day by comparing the total on the machine’s register with what was in the till.

如果苏联生产的收银机太少，那么他们就不得不保留旧的纸质系统。这在一定程度上反映了商业活动及其技术的低优先级。革命前，俄罗斯对贸易不屑一顾，贸易与受鄙视的犹太人有联系，20 世纪 20 年代零售组织几乎完全崩溃。尽管在第二个五年计划中曾试图对其进行现代化和机械化，但它仍然是一个低优先级部门 [Randall, 2008]。但贸易机械化的缺乏表明在采用节省劳动力的技术方面普遍进展缓慢。

If they made too few cash registers, then the Soviets had to keep the old paper system. This is partly a reflection of the low priority assigned commercial activity, and thus to its technology. There was a pre-revolutionary history of disdain for trade in Russia, an association of trade with the despised Jews, and an almost complete breakdown of retail organization during the 1920s. Although an attempt was made to modernize and mechanize it in the second 5-year plan, it remained a low priority sector [Randall, 2008]. But the lack of mechanization in trade was symptomatic of a more general slowness in adopting labor-saving techniques.

苏联工业的劳动力利用效率不如美国或西德。当然，从某种意义上说，苏联的劳动力利用效率很高：没有失业，全职就业的女性比例高于其他任何国家。但发达的工业经济必须能够将劳动力转移到最能有效利用的地方。在资本主义制度下，这是通过失业储备来实现的，尽管从宏观经济层面来看，这种储备效率低下，但确实允许新产业迅速扩张。

Labor was not used as efficiently in Soviet industry as it was in the United States or West Germany. In one sense, of course, the USSR used labor very effectively: it had no unemployment and the proportion of women in fulltime employment was higher than in any other country. But a developed industrial economy has to be able to transfer labor to where it can be most efficiently used. Under capitalism this is achieved by the existence of a reserve of unemployment, which, though it is inefficient at a macroeconomic level, does allow rapid expansion of new industries.

苏联企业倾向于囤积工人，将员工留在公司名册上，以备将来需要他们来满足计划当局的需求。这既是因为货币工资水平相对较低，也是因为国家银行愿意提供信贷来支付这些费用。货币工资水平低是国家通过国有企业利润而不是所得税来增加收入的结果。

The Soviet enterprise tended to hoard workers, keeping people on its books just in case they were needed to meet future demands from the planning authorities. This was made possible both by the relatively low level of money wages and because the state bank readily extended credit to cover such costs. The low level of money wages was in turn a consequence of the way the state raised its revenue from the profits of state enterprises rather than from income taxes.

6.7 社会主义还是国有资本主义

6.7 SOCIALISM OR STATE-OWNED CAPITALISM

这与一个长期存在争议的问题有关：苏联经济是一种新的社会主义组织形式，还是一种国有资本主义组织形式？在马克思主义的讨论中，这个问题的提出方式是苏联是否有一种新的生产方式。

This relates to what has long been a controversial issue: Was the Soviet economy a new socialist form of organization or simply a state-owned capitalist one? In Marxist discussions this has been posed in terms of whether the USSR had a new mode of production or not.

希勒尔·蒂克汀（Hillel Ticktin）[2011]等学者认为，社会主义在原则上是一种新的生产方式，但现有的社会主义经济体并没有这种生产方式，而苏联也没有生产方式：

Scholars like Hillel Ticktin [2011] hold that socialism is, in principle, a new mode of production but that the existing socialist economies did not have this mode of production and the USSR had no mode of production:

在社会主义和马克思主义理论中，这在理论上和技术上都是不可能的，因为社会主义是一个全球体系，是一种继承资本主义的生产方式，只能在世界范围内实施。因此，任何声称苏联、中国、委内瑞拉或古巴正在建设社会主义的说法都是没有意义的，除非社会主义建设被含蓄地或明确地重新定义，脱离马克思主义和马克思主义传统内的任何社会主义。

In socialist and Marxist theory this is both theoretically and technically impossible, as socialism is a global system, a mode of production succeeding capitalism, which can only be implemented on a world scale. Hence any statement that the USSR, China, Venezuela or Cuba were building socialism does not make sense, unless the building of socialism is implicitly or explicitly re-defined away from Marxism and practically any socialism within the Marxist tradition.

我认为这种说法存在很多问题。首先，马克思主义传统被高度选择性地缩小了。蒂金可能认为没有马克思主义者会认为苏联集团或中国是社会主义国家。但他只能通过将这些国家中数百万共产党员和自认为是马克思主义者的人排除在外来坚持这种观点。这些人显然“不是马克思主义传统的一部分”。实际上，他是说，同意我的人不可能不同意我的观点。

I think that there are many problems with this. First, there is a highly selective narrowing of the Marxist tradition. Ticktin may think that no Marxist would ever have seen the Soviet bloc or China as socialist. But he can only hold that by defining out of existence all those millions who have been members of Communist parties in these countries and who considered themselves to be Marxist. These people were apparently “not part of the Marxist tradition.” In effect he is saying nobody who agrees with me could possibly disagree with me.

嗯，是的。

Well, yes.

充其量，这不过是诉诸权威，而且是可疑的诉求。马克思是否提出过社会主义生产方式这一概念，这值得怀疑。129^他当然从未发表过任何关于这种生产方式的理论，更不用说任何关于它只能在全球存在的论证了。即使他曾提出过这种论证，他又怎么会知道社会主义只能在全球存在呢？

At best it is no more than an appeal to authority, and a dubious one at that. It is questionable that Marx even proposed such a thing as a socialist mode of production.¹²⁹ He certainly never published any theory of such a mode of production, far less any argument that it could only exist globally. Even if he had argued that, how would he have known that socialism could only exist globally?

在十九世纪，这种所谓的理论不可能得到实证支持。现在有什么实证证据可以支持这种理论呢？

There could have been no empirical backing for this alleged theory in the nineteenth century. What is the empirical evidence now to back up such a theory?

这在一定程度上取决于人们所指的生产方式。没有生产方式，社会怎么可能存在？

This comes down, in part, to what people mean by mode of production. How could any society exist without a mode of production?

如果我们从物质生产方式的角度来问“苏联的生产方式是什么？”，那么很显然，这种生产方式是电气化机器工业。但我们知道，这也是当时美国的物质生产方式。因此，物质生产方式要么不足以区分资本主义和社会主义，要么社会主义必须需要一些完全不同的技术。蒂克廷可能主张后者——社会主义需要一些目前尚不知名的、只能在全球范围内运作的技术。任何关于尚未想到的技术的说法都一定是推测性的，与蒂克廷声称苏联根本没有生产方式的说法不符。相反，他的意思是，生产方式是一种自我维持和稳定的东西，具有提取剩余产品的独特方式。

If we ask the question “What mode of production did the USSR have?” in the sense of a mode of material production, then it is clear that the mode was electrified machine industry. But we know that this was also the mode of material production in the United States at the same time. So the mode of material production is either not enough to distinguish capitalism from socialism, or socialism must have required some radically different technologies. Ticktin could be arguing the latter—that some as yet unknown technology which can only operate at a global scale is required for socialism. Any claims about technologies yet to be thought of must be rather speculative and would not sit with Ticktin’s claim that the USSR had no mode of production at all. Instead, what he means is that a mode of production was something self-sustaining and stable with a unique mode of extracting a surplus product.

我认为蒂克廷从根本上是错误的，苏联确实有一种独特的剩余提取模式。所有超过生存水平的社会都需要生产剩余，社会主义社会也不例外。如果我们接受马克思的如果认为不同的社会经济形式以生产剩余的方式区分，那么社会主义社会就必须有自己的剩余提取方式。通过观察苏联等实际的社会主义社会，我们就可以了解这一点。

I argue that Tictin is fundamentally wrong, the USSR did have a distinct mode of surplus extraction. All societies beyond subsistence level need to produce a surplus and socialist societies are no exception. If we accept Marx’s argument that the different economic forms of society are distinguished by the means by which the surplus is produced, then socialist society must have its own form of surplus extraction. It is by looking at actual socialist societies like the USSR that we can grasp what this is.

社会主义计划经济确实有一种独特的剩余提取形式。剩余量的大小取决于劳动人口再生产与其他活动之间计划的劳动力分配。这与资本主义制度下的机制相反，资本主义制度下，增加值在工资和利润之间的货币分配是第一位的。在资本主义经济中，当工资和利润被花掉时，劳动力在再生产和其他活动之间的分配是二阶效应。在社会主义经济中，劳动力的分配是第一位的。凯恩斯[2010]在我前面引用的那段话中，关注的就是战争经济的这个问题。他在文章的另一段话中说得更清楚：

Socialist planned economy does indeed have a distinct form of surplus extraction. The magnitude of the surplus is determined by the planned allocation of labor between that for the reproduction of the working population versus other activities. This is the inverse of the mechanism that operates under capitalism where the monetary division of the value added between wages and profits comes first. In a capitalist economy the allocation of labor between reproduction and other activities occurs as a second-order effect when the wages and profits are spent. In a socialist economy it is the allocation of labor that comes first. Keynes [2010] was focusing on just this issue with respect to war economy in the passage I cited earlier. He makes it even more clear in another passage from his essay:

这引出了我们的基本主张。将留出一定数量的资金供民众消费。这一数额可能大于或小于完美的智慧和远见所能提供的数额。关键在于，这一数额仅在较小程度上取决于公众口袋里的钱数以及他们花钱的意愿。

This leads up to our fundamental proposition. There will be a certain definite amount left over for civilian consumption. This amount may be larger or smaller than what perfect wisdom and foresight would provide. The point is that its amount will depend only to a minor extent on the amount of money in the pockets of the public and on their readiness to spend it.

社会主义经济，因为其经济计算和控制的决定性部分是用实物单位而不是货币单位进行的，所以与其他非货币或有限使用货币的经济体有共同之处。最简单的比较是与古典欧洲封建制度进行比较，在封建制度中，为领主所做的劳动在时间和空间上与农民为自己所做的工作截然不同。金钱对此没有影响。农民的义务以时间或物质产品来规定。鉴于封建分工的规模很小，这似乎是农民和领主之间的直接人际关系。对于社会主义经济来说，决定因素是非个人的和广泛的，在整个大陆经济的规模上运作，通过将数百万工人分配到数万个生产部门。

A socialist economy, because a determining part of its economic calculation and control is performed in physical rather than monetary units, has something in common with other economies that were either non-monetary or had limited use of money. The easiest comparison is with classical European feudalism where the labor performed for the lord was distinct in time and space from the work the peasants did for themselves. Money had no influence over it. The peasants’ obligations were specified in terms of time or material products. Given the dwarf scale of the feudal division of labor this appears as a direct interpersonal relation between the peasant and the lord. For the socialist economy the determination was impersonal and vast, operating at the scale of a whole continental economy, via the allocation of millions of workers to tens of thousands of branches of production.

一旦计划中分配给生产消费品的劳动力数量固定下来，工资等的任何变化都无法改变剩余劳动力与必要劳动力的总体比率。如果货币工资上涨而分配给消费品的劳动力数量没有增加，那么其结果是人们银行账户中的资金积累将确保消费品市场“紧俏”。商品会售罄，但实际工资不会整体上涨。

Once the amount of labor allocated in the plan to making consumption goods is fixed, no changes in wages, etc., can alter the overall ratio of surplus to necessary labor. If money wages rise without the labor allocation going to consumer goods rising, then the effect is the accumulation of money in people’s bank accounts that will ensure a “tight” market in consumer goods. Goods would fly off the shelves but there would be no overall rise in real wages.

计划的存在导致货币关系与价值关系（即具体劳动的数量）脱节。货币不再是控制劳动力的一般形式。首先，社会主义经济往往明确禁止私人雇佣工人。此外，消费品相对于生产资料的货币需求增加不会导致劳动力转向消费品生产。工资和价格政策随后成为控制货币需求以使其适应消费品行业实际产品的问题。

The existence of planning introduces a disconnect between monetary relations and value relations, understood as quantities of embodied labor. Money ceases to be a general form of command over labor. For a start, socialist economies have often explicitly prohibited the private employment of workers. In addition, a rise in monetary demand for consumer goods versus means of production will not cause a shift in labor toward consumer goods production. Wages and prices policies then become a matter of controlling monetary demand to make it fit the real product of the consumer goods industries.

6.8 价值规律为何适用于社会主义经济

6.8 WHY THE LAW OF VALUE APPLIES IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

共产党人用他们所谓的价值规律来讨论商品和货币在社会主义经济中的作用问题 [Stalin, 1952]。这个术语有显性和隐性的含义。显性或表面的含义是，在资本主义经济中，相对劳动价值将充当相对价格的吸引因素。隐性的含义是，所有社会中的分配关系都受到劳动分配的制约^。130

The issue of the role of commodities and money in socialist economies was debated by the Communists in terms of what they called the Law of Value [Stalin, 1952]. The term had exoteric and esoteric meanings. The exoteric, or superficial, meaning is that in a capitalist-type economy, relative labor values will act as attractors for relative prices. The esoteric meaning is that the distribution relations in all societies are constrained by the distribution of labor.¹³⁰

在资本主义经济中，各大生产部门依靠贸易维持生存，其各自的收入至少必须与其所支持的人口大致成比例。

In a capitalist economy the great branches of production subsist by trade and their respective revenues must at least be roughly proportional to the populations they support.

尽管在社会主义经济中，经济的绝大部分是公有的，但人口在经济各部门的分布以及人口仍然生活在家庭中的事实仍然发挥着影响。这似乎是一个不寻常的观察结果，但在以前的阶级社会中成长起来的共产主义组织已经废除了家庭制度。想想修道院社区或欧文的新和谐。在这种无家庭的社区中，没有个人财产，只有社区财产。食物准备是集体的，儿童保育要么像修道院那样被废除，要么由集体进行。但如果你有家庭，那么家庭的私有财产就不同于社区财产。由于家庭的构成和消费需求不同，给所有家庭统一的商品配给是不切实际的。例如，一对老夫妇几乎不需要孩子的鞋子或玩具。因此，有家庭的社会主义经济必须允许消费有一定的灵活性，他们通过将一部分收入以货币形式分配来实现这一点。原则上，他们可以使用硬币和纸币以外的其他东西。他们可以为人们保留社会信用账户或劳动账户，但在所有情况下，许多家庭消费品都会有类似于价格的东西。

Although in a socialist economy the great bulk of the economy is publicly run, the distribution of the population accross sectors of the economy continues to exert an influence as does the fact that the population still lives in households. This may seem an unexceptional observation, but communist organizations that grew up within previous class societies dispensed with the household as an institution. Think of a monastic community or Owen’s New Harmony. In such householdless communities there would be no personal property, as opposed to community property. Food preparation was communal, and childcare was either abolished as in monastic orders or carried out communally. But if you have households then private property of the household is distinct from community property. Since the composition and consumption needs of households differ, it is impractical to give all households a uniform ration of goods. An old couple would have little need for children’s shoes or toys, for example. So a socialist economy with households has to allow some flexibility in consumption, which they achieve by distributing a portion of people’s income in money. In principle they could have used something other than coins and notes. They could have kept social credit accounts or labor accounts for people, but in all cases many goods for household consumption would have something very like a price.

图6.16 印第安纳州的新和谐乌托邦社区，由罗伯特·欧文于1825年设计。

Figure 6.16. The New Harmony utopian community in Indiana, designed by Robert Owen in 1825.

那么，在有家庭的社会主义社会中，价值规律的深奥之处、社会分工造成的根本约束如何表达呢？

In a socialist society, then, with households, how does the esoteric aspect of the law of value, the underlying constraint posed by the social division of labor, express itself?

6.8.1 部门间关系

6.8.1 Intersectoral relations

我把社会主义经济划分为三个部分：

I shall divide the socialist economy into three sectors:

1.生产资料的生产。

1. The production of means of production.

2. 生产个人消费品，分发给工人家庭出售或收取费用。此时，这些物品是以实际货币出售还是以劳动账户借记的方式出售，都无关紧要。

2. The production of articles of personal consumption that are distributed for sale or charge to individual workers’ families. At this point it makes no difference whether the articles are sold for actual money or against the debit of a labor account.

3. 提供免费服务，如教育、医疗保健、国防和公共基础设施。这并不是说被征召入伍对应征者来说不是一项费用，而是说他们个人不必为他们的军事服务支付现金或劳动积分。同样，教育需要成人社会的时间和资源，并让学生感受到失去娱乐时间的痛苦，但据推测没有学费。

3. The provision of uncharged services such as education, health care, defense, and public infrastructure. This is not to say that being conscripted into the army is not a charge on the conscript, but that they do not individually have to pay in cash or labor credits for their military service. Similarly, education costs adult society time and resources, and costs the pupils a keenly felt loss of playtime, but it is assumed that there are no school fees.

我将使用数字 1、2、3 来表示这些部门。部门 1 和 2 产生实物产出，也就是说，它们在亚当·斯密对“生产性”一词的意义上具有物质生产力。我将称部门 1 的产出为机器，尽管它也包括所有其他生产资料，使用小写符号 m 来表示流量，分别表示M ₁、M ₂、M ₃等部门使用的机器总产量和机器设备存量。

I will use the numbers 1, 2, 3 to denote these sectors. Sectors 1 and 2 produce physical outputs, that is to say, they are materially productive in the sense of Adam Smith’s use of the term productive. I will call the output of sector 1 machines, though it also includes all other means of production, and will use the symbol m, in lowercase, to indicate a flow, for the gross output of machines and the stock of machinery and equipment used in the sectors as M₁, M₂, M₃.

机器会磨损。我假设每年有一小部分（δ）机器会磨损。因此，对于各个行业来说，仅仅维持现状所需的新机器流量就是δM ₁、δM ₂、δM ₃。如果经济增长，那么就会有一些机器流量超过磨损量，留作增长之用，我将其称为m _g：

Machines wear out. I assume that a fraction (δ) of them wear out each year. So for the sectors the flow of new machines needed to simply stand still is given as δM₁, δM₂, δM₃. If the economy is growing there will be some surplus flow of machinery over wear and tear, set asside for growth, which I will call m_g :

我将假设劳动人口 P 分为P ₁、 P ₂、 P ₃三个部门，并且每工作一年，政府都会给一个人发放工资 w，要么以现金支付，要么在数据库中将一些单位记录到个人消费账户中。出于预算目的，国家还必须核算不同部门（直至单个工厂、医院等）的机器和设备的使用情况。假设此类收费的核算单位与个人消费账户使用的单位相同，可以是金钱、劳动时间或能量。我将使用c作为机器的收费率。这样，假设政府不向自己收取利息，则每个部门的当前核算成本C¡

I will assume that the working population is P divided into P₁, P₂, P₃ working in the three sectors, and that for each year of work the government credits a person with a wage of w, either by paying them cash or by recording some units into their personal consumption account in a database. The state also, for budgetary purposes, has to account for the usage of machinery and equipment in different sectors right down to the individual factories, hospitals, etc. The accounting unit for such charging is assumed to be the same, either money, labor hours, or concievably energy, as is used for personal consumption accounts. I will use c for the charging rate for a machine. This then gives the current accounting costs C¡ of each sector, assuming that the government does not charge itself interest, of

每个部门的会计成本由使用公有机器的费用和向在公有机器工作的人支付的费用组成。前者是公共部门内部的费用，但如果政府要对部门的规模做出总体预算决策，就必须进行这种部门收费。随着所有权的改变，实际销售发生的唯一时刻是消费品行业的产出出售给劳动人口的时候。我将其称为面包或烘焙行业，并将该行业的总产出标记为b，面包价格标记为 p。如果我们暂时假设劳动人口没有储蓄机制，那么我们有

The accounting costs of each sector are made up of the charge for the use of publicly owned machinery, and the payments to the people working there. The first is a charge internal to the public sector, but the government has to carry out such sectoral charging if it is to make overall budgetary decisions about the scale of the sectors. The only point at which an actual sale happens, with change of ownership, is when the output of the consumer goods industry is sold to the working population. I will call this the bread or baking industry and label the total output of the industry b and the price of bread p. If we assume for the moment that there is no mechanism by which the working population can save, then we have

其中t是所得税率。也就是说，面包价格乘以面包产量等于劳动人口获得的税后收入。这是他们的货币工资，但此外他们还消费公共部门 3 提供的教育、医疗保健等社会工资。上面的等式给出了面包价格与货币工资的关系。

where t is the income tax rate. That is to say, the price of bread times the bread output equals the after-tax income that the working population gets. This is their money wage, but in addition they consume a social wage of education, health care, etc., provided by public sector 3. The equation above gives the price of bread as a function of the money wage.

政府应如何设定公共部门使用的机器的费用并不是那么明显，但有一种简单的方法就是按照机器的估算生产成本来收费：

It is not so obvious how the government should set the charge for machinery used by the public sector, but one simple way is to charge machines at their imputed cost of production:

税收收入加上消费品销售利润将用于支付免费公共服务的成本和新机器的净积累：

The tax revenue plus any profit on sales of consumer goods is then used to cover the cost of the free public services and the net accumulation of new machinery:

我们现在有 7 个方程，其中有 8 个未绑定变量 m _g、c、w、t、p、C ₁、C ₂、C ₃。我假设m、b、M ₁、M ₂、M ₃、P ₁、P ₂、P ₃、δ 由实际活动结构固定，因此原则上政府可以确定税率或工资率，但这样做之后，所有其他变量都会受到限制。让我们看看选项。如果社会主义国家保留货币，但免费提供许多服务，它必须平衡工人工资中对货币的需求与消费品中的社会劳动量。由于社会主义工作日的一部分用于生产免费商品和服务，另一部分用于积累新建筑、基础设施和机械，工人阶级的可支配收入必须限制在与制造消费品所花费的小时数等值的货币上。原则上，有多种方法可以做到这一点：

We now have 7 equations with 8 unbound variables m_g, c, w, t, p, C₁, C₂, C₃. I assume that m, b, M₁, M₂, M₃, P₁, P₂, P₃, δ are fixed by the actual structure of activity, so in principle the government could fix either the tax rate or the wage rate, but having done that, all the other variables are constrained. Let us look at options. If the socialist country retains money, but delivers many services free, it has to balance the monetary demand in the hands of workers from their wages with the amount of social labor going into consumer commodities. Since a part of the socialist working day had been allocated to producing free goods and services, and another part to the accumulation of new buildings, infrastructure and machinery, the disposable income of the working class had to be limited to the money equivalent of the number of hours spent making consumer commodities. There are, in principle, a number of ways this could be done:

1.向雇员征收所得税或人头税[马克思和恩格斯，1977年；马克思，1970年；马克思和盖得，1880年]。

1. By levying an income tax or poll tax on employees [Marx and Engels, 1977; Marx, 1970; Marx and Guesde, 1880].

2. 征收销售税，即像增值税一样按销售价格的一定百分比征收的税。131 销售税^和营业税都是间接税；它们的征收地点不同：是在生产时还是在销售时。

2. By levying a sales tax, that is, one that is raised as a percentage of the selling price like VAT.¹³¹ Both this and the turnover tax are indirect taxation; they differ in where they are collected: at production or at sale.

3. 通过对所有商品加价或加利润来定价。由于这些利润归属于国有工厂，因此可以成为政府收入，用于资助免费服务、积累等。在苏联，这被正式确定为对所有政府工厂征收的营业税。

3. By pricing all goods at a markup or profit. This profit, since it accrues to state factories, can then become government revenue and be used to fund free services, accumulation, etc. In the USSR this was formalized as a turnover tax levied on all government factories.

有强有力的论据支持第一种选择 [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1992]。最初，声称社会主义制度下不需要所得税可能在政治上很受欢迎，但这是骗人的，因为间接税仍然存在。工资仍然被压低到允许营业税资助政府服务的水平，因此从实得工资来看，人们的境况并没有好转。直接扣除所得税更为明显，但相反，可见的东西更容易理解，因此更容易做出公开的民主决策。

There are strong arguments to favor the first option [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1992]. It may initially have been politically popular to claim that under socialism there was no need for income tax, but that is dishonest, since indirect taxation remained. Wages were still held down to a level that would allow the turnover tax to fund government services, so in terms of take-home pay people were no better off. A direct deduction of income tax is more visible, but the converse is that something visible is easier to understand, and as a result easier to make open democratic decisions about.

我将举一个简单的例子，比较不同的工资和税收政策的效果。

I will present a simple example and compare the effect of different wage and tax policies.

假设经济的技术结构如表 6.5所示。我们假设机器的折旧年限为 10 年，因此使用机器的当前成本为机器价格 ÷ 10。

The technical structure of the economy is assumed to be as given in Table 6.5. We assume machines are depreciated over ten years, so that the current cost of using a machine is machine price ÷ 10.

1. 工资固定为1，这最终相当于以劳动价值来估价，消费品销售不产生利润，所得税会调整以满足公共服务和积累的成本。

1. The wage is fixed at 1, this ends up equivalent to valuing things at labor values, no profit is made on the sale of consumer goods, and income taxes are adjusted to meet the cost of the public services and accumulation.

解该方程可得：

Solving the equations gives us:

2. 在这种情况下，所得税被废除，消费品的价格必须上涨以弥补政府收入的缺口。假设消费品的实物产出保持不变，减少所得税的唯一效果就是提高价格。净效应是，政府的大部分收入来自消费品税或国有工业利润。工资和生产资料费用保持不变，但消费品成本几乎翻了一番。

2. In this scenario income tax is abolished and the price of the consumer goods have to rise to cover the shortfall in government revenue. Given that the physical output of consumer goods stays the same, the only effect of reducing income tax is to increase prices. The net effect is that the government raises most of its income from what can either be viewed as a tax on consumer goods or on the profits of nationalized industry. Wages turn out to be the same, as does the charge for means of production, but consumer goods cost almost twice as much.

解该方程可得：

Solving the equations gives us:

现在，机械和面包的相对价格与劳动力价值已经出现很大差异，由于要征税，面包的售价较高。

The relative prices of machinery and bread now diverge significantly from labor values, with bread being sold at a premium due to the tax being levied on it.

3. 在苏联使用的营业税制度中，税款在部门 1 和部门 2 都征收。税额由以下公式确定：

3. In the turnover tax variant—which the USSR used—the tax is levied in both sectors 1 and 2. The tax is determined by the equations:

表 6.5：社会主义再生产实例中使用的技术结构

TABLE 6.5: The Technology Structure Used in the Worked Example of Socialist Reproduction

关键在于，该税是对两个行业都征收的，而不仅仅是在消费品销售点征收。这意味着生产资料的会计价格因流转税而提高。

The key point is that the tax is levied on both sectors rather than just at the point of sale of consumer goods. This means that the accounting price of means of production is raised by the turnover tax.

解该方程可得：

Solving the equations gives us:

请注意，这里的机器价格上涨了一倍多。面包的最终售价与销售税变量下的价格相同。因此，在所有情况下，从工人那里收取的收入保持不变，但现在政府还从部门 1 的工厂收取收入。部门 1 内部收取的收入全部用于支付部门 3 对其使用的机器收取的更高成本和新投资品的更高成本。由于机器现在按账面价格更贵，政府提供免费公共服务和新投资的总表观成本比以前高得多，因此需要相应更高的税收收入。

Note that the price of machinery has more than doubled here. The final selling price of bread remains what it would have been under the sales tax variant. Thus the revenue collected from workers remains the same in all cases, but now the government also collects revenue from its factories in sector 1. The revenue collected internally in sector 1 is then all spent internally on the higher costs that sector 3 has to charge for the machines it uses and higher cost of the new investment goods. Because machinery is now more expensive at book prices, the total apparent cost to the government of providing free public services and new investment is substantially higher than before, and needs a correspondingly higher tax revenue.

在这三种情况下，商品流动是相同的，但相对价格有三组不同。社会主义政府可以忽视劳动价值的程度受到其征收的税收水平的限制。如果他们依靠所得税获得公共收入，那么行业价格将与劳动价值成正比。如果他们试图将所得税削减到太低的水平以支持公共服务，那么消费品的价格必须提高到相当于销售税的水平，以防止购买力在公众手中积累，从而抑制通货膨胀。使用营业税通常会产生通货膨胀效应，正如我们稍后将看到的那样，这会阻碍节省劳动力的技术的发展。

In all three scenarios the same flows of goods exist, but there are three different sets of relative prices. The extent to which a socialist government can disregard labor values is constrained by the level of tax it levies. If they rely on income tax for public revenue, then sector prices will be proportional to labor values. If they attempt to curtail income tax to a level too low to support public services, then the price of consumer goods has to be raised in what amounts to a sales tax to prevent the accumulation of purchasing power in the hands of the public, and thus suppress inflation. The use of a turnover tax has a generally inflationary effect, which, as we shall see later, holds back the development of labor-saving technology.

但更严重的是，压低工资和从可视为营业额的资金中拨款的政策税收或公营工厂的利润率对经济效率产生了不利影响。

But more serious than this, the policy of holding down wages and funding public services out of what can either be considered a turnover tax, or a rate of profit in public factories, had adverse effects on economic efficiency.

在上述情形 1 中，会计价格与劳动量成正比，一台机器的投资成本为 53 个劳动单位。如果机器按全价定价，合理的工厂管理成本为 5.3 个劳动单位，与一台机器相同；而在营业税情况下，一台机器的成本为 117 个劳动单位，合理的管理者会将一台机器一年的使用成本视为 11.7 个劳动单位。

In scenario 1 above, where accounting prices are proportional to labor content, the investment charge for a machine was 53 units of labor. If machinery was priced at full value, a rational factory management would cost 5.3 units of labor, the same as one machine, whereas in the turnover tax case a machine is costed at 117 units of labor and a rational manager would treat the use of one machine for a year as equivalent to 11.7 units of labor.

在部门 1 中，一家工厂采用一项技术，使用 960 名员工和 60 台机器生产 24 台新机器。根据所得税，该技术的总成本记为 1278，根据营业税，记为 1662，更高。有关详细信息，请参阅表 6.6。

In sector 1, a factory with a technology that uses 960 people and 60 machines to produce 24 new machines. With the income tax the total cost of that technique is booked as 1278, with the turnover tax the booked cost is higher at 1662. For full details, look in Table 6.6.

假设出现了一种新技术，可以使用 140 台机器和 200 名工人制造 24 台新机器。如果我们根据所得税情景（即劳动力价值）计算成本，新技术可节省 26%。总预定成本从 1,278 降至 942，因此改用新方法制造机器显然是有利的。但考虑到营业税，机器的价格是原来的两倍多。额外机器的成本超过了机器带来的大量劳动力节省。

Suppose a new technology comes along that can make 24 new machines using 140 machines and 200 people. If we cost this out according to the income tax scenario, that is, in terms of labor values, the new technique gives a 26 percent saving. Total booked cost falls from 1,278 to 942, so it is clearly advantageous to switch to the new way of making machines. But with the turnover tax, machines are more than twice as expensive. The cost of additional machines outweighs the big laborsaving the machines bring about.

请注意，在表 6.6中，在所得税情景下，新型高度机械化技术更便宜，但在营业税情景下，它似乎更昂贵。在营业税方案下，更手工、社会成本更高的流程将比机械化流程更受青睐。使用直接劳动时间计算当然会揭示正确答案。

Note in Table 6.6 that under the income tax scenario the new and highly mechanized technique is cheaper, but under the turnover tax scenario it would appear to be more expensive. Under the turnover tax scheme, a more manual process, of greater social cost will be preferred to the mechanized one. Use of direct labor time calculation would of course have revealed the right answer.

表 6.6：所得税和营业税情景下两种技术的相对成本

TABLE 6.6: Relative Cost of Two Techniques under the Income Tax and Turnover Tax Scenarios

请注意，在所得税情景下，新的高度机械化的技术更便宜，但在营业税情景下，它似乎更昂贵。

Note that under the income tax scenario, the new and highly mechanized technique is cheaper, but under the turnover tax scenario, it would appear to be more expensive.

苏联对营业税的解决方案是短期的民粹主义，阻碍了效率。从长远来看，它鼓励工厂浪费劳动力，因为低工资加上服务和必需品补贴意味着劳动力的真实成本被隐藏了。随着更多免费社会服务由营业税资助，工资在必要劳动时间中所占的比例越来越小，其余部分都是免费提供的。但这让劳动力显得廉价，而新机器显得昂贵。理性的管理者不会用机器取代劳动密集型流程，因为使用大量工人似乎更具成本效益。因此，长期存在人员过剩和更高效技术的采用率低下的问题。

The Soviet solution of a turnover tax was short-term populism that hampered efficiency. In the long run it encouraged the wasteful hoarding of labor by factories since the combination of low wages and subsidization of services and essentials meant that the true cost of labor was hidden. As more free social services were provided, funded by the turnover tax, the wage came to represent a smaller and smaller part of the necessary labor time—the rest being provided free. But this made labor appear cheap and new machinery appear expensive. Rational managers would not replace labor-intensive processes with machines, because using lots of workers seemed more cost effective. Hence chronic overstaffing and poor uptake of more efficient techniques.

劳动价值计算与所得税的结合将会成为更为合理的经济计算的基础。

The combination of labor value calculation and income tax would have been a much sounder basis for rational economic calculation.

6.8.2 截面内约束

6.8.2 Intra-sectional constraints

即使你假设分配给生产消费品的人数不变，消费品的生产仍然具有相当大的灵活性。假设目的是根据消费者的需求调整产量，而消费者的需求则由他们选择用社会信用购买的商品来表达。这对商品的相对价格意味着什么？

Even if you assume that the number of people allocated to make consumption goods does not change, that still leaves considerable flexibility in which consumer goods are made. Asume the intention is to adjust output to consumer wants as expressed by the goods they choose to spend their social credits on. What does this imply for the relative prices of goods?

这些相对价格是否应该与相对劳动价值相对应？

Should these relative prices correspond to relative labor values?

是的，他们必须这样做，因为只有在这种情况下，人们在消费方面做出的调整才能与预定的制造消费品的人数相兼容。假设一组商品（比如家具）与另一组商品（比如衣服）相比被系统地低估。假设衣服的定价与劳动价值相等，而家具的售价相对于其劳动价值打了 50% 的折扣。请注意，无论社会信用是用小时还是用某些任意货币单位来衡量，总会有一些货币数量，在所有价格中平均下来，代表一小时的劳动。然后，消费者试图将部分衣服消费转移到家具上。假设他们将衣服消费削减了相当于 1 亿小时信用的金额，并将这些信用转换为家具。由于家具的标价打了 50% 的折扣，从衣服转换而来的这 1 亿小时信用似乎足以购买花费 2 亿小时制作的家具。即使过去在服装行业工作了 1 亿小时的工人转移到家具制造业，也无法提供足够的额外劳动力来制造价值 2 亿小时的椅子、桌子等。

Yes, they must, for it is only under this condition that the attempted adjustments people make in their consumption will be compatible with the predetermined number of people working making consumer goods. Suppose that one group of goods—say furniture—is systematically undervalued compared to another group of goods, let us say clothes. Suppose clothes are priced at par for labor values and furniture is sold at a 50 percent discount with respect to its labor value. Note that it does not matter if the social credits are measured in hours or in some arbitrary currency units, there will always be some quantity of the currency that, averaged across all prices, represents an hour of embodied labor. Consumers then attempt to shift part of their clothes consumption to furniture. Suppose they cut clothes consumption by the equivalent of 100 million hours of credits, and switch these credits to furniture. Since the furniture is being marked at a 50 percent discount, these 100 million hours of credits switched from clothing appear to be enough to buy furniture that took 200 million hours to make. Even if the workers who in the past worked the 100 million hours in the clothing industry were shifted to make furniture, that would not provide enough additional labor to make 200 million hours’ worth of chairs, tables, etc.

更一般而言，如果价格与劳动价值不成比例，那么从一种商品到另一种商品的购买转变将导致需求模式过于庞大，现有劳动力无法满足，或者需求从低估的商品转向高估的商品，导致消费品行业失业和兼职。二十世纪欧洲的一些社会主义国家长期存在与相对价格和相对劳动价值严重背离相关的问题。这种情况在农产品中尤为普遍。社会主义社会中城市工人阶级的巨大政治影响力使政府很难提高基本食品的价格。1956 年、1970 年和 1976 年的波兰抗议活动都集中在这个问题上，在所有情况下，政府都让步并采取压低食品价格的措施，1976 年还重新实行配给制。一般来说，如果价格与价值不符，对低估商品的超额需求将大于现有劳动力、技术等所能生产的数量。结果就会出现明显的短缺，只能通过配给来减少。

More generally, if prices are not proportional to labor values, then shifts in purchases from one good to another will lead either to patterns of demand that are too big to be met with the existing workforce, or if the demand shift goes from undervalued to overvalued goods, to unemployment and parttime working in the consumer goods industry. Some of the socialist states in twentieth-century Europe had chronic problems associated with serious divergences between relative prices and relative labor values. This was particularly prevalent with agricultural products. The great political influence of the urban working classes in socialist societies made it very hard for governments to raise the prices of basic foodstuffs. The Polish protests of 1956, 1970, and 1976 all focused on this issue and in all cases the government backed down and resorted to holding food prices down, in 1976 this was combined with the reintroduction of rationing. In general we can say that if prices do not correspond to values, the excess demand for undervalued items will be greater than what it is possible to produce with the available labor force, technology, etc. In consequence there will be evident shortages that can only be curtailed by rationing.

图 6.17. 1956 年波兰工人举行示威，要求获得廉价面包。

Figure 6.17. Workers demonstrate with the demand for cheap bread in Poland 1956.

波兰的情况因农业特别落后而变得复杂，直到 20 世纪 80 年代，波兰的农业仍然以小型农民农场为基础，机械化程度低，劳动强度高，这是这种生产方式的必然结果。因此，生产粮食所需的劳动力相对较高，而且很大一部分人口仍然忙于种植粮食。参见图 6.18，看看波兰农业中劳动力使用量与农业附加值之间的差异。请注意，农业的货币附加值与从事农业的劳动力相比低得不成比例。很明显，农产品的售价远低于其国内劳动力的价值。我们可以用两种方式来解释这一点：

The Polish case was complicated by the particularly backward state of agriculture there, which right into the 1980s continued to be based on small peasant farms with the low levels of mechanization and high labor intensity that goes with that mode of production. The labor required to produce food was thus relatively high, and a large portion of the population was still tied up in growing it. Look at Figure 6.18 and see the discrepancy between labor used and value added in Polish agriculture. Note that the monetary value added by agriculture is disproportionately low compared to the workforce engaged in it. It is clear that agricultural products were sold well below their values in terms of domestic labor. One can interpret this in two ways:

图 6.18. 1981 年波兰劳动力分布与增加值分布的比较。来源：联合国统计数据库。

Figure 6.18. Comparison of the distribution of the labor force in Poland in 1981 with the distribution of value added. Source: UN statistical databases.

1. 来自城市工人阶级的政治压力使得食品价格低于与劳动力相应的应有价格。

1. Political pressure from the urban working class held food prices down below what they should have been, given the labor used.

2. 按照国际标准，波兰农业效率较低，因此每单位劳动的附加值较低。这意味着政府在制定国内价格时，必须考虑进口食品的国际价格。

2. The efficiency of Polish agriculture was low by international standards, hence the low value added per unit of labor used. This would presuppose that the international prices of food imports also entered into the calculations made by the government when it set domestic prices.

无论这两个原因如何综合作用，1981 年波兰农业部门的产出价格仅为其实际价值的 47%。波兰一个特别关键的社会主义国家的例子，其价格与价值之间存在巨大差异。如果我们将其与保加利亚进行比较（图 6.19），我们会发现保加利亚的农产品价格与农产品价值之间的差距要小得多。保加利亚的农业仍然被低估，因为其产品的售价为其真实价值的 74%，但差异远低于波兰。与波兰不同，波兰的农业仍然以农民生产方式为基础，而保加利亚拥有大规模的社会主义农业，其劳动力利用效率明显更高。20 世纪 80 年代初，我去过这两个国家，很明显，虽然波兰的食物供应似乎非常短缺，但保加利亚的食物供应充足。波兰的食品店相对空荡荡的，而保加利亚的食品店似乎堆满了农产品。波兰一再出现对食品的政治不满，而保加利亚却没有出现这种情况。

Whatever the mix of these two causes, the agricultural sector in Poland was selling its output at only 47 percent of its real value in 1981. Poland was a particularly critical example of a socialist country where prices diverged drastically from values. If we compare it with Bulgaria (Figure 6.19), we see that Bulgaria had a much smaller disparity between agricultural prices and agricultural values. Bulgarian agriculture was still undervalued, since its products sold at 74 percent of their true value, but the discrepancy was far lower than in Poland. Unlike Poland, where agriculture was still based on the peasant mode of production, Bulgaria had large-scale socialist agriculture, which was markedly more efficient in its use of labor. I traveled in both countries during the early 1980s and it was very evident that while food appeared to be in very short supply in Poland, it was plentiful in Bulgaria. The food shops in Poland were relatively bare, whereas those in Bulgaria seemed loaded with produce. Political discontent about food was a repeated occurrence in Poland, and absent in Bulgaria.

生产力的发展和合作形式决定了商品的价值。现有技术决定了社会制造某种东西所需的最低劳动量，即使产权关系发生变化，这一点也依然适用。如果一个国家发生政治革命，技术和合作都不会发生相应的变化。只有在新的产权关系影响技术的引进或导致新型合作工作兴起（如集体农场或人民公社）时，这种情况才会发生。

It is the development of the productive forces and forms of cooperation that determine the values of goods. The available technology determines the minimum amount of labor that society has to use to make something and this will hold true even if property relations change. If a political revolution occurs in a country, there is no corresponding change in either technology or in cooperation. That can only come later as the new property relations shape the introduction of technology or cause the rise of new types of cooperative work—like collective farms or People’s Communes.

因此，我们谈论的是长期，在这个时期内，新的合作形式和技术将被引入。在社会主义经济中，关于这一点的真正重大决策是政治决策，而不是经济决策。保加利亚的农业集体化和引进拖拉机、联合收割机等是一个政治决策。在中国，成立人民公社并进行大规模灌溉和土地复垦是一个政治决策。这些决策导致了生产力的提高，但并不是市场纪律带来了生产力的提高。一个行业的实际劳动生产率将是一个随机变量。如果最低劳动要求因新技术而发生变化，那么，除非随机变量的离散度随着时间的推移而增加，否则平均值也会下降。我强调最低要求，因为技术变革的前沿改变了最低要求。但从会计角度来看，你必须按平均劳动含量而不是最低含量来定价。

So we are talking about the long term, over which new forms of cooperation and technology are introduced. In a socialist economy the really big decisions about this are political not economic. Collectivizing agriculture and introducing tractors, combine harvesters and so on in Bulgaria was a political decision. Forming People’s Communes in China and engaging in large-scale irrigation and land reclamation was a political decision. These decisions led to improvements in productivity but it was not the discipline of the market that brought it about. The actual labor productivity in a sector will be a random variable. If the minimum labor required shifts due to new technology then, unless the dispersion of the random variable increases over time, the mean also goes down. I emphasize minimum as the leading edge of technical change shifts the minimum requirement. But on accounting grounds you have to charge goods at the average labor content, not the minimum content.

另一方面，在做出相反政治决定的国家，例如 1956 年波兰的哥穆尔卡决定放弃集体化，结果农业仍然是小农农场。我记得 1980 年飞越该国时，从空中看到了两种类型的田地。在 1945 年之前属于普鲁士的地区，有前贵族庄园的大片方形田地，但在该国大部分地区，人们看到的是中世纪农业特有的条状田地系统。这种形式的财产关系无法有效地提高劳动生产率。结果，整个社会工作日的很大一部分都用于种植粮食（见图6.18）。大约三分之一的总工作日都花在了这上面。

On the other hand, in countries where a reverse political decision was made, as in Poland in 1956 where Gomulka decided to abandon collectivization, as a result agriculture remained peasant farms. I recall flying over the country in 1980 and saw two types of fields from the air. In areas that prior to 1945 had been part of Prussia, there were large square fields of the former aristocratic estates, but over most of the country one saw strip field systems characteristic of agriculture from the Middle Ages. This form of property relations could not develop the productivity of labor effectively. In consequence a large part of the overall social working day was devoted to growing food (see Figure 6.18). Roughly a third of the total working day went on that.

图 6.19. 1981 年保加利亚劳动力分布与增加值分布的比较。来源：联合国统计数据库。

Figure 6.19. Comparison of the distribution of the labor force in Bulgaria in 1981 with the distribution of value added. Source: UN statistical databases.

另一方面，工人阶级的政治压力意味着必须以低价出售食品——我记得 1980 年的价格以我们的标准低得可笑。这意味着，就销售价格而言，占经济三分之一的农业部门以远低于其价值的价格出售其产出。在销售价格中，农业的表观增加值约为 GDP 的 12%。因此，价格和真实劳动价值之间存在很大差异。如果人们试图将总收入的 20% 用于购买食品，而这在当时的价格下是很容易负担得起的，那么农民农业就无法支持这一点。20% 的收入支出将导致需求增加三分之二，并且需要三分之二以上的土地劳动力来生产——这几乎是不可能的。

On the other hand political pressure from the working class meant that food had to be sold cheaply—I remember that in 1980 the prices were ridiculously low by our standards. This meant that in terms of the selling prices, the farming sector—one-third of the economy—sold its output at well below its value. In selling price, the apparent value added by agriculture was around 12 percent of the GDP. So there was a big discrepancy between price and true labor value. If the population attempted to devote 20 percent of total income to food, which was easily affordable at the prices prevailing, then peasant agriculture could not have supported that. An expenditure of 20 percent of income would be a rise in demand by two-thirds and would have required two-thirds more labor on the land to produce it—quite impossible.

我之所以以波兰为例，是因为它是社会主义政府试图忽视价值来为国营商店定价的最显著例子。这是一个政治决定，它产生的效果也是政治性的——商店里的肉很快就卖光了，导致长期短缺。这反过来又引起了不满，那些主张恢复完全资本主义制度的人可以利用这种不满。讽刺的是，当时波兰的人均肉类消费量实际上高于苏格兰，而苏格兰却没有关于肉类短缺的抱怨。我要说的是，永远不要屈服于在社会主义经济中可以忽视劳动价值的诱惑。其结果是政治灾难性的。

I give Poland as an example because it is the most striking instance of a socialist government attempting to ignore value in setting prices in the state shops. That was a political decision, and the effects it produced were also political—chronic shortages as shops were quickly sold out of meat. This in turn produced discontent that could be harnessed by those arguing for the return of a full capitalist system. The irony was that the consumption of meat per capita in Poland was actually greater than in Scotland at the time, and there were no complaints about meat shortages in Scotland. The point I am making is that the temptation to say you can ignore labor value in a socialist economy should never be given way to. Its results are politically disastrous.

你如何用价值规律来规划？

How can you plan with the Law of Value?

答案取决于你谈论的是该术语的显性解释还是隐性解释。隐性解释是，价值规律是更深层次的东西的表达——社会劳动力在不同具体活动之间的分配比例。从这个意义上说，价值规律规划就是规划社会劳动力的分配，并确保社会劳动力得到有效利用。132^与传统的苏联技术相比，这将涉及几个重要的区别：

The answer depends on whether you are talking about the exoteric or esoteric interpretation of the term. The esoteric interpretation is that the law of value is an expression of something deeper—the proportions in which the social workforce is distributed between different concrete activities. Planning with the law of value is in this sense planning the distribution of social labor, and ensuring that the social labor is used effectively.¹³² As compared to the traditional Soviet techniques this would have involved several important differences:

1. 用社会劳动体现来核算所有产品，并确保消费品的销售价格与社会劳动体现成正比。只有在这种情况下，产品之间消费者需求的转移才是劳动节约的。

1. Accounting for all products in terms of embodied social labor and ensuring that the selling prices of consumer goods is proportional to the labor embodied. It is only under these circumstances that shifts in consumer demand between products is labor conserving.

2.以劳动时间为一般会计单位，并设立某种形式的不可转让的个人劳动账户。

2. Using labor time as the general unit of account, with some form of nontransferable personal labor accounts.

3. 取消劳动力和劳动力之间的区别，向工厂收取全部劳动力的费用。如果支付的是货币工资，那么劳动力的价值就会被低估，因为劳动力的价值低于劳动力本身。这导致技术选择偏向于效率低下的劳动密集型技术。

3. Charging factories for the total labor used by abolishing the distinction between labor and labor power. If money wages are paid then labor appears undervalued since labor power has a lower value than the labor itself. This biases the choice of techniques toward inefficient labor-intensive ones.

4. 设定受劳动代币支出变化调节的消费品产出目标。

4. Setting goals for output of consumer goods modulated by the shifts in spending of labor tokens.

5. 为工厂集体提供硬劳动预算。他们将有一个以小时为单位的预算来实现给定的物理输出，但他们可以自由选择使用活劳动或根据其劳动量评估的机器来实现这一目标。如果他们过度使用预算，他们将面临人员调动，个人将被调到其他集体，在那里他们的劳动对社会更有必要。

5. Giving factory collectives hard labor budgets. They would have a budget in hours to achieve a given physical output, but they would be free to select between using living labor or machinery evaluated at its labor content to do so. If they overused their budget they would face staffing transfers, with individuals being transferred to other collectives where their labor was more socially necessary.

劳动时间核算使社会关系不再神秘或被盲目崇拜。它表明，关系不再是人与金钱这种客观事物之间的关系，而是人与人的生活。如果我每工作一小时就能获得一小时的社会信用，并能用这笔信用购买花了一个小时制造的商品，那么很明显，我是在平等地参与社会交换。如果我工作一小时只获得 40 分钟的时间，那么显然有些奇怪。如果差额是由我有机会投票决定的 33% 的所得税造成的，那是一回事。如果我看到其他人每工作一小时就能获得超过一小时的信用，我就会提出一些尖锐的问题。

Labor time accounting demystifies or de-fetishizes social relations. Rather than relations appearing to be between people and an objective thing called money, they make it evident that what is involved are people’s lives. If I get one hour of social credit for each hour I work, and can for this credit acquire goods that took an hour to make, then it is clear that I am participating as an equal in social exchange. If I am only credited with 40 minutes’ time for working an hour, it is clear that there is something odd going on. If the difference is made of a 33 percent income tax that I had a chance to vote on, that is one thing. If instead I see that someone else is getting credited with more than an hour for each hour that they work, I am going to be asking some hard questions.

劳动时间核算的前提是平等和公平。如果一个人获得的报酬比他实际工作的报酬多，那么先验暗示就是这其中存在问题。因此，采用劳动时间核算将带来巨大的均等压力：不同工作类别之间的均等以及男女之间的均等。当然，它完全消除了不劳而获的资本收入的可能性。它作出了道德假设，即劳动是唯一合法的收入来源。对于老年人、病人、有孩子的家庭，任何其他收入都必须从工作者的收入中明确自愿扣除。

Labor time accounting has a presumption of equality and equity. If one person gets credited more than they actually work, the a priori implication is that there is something dodgy about it. Its adoption would thus involve a big pressure toward leveling: between different categories of work and leveling between men and women. It of course eliminates completely the possibility of unearned capital income. It makes the moral presumption that labor is the only legitimate source of income. Any other income, to the old, the sick, to families with children, has to be an explicit voluntary deduction from the incomes of those who work.

劳动代币的意义在于，它通过废除不劳而获的收入确立了所有人的劳动义务；它使人们之间的经济关系变得透明；它具有平等性，确保所有劳动都被视为平等。最后一点是，20 世纪的官僚国家社会主义从未采用过劳动代币。哪个统治者或管理者愿意将自己的工作与普通劳动者的工作视为平等？

The significance of labor tokens is that they establish the obligation on all to work by abolishing unearned incomes; they make the economic relations between people transparently obvious; and they are egalitarian, ensuring that all labor is counted as equal. It is the last point that ensured labor tokens were never adopted under the bureaucratic state socialisms of the twentieth century. What ruler or manager was willing to see his work as equal to that of a mere laborer?

这个计划没有什么特别新颖之处，这里只简单阐述了一下，但在其他地方有更详细的阐述。它只是对马克思 [1970] 在评论 1875 年德国社会主义者纲领草案时提出的建议的详细和逐字阐述。

There is nothing terribly original in this scheme, which is set out briefly here, but in much more detail elsewhere. It is simply a detailed and literal elaboration of the proposals Marx [1970] made in his comments on the draft of the 1875 program of the German Socialists.

假设人们会拥有电子劳动信用卡，其信用额度只能取消，不能流通。你不能将信用额度存入他人账户，但可以从公共商店购买东西。这完全消除了黑市出现的可能性。

The assumption is that people would have electronic labor credit cards whose credits could only be cancelled out, not circulated. You could not pay credits into somebody else’s account but you could get things from communal stores. This completely eliminates the possibility of a black market.

绝对有必要对商品的劳动价值进行现实的分配。社会主义政府必须避免低估公共商店中必需品的价值。如果它们被低估，那么劳动信用额度的购买力就会过剩。如果面包的制作需要 3 亿人工小时，但以 1 亿小时的价格出售，那么就会有超过 2 亿信用额度被发放给面包师、磨坊主、农民等。我们从痛苦的经历中知道，这种低估只会导致排队和明显的短缺。

It is absolutely essential that distribution labor values of goods be realistic. A socialist government must avoid the temptation to undervalue necessities in the communal stores. If they are undervalued, there will be excess purchasing power in terms of labor credits. If bread used 300 million person hours to make but was sold for 100 million hours, an excess of 200 million credits would have been issued to the bakers, millers, farmers, etc. Such undervaluation, we know from bitter experience, just leads to queues and apparent shortages.

如果价格等于劳动量，那么销售额与实际产量的偏差可以用来实时调整计划目标，将劳动力从供不应求的产品重新分配到已经销售一空的产品上。

If prices are equal to labor content, then deviations of sales from actual production can be used to adjust plan targets on a real-time basis, reallocating labor from products whose demand falls short of production to those that are selling out.

然而，出于环保原因，计划经济中仍会出现分销价格与劳动含量偏差的情况。如果计划系统有一项约束，即化石燃料总产量每年必须下降 2%，那么计划当局将被迫要么将燃料分销价格提高到高于其劳动含量，要么对汽油实行定量配给。如果汽油以溢价分销，那么不含化石燃料的商品就必须以折扣价分销给消费者。标签上可能显示环保溢价或折扣。

Deviations of distribution price from labor content would, however, still occur in a planned economy for environmental reasons. If the planning system had a constraint that total production of fossil fuel had to decline by 2 percent a year, then the planning authorities would be forced either to raise the distribution price of fuel above its labor content or to ration petrol. If petrol was distributed at a premium, goods that did not contain fossil fuels would have to be distributed to consumers at a discount. There might be a case for the environmental premiums or discounts being displayed on the label.

免费分配商品和服务只对满足某些特殊条件的商品或服务才可行。实际分配可以通过深思熟虑的决定或排队来定量分配——这就是 NHS 运作的方式。你可以得到免费治疗，但前提是医生认为你需要它，并且你愿意等待。这排除了例如将资源浪费在阴茎或乳房增大手术上的可能性，因为这些手术的实际使用量很容易计算。我们知道，对小学教育的需求取决于达到学龄儿童的数量。免费上学只会将需求增加到这个限额，而不会再增加。否则，所使用的资源就会被浪费。例如，苏联利用发电站的废热提供免费的区域供热；为退休人员提供非高峰时段的免费出行；在安装基本基础设施后免费使用互联网。

Free distribution of goods and services is only viable for those goods or services for which certain special conditions are met. The actual allocation can be rationed by deliberate decisions or by queues—this is how the NHS is able to function. You can get free treatment but only if a doctor decides you need it and you are willing to wait your turn. This rules out, for example, resources being wasted on penis or breast enlargement surgery, where the actual usage is easily calculable. We know that demand for primary schooling is set by the number of children reaching school age. Making schools free increased demand up to this limit and no further. The resources being used would otherwise go to waste. Examples are the free district heating provided in the USSR from waste heat of power stations; providing free travel to pensioners outside of rush hours; free use of Internet once the basic infrastructure has been installed.

6.9 社会主义危机和资本主义复辟的影响

6.9 CRISIS OF SOCIALISM AND EFFECTS OF CAPITALIST RESTORATION

对社会主义经济的主要批评是，计划经济本质上比市场经济效率低，因为规划一个主要经济体所涉及的官僚任务规模庞大。如果有数十万甚至数百万种不同的产品，没有一个中央计划当局能够追踪所有这些产品。相反，他们被迫为不同行业的产出设定总目标。对于天然气或电力等一些行业来说，这不是问题。电力和天然气没有区别，一千瓦就是一千瓦——没有争议。但即使是钢铁等另一个大宗行业，也有各种各样的产品不同种类的轧制板材和钢筋、不同抗拉强度的不同等级的钢材等等。如果计划人员不能跟踪所有这些不同的品种，而只是以吨为单位设定轧机目标，那么钢厂就会最大限度地提高最容易生产的品种的产量。

The main criticism leveled at the socialist economies was that a planned economy was inherently less efficient than a market one, due to the sheer scale of the bureaucratic task involved with planning a major economy. If there are hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions, of distinct products, no central planning authority could hope to keep track of them all. Instead they were forced to set gross targets for the outputs of different industries. For some industries like gas or electric power, this was not a problem. Electricity and gas are undifferentiated, a kilowatt is a kilowatt—no argument. But even for another bulk industry like steel, there was a wide variety of different rolled plates and bars, different grades of steel with different tensile strength, etc. If the planners could not keep track of all these different varieties and just set rolling mills targets in tons, the mills would maximize their tonnage of whatever variety was easiest to produce.

钢铁的例子有些牵强，因为这种程度的差异化仍然可以通过传统的行政手段相当容易地处理。吨位目标仍然可以根据不同类型的钢铁来设定。但当你转向消费品——衣服、陶器等时，产品范围太大，目标开始以货币产出来设定。

The steel example is a little forced, since this degree of differentiation was still fairly readily handled by conventional administrative means. Tonnage targets could still be set in terms of distinct types of steel. But when you turn to consumer goods—clothes, crockery etc., the range of products was too big and targets were started set in terms of monetary output.

该计划将规定服装、家具等产品产值的增长。这将带来什么增长则取决于价格结构。为了防止企业以其他形式玩弄计划，价格必须符合经济现实。如果椅子的价格与桌子相比过高，那么工厂集中精力生产椅子就变得合理了。

The plan would specify a growth in the value of output of clothing, furniture, etc. What this translated to then depended on the price structure. In order to prevent other forms of gaming the plan by enterprises it was important that the prices were economically realistic. If the price for chairs is set too high compared to tables, it becomes rational for factories to concentrate on chair production.

通过诉诸货币目标，社会主义经济体已经承认了米塞斯的部分观点。他们诉诸于米塞斯宣称对任何经济理性都至关重要的货币计算。自由主义经济学家认为，计划者不可能制定出一套合理的价格，因为只有竞争市场才能做到这一点。计划需要汇总。汇总意味着货币目标。货币目标需要合理的价格。合理的价格需要市场。但是如果你有市场，你就可以放弃计划。计划辩证地意味着计划的取代。

By resorting to monetary targets, the socialist economies were already conceding part of Mises’s argument. They were resorting to the monetary calculation that he had declared to be vital to any economic rationality. Liberal economists argue that it was impossible for planners to come up with a rational set of prices, as only the competitive market could do so. Planning required aggregation. Aggregation implied monetary targets. Monetary targets required rational prices. Rational prices required the market. But if you had the market you could dispense with planning. Planning dialectically implied the supersession of planning.

值得注意的是，这主要是理论上的论点。在苏联末期，有大量的轶事证据支持这一论点，但即使与传统的苏联计划经济相比，市场经济的宏观经济效率更高，经验证据却少得多。正如艾伦 [2003] 所指出的，唯一一个长期增长率超过苏联的资本主义经济体是日本，而日本的模式与无计划资本主义相去甚远。与 20 世纪 20 年代经济水平相同的其他国家相比，苏联的增长速度要快得多。有人可能会说，这是由于计划经济的宏观经济优势，即通过消除未来市场需求的不确定性，它鼓励了更高水平的投资。这种宏观经济优势可能超过了与计划经济相关的微观经济效率低下。

It is worth noting that this is a largely theoretical argument. It was, in late Soviet days, backed up with lots of anecdotal evidence, but empirical evidence for the greater macroeconomic efficiency of markets even when compared to classical Soviet planning is on much thinner ground. As Allen [2003] shows, the only capitalist economy whose long-term growth rate exceeded that of the USSR was Japan, whose own model was some way from unplanned capitalism. Compared to other countries starting out at the same economic level in the 1920s, the USSR grew considerably faster. One could argue that this was due to marcroeconomic advantages of planning, that is, by removing uncertainty about future market demand it encouraged a higher level of investment. It is possible that this macroeconomic advantage outweighed any microeconomic inefficiency associated with plans.

市场可能比计划表现更好的最有力证据来自中国，这当然是正统的中国观点。他们声称社会主义市场经济避免了资本主义的宏观经济不稳定，同时利用了市场的微观经济效率。他们引用邓小平领导的中国经济在 20 世纪 90 年代后期实现了更高的增长率作为证据。结构调整。但自邓小平以来，中国一直走重商主义道路。其结果是，中国工人被剥削，而他们的产品出口到美国，以换取美国纸币。后者对中国工人没有任何好处，尽管它确实使中国私营企业能够收购美国的资产。从中国政府的角度来看，这是一个更微妙的问题。一方面，中国国有企业可以收购海外公司，但这是否是一个长期优势是一个有争议的问题，因为本来可以用来改善中国经济和生活水平的实物商品被牺牲了。

The strongest evidence that markets may perform better than plans would come from China, and that certainly is the orthodox Chinese view. Their claim is that a socialist market economy avoids the macroeconomic instability of capitalism while harnessing the microeconomic efficiency of the market. As evidence they cite a higher rate of growth after Deng’s restructuring. But China since Deng has followed a mercantilist road. It has the effect of beggaring the workers of China whose products are exported to the United States in return for U.S. paper. The latter is of no benefit for the Chinese workers, though it does enable private Chinese companies to buy up assets in the United States. From the standpoint of the Chinese state it is a more nuanced issue. On the one hand Chinese state companies can buy up overseas firms, but whether this is a long-term advantage is a moot point since real goods which could have been used to improve the Chinese economy and living standards have been sacrificed.

从历史上看，出口导向型经济使中国避开了西方对苏联实施的技术禁令，从而在制造技术上迅速赶超。如今，中国在某些大规模生产领域正在超越美国，这种优势已不那么明显，转向提高国内消费和工资是合乎情理的，而且与德国不同，中国确实正在这样做。邓小平时代之后中国所经历的增长优势可能很大程度上归功于新的引进最新生产技术的能力，而不是微观经济效率。但非常明显的是，亲市场重组极大地扩大了经济不平等，并催生了一个新的国内亿万富翁阶层。这反过来又产生了扩大私有制和削弱国有工业仍然占主导地位的政治压力。

Historically the process of having an export-led economy allowed China to avoid the technology bans that the West imposed on the USSR, allowing rapid catch-up in manufacturing techniques. Now that China is overtaking the United States in some areas of mass production, that advantage is less clear, and a shift toward higher domestic consumption and higher wages makes sense, and is indeed being followed in China, unlike Germany. It could be that the growth advantage that China experienced post-Deng owed a lot to a new ability to import the latest productive techniques instead of microeconomic efficiency. But what is abundantly clear is that the pro-market restructuring had the effect of drastically widening economic inequalities and giving rise to a new domestic billionaire class. This in turn produces political pressure to extend private ownership and undermine the still dominant position of state industry.

那么问题来了：计划体制能否在产品种类高度多样化的现代经济中发挥作用？它又将如何克服米塞斯的社会主义计算论？自 20 世纪 80 年代末以来，我和其他人一直认为答案是肯定的。

So the question arises, could a planning system work in a modern economy with a highly diversified product range, and how would it overcome the socialist calculation argument of Mises? I and others have since the late 1980s been arguing that the answer is yes.

米塞斯对社会主义的批判集中在比较不同生产方式的成本的必要性上。除非你能做到这一点，否则你就无法选择最高效的生产方式。我们的回应是，不仅劳动时间原则上是一种选择（米塞斯也承认这一点），而且利用现代计算机技术，完全有可能保持生产过程中每项投入的劳动力成本的最新数据。利用这些数据，工作场所将拥有与价格一样好的数据，可用于在各种技术之间进行选择。

The Mises critique of socialism focused on the need to compare the costs of alternative ways of making things. Unless you can do that you cannot choose the most efficient. Our response has been not only that labor time in principle is an alternative, which Mises conceded, but that with modern computer technology it is perfectly possible to maintain up-to-date figures for the labor cost of each input to the production process. Using these, workplaces will have data that are as good as prices for choosing between techniques.

劳动价值与价格等任何标量一样有局限性，因为生产的限制是多方面的。不仅劳动力，而且自然资源和生态考虑也限制了我们能生产的东西。没有一个单一的标量可以解决这个问题。但是，如何处理像这样的多重约束的问题早在 1930 年代就被社会主义经济学解决了。康托罗维奇提出了一种完全通用的技术，用于如何在劳动时间之外的限制下实现社会主义计划。133^康托罗维奇的方法是一种实物计算，即非货币计算。在他有生之年，在整个苏联经济层面使用这种方法是不切实际的，因为计算资源太少，但到了 20 世纪 90 年代，计算机已经可以胜任这项工作了^。134

There are limitations to labor values as there are to any scalar measure like price, since the constraints on production are multifactorial. Not only labor power, but also natural resources and ecological considerations constrain what we can make. No single scalar measure can handle this. But the problem of how to deal with multiple constraints like this was already solved by socialist economics way back in the 1930s. Kantorovich came up with a completely general technique for how to meet a socialist plan subject to constraints additional to labor time.¹³³ Kantorovich’s method is a form of in-kind calculation, that is, non-monetary. It was not practical to use it at the level of the whole Soviet economy during his lifetime as the computing resources were too poor, but by the 1990s computers were up to the job.¹³⁴

因此，自米塞斯写作以来，社会主义经济计算的基本问题已经得到解决。这在苏联是不切实际的，原因有二：1) 当时没有计算机技术；2) 它将涉及用不可转让的劳动账户取代货币计算和支付。这将是迈向更大社会平等的根本性一步。

So the basic problem of socialist economic calculation without money had been solved since Mises wrote. It was impractical in the USSR for two reasons: 1) the computer technology was not there; 2) it would have involved replacing money calculation and payment with nontransferable labor accounts. This would have been a radical step toward greater social equality.

苏联和随后在戈尔巴乔夫和叶利钦领导下的俄罗斯经济的崩溃是一场和平时期前所未有的经济灾难。世界第二超级大国沦为一个小型破产经济体，工业生产和生活水平大幅下降。没有什么比人口统计数据更能说明这场灾难的规模了，人口数据显示，贫困、饥饿、无家可归和酗酒导致死亡率大幅上升（表 6.7）。

The collapse of the Soviet and later the Russian economy under Gorbachev and then Yeltsin was an economic disaster that was otherwise unprecedented in time of peace. The world’s second superpower was reduced to the status of a minor bankrupt economy with a huge decline in industrial production and in living standards. Nothing brings out the scale of the catastrophe better than the demographic data that show a huge rise in the mortality rate brought about by the poverty, hunger, homelessness, and alcoholism that these brought in their wake (Table 6.7).

要确定造成这一结果的原因，必须考虑导致相对停滞、危机和崩溃的长期、中期和短期因素。长期因素是苏联经济的结构性问题，需要改革来解决。戈尔巴乔夫和叶利钦政府推出的实际政策非但没有解决这些问题，反而使情况更加恶化。

In determining what caused this one has to look at long-term, mediumterm and short-term factors that led to relative stagnation, crisis, and then collapse. The long-term factors were structural problems in the Soviet economy and required reforms to address them. The actual policies introduced by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments, far from dealing with these problems, actually made the situation catastrophically worse.

6.9.1 长期

6.9.1 Long term

1930 年至 1970 年期间（不包括战争年代），苏联经济快速增长。经济增长速度究竟有多快存在很大争议，但普遍认为，1928 年至 1975 年间苏联经济增速明显快于英国，此后增速放缓至英国水平。苏联经济高速增长使苏联从一个发展水平与 1922 年巴西相当的农业国家，到 1960 年代中期成为世界第二大工业、技术和军事强国。

During the period from 1930 to 1970, and excluding the war years, the USSR experienced rapid economic growth. There is considerable dispute about just how fast the economy grew, but it is generally agreed to have grown significantly faster than the UK between 1928 and 1975, with the growth rate slowing down to the UK level after that. This growth took the USSR from a peasant country whose level of development had been comparable to Brazil in 1922 to becoming the world’s second industrial and technological and military power by the mid-1960s.

许多原因导致了后期增长相对放缓。

A number of reasons contributed to this relative slowdown in growth in the latter period.

在工业化的初期，劳动力从农业转向工业，经济更容易快速增长。之后的增长必须依靠已经工业化的经济中劳动生产率的提高，而这种提高通常低于农业和工业之间的生产率差异。我之前在费尔德曼理论的背景下讨论过这一点。

It is easier for an economy to grow rapidly during the initial phase of industrialization when labor is being switched from agriculture to industry. Afterward growth has to rely upon improvements in labor productivity in an already industrialized economy, which are typically less than the difference in productivity between agriculture and industry. I discussed this earlier in the context of the Feldman theory.

苏联工业产出中很大一部分用于国防，特别是在冷战后期，当时他们正与里根的“星球大战”计划竞争。用于国防的熟练劳动力限制了可以用于发明新的、生产率更高的工业设备的科学家和工程师的数量。

A relatively large portion of Soviet industrial output was devoted to defense, particularly in the latter stages of the Cold War, when they were in competition with Reagan’s “Star Wars” programs. The skilled manpower used up for defense restricted the number of scientists and engineers who could be allocated to inventing new and more productive industrial equipment.

美国等资本主义国家对苏联实施了禁运，不允许其提供先进技术设备，这就使得苏联不得不高度依赖本国的设备设计，而西方国家在技术出口方面不存在类似的壁垒，因此西方资本主义国家的工业发展是协同的。

The United States and other capitalist countries imposed embargoes on the supply of advanced technological equipment to the USSR. This meant that the USSR had to rely to an unusually high degree on domestic designs of equipment. In the West there were no comparable barriers to the export of technology so that the industrial development of the Western capitalist countries was synergistic.

尽管苏联的工业增长在 1980 年代放缓至美国水平，但这本身并不算灾难；毕竟美国几十年来一直保持着这种增长率（每年 2.5%）而没有出现危机。事实上，虽然美国工人阶级的收入在 1980 年代实际上处于停滞状态，但在苏联，他们的收入却持续上升。区别在于两国知识分子和管理阶层的地位。在美国，收入差距逐渐扩大，因此国民收入的增长几乎全部流向了人口中最富有的 10%。美国大部分工人阶级的收入已停滞了半个世纪（图 5.14）。在苏联，收入差距相对较小，虽然所有群体的收入都在继续增长，但比 1950 年代和 1960 年代要小得多。一些苏联知识分子认为，2.5% 的增长是无法忍受的停滞——也许是因为他们将自己与美国或德国的管理人员和专业人士进行了比较。因此，这一阶层形成了这样一种观念：与美国相比，社会主义制度是失败的。

Although Soviet industrial growth in the 1980s slowed down to U.S. levels, this by itself was not a disaster; after all the United States had experienced this sort of growth rate (2.5 percent a year) for decades without crisis. Indeed, while working-class incomes in the United States actually stagnated over the 1980s, in the USSR they continued to rise. The difference was in the position of the intelligentsia and the managerial strata in the two countries. In the United States income differentials became progressively greater, so that the rise in national income nearly all went to the top 10 percent of the population. The bulk of the working class in the United States has seen its income stagnate for half a century (Figure 5.14). In the USSR income differentials were relatively narrow, and while all groups continued to experience a rise in incomes, this was much smaller than had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. This 2.5 percent growth was experienced by some of the Soviet intelligentsia as intolerable stagnation—perhaps because they compared themselves with managers and professionals in the United States or Germany. A perception thus took root among this class that the socialist system was failing when compared to the United States.

再次，如果不是这些阶层在苏联内部具有不成比例的影响力，这对于该制度的未来生存来说并不重要。虽然执政的共产党名义上是一个工人党，但其党员中的大部分成员都是来自最熟练的技术和专业雇员，而体力劳动者的比例则偏低。

Again, this would not have been critical to the future survival of the system were it not for the fact that these strata were disproportionately influential within the USSR. Although the ruling Communist Party was notionally a workers’ party, a disproportionately high proportion of its members were drawn from the most skilled technical and professional employees, and manual workers were proportionally underrepresented.

苏联经济增长放缓在很大程度上是经济成熟的必然结果，即向成熟工业国家典型的增长率靠拢。一项旨在提高经济管理效率的温和措施计划可能使增长率有所回升，但期望 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代的快速增长重现是不现实的。然而，苏联得到的不是温和的改革计划，而是对其基本经济结构的彻底拆除。这项拆除工作是由新自由主义意识形态推动的。苏联和美国的新自由主义经济学家承诺，一旦取消计划体制，让企业自由地在市场上竞争，经济效率就会得到根本改善。

The slowdown in Soviet growth was in large measure the inevitable result of economic maturity, a movement toward the rate of growth typical of mature industrial countries. A modest program of measures to improve the efficiency of economic management would probably have produced some recovery in the growth rate, but it would have been unrealistic to expect the rapid growth of the 1950s and 1960s to return. What the USSR got, however, was not a modest program of reform, but a radical demolition job on its basic economic structures. This demolition job was motivated by neoliberal ideology. Neoliberal economists, both with the USSR and visiting from the United States, promised that once the planning system was removed and once enterprises were left free to compete in the market, then economic efficiency would be radically improved.

表 6.7：俄罗斯引入资本主义导致的超额死亡率

TABLE 6.7: Excess Deaths as a Consequence of the Introduction of Capitalism in Russia

年

Year

数千人死亡

Thousands Deaths

相对于 1986 年而言过剩

Excess Relative to 1986

1986

1,498

1987

1,531

1988

1,569

1989

1,583

1990

1,656

158

1991

1,690

192

1992

1,807

309

1993

2,129

631

1994

2,301

803

1995

2,203

705

1996

2,082

584

1997

2,105

607

1998

1,988

490

1999

2,144

646

2000

2,225

727

2001

2,251

753

2002

2,332

834

2003

2,365

867

2004

2,295

797

2005

2,303

805

2006

2,166

668

2007

2,080

582

2008

2,075

577

2009

2,010

512

全部的

Total

48,388

12,436

数据显示，20 年间死亡人数约为 1200 万人。资料来源：历届联合国人口年鉴，表 18。

Figures amount to some 12 million deaths over 20 years. Source: Successive UN Demographic Yearbook(s), Table 18.

6.9.2 中期

6.9.2 Medium term

苏联经济崩溃的中期原因在于戈尔巴乔夫政府为改善经济而采取的政策。这些政策的综合效果是国家破产、货币贬值。

The medium-term causes of Soviet economic collapse lay in the policies that the Gorbachev government embarked on in its attempts to improve the economy. The combined effect of these policies was to bankrupt the state and debauch the currency.

必须认识到，苏联国家的财政基础主要在于企业营业额税和销售税。

One has to realize that the financial basis of the Soviet state lay mainly in the taxes that it levied on turnover by enterprises and on sales taxes.

为了杜绝酗酒导致旷工和健康状况不佳的现象，戈尔巴乔夫政府实施了禁酒令。禁酒令和全面加强工作纪律，使得戈尔巴乔夫执政头几年的经济增长有所改善。然而，禁酒令也带来了意想不到的副作用。由于政府商店不再允许销售伏特加，黑市出现了非法酿造伏特加，由黑社会控制。从中获取金钱和力量的犯罪阶层后来变成了最危险的敌人。

In an effort to stamp out the heavy drinking that led to absenteeism from work and to poor health, the Gorbachev government banned alcohol. This and the general tightening up of work discipline led, in the first couple of years of his government, to some improvement in economic growth. It had, however, unforeseen side effects. Since sales of vodka could no longer take place in government shops, a black market of illegally distilled vodka sprang up, controlled by the criminal underworld. The criminal class that gained money and strength from this later turned out to be a most dangerous enemy.

非法酒类贸易的钱落入了犯罪分子的手中，导致国家失去了重要的税收来源，而由于没有其他税收可以弥补，这引发了通货膨胀。

While money from the illegal drinks trade went into the hands of criminals, the state lost a significant source of tax revenue, which, because it was not made up by other taxes, touched off an inflationary process.

如果酒水税的损失是国家财政的唯一问题，那么可以通过提高其他一些商品的价格来弥补。但是，当戈尔巴乔夫受到新自由主义经济学家的论点影响，允许企业保留他们欠国家的很大一部分营业税收入时，情况就变得更糟了。新自由主义者认为，如果允许管理人员保留这笔收入，他们将比政府更有效地利用它。

Were the loss of the taxes on drinks the only problem for state finance, it could have been solved by raising the prices of some other commodities to compensate. But the situation was made worse when, influenced by the arguments of neoliberal economists, Gorbachev allowed enterprises to keep a large part of the turnover tax revenue that they owed the state. The neoliberals argued that if managers were allowed to keep this revenue, they would make more efficient use of it than the government.

随后，国家陷入了灾难性的收入危机，不得不依赖中央银行的信贷来为经常性支出提供资金。货币存量的扩张导致通货膨胀迅速加剧，公众对经济的信心也受到侵蚀。与此同时，企业经理手中未经审计的额外资金为腐败提供了巨大的机会。戈尔巴乔夫政府最近将工人合作社合法化，允许它们独立经营。这种合法形式随后被新阶层的腐败官员、黑帮和小商人用来洗白腐败资金。

What actually ensued was a catastrophic revenue crisis for the state, which was forced to rely on the issue of credit by the central bank to finance their current expenditure. The expansion of the money stock led to rapid inflation and the erosion of public confidence in the economy. Meanwhile, the additional unaudited funds in the hands of enterprise managers opened up huge opportunities for corruption. The Gorbachev government had recently legalized worker cooperatives, allowing them to trade independently. This legal form was then used by a new stratum of corrupt officials, gangsters, and petty businessmen to launder corruptly obtained funds.

6.9.3 结果

6.9.3 Results

自由主义理论认为，一旦企业摆脱了政府的束缚，“市场的魔力”将确保它们能够高效地互动，为公众谋福利。但这种经济观点大大夸大了市场的作用。即使在所谓的市场经济中，经济学教科书中描述的市场也仅限于世界石油和货币市场等专业领域。一个经济体的主要产业结构依赖于一个复杂的、相互关联的生产者-消费者关系系统，在这个系统中，相同的供应商每周都会向相同的客户定期交货。

Liberal theory held that once enterprises were free from the state, the “magic of the market” would ensure that they would interact productively and efficiently for the public good. But this vision of the economy greatly overstated the role of markets. Even in so-called market economies, markets of the sort described in economics textbooks are the exception restricted to specialist areas like the world oil and currency markets. The main industrial structure of an economy depends on a complex interlinked system of regular producer-consumer relationships in which the same suppliers make regular deliveries to the same customers week in, week out.

在苏联，这个相互关联的系统横跨两大洲，并把其他经济体纳入其网络：东欧、古巴、北越。企业依赖定期的国家订单，订单内容可能被分发到数千英里之外的其他企业。西伯利亚荒野的整个城镇和社区都依赖这些定期订单来维持经济生存。一旦国家破产而无法继续下达这些订单，一旦它再也付不起工资，一旦协调这些订单的计划网络被取消，那么发生的就不是自由主义理论所承诺的经济自发自组织，而是多米诺骨牌式的崩溃。

In the USSR this interlinked system stretched across two continents, and drew into its network other economies: East Europe, Cuba, North Vietnam. Enterprises depended on regular state orders, the contents of which might be dispatched to other enterprises thousands of miles away. Whole towns and communities across the wilds of Siberia relied on these regular orders for their economic survival. Once the state was too bankrupt to continue making these orders, once it could no longer afford to pay wages, and once the planning network that had coordinated these orders was removed, what occurred was not the spontaneous self-organization of the economy promized by liberal theory, but a domino process of collapse.

由于没有订单，从事第一产业的工厂倒闭。由于没有零部件和供应品的交付，第二产业无法继续生产，因此也倒闭了。在迅速而具有破坏性的连锁反应中，一个又一个行业倒闭。由于苏联分裂成十几个不同的国家，每个国家都有各自的经济，这个过程变得更加糟糕。工业体系原本是作为一个整体来运作的，但由于国家壁垒的分裂，它变成了一片废墟。

Without any orders, factories engaged in primary industries closed down. Without deliveries of components and supplies secondary industries could no longer continue production, so they too closed. In a rapid and destructive cascade, industry after industry closed down. The process was made far worse by the way the USSR split into a dozen different countries all with their own separate economies. The industrial system had been designed to work as an integrated whole; split up by national barriers it lay in ruins.

表 6.8：2003 年俄罗斯部分工业部门的产出与 1998 年的比较（1990 年=100）

TABLE 6.8: Output of Selected Branches of Industry in Russia in 2003 Compared to 1998 (1990=100)

行业

Industry

输出

Output

整个行业

Total Industry

电力

Electric Power

气体

Gas

采油

Oil extraction

石油精炼

Oil Refining

黑色冶金学

Ferrous Mettallurgy

有色冶金

Non-Ferrous Metallurgy

化学品和石化产品

Chemicals and Petrochemicals

机械制造

Machine Building

木材和纸张

Wood and Paper

四十八

建筑材料

Building Materials

四十二

轻工业

Light Industry

食物

Food

资料来源：Goskomstat，2004 年，表 14.3。

Source: Goskomstat, 2004, Table 14.3.

表 6.8中的数字显示了 2003 年经济倒退的程度。这些数字表明，即使经过 13 年的自由市场运作，经济的复苏仍然非常缓慢。

The figures in Table 6.8 show how far the economy had regressed in 2003. These figures show how little recovery there had been, even after 13 years of operation of the free market.

如果经济继续以勃列日涅夫执政后期的温和速度增长，比如说 2.5%，那么工业生产将达到 1990 年水平的 140%。十三年资本主义制度的净效应是，俄罗斯的工业产能只有社会主义经济表现最差的几年所预期的一半。

If the economy had continued to grow even at the modest rate of the later Brezhnev years, say 2.5 percent, then industrial production would, on this scale, have stood at 140 percent of 1990 levels. The net effect of thirteen years of capitalism was to leave Russia with half the industrial capacity that could have been expected even from the poorest performing years of the socialist economy.

第七章

CHAPTER 7

未来经济

Future Economies

人们在社会生产自己的存在时，必然要进入一定的、不以他们的意志为转移的关系，即适合于他们物质生产力发展一定阶段的生产关系。这些生产关系的总和构成社会的经济结构，即法律和政治上层建筑的现实基础，与之相适应的是一定的社会意识形式。物质生活的生产方式决定着社会、政治和精神生活的总过程。不是人们的意识决定他们的存在，而是他们的社会存在决定他们的意识。在一定的发展阶段，社会的物质生产力与现有的生产关系发生冲突，或者这只不过是用法律术语来表达，与它们迄今为止在其中运作的财产关系发生冲突。这些关系从生产力发展的形式转变为生产力的桎梏。然后社会革命时代就开始了。经济基础的变化迟早会导致整个庞大的上层建筑的变革。——马克思等人，1978，序言

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.—MARX ET AL., 1978, PREFACE

乌托邦式的社会转型方法与唯物主义方法的区别在于，后者必须从技术要求与当前社会形态之间存在的现实矛盾出发。这些矛盾并不代表人们可能期望的未来，而是人们可能需要的未来。

What distinguishes a utopian approach to social transformation from a materialist one is that the latter must start with the real contradictions that exist between technological imperatives and the social forms that currently exist. These specify not a future that might be desired, but what may be required.

因此，我们必须从技术综合体和人口统计开始，因为所有社会形态都是将一组特定的技术与特定的人口密度相结合的。只有一些技术综合体与给定的人口密度是相容的。我们目前的人口无法靠畜牧业生存；这是显而易见的。目前的人口也无法长期靠开采化石燃料经济生存。

One therefore has to start with technology complexes and demographics since all social formations combine a particular set of technologies with a particular density of human population. Only some technology complexes are compatible with a given population density. Our current population could not survive on the basis of pastoralism; so much is obvious. Nor can the present population long survive on the basis of an extractive fossil-fuel economy.

现有经济对气候变化、粮食安全和健康的影响是如此严重，以至于即使在现有的社会关系下，也发生了历史上前所未有的事情。国际组织，特别是 IPCC（国际气候变化专门委员会），正在开展一项协调的科学调查，研究如何从广义上塑造世界技术综合体，以实现在气候、健康和粮食安全方面可持续的世界经济。这需要付出巨大的努力来构建复杂的、自然的世界经济模型，¹³⁵这正是 Neurath [1919] 大约一百年前推测的那种东西。

The consequences of the existing economy for climate change, food security, and health are so severe that even with the existing social relations, something historically unprecedented is happening. International organizations, particularly the IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) are embarked on a coordinated scientific investigation of how, at a broad level, the technology complex of the world would have to be shaped to allow a world economy that is sustainable in terms of climate, health, and food security. This involves a huge effort to build complex, in natura, models of the world economy,¹³⁵ the sort of thing that Neurath [1919] speculated about one hundred years ago.

人们已经模拟了几种称为代表性浓度路径 (RCP) 的情景，这些情景取决于不同温室气体浓度所涉及的每平方米辐射强迫^136。例如，最热的模型是 RCP8.5，到 2100 年辐射强迫为 8.5 瓦/平方米。人们希望能将温升控制在 2 度以下的模型是 RCP2.6，这需要大幅减少排放，到本世纪末基本上结束所有净化石燃料排放，并在本十年立即开始减排。Van Vuuren 等人 [2011] 声称，实现这些减排具有足够的技术潜力。他们建议，可以通过提高能源效率、使用可再生能源、更多地使用核能，以及最重要的是使用生物能源结合碳捕获与储存来减少二氧化碳_排放。原则上，使用生物能源结合碳捕获实际上可以开始减少大气中的_二氧化碳。

Several scenarios, called Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP), have been modeled, depending on the radiative forcing per square meter¹³⁶ involved with different concentrations of greenhouse gases. So, for example, the hottest model is RCP8.5 involving an 8.5 watt per square meter forcing by 2100. The model that would, it is hoped, keep temperature rises under 2 degrees is RCP2.6, which requires significant emission reductions, essentially ending all net fossil fuel emissions by the end of the century, with an immediate start to reductions this decade. Van Vuuren et al. [2011] claim that there is sufficient technical potential to achieve these emission reductions. CO₂ emissions could, they suggest, be reduced by a combination of energy efficiency, use of renewables, a lot more nuclear power, and most critically, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. In principle, bioenergy with carbon capture could actually start reducing atmospheric CO₂.

我将以 RCP2.6 的目标作为讨论的起点，然后研究通过所提出的技术手段和政策机制实际实现这些目标的可行性。

I will take the targets of RCP2.6 as a starting point for discussion, before examining the plausibility of actually achieving them with the proposed technical means and policy mechanisms.

7.1 技术综合体

7.1 TECHNOLOGY COMPLEX

当代资本主义严重依赖化石燃料。全球近 90% 的一次能源来自这些来源，而来自核能和可再生能源的比例近年来略有下降。工业和商业消耗了所有一次能源的约 60%；运输和住宅各占约 20%。

Contemporary capitalism is heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Almost 90 percent of world primary energy comes from these sources, and the percentage coming from nuclear and renewable sources has if anything tended to fall slightly in recent years. Industry and commerce use about 60 percent of all primary energy; transport and residential use around 20 percent each.

目前成熟的化石燃料替代品是核能和水力发电。后者有严重的地域限制。使用核电的限制一方面是政治上的反对，另一方面是能够委托核电站的国家和公司数量很少。在成本方面，它已经与煤电具有竞争力^。137

The current mature alternatives to fossil fuels are nuclear energy and hydropower. The latter has severe geographical limitations. The limitations to the use of nuclear power are on the one hand political opposition, and on the other the small number of countries and firms that have the ability to commission nuclear plants. In terms of cost it is already competitive with coal power for electricity.¹³⁷

图 7.1。高和低 RCP 预测。需要较低的预测才能将人类活动导致的气候变化保持在 2 度以下。来源：Field 等人，2014 年，图 SPM.4。

Figure 7.1. High and low RCP projections. Lower projection is necessary to keep anthropogenic climate rise below 2 degrees. Source: Field et al., 2014, Fig. SPM.4.

两种快速成熟的替代能源是太阳能和风能。这两种能源的价格一直在快速下降，在美国，按平准化成本衡量，它们在发电方面已经与煤炭具有竞争力。这两种能源的产量都取决于当地的风能和阳光，因此会因地而异。

The the two rapidly maturing alternative energy sources are solar and wind power. Prices of both of these have been falling rapidly and in the United States are already competitive with coal for electricity generation when measured as levelized costs. Both of these depend for their yield on the local wind and sunshine, and so will vary from place to place.

尽管 Van Vuuren 等人 [2011] 非常重视碳捕获和储存，认为这是实现温室气体排放目标的一种机制，但这是迄今为止发展最少的技术之一。尽管有将二氧化碳注入油藏以提高采收率的经验_，但在远离油藏的大型燃煤发电站运行、提取二氧化碳_然后将其输送到适当的注入地点方面，目前还缺乏实际经验。这些措施是可行的，但缺乏核电等工作经验。二氧化碳随后从地下储层泄漏显然存在危险，正如尼奥斯湖灾难 [Baxter 等人，1989] 所示，当时有 1,700 人因气体突然泄漏而丧生。

Although Van Vuuren et al. [2011] put great emphasis on carbon capture and storage as a mechanism that will allow green house gas emission targets to be met, this is one of the least developed techniques so far. Although there is experience of injecting CO₂ into oil reservoirs for enhanced recovery, there is as yet little practical experience in operating full-scale coal-fired power stations far from oil reservoirs, extracting the CO₂, and then piping it to appropriate injection sites. The components are plausible, but the working experience that, for example, nuclear power has, is absent. There are clearly hazards associated with the subsequent escape of carbon dioxide from subterranean reservoirs, as shown by the Lake Nyos disaster [Baxter et al., 1989] where 1,700 people were killed by a sudden escape of the gas.

然而，考虑到其他领域正在取得的良好进展，至少在发电方面，核能、太阳能和风能的结合可以取代目前对煤炭的大部分依赖，这似乎是合理的。

However, given the good progress being made in other areas, it seems plausible that, at least for electricity generation, a combination of nuclear, solar, and wind power could replace a large part of current dependence on coal.

马克思声称，技术发展阶段最终决定了社会关系的界限。他认为，共产主义是工业社会的未来，而燃煤蒸汽机是资本主义经济的基础。向后化石燃料经济的过渡是否有利于共产主义而不是资本主义？

Marx claimed that the stage of development of technology is what ultimately determines the bounds on social relations. He believed that communism was the likely future of industrial society and that coal-powered steam engines were the foundation of capitalist economy. Is there anything about the transition to a post-fossil fuel economy that would favor communism over capitalism?

苏联严重依赖大规模的能源和其他产品的综合生产。资本主义建立后的经济衰退清楚地表明，资本主义财产关系无法维持这种生产力形式。在新资本主义俄罗斯，唯一表现相对良好的行业是化石燃料开采。

The USSR depended heavily on large-scale integrated production both of energy and other products. The economic regression that followed the establishment of capitalism made it clear that capitalist property relations were incapable of sustaining this form of the productive forces. The one industry that did relatively well in the new capitalist Russia was fossil fuel extraction.

苏联确实有非化石能源的长期计划：核能、热核能和轨道太阳能发电站。所有这些都是后资本主义形式的能源生产，因为它们的发展依赖于东方的社会主义经济或西方的国家支持的发展：美国的 AEC 或英国的 AEA 是核能。热核能研究绝大多数由国家资助，最有前途的反应堆设计托卡马克是在苏联发明的，并成为国际 ITER 实验动力反应堆的基础 [Azizov，2012]。轨道太阳能发电站 [Glaser et al.，1974] 是 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代备受关注的未来技术。它们将通过沐浴在永久的阳光下，克服昼夜和恶劣天气的限制，并将能量以微波的形式传送到地球。苏联的终极航天发射器“能源号”被视为建造此类轨道站的工具 [Hendrickx and Vis，2007]。

The USSR did have long-term plans for non-fossil energy sources: nuclear, thermonuclear, and orbiting solar power stations. All of these are post-capitalist forms of energy production in the sense that their development has depended on socialist economy in the East or in the West on state-sponsored development: AEC in the United States or the AEA in the UK for nuclear power. Thermonuclear power research has been overwhelmingly state-funded, and the most promising reactor design, the Tokamak, was invented in the USSR and forms the basis for the international ITER experimental power reactor [Azizov, 2012]. Orbiting solar power stations [Glaser et al., 1974] were a futuristic technology much talked about in the 1970s and 1980s. They would overcome the limitations of day and night and bad weather by being bathed in permanent sunlight, and would beam energy to Earth as microwaves. The ultimate Soviet space launcher, Energiya, was seen as the tool to build such orbiting stations [Hendrickx and Vis, 2007].

图 7.2. 苏联“能源”号运载火箭，设计用于发射轨道太阳能发电厂。图中所示为暴风雪号航天飞机。

Figure 7.2. The Soviet Energiya launcher, designed to release orbiting solar power plants. The Buran shuttle is shown attached.

因此，我们可以假设，共产主义经济的能量基础将是轨道太阳能发电站和巨大的托卡马克，它们能够从海水中的氘中提供无限的能量。这是一对私人资本无法开发的技术，因为在几十年内，前期投资巨大，才有可能获得利润。它将此外，这是一条高度资本密集型的道路，正如我在第 5.9 节中所述，高资本密集度与低盈利能力相关，这会阻碍私营企业的发展。

So we could hypothesize that the energetic basis of Communist economy would be orbiting solar power stations and huge Tokamaks able to supply essentially limitless energy from the deuterium in sea water. This is a pair of technologies that private capital has been unable to develop because of the huge initial investment, over many decades, before any possible profit could be returned. It would moreover, be a highly capital-intensive path and, as I have established in Section 5.9, high-capital intensity is associated with low profitability, which deters private firms.

图 7.3。ITER 反应堆模型。请注意图中的微型人体模型。照片：Stephan Mosel，Creative Commons。

Figure 7.3. Model of the ITER reactor. Note tiny human figure for scale. Photo: Stephan Mosel, Creative Commons.

热核能的开发成本非常高，甚至超出了单个国家所能承受的范围。唯一可行的热核反应堆建设项目 ITER 由 35 个国家组成的联合体建设。ITER 是在苏联于 1985 年 11 月日内瓦超级大国峰会上发起的。设计工作从 1988 年持续到 2001 年。2005 年，各方同意将反应堆选址法国。2010 年，反应堆在普罗旺斯地区艾克斯附近开始建设。这将是有史以来建造的最大、最复杂的机器。第一个等离子体计划于 2025 年产生，但预计要到 2035 年才会使用实际的氘/氚等离子体来产生有用的电力。因此，整个项目将需要五十年才能产生电力。但在 ITER 成立之前，自萨哈罗夫和塔姆于 1950 年首次提出该设计以来，苏联已经有了 35 年的开发该技术的历史。

The development costs of the scale associated with thermonuclear power are so large that they are beyond even what individual nations can afford. The only practical project to build a thermonuclear reactor, ITER, is being constructed by a consortium of 35 states. ITER was started at the initiative of the USSR at the Geneva Superpower Summit in November 1985. Design work took from 1988 to 2001. In 2005 it was agreed that the site of the reactor would be in France. In 2010 construction started near Aix-en-Provence. It will be the largest and most complex machine ever constructed. The first plasma is scheduled to be generated in 2025 but it is not anticipated to use actual deuterium/tritium plasma to generate useful power until 2035. The whole project will thus have taken fifty years to yield power. But prior to ITER being formed there had already been a 35-year Soviet history of development of the technology since Sakharov and Tamm initially proposed the design in 1950.

热核等离子反应堆的开发是私人资本主义无法做到的。它需要基于对未来人类需求的理解的远见，而只有公共机构，尤其是世界公共机构，才能承担这项任务。

The development of thermonuclear plasma reactors is something that private capitalism could not have done. It required foresight based on an appreciation of future human needs that only public bodies, indeed a world public body, could undertake.

相比之下，太阳能和风能可以零碎地开发，而且资本成本相对较低。因此，只要政府最初提供适度的激励，私营企业就非常愿意投资。我们还不知道这些低技术替代能源方法是否足以为未来文明提供动力。如果足够，那么除了限制化石燃料的国际政治制裁外，能源基础中将没有任何因素可以阻止私有制的延续。如果事实证明风能和太阳能的供应过于间歇、过于依赖季节或夜间供应不足，那么核聚变能源将成为最有效的能源。提供基本负荷电力的可行方法。如果储能技术（无论是电池、抽水蓄能、压缩空气蓄能，还是飞轮蓄能）发展得足够快，那么可能就不需要聚变了。

Solar and wind power can, in contrast, be developed piecemeal with relatively modest capital costs. A such, private firms are quite willing to invest, given modest initial government incentives. We do not know yet whether these lower-tech approaches to alternative energy will be enough to power future civilization. If they are enough, then other than international political sanctions restricting fossil fuels, there will be nothing in the energy base that militates against the perpetuation of private ownership. If it turns out that the supply of energy from wind and sun is too intermittent, too dependent on the seasons, or too deficient at night, then fusion power will be the most plausible way of providing base load power. If energy storage technologies, either batteries, pumped storage, compressed air storage, or even flywheel storage, develop fast enough, fusion may not be needed.

这种可能性引发了人们对自给自足的幻想，以及一个经济上自给自足、脱离电网生活的社会。但仔细研究一下，这个想法就不攻自破了。太阳能只为那些有足够资金购买太阳能电池板、屋顶面积足够大或有空地安装太阳能电池板的人带来一定程度的自给自足。对于住在租房中的城市居民或那些负担不起初始资本的人来说，这不是一个选择。虽然大屋顶房屋的业主可以减少电力购买量，但工业、电信、办公室、电气化铁路等仍然需要电网。

This possibility gives rise to fantasies about self-sufficiency and a society of people who are economically self-sufficient, living off-grid. The idea breaks down as soon as it is examined in detail. Solar power only brings an element of self-sufficiency to those with enough capital to buy the panels, and enough roof area or free land to install it on. It is not an option for urban dwellers in rented flats or for those who cannot afford the initial capital. While owners of houses with big roofs will be able to reduce their electricity purchases, electric grids will still be needed for industry, telecoms, offices, electric railways, and the like.

7.1.1 材料

7.1.1 Materials

工业社会严重依赖那些要么使用化石燃料要么不可避免地排放二氧化碳的材料。在十九世纪，工业化国家的工业建筑和住房大多是用砖建造的。砖的生产需要将粘土与磨碎的煤混合，然后在窑中干燥和烧结，混合物中的煤提供了大部分燃料。

Industrial society is heavily dependent on materials whose production either uses fossil fuel or unavoidably emits carbon dioxide. In the nineteenth-century industrial buildings and housing in industrialized nations were largely built from brick. Brick production involved the mixing of clays with ground coal which was then dried and sintered in kilns, with the coal in the mixture providing a large part of the fuel.

20 世纪，混凝土成为主要的建筑材料。但建造混凝土也需要消耗大量能源。混凝土是沙子、石头和水泥粉的混合物。水泥粉是这里最大的能源消耗者。该过程包括加热石灰石以分解其中的 CaCO ₃生成 CaO + CO ₂。这显然会直接释放二氧化碳。该过程需要 4GJ/吨至 7GJ/吨的能量 [Worrell 等人，2001]。目前，这种能量由化石燃料提供，该过程涉及约 5% 的世界工业能源。Worrell 估计，1994 年全球二氧化碳总排放量的约 5% 来自水泥生产。对于中国来说，7% 到 9% 的所有排放量来自水泥制造。[Liu 等人，2015]

In the twentieth century concrete became the main building material. But this too involves a lot of energy in its construction. Concrete is a mixture of sand, stones, and cement powder. Cement powder is the biggest energy consumer here. The process involves heating limestone to disassociate the CaCO₃ it contains to produce CaO + CO₂. This obviously involves a direct release of carbon dioxide. The process requires between 4GJ/ton and 7GJ/ton of energy [Worrell et al., 2001]. This energy is currently supplied by fossil fuels with on the order of 5 percent of world industrial energy involved in the process. Worrell estimated that in 1994 around 5 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions worldwide came from cement production. For China something between 7 percent and 9 percent of all emissions are from cement making. [Liu et al., 2015]

原则上，通过太阳能加热熔化石灰石，然后通过太阳能热电化学过程 (STEP) 进行电解，可以生产不含二氧化碳的水泥 [Licht 等人，2012]。通过选择温度，可以获得电解转化 Ca CO ₃ → CaO + C + O _2，同时释放元素碳和氧。假设产生的碳被埋起来，整个过程将是碳中性的。138如果以严格的碳中性方式运作^，以这种方式生产水泥的成本将是目前方法的两到三倍。

It is in principle possible to produce cement without carbon dioxide by a combination of solar heating to melt limestone and then electrolysis by the Solar Thermal Electrochemical Process (STEP) [Licht et al., 2012]. By choice of temperature one can obtain the electrolytic transformation Ca CO₃ → CaO + C + O₂ with elemental carbon and oxygen being released. Assuming that the carbon produced was buried, the overall process would be carbon neutral.¹³⁸ If operated in a strictly carbon-neutral fashion the cost of cement produced this way would be two to three times as great as with current methods.

钢铁是工业社会的基础金属，用于制造机械、船舶、桥梁、汽车和建筑业。如今，钢铁生产采用碱性氧气炼钢法和电弧炼钢法。碱性氧气炼钢法将高炉生产的生铁精炼成结构钢，尽管部分原料是回收的废钢。电弧炉完全使用回收的废钢。在美国，大约 70% 的钢铁产量来自回收材料。其余 30% 来自铁矿石加工。矿石中的氧化铁用碳还原为金属铁，目前以焦炭的形式存在，尽管过去使用木炭。因此，该过程不可避免地会排放二氧化碳：焦炭提供燃料来加热熔炉，而焦炭燃烧产生的一氧化碳是还原剂。

Steel has been the fundamental metal of industrial society, used in making machinery, ships, bridges, cars, and in the construction industry. Today steel production comes from the basic oxygen process and the electric arc process. The basic oxygen process refines pig iron produced in blast furnaces into structural steel, though a portion of the feedstock is recycled scrap steel. Electric arc furnaces work entirely with recycled scrap. In the United States around 70 percent of all steel output is from recycled sources. The remaining 30 percent comes from the processing of iron ore. The iron oxide in the ore is reduced to metallic iron using carbon, currently in the form of coke, though charcoal was used in the past. As such the process inevitably emits carbon dioxide: the coke provides the fuel to heat the furnace, and because carbon monoxide, produced by burning the coke, is the reducing agent.

如果我们假设世界需要大幅减少二氧化碳_排放量，这意味着：

If we assume that the world will require drastic reductions in CO₂ emissions, this implies:

• 钢铁行业必须主要依赖回收利用，并只辅以少量由木炭生产的基本钢。

• That the steel industry will have to become overwhelmingly based on recycling, supplemented with only such small amounts of basic steel as can be produced from charcoal.

• 在许多用途上，其他金属（最有可能是铝）将不得不替代钢铁。铝是通过完全电解工艺生产的，碳电极腐蚀产生的二氧化碳排放量相对较小。

• That other metals, most likely aluminum, will have to substitute for steel in many uses. Aluminum is produced by an entirely electrolytic process, with a relatively small carbon dioxide emission from the erosion of the carbon electrodes.

2017 年，每吨铝的成本约为钢的五倍。铝的强度也比钢低，因此铝结构件必须比相应的钢结构件更厚。但由于铝的密度较低，这些影响可以部分抵消，相应的铝部件重量仅为钢部件的 60% 左右。因此，总体而言，使用铝代替钢的成本约为钢的三倍。

Per ton, in 2017, aluminum cost about five times as much as steel. It is also weaker than steel so aluminium structural members have to be thicker than the corresponding steel ones. But given its lower density these effects partially cancel out, and corresponding aluminum parts will weigh only about 60 percent of steel parts. Overall, then, the use of aluminum instead of steel is about three times as expensive.

因此，工业文明的两种基本建筑材料——混凝土和钢铁——很可能必须被价格高出三倍的替代品取代。廉价混凝土是世界城市化的基础 [Edgerton, 2011b]，廉价钢铁是机械化的基础。

So it is likely that the two fundamental construction materials of industrial civilization, concrete and steel, will have to be replaced by alternatives that are around three times as expensive. Cheap concrete has been the foundation of world urbanization [Edgerton, 2011b], and cheap steel of mechanization.

当碳排放限制砖和混凝土时，石材仍将作为一种低碳建筑材料。斯莫特 [1986] 将工业化苏格兰贫民窟住房条件更差和拥挤程度更大的原因归咎于 20 世纪 30 年代之前的法定要求，即苏格兰的住宅必须使用昂贵的石材，而英格兰可以使用廉价的砖块。

Stone will remain available as a low-carbon building material when carbon emissions restrict brick and concrete. Smout [1986] attributes the greater overcrowding and worse slum housing conditions in industrial Scotland to the statutory requirement, up to the 1930s, to use expensive stone in residential accommodations in Scotland whereas cheap brick could be used in England.

与 20 世纪 50 年代兴起的砖混结构住房相比，格拉斯哥的旧石砌房屋因其美观而受到人们的赞赏。但是，如果全世界数十亿新城市居民不得不依赖石砌房屋，那么过度拥挤的现象将持续下去。过度拥挤带来了剥削性的地主，并加强了有产阶级的统治地位。另一方面，一旦人口增长放缓，石砌建筑的耐用性就成为一种优势。随着时间的推移，在人口保持稳定的情况下，使用石砌建筑可以实现相对较高的住房标准。在短期内，可能需要大规模生产的铝制单元来取代 20 世纪城市化时期的浇筑混凝土公寓。

The old stone tenements of Glasgow are appreciated for their aesthetics, in comparison to the brick and concrete housing that went up in the 1950s. But if the billions of new urban dwellers accross the world will have to depend on the building of stone housing, then overcrowding will persist. Overcrowding brings exploitative landlords and reinforces the dominance of the propertied classes. On the other hand, once population growth slows down, the durability of stone construction is an advantage. Over time, with a static population, relatively high standards of housing could be achieved using stone. In the shorter term it may be necessary for mass-produced aluminum units to stand in for the poured concrete flats of twentieth-century urbanization.

7.1.2 运输

7.1.2 Transport

正如斯米尔 [2010] 所说，全球化的两大引擎是高旁通涡轮机和高压缩柴油机。一个为飞机提供动力，另一个为轮船、火车、卡车和公共汽车提供动力。MAN 和 Wärtsilä 柴油发动机驱动着连接亚洲、欧洲和美洲的大型轮船。柴油火车运载着美国一半以上的货物。涡轮机为所有空运提供动力。所有设备都依靠石油运行；没有石油，世界上大多数交通运输都会停止。

As Smil [2010] says, the two engines of globalization are the high bypass turbine and the high compression diesel. One powers aircraft, the other ships, trains, trucks, and buses. MAN and Wärtsilä diesel engines drive the vast ships linking Asia, Europe, and America. Diesel trains carry more than half of America’s goods. Turbines power all air freight. All run on oil; without oil, most world transport stops.

石油不会在一夜之间耗尽或被禁用，但几十年后，石油供应将逐渐减少，原因要么是资源枯竭，要么是国际上对化石燃料使用的限制。那么运输系统，以及背后的整个全球资本主义分工，将如何应对呢？

Oil is not going to run out or be banned overnight, but it will become progressively less available over a few decades, either due to resource exhaustion or international restrictions of fossil fuel use. How then is a transport system, and behind that, a whole global capitalist division of labor, going to respond?

首先从航运来看，成本显然会上升。今天，我们有柴油驱动的钢制船舶。到本世纪末，船舶将由什么材料建造和驱动？

Looking first at shipping, it is clear that costs will rise. Today we have diesel-powered steel ships. At the end of this century what will ships be built of and powered by?

在钢船出现之前，我们使用的是木船，而风帆动力一直延续到二十世纪初，因此通过恢复早期技术，国际贸易仍然可行。但这将意味着贸易量大幅减少和运输成本上升。现代尺寸的船只不能用木头建造。木制船只最多只能容纳几千吨，大约是当代最大集装箱船的百分之一，是最常见的散货船的十分之一。由于需要大量船员来操纵风帆，成本会高得多。

Before steel ships we had wooden ones, and sail power hung on into the early twentieth century, so international trade would still be possible by a reversion to earlier technologies. But this would mean both a severe reduction in trade volume and a rise in carrying costs. Vessels of modern size cannot be built of wood. Wooden construction implies ships of at most a couple of thousand tons, about a hundredth of the size of the largest contemporary container ships and a tenth the size of the most common bulk carrier. Costs would be much higher because of the large crews needed to handle sails.

但也有明显的替代方案。铝在军舰建造中被广泛使用，如果船东被迫支付更高的建造成本，铝也可以用于商船。但目前还没有人建造大型铝船。最大的铝船长约 100 米，而目前的货船长度是这个数字的四倍。

But there are obvious alternatives. Aluminum has been extensively used in warship construction, and could be used for merchant shipping were owners forced to pay the higher construction cost. But nobody has yet built large aluminum ships. The largest have been around 100 meters whereas current freighters run up to four times that length.

图 7.4. Flettner 转子船。左侧为原始船，右侧为现代实验型 Eship1。

Figure 7.4. The Flettner rotor ship. The original ship is on the left with the modern experimental Eship1 on the right.

铝船一直受到腐蚀问题的困扰。铝是一种电阳性金属，与青铜或钢等其他金属接触时，与水接触会产生电池效应。结果就是电解腐蚀，腐蚀铝。原则上，如果船体只使用铝，就可以避免这种情况。这种类型的散货船设计已经存在了几十年，但经济效益不佳 [Altenburg，1971]。但总体而言，几十年来，建造这种船舶的技术似乎毫无疑问是可以掌握的。推进是更大的问题。

Aluminum ships have been plagued by corrosion problems. As a highly electo-positive metal, any contact with other metals like bronze or steel sets up a battery on contact with water. The consequence is electrolytic corrosion that eats away at the aluminum. In principle this can be avoided by using only aluminum in the hull. Designs have existed for bulk cargo ships of this type for decades, but have been uneconomic [Altenburg, 1971]. Overall, and over decades, however, there seems little doubt that the technology of building such ships can be mastered. Propulsion is the bigger problem.

电池和太阳能被排除在外。电池长期以来一直用于潜艇，但电池的续航时间不足以支撑远洋航行，而太阳能为大型重型船舶提供的能量太少。风能仍然是最有可能的替代方案。确实存在带有传统桅杆和船帆的货船设计，但即使有某种形式的动力辅助，操纵船帆所需的船员也可能比机动船所需的船员多。一种有前途的替代方案是 Flettner 转子。139^它依靠风对旋转的圆柱体施加垂直力。它需要适度的功率来旋转圆柱体，但通过利用风能，产生的推进力比投入的要大得多。这种船不需要大量船员。20 世纪 20 年代建造了几艘使用这种技术的货船（图 7.4），但当时它们被证明与柴油相比不经济。鉴于柴油船从那时起已经有了很大的改进，在没有控制化石燃料使用的情况下，它们仍然不经济^。140

Batteries and solar power are ruled out. Batteries, which have long been used in submarines, do not last long enough for ocean voyages, and solar power provides too little energy for a large heavy vessel. Wind remains the most likely alternative. Designs do exist for cargo ships with conventional masts and sails, but the crew required to handle sails, even with some form of power assist, is likely to be more than would be needed for a motor vessel. A promising alternative is the Flettner rotor.¹³⁹ This relies on wind that will exert a perpendicular force on a spinning cylinder. It requires a modest power to rotate the cylinder but, by harnessing the wind, yields much more propulsive power than is put in. Such ships do not need big crews. A couple of cargo ships using this were built in the 1920s (Figure 7.4), but at that time they proved uneconomic in comparison to diesel. Given that diesel ships have improved a lot since then, they remain uneconomic in the absence of controls on the use of fossil fuels.¹⁴⁰

另一种可能性是，长期以来用于军舰的核能可能会应用于货船。毫无疑问，核能是可行的，而且可以使船只速度非常快。但在成本不是问题的环境中，在训练有素的船员的带领下使用核能与在商用船上使用核能之间存在很大差异。在四艘实验性核货船中，萨凡纳号（美国）、奥托·哈恩号（德国）、陆奥号（日本）和西弗莫尔普特号（苏联），只有最后一艘成功了。成本、可靠性和安全性方面的考虑阻碍了这项技术的普遍应用。

Another possibility is that nuclear energy, long used in warships, might be applied to cargo vessels. There is no doubt that it works, and can drive ships very fast. But there is a big difference between operating nuclear energy in an environment where cost is no object, with highly trained crews, and using it in a commercial ship. Of the four experimental atomic cargo ships, Savannah (US), Otto Hahn (German), Mutsu (Japanese), and Sevmorput (Soviet) only the last was a success. Cost, reliability, and safety considerations have prevented a general uptake of the technology.

因此，由此得出的结论是，化石燃料时代的结束可能会导致航运成本大幅上升。船舶的建造成本和运营成本将更高，而且速度可能也会更慢。

So the conclusion to take from this is that the end of the fossil fuel era is likely to lead to a significant increase in shipping costs. Ships will cost more to build, more to operate, and probably be slower.

这将严重破坏当前的全球化模式。与全球生产商相比，更高的运输成本将有利于本地生产商，陆路运输将优于海上运输。许多国家的铁路货运仍然严重依赖柴油，但电气化铁路是一项古老且久经考验的技术。安装电线和购买新机车的成本很高，但随后的运行成本却差不多。即使在目前的发电结构下，电动火车的碳排放量也低于柴油 [Givoni 等，2009]。随着发电系统转向可再生能源和核能，这一优势将变得更加明显。在铁路由国有和计划运营的国家（如中国），电气化程度往往较高，而在基础设施由私有运营的国家（如美国），电气化程度较低。

This will substantially undermine the current model of globalization. Higher shipping costs will favor local producers compared to global ones, and land links rather than sea links. Rail freight is still heavily dependent on diesel in many countries, but electric railways are an old and well-tried technology. It is expensive to put in the wires and to buy new locomotives, but running costs subsequently are similar. Even with the current structure of electricity generation electric trains release less carbon than diesel [Givoni et al., 2009]. As the electricity generation system moves toward renewables and nuclear, this advantage will become more pronounced. Electrification tends to be high in countries like China where the railways are state owned and planned and low in countries like the United States where the infrastructure is private.

中国的铁路运输量位居世界前列，铁路网总长 93,000 公里，其中电气化铁路 46,000 公里 [中国铁道部，2012]。电气化率逐步提高：1975 年仅为 5%，而现在由于有意识的中央计划，电气化率已达到 40% [Juhász et al.，2013]。

China’s rail transport volume is one of the highest in the world, having a 93,000km network of which 46,000km is electrified [Ministry of Railways, China, 2012]. The rate of electrification increased gradually: in 1975 it was only 5 percent, by now it is about 40 percent as a result of a conscious central planning [Juhász et al., 2013].

相比之下，美国铁路网只有 1% 实现了电气化。我们之前讨论过，在资本主义经济体中，资本密集度高的行业利润率较低，这不利于投资。美国和中国铁路之间的对比就是一个特别鲜明的例子。美国等大国的铁路电气化在技术上是可行的，正如中国所表明的那样，但受到私有制的阻碍。因此，转换为电动火车的需求将倾向于用公共铁路取代私人铁路。

In contrast, only 1 percent of the U.S. network is electrified. We discussed earlier how, in capitalist economies, high capital-intensive industries have a low rate of profit, which discourages investment in them. The contrast between U.S. and Chinese railways is a particularly stark example. The electrification of the railways in large countries like the United States is technically feasible as China shows, but it is held back by private ownership. Thus, the need to convert to electric trains will tend to favor the replacement of private with public railways.

火车运输的货物比例可能会上升，因为在没有柴油卡车的情况下，长途卡车运输可能不可行。最好的电动重型卡车续航里程也只有 100 公里，充电需要几个小时。货物运输系统中，电动卡车可能只用于城市内的最终配送^。141

The percentage of freight carried by trains may well rise, because in the absence of diesel engine trucks, long-distance trucking is likely to be unviable. The best electric heavy trucks have a range of only 100km and take several hours to charge. The goods transport system is likely to have electric trucks being used only for final delivery within cities.¹⁴¹

对于城市交通而言，配备锂电池的电动汽车无疑是化石燃料汽车的可行替代品。但电池中锂的长期供应量仍存在疑问 [Kushnir and Sandén，2012]。如果全世界的汽车保有量都达到欧洲目前的水平，而且这些汽车都使用锂电池，那么世界锂资源是否充足就值得怀疑了，尽管这是对未来使用量的一个相对极端的预测。Gaines 等人 [2009] 对未来汽车使用量进行了更为温和的预测，得出的结论是锂资源不太可能成为一大制约因素。

For urban transport, electric cars with lithium batteries are certainly a viable replacement for fossil fuel ones. There are questions associated with the long-term availability of lithium for the batteries [Kushnir and Sandén, 2012]. If the whole world were to attain the current European levels of car ownership, and these all used lithium batteries, it is questionable whether world lithium resources are sufficient, though that is a relatively extreme projection of future use. Gaines et al. [2009], using more modest projections of future car use, conclude that lithium resources are unlikely to be a big constraint.

锂资源在地理分布上十分集中，全球四大锂生产国拥有 90% 的储量。如果所有汽车都使用锂，这些国家将能够获得与当今主要石油生产国类似的租金收入。但总体而言，这些收入可能低于当前世界经济中的石油租金，因为锂可以回收利用，但与石油不同，它不会成为主要能源。

Lithium is geographically concentrated with the top four producing countries having 90 percent of world reserves. In the event of it being used in all cars, these countries would be in a position to gain rent revenues analogous to the leading oil producers today. On the whole, though, these are likely to be smaller than the oil rents in the current world economy, because lithium can be recycled, but unlike oil it will not be a primary energy source.

航空业改用非化石燃料不会带来严重的工程问题。液氢是一种可行的替代品 [Koroneos et al., 2005; Contreras et al., 1997]，其能量重量比远高于现有燃料。其主要缺点是密度低得多，因此机身体积的很大一部分必须留给燃料箱。目前已有空客和波音的大型喷气式客机改型，采用氢燃料 [Price, 1991]。波音的设计将上层甲板延伸至机身长度，并完全装满液氢罐。1988 年，图波列夫实际上制造了一架改型 Tu155，以氢气为动力 [Pohl and Malychev, 1997]，客舱后部必须被燃料箱占据。

There are no serious engineering problems with converting the aviation industry to use non-fossil fuels. Liquid hydrogen is a viable alternative [Koroneos et al., 2005; Contreras et al., 1997] and has a much better energy-to-weight ratio than existing fuels. Its main drawback is that it is much less dense, so that a substantial part of the fuselage volume would have to be given over to fuel tanks. Designs exist for modified Airbus and Boeing jumbo jets powered by hydrogen [Price, 1991]. The Boeing design had the upper deck extended to the length of the fuselage and entirely filled with liquid hydrogen tanks. In 1988 Tupolev actually built a modified Tu155 that flew on hydrogen [Pohl and Malychev, 1997], the back part of the passenger cabin having to be occupied by the fuel tank.

虽然这种转换是可能的，但代价是飞行成本的提高。由于燃料体积太大，这种飞机能够搭载的乘客数量将少于同等大小的传统飞机。燃料价格也更高。尽管光伏电力在终生成本方面已开始与化石燃料电力相媲美，但这并不意味着通过太阳能电解产生的氢气与煤油一样便宜。

Although the conversion is possible, it will come at the cost of more expensive flights. Because the fuel is so bulky, the aircraft will be able to carry fewer passengers than a conventional one of the same size. The fuel is also more expensive. Although photovoltaic electricity is begining to rival fossil fuel electricity in lifetime costs, this does not imply that hydrogen produced by electrolysis from solar power is as cheap as kerosene.

利用石油生产电力的流程如下：

Producing electricity from oil proceeds thus:

（a） 石油（效率40%）→电力

(a) oil (40 percent efficient)→electricity

从石油燃料开始电解生产氢气的过程如下：

Producing hydrogen by electrolysis starting with oil fuel progresses thus:

（b） 石油（效率 40%）→电力（效率 70%）→氢气

(b) oil (40 percent efficient)→electricity (70 percent efficient)→hydrogen

因为电解过程中存在热力学损失。如果我们用光伏代替，则有：

Because of the thermodynamic loss in electrolysis. If we substitute this with photovoltaic we have:

（c） 光伏电力（效率70%）→氢气

然后，氢气或煤油航空燃料必须转化为动力：

The hydrogen or kerosene aviation fuel then has to be turned into motive power:

（d） 航空燃料（效率40%）→飞行动力

(d) aviation fuel (40 percent efficient)→motive power for flights

假设光伏电的成本与过程 (a) 相同。因此，光伏电的成本与过程 (d) 中的飞行动力相同，其中航空燃料是煤油。但如果我们必须产生氢气，然后在涡轮机中燃烧它，那么总体后续效率为 70% × 40% = 28%。因此，即使光伏电与化石燃料电一样便宜，作为航空燃料的来源，它的成本仍将是煤油的三倍以上。

Suppose photovoltaic electricity costs the same as process (a). Thus photovoltaic electricity is of the same cost as flight motive power in process (d) where the aviation fuel is kerosene. But if we have to generate hydrogen and then burn it in a turbine, the overall subsequent efficiency is 70 percent × 40 percent = 28 percent. So even if photovoltaic electricity is as cheap as fossil fuel electricity, as a source of aviation fuel it will still be more than three times as expensive as kerosene.

图 7.5. 英国过去半个世纪的劳动生产率增长。增长率以过去 5 年整体经济人均产出的移动平均值计算。来源：英国国家统计局数据。

Figure 7.5. Growth of labor productivity over the last half-century in the UK. Growth rates computed as moving average over last 5 years for output per worker for the whole economy. Source: ONS data.

客运容量下降和热力学效率降低意味着每客英里的成本将大幅上升。

Lower passenger capacity and lower thermodynamic efficiency mean that cost per passenger mile will rise substantially.

转向非化石燃料经济将导致多个领域的成本大幅增加：材料、运输、工艺加热。在空运和海运方面，按目前的劳动生产率计算，成本可能会增加一倍甚至更多。

The change to a non–fossil fuel economy involves big increases in costs in a number of areas: materials, transport, process heating. In air and sea transport this could amount to a doubling or more of costs assuming current labor productivity.

在整个工业时代，劳动生产率一直在提高，因此人们可能希望，一旦人类的聪明才智被用于提高风力驱动的铝制船舶或氢动力飞机的生产率，最初的损失将很快得到弥补。这种转变将需要几十年的时间。这难道不会给生产率的提高留下足够的时间来抵消损失吗？

Throughout the Industrial Age labor productivity has risen, so one might hope that once human ingenuity is devoted to increasing the productivity of wind-powered aluminum ships or hydrogen planes the initial loss will soon be recovered. The changeover will take decades. Will this not leave plenty of time for productivity rises to offset the loss?

这种乐观的看法存在几个问题。首先，劳动生产率增长在过去半个世纪里一直在下降（图 7.5、7.6）。我们应该预期，正在进口最先进技术的后工业化经济体的生产率增长速度将比已经工业化的经济体更快。日本和意大利等 1960 年尚未完成工业化的国家的劳动生产率增长应该下降，这并不奇怪，但即使是像英国这样在 1960 年完全实现工业化的经济体也显示出同样的趋势。即使在 2008 年经济衰退之前，大多数工业经济体的生产率提高速度也低于每年 2%，如果目前的趋势继续下去，未来几十年的生产率增长将普遍停止。

There are several problems with such an optimistic view. The first is that labor productivity growth has been declining over the last half-century (Figures 7.5, 7.6). We should expect late industrializing economies that are importing the most advanced techniques to have more rapid productivity growth than those that are already industrialized. That labor productivity growth should decline in countries like Japan and Italy, which had not completed industrialization in 1960, is not surprising, but even economies like the UK, fully industrialized in 1960, show the same trend. Even before the 2008 recession, the bulk of industrial economies were improving their productivity at under 2 percent a year, and, if current trends continue, productivity growth will stop generally in the next decades.

图 7.6. 2008 年经济衰退开始前生产率增长下降。来源：扩展宾夕法尼亚世界表。

Figure 7.6. Decline in productivity growth, up to the start of the 2008 recession. Sourc: Extended Penn World Tables.

如果生产率每年增长 2%，则需要 35 年才能抵消空运和海运成本翻倍的影响。如果增长率降至 1%，则需要 70 年。然而，这可能不足以拯救全球化。1% 或 2% 的数字是整个经济生产率的平均增长。

If productivity grows at 2 percent a year, it would take 35 years to offset a doubling of costs of air and sea transport. If growth shrinks to 1 percent it would take 70 years. This, however, may not be enough to save globalization. The figures of 1 percent or 2 percent are average increases in productivity across the whole economy.

目前，将捕捞的虾空运到泰国去壳，然后再空运回泰国的超市是比较划算的。这只有在廉价空运的情况下才可行。假设空运费用翻倍，这项业务就无利可图了。假设在 2067 年，英国劳动生产率普遍提高，最初翻倍的空运费用现在在劳动时间方面下降到与现在相同的工作日数。我们是否希望恢复空运虾到泰国？

It currently pays to fly prawns caught off the cost of Britain to Thailand to be shelled and then fly them back to supermarkets here. This is only viable with cheap air freight. Suppose air freight charges doubled and the business became unprofitable. Suppose that in 2067, the general improvement in UK labor productivity is such that the initially doubled air freight charges have now fallen, in terms of labor time, to the same number of worker days as now. Would we expect the flying of prawns to Thailand to resume?

不会。一方面，泰国如今拥有的廉价劳动力在经过半个世纪的发展后不太可能再有。另一方面，英国对虾剥壳行业的劳动生产率也有望提高。如果英国对虾剥壳行业以与其他经济领域相同的方式增长，那么其劳动生产率也将翻一番。因此，泰国对虾剥壳行业的比较优势不会再次出现。

No. For one thing the cheap labor to be had in Thailand today is unlikely to be available after half a century of development there. For another, labor productivity in the UK prawn-shelling business can be expected to have increased as well. If it grows the same way as the rest of the economy, it too will have doubled. So the comparative advantage of shelling in Thailand would not reappear.

人们对技术变革的速度过于自信。我已经足够老了，已经看到技术变革的速度大大减缓在我的一生中，我从未见过如此快的劳动力生产率。我记得，在 20 世纪 70 年代末，格雷格·迈克尔森和我第一次注意到这种放缓的现象，并开始讨论它。技术变革的速度远不及 20 世纪 50 年代或 60 年代，更不用说 1890 年至 1914 年之间了。劳动生产率的趋势是放缓。

People are being overconfident about the rate of technical change. I am old enough to have seen the rate of technical change slow down a lot within my own lifetime. I remember that it was in the late 1970s that Greg Michaelson and I first noticed this slowdown happening and started to discuss it. Technical change is nothing like as rapid as it was in the 1950s or 1960s, let alone between 1890 and 1914. The tendency is for labor productivity to slow down.

也许我们的孙子会使用磁悬浮列车，但在 20 世纪 60 年代，我们预计线性感应单轨列车将在 1980 年投入使用。毕竟，他们正在东英吉利建造原型。英国铁路公司在 20 世纪 60 年代末开发了高速倾转列车，并计划在 70 年代与其他线路的 125 英里/小时柴油机一起投入使用。142目前的维珍列车柴油机并不比那些 HST 快。1975 年，我可以在 4 小时 20 分钟内从爱丁堡^到达伦敦；四十年后的今天，速度并没有更快。我们承诺的飞行汽车、个人喷气背包和 15 小时工作制在哪里？

Perhaps our grandchildren will be using magnetic levitation trains, but in the 1960s we expected linear induction monorail trains to be in use by 1980. After all, they were building a prototype in East Anglia. High-speed tilting trains were being developed by British Rail in the late 1960s and were scheduled for use in the ’70s along with 125 mph diesels for other lines.¹⁴² Current Virgin Train diesels are no faster than those HSTs. In 1975 I could go from Edinburgh to London in 4 hrs 20 mins; it is no faster today, forty years later. Where are the flying cars, personal jetpacks, and 15-hour working weeks we were promised?

在某些地区，交通和技术已经大大退步。19 世纪风格的自行车送货员又回到了街头，这是 Deliveroo 的“标志设计”。20 世纪 70 年代，英国可以制造超音速客机，美国可以把人类送上月球。但这些技术现在都无法实现。20 世纪 50 年代，英国可以从头开始建造一系列核电站，每座核电站大约需要五年时间。现在我们必须从中国和法国花费巨资进口这项技术，而且需要十多年的时间。

In some areas transport and technology have regressed considerably. Nineteenth-century-style bicycle delivery boys are back on the streets, “badge engineered” by Deliveroo. In the ’70s Britain could, build supersonic airliners, the Americans could land people on the moon. Neither of those technologies are available now. In the 1950s the UK could from a complete standing start, build a whole series of nuclear power stations, with each one taking about five years. Now we have to import the technology at vast expense from China and France, and it takes over a decade.

在我祖父的一生中，交通方式从城镇中的马匹运输和唯一的飞行方式（气球）发展到普遍使用汽车和大型喷气式飞机。娱乐方式从幻灯秀发展到电影，然后是电视。他出生时没有电话系统，更不用说电脑了，但当他年老时，他看到了我正在使用的工作站（ICL PERQ），并立即能够理解 Unix 文件系统。

During my grandfather’s lifetime, travel went from horse transport in towns and the only form of flight being by balloon to generalized use of cars and mass jet transport. Entertainment went from magic lantern shows to cinema, and then television. There was no telephone system when he was born, let alone computers, but in his old age he came and saw the workstation I was using (an ICL PERQ) and was immediately able to understand the Unix filing system.

这是因为技术发展具有某些内在属性，还是证明了马克思关于社会形式最终会成为新技术发展的桎梏的正确性？

Is this because of some inherent property of the development of technology, or is it evidence that Marx was right about social forms eventually becoming a fetter on the development of new technologies?

我们知道，许多单项技术的发展都是以图 7.7所示的逻辑或 S 曲线的形式进行的。例如，英国蒸汽机技术的传播就是这样发展的 [Nuvolari 等，2011]。但是，正如 Modis [2013] 所表明的那样，领先工业经济体的生产力总体发展也具有这种形状。日本的 GDP 增长几乎完全符合逻辑曲线，人均 GDP 自 1990 年以来一直处于平稳和停滞状态。在逻辑增长的早期阶段，它看起来呈指数增长，然后会放缓并最终趋向于上限。因此，对于印度或中国这样的国家，我们无法判断其增长是逻辑增长还是指数级增长。如果我们集中关注那些确实表现出逻辑模式的国家，会发生什么呢？

We know that many individual technologies develop with a logistic or S curve like that shown in Figure 7.7. For example, the diffusion of steam engine technology in Britain developed this way [Nuvolari et al., 2011]. But, as Modis [2013] showed, the overall development of productivity in leading industrial economies also has this shape. Japanese GDP growth almost exactly fits a logistic curve, with GDP per capita having leveled off and been stagnant since 1990. In the early stages of logistic growth, it looks exponential, then it slows down and eventually tends toward an upper bound. So for countries like India or China we cannot tell if the growth is logistic or exponential. If we concentrate on the countries that do show a logistic pattern, what is happening?

答案可能有两个。一是工业社会的基本技术综合体可能已接近极限。二是资本主义社会关系已成为生产力的绝对桎梏。如果是这样，我们可以将增长趋于平稳归因于利润率的下降，如图5.25所示。按照这种解释，利润率的下降将抑制投资。因此，由于投资下降，技术进步的速度将会放缓。

There are two possible answers. It may be that the basic technology complex of industrial society is drawing close to its limit. Alternatively, capitalist social relations have become an absolute fetter on productive forces. If that is the case, we could attribute the leveling off of growth to the fall in the rate of profit, shown for example in Figure 5.25. This fall in profit rates would, in this interpretation, curtail investment. Because of the decline in investment, then, the rate of technical progress would have slowed down.

这是一个合理的解释，因为在图7.8所示的时期内，人均净投资确实出现了下降。这里的数据计算为：净投资为(id)/x，总投资为i/x，其中d是2005年购买力平价下人均折旧估计值，i是2005年购买力平价下人均年投资，x是2005年购买力平价下人均GDP。

This is a plausible explanation as there does appear to be a decline in net investment per worker over the period shown in Figure 7.8. Here data is computed as (i-d)/x for net investment and i/x for gross investment, where d is estimated depreciation per worker in 2005 purchasing power parity, i is investment per worker-year in 2005 purchasing power parity, and x is GDP per worker in 2005 purchasing power parity.

值得注意的是，总投资并没有下降。人均资本存量的增加意味着折旧会吞噬越来越多的总投资 [Zachariah，2008]。因此，无论现行的产权关系如何，净投资都会下降。

It is noticeable that gross investment is not declining. A rise in the capital stock per worker implies that depreciation eats up more and more of gross investment [Zachariah, 2008]. The decline in net investment is thus expected whatever the property relations prevailing.

这是否是全部情况又是另一回事。即使净价值积累下降，仍然会有一个用新机器替换旧机器的过程，因为旧机器磨损了。即使新机器的价值与它所取代的机器相同，但由于它更现代化，所以应该更有效率。因此，它仍然应该提高劳动生产率。

Whether it is the whole story is another matter. Even when net accumulation of value declines, there is still a process of replacement of old machinery with new as it wears out. Even if the new machinery is of the same value as what it replaced, since it was more modern it should be more effective. It should, as a result, still raise the productivity of labor.

在这种情况下，停滞与生产力持续温和增长是相容的。143生产力增长随后将被日本人口的老龄化所抵消。劳动力减少，生产力缓慢提高，可能足以保持^人均GDP 不变。人均 GDP 的逻辑将是零净积累和人口结构变化的综合效应。

Stagnation in that case is compatible with a continued modest growth in productivity.¹⁴³ The productivity gains would then be eaten up by the aging of the Japanese population. A shrinking workforce, getting slowly more productive, might just be enough to hold GDP per capita constant. The logistic in GDP per capita would then be the combined effect of zero net accumulation and changing demography.

图 7.7. 逻辑曲线最初看起来像指数增长。

Figure 7.7. The logistic curve, which initially looks like exponential growth.

图 7.8。英国、美国、意大利、法国和日本的工人净投资占工人产出的长期趋势呈下降趋势。资料来源：扩展宾夕法尼亚世界表。

Figure 7.8. Long-term trend of net investment per worker as a share of output per worker is declining in this data for UK, United States, Italy, France, Japan. Source: Extended Penn World Tables.

但我们仍应谨慎地认为劳动生产率下降仅仅是资本主义财产关系的产物。即使这是直接原因，我对费尔德曼增长理论的分析也表明，社会主义增长也存在类似的、最终是人口因素的限制。随着社会生产资料存量的增加，越来越多的劳动力必须工作来替换和更新这些存量。因此，正如苏联的历史所表明的那样，在社会主义制度下，净积累也会放缓。

But we should still be cautious about saying that the decline in labor productivity is simply an artifact of capitalist property relations. Even if these are a proximate cause, my analysis of Feldman growth theory showed that there were analogous, ultimately demographic, constraints on socialist growth. As society raises the stock of means of production, an increasing portion of the labor force has to work replacing and updating this stock. So net accumulation also slows down under socialism, as the history of the USSR showed.

这意味着资本主义和社会主义所依赖的工业生产方式有其固有的局限性。使用必然会磨损的机器进行生产，再加上人口结构转变导致人口增长放缓，意味着每个工人所制造的机器的价值会达到极限。无论财产关系如何，这都是如此。

This implies that the industrial mode of production that underlies both capitalism and socialism has its own inherent limitation. Producing by means of machinery that must wear out, along with a demographic transition that slows population growth, means that the value of machinery built up per worker hits limits. This holds whatever the property relations.

资本主义经济将受到更严重的影响。利润率下降的后果是积累放缓，从而导致失业、产能闲置、企业负债累累以及普遍衰退。社会主义经济的投资不是为了私人利益，即使增长率放缓，也可以继续投资。资本主义经济还会经历由信贷扩张和收缩驱动的额外周期。在图 7.5中，这些周期清晰可见，叠加在长期下降趋势上。

A capitalist economy will be more seriously affected. The consequence of a falling rate of profit is a slackening of accumulation, which leads to unemployment, unused capacity, over indebted firms, and a generalized slump. A socialist economy, where investment is not carried out for private gain, can go on investing even when the growth rate slows down. Capitalist economies also go through additional cycles driven by the expansion and contraction of credit. In Figure 7.5 these cycles are clearly visible, overlaid on a secular declining trend.

因此，我给出了有关资本主义社会关系的解释，以及有关工业生产方式的解释。还有其他可能的解释与创新有关，即两者之间的关系社会和自然，或者技术固有的热力学极限。也许问题在于推动二十世纪增长的创新已经枯竭，而没有足够激进的创新出现。也许过去三十年没有出现像蒸汽机、电力、铁路或动力飞行那样激进的创新。我们有手机和智能手机，但它们的意义能与电话和无线技术的最初发展相比吗？

So I have given an explanation relating to the capitalist social relations plus an explanation relating to the industrial mode of production. There are other possible explanations relating to innovation, the relationship between society and nature, or to inherent thermodynamic limits of technology. Perhaps the problem is the exhaustion of the innovations on which twentieth-century growth was powered, without sufficiently radical new ones coming onstream. Maybe the last thirty years have just not seen any innovations as radical as the steam engine, electricity, the railway, or powered flight. We have had cellphones and smartphones, but do these compare in significance to the initial development of the telephone and wireless?

智能手机集电话、计算、无线和带有动态图像的屏幕于一体，但这些都是 20 世纪的经典技术。创新在于缩小尺寸并进行大规模生产。iPhone 可能看起来像我们天空中的明亮星星，但它们与 19 世纪和 20 世纪改变生活的创新星座完全不同。现代世界没有像韦尔斯如此直接地传达的令人眼花缭乱的技术和社会变革速度 [2005a；2005b；1930；1914；Wells 和 Parrinder，2005]。20 世纪的快速增长结合或叠加了许多不同技术的 S 曲线的指数阶段。随着这些曲线进入渐近阶段，除非大量全新技术开始沿着自己的 S 曲线发展，否则增长就会放缓。单个 S 曲线之所以呈这种形状，有两个原因：

A smartphone combines telephony, computing, wireless, and a screen with moving pictures, but these are all classic twentieth-century technologies. The innovation was to shrink them and mass-produce them. The iPhones may seem like bright stars in our sky, but they are nothing like the constellations of innovation that transformed life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The modern world has nothing like the dizzying speed of technical and social change that Wells conveyed with such immediacy [2005a; 2005b; 1930; 1914; Wells and Parrinder, 2005]. The rapid growth of the twentieth century combined, or superposed, the exponential stage of the S-curves of many different technologies. As these curves shift into their asymptotic phases, growth slows down unless a large number of entirely new technologies start on their own S-curves. The individual S-curves have that shape for two reasons:

1. 技术的扩散过程是S型的。

1. The diffusion process of a technology is S-shaped.

最初只有少数人拥有手工制造的汽车。福特的生产线允许他们大规模生产。然后所有制造商都转向生产线，汽车使用量呈指数级增长。最终大多数家庭都拥有汽车，增长速度放缓至更换水平。

Initially a few people had handmade cars. Ford’s production line allowed their mass production. Then all manufacturers switched to production lines, and car use grew exponentially. Eventually the majority of families had cars and growth slowed down to replacement levels.

2. 技术受到自然法则的限制。

2. Technologies hit limits set by natural law.

从十八世纪末到十九世纪中叶，蒸汽机的效率呈指数级增长。双胀式发动机和三胀式发动机相继问世。然后是帕森斯涡轮机。但所有这些朗肯循环发动机的效率都有一个极限。理论上，它们的最大效率在 60% 左右，但实际上最好的发电站只能达到 42%。为了提高效率，它们需要更热的蒸汽。更高的蒸汽温度会削弱涡轮机中使用的钢材，因此效率已经稳定下来^。144

Steam-engine efficiency grew exponentially from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Double then triple expansion engines were introduced. Then came the Parson’s turbine. But there is an ultimate limit to the efficiency of all these Rankine cycle engines. In theory their maximum efficiency is in the 60 percent range, but in practice the best power stations hit only 42 percent. To get higher efficiency they would need hotter steam. Higher steam temperatures would weaken the steel used in their turbines, so the efficiency has plateaued.¹⁴⁴

我们已经触及社会与自然的关系，指出化石燃料的终结是一个迫在眉睫的问题，并表示这意味着所有依赖能源的生产部门的实际成本（即劳动力成本）上升。但其影响已经显现。转变非化石燃料发电的转变已经对电力成本产生了影响。生物燃料的生产占用了粮食生产的土地，推高了粮食价格。即使没有《京都议定书》和《巴黎协定》，石油需求的增长也使石油价格在 20 世纪 70 年代和 21 世纪出现了两次大涨（图 7.9）。这意味着每千瓦时电力所需交换的劳动力数量增加。这两次高价浪潮与国际劳动生产率增长率明显放缓相吻合（图 7.6）。

We have already touched on the relationship between society and nature in identifying the end of fossil fuel as a looming issue, saying that it implies a rise in real costs, that is to say labor costs, across all energy dependent branches of production. But the effects are already being experienced. Shifts to non–fossil fuel sources of power are already having impacts on power costs. The production of biofuels withdraws land from food production and raises food prices. Even without the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, the growth in demand for oil had enabled the price to be raised in two great waves, in the 1970s and again the 2000s (Figure 7.9). This represented an increase in the amount of labor that had to be exchanged for a kilowatt hour of power. These waves of high prices coincided with clear slowdowns in the rate of labor productivity growth internationally (Figure 7.6).

生产力的提高依赖于用能源替代劳动力。当获取一定量能源所需的劳动力数量增加时，提高劳动生产率就变得更加困难。更糟糕的是，成本的增加主要是以向石油国家支付租金的形式出现的，而这些租金随后被浪费在了非生产性方面。

Improvements in productivity had been dependent on substituting energy for labor. When the amount of labor required to acquire a given amount of energy rose, that made it much harder to increase the productiveness of labor. What made things worse was that the increase in costs was largely in the form of rents to the oil states, which were then spent unproductively.

绿色游说者热情地谈论未来替代能源将创造的就业机会数量。这默认了替代能源将耗费更多的劳动力。对于绿色能源而言，额外的成本转化为劳动力和资本收入，而不是像现在一样转化为地租，但总体而言，这仍然是一项实际的经济成本。

Green lobbyists talk enthusiastically about the number of future jobs to be had from alternative energy. This is a tacit admission that alternative energy will cost more labor. With green energy, the extra cost translates into revenue for labor and capital rather than ground rent as at present, but overall it is still a real economic cost.

我之所以提出现代技术进步速度缓慢的观点，部分是为了反驳自动化和机器人技术以前所未有的速度发展，威胁到未来失业率的观点 [Martin, 2015]。事实上，劳动生产率数据表明，劳动力生产率正在放缓，与此同时，人口结构的变化也威胁到劳动力短缺。但这些数据是实际生产率，国家统计中的实际生产率是货币生产率除以通货膨胀率的平减指数。它只衡量生产商品的劳动生产率。如果自动化带来的真正变化是这些统计数据中没有衡量的东西，该怎么办？

The argument that I have been making about the slow rate of modern technical advance is intended, in part, as a counter to the idea that automation and robotics are advancing at unprecedented speed threatening a jobless future [Martin, 2015]. In fact, the labor productivity figures show a slowdown, at the same time as changing demographics threaten a labor shortage. But the figures are for real productivity, where real productivity in the national statistics is this monetary productivity divided by a deflater for the rate of inflation. It only measures the productivity of labor in producing commodities. What if the real change brought on by automation is in something not measured in these statistics?

图 7.9. 原油价格的长期趋势。来源：www.macrotrends.net

Figure 7.9. Long-term trend in crude oil prices. Source: www.macrotrends.net

7.1.3 信息

7.1.3 Information

自动化的最大影响在于信息的传播，而不是物理对象的生产。当你与互联网互动时，你的计算机会与大量其他计算机进行通信：ADSL 调制解调器和无线路由器、本地电话交换大楼中的路由器、主要枢纽的交换机以及谷歌、苹果或微软等大公司拥有的服务器群。所有这些都会自动响应，无需任何人工干预即可提供你请求的信息。人们努力制造设备、设置设备、编写设备使用的软件以及生产设备所需的电力。所有这些都是在幕后进行的，先于你的特定互动，并且与你的特定互动无关。网络向你提供的实际信息不是由人们所做的支持工作所预见或依赖的。即使在原则上，也很难将任何人力劳动量与你获得的信息量联系起来。我们唯一可以肯定的是，每比特传输所需的一小时劳动量将是微不足道的。

The biggest impact of automation has been on the dissemination of information rather than on the production of physical objects. When you interact with the Internet, your computer communicates with a plethora of other computers: an ADSL modem and wireless router, routers in the local telephone exchange building, switches at major hubs, and server farms owned by big companies like Google, Apple, or Microsoft. These all respond automatically and without any human intervention to deliver the information you request. People worked to build the equipment, to set it up, to write the software it uses, and to generate the electricity on which it depends. That is all in the background, prior to and independent of your particular interaction. The actual information that the web delivers to you is not foreseen by or dependent on the enabling work that people did. It is hard, even in principle, to associate any quantum of human labor to the quanta of information you get back. All we can be sure of is that the fraction of an hour of labor per bit delivered will be tiny.

因此，比特币不是商品。

In consequence, the bits are not commodities.

以货币交易量来衡量的GDP几乎不能反映这一活动。账目中出现的只是上网费用，以及广告商向谷歌支付的费用。

GDP measured in monetary transaction hardly grasps this activity. All that appears in the accounts are the fees paid to access the Net, and the fees that advertisers pay Google.

从会计角度来看，谷歌的业务是销售广告，其劳动生产率只能用广告销售金额与其雇员人数之比来衡量。但这忽略了网络的真正效用，即信息的快速发现，而代之以一个偶然的衡量标准，即源自支持它的资金模式的标准。原则上，政府可以招标提供无广告的网络索引和社交媒体服务。以向最终用户提供的服务而言，生产率可能会更高。谷歌和 Facebook 的大部分软件开发工作都用于为广告商寻找更好的潜在客户，而不是改善对最终用户的服务。

From an accounting standpoint, Google is in business to sell ads, and its labor productivity can only be measured in terms of the dollars of advertising sold in comparision to the number of people it employs. But this misses the real utility of the Web, the rapid discovery of information, and substitutes an adventitious measure, one born out of the funding model used to support it. In principle, governments could put out tenders to supply ad-free Web indexing and social media services. The productivity in terms of service delivered to end users would probably be higher. Much of the software development effort by Google and Facebook goes into identifying better leads for advertisers rather than improving services to end users.

资本主义网络通过一种奇怪的相互寄生关系发展，价值形式自我废除。最终用户寄生于所提供的免费服务。但这些免费服务的提供者反过来又通过向第三方出售有关用户活动和兴趣的信息来寄生于最终用户。但谷歌能否提供有用的索引服务取决于是否存在大量的免费信息。这取决于人们是否愿意写博客、发布关于自己的新闻、拍摄和上传视频、制作自己的录音等。这取决于科学家是否愿意将他们的研究成果发布在免费的档案网站上，以及公共机构是否愿意免费提供统计数据和报告。这种规模的免费信息在质量上是全新的。一些免费知识一直存在。在学校里教授的知识不属于任何人。科学成果一直是学者的共同财产。民歌属于音乐家群体。但它们的编码分发，如书籍、乐谱、唱片等，都以商品形式存在。

The capitalist Web develops via a curious mutual parasitism, in which the value form abolishes itself. The end users parasitize the free services offered. But the providers of these free services in turn parasitize the end users by selling information about their activity and interests to third parties. But the very possibility of Google being able to offer a useful indexing service depends on there being lots of free information. It depends on people being willing to write blogs, post news about themselves, take and upload videos, make their own audio recordings, etc. It depends on scientists being willing to post their research on free archive sites, on public bodies making statistics and reports freely available. Free information on this scale is something qualitatively new. Some free knowledge has always existed. That taught in schools belonged to nobody. Scientific results have been the common property of scholars. Folksong belonged to the community of musicians. But their encoded distribution, as books, sheet music, phonograph records, etc., took commodity form.

个人在网络上发布内容的工作就是共产主义的实践：为自我实现而工作，非异化劳动，非商品化劳动。即使是网络生产手段，在主要方面也摆脱了价值关系。这座大厦的大部分都建立在免费的开源软件上。一些开源软件是在有偿工作时间内由公司员工编写的，这些公司出于自己的商业原因选择将软件开源。但另一大部分是由人们在空闲时间或教育或研究机构的人员编写的，没有任何商业动机。这些新生产力的存在在那些从事这些工作的人中催生了一种新的共产主义伦理，总结为一句口号：信息想要自由[Brand, 1987] ^。145

The work individual people do posting stuff on the web is communism in action: work done for self-realization, unalienated labor, uncommodified labor. Even the means of web production escape, in the main, value relations. Much of the edifice rests on free open-source software. Some open-source software is written during paid working hours by employees of firms that, for their own business reasons, choose to release the software open-source. But another large part is written by people in their free time, or by people at educational or research institutes, with no commercial motive. The existence of these new productive forces gives rise to a new form of communist ethic among those who work them, summarized in the slogan: information wants to be free [Brand, 1987].¹⁴⁵

这种新兴的非商品分销仅限于信息商品而非实物商品，并受到知识产权的进一步限制。个人电脑是用最少的劳动生产软件、音乐、书籍等的多份副本的手段。但是，如果人们从事此类生产，他们就会被贴上海盗的标签。因此，原本适用于劫持船只并杀害船员的暴力罪犯的标签，现在被贴在和平从事生产的人身上。这是一个财产关系阻碍生产的明显例子。如果海盗抢走了船上的货物，他们就剥夺了其他人的货物。如果黑客分发一首歌曲的副本，没有人会被剥夺这首歌。事实上，更多的人可以听到这首歌。唯一的剥夺是版权持有者放弃了部分垄断利润。

This nascent non-commodity distribution is restricted to information goods rather than physical ones, and further restricted by intellectual property rights. Personal computers are the means by which multiple copies of software, music, books and so on can be produced by minimal labor. But if people engage in such production they are labelled pirates. Thus a label originally applied to violent criminals who seized ships and killed their crews is attached to people engaged peacefully in production. Here we have a clear example of property relations holding back production. If pirates grab the cargo of a ship, they deprive others of it. If a hacker distributes copies of a song, nobody is deprived of it. Indeed more people get to hear it. The only deprivation is that of the copyright holders who forgo some of their monopoly profit.

为了防止复制，政府制定了一系列技术和法律措施。数字版权管理 (DRM) 水印被用来试图使电子书的副本无法阅读。政府通过法律禁止规避这些规定。最终，保护数字产权的技术尝试都被规避了。垄断者被迫依靠法院来监禁那些创建索引工具和允许免费文件共享的网站的人。

A whole series of technical and legal measures are enacted to prevent copying. Digital Rights Management (DRM) watermarking is used to try to make copies of e-books unreadable. Laws are passed to ban the circumvention of these provisions. In the end the technical attempts to protect digital property rights are all circumvented. The monopolists are forced to rely on the courts to imprison those who create the indexing tools and sites that allow free file sharing.

图7.10.世界社会政治体系中受环境驱动的反馈。

Figure 7.10. Environmentally driven feedbacks in the world sociopolitical system.

预测是一件有风险的事情，尤其是预测未来时。人们能做的最好的事情就是从明显的因果过程中做出合理的推断。我们知道，技术变革和劳动生产率已经放缓了五十年。向后化石燃料经济的过渡将给劳动生产率带来进一步的压力，特别是运输成本。这也许预示着工业文明及其生产方式的固有局限性。或者，也许应该归咎于世界经济的资本主义结构。我已经确定了几个技术领域，在能源生产和信息分发方面，资本主义似乎阻碍了发展。

PREDICTION IS A RISKY AFFAIR, especially, one might add, when applied to the future. The best one can do is make rational extrapolations from apparent causal processes. We know that technological change and labor productivity have been slowing down for fifty years. The transition to a post–fossil fuel economy will put further pressure on labor productivity and particularly on transport costs. It may be that this portends the inherent limits of industrial civilization and its mode of production. Alternatively, maybe it is the capitalist structure of the world economy that is to blame. I have identified several areas of technology, in energy production and information distribution, where capitalism appears to hold things back.

各阶层收入不断提高的社会妥协越来越难以实现，政治经济越来越成为一种零和博弈，收入分配方面的阶级斗争愈演愈烈。

A social compromise in which the income of all classes continues to rise becomes harder to establish. Political economy becomes more of zero sum game that pressages an intensified class struggle over the distribution of income.

7.2 人口

7.2 POPULATION

从 1980 年代开始，随着劳动生产率增长放缓，工业化资本主义国家的剥削也随之增加。生产率的增长不成比例地流向了上层阶级。这有直接的政治原因。1970 年代军事政变后，智利率先推行新自由主义政策，这预示着这些政策通过撒切尔和里根传播到其他国家，并在苏联解体后得到推广。但这些都是次要现象。驱动力是人口和技术。在交通运输的改善、大型柴油集装箱船的出现压低了运输成本的同时，大量劳动力储备被投入到亚洲的世界市场。

From the 1980s, alongside a slowing in the growth of labor productivity, there was an increase in exploitation across the industrialized capitalist countries. The productivity growth that did occur went disproportionately to the upper classes. There were immediate political reasons for this. The pioneering of neoliberal policies in Chile during the 1970s, after the military coup, heralded their spread to other countries via Thatcher and Reagan and their generalization following the fall of the USSR. But these are secondary phenomena. The driving forces were demography and technology. Vast reserves of labor power were being thrown onto the world market in Asia at a time when improvements in transport, large diesel container ships, were driving down shipping costs.

劳动力相对于资本在经济和政治上的弱势是由于更加统一的世界市场中劳动力过剩。所有其他贸易自由化措施都是基于这一基本事实。

The economic and political weakness of labor relative to capital was due to there being a glut of labor in a more unified world market. All the other measures of trade liberalization were predicated on this basic fact.

我在 2017 年撰文时，我们正处于主导这一过程的 S 曲线的拐点。世界生育水平正在接近简单再生产水平（图 5.31），亚洲的下降速度更快。在中国，这已经导致工资快速上涨（图 6.10）。印度和非洲仍然是劳动力储备地，但随着东亚、欧洲和北美的工业化，劳动力储备与资本创造的比率正在向有利于劳动力的方向转变。

As I write in 2017, we are passing the inflection point of the S-curve that governs this process. World fertility levels are approaching simple reproduction (Figure 5.31), with the decline in Asia being even more rapid. Already in China this is leading to fast rises in wages (Figure 6.10). India and Africa remain as reserves of labor but, with East Asia, Europe, and North America now industrialized, the ratio of labor reserves to capital generation is shifting to favor labor.

如果没有另一场世界大战造成的混乱，劳动力市场的紧缩和技术变革的放缓将导致收入分配的斗争更加激烈。商业阶级对劳动力短缺的第一反应是鼓励移民，这是一种增加剥削的有效手段（见图5.28）。最终，廉价劳动力资源将被耗尽，但在此之前，工人阶级对反移民民粹主义的支持可能会阻碍这一进程。

Absent the disruption that would be caused by another world war, a tightening labor market and a slowdown in technical change will lead to a more intense struggle over the distribution of income. The first response of the business class to this labor shortage is to encourage immigration, an effective means of increasing exploitation (see Figure 5.28). Eventually the pool of cheap labor will be exhausted, but well before that, working-class support for anti-immigrant populism is likely to block the process.

发达经济体将日益面临劳动人口减少的制约。我之前指出，在这种情况下，资本积累变得不可能。在人口稳定的情况下，均衡利润率趋于零。如果劳动人口减少，那么积累必定为负数，如果考虑到资本账户的损失，那么整个经济最终都会亏损。

Developed economies will increasingly face the constraint of a shrinking working population. I showed earlier that under these circumstances capital accumulation becomes impossible. The equilibrium rate of profit tends to zero with a stable population. If the working population shrinks, then accumulation must become negative, and if you take into account losses on capital account, then the whole economy ends up running at a loss.

到那时，经济本身如何组织的问题将越来越成为政治问题。如何阻止经济衰退和人口下降的问题将越来越多地被提出。

At this point the issue of how the economy itself is organized will become more and more an issue of politics. The questions of how economic decline and population decline can be halted will be increasingly asked.

这些问题将在一个已经高度分化的社会中提出，即富裕的精英阶层和生活水平正在下降的大多数人。精英阶层的反应是通过打击大多数人的生活水平来提高盈利能力。但由于人口停滞不前，有利可图的投资机会不足。精英阶层增加了他们在国民收入中的份额，但却越来越多地将其花在非生产性的奢侈品上。精英阶层在不断增长的国民财富份额中保持着安全，继续生活在一切都很好的幻想中，直到社会压力变得无法忍受。

These issues will be raised in a society that is already highly polarized between a wealthy elite and a majority whose standards of living are falling. The elite response will be to raise profitability by attacking the living standard of the majority. But, with a stagnant population, there are insufficient opportunities for profitable investment. The elites boost their share of national income but increasingly spend it on unproductive luxuries. Insulated by their burgeoning share of national wealth, the elites continue to live in the illusion that all is well, until social pressures become insufferable.

7.3 政治

7.3 POLITICS

即将到来的社会冲突时代，结果很可能是各党派互相毁灭。没有人能够预测这些竞争的最终结果。但可以肯定的是，社会主义思想将从苏联解体后的流放状态重新回到全国辩论的中心。美洲和欧洲已经出现了预兆。社会主义思想要想不仅在政府中获胜，而且在掌权后指导经济，就必须围绕一套解决本世纪问题的答案进行整合。社会主义思想将成为 21 世纪中叶的实用常识，就像 60 年前一样。

The coming era of social conflict could well result in nothing more than the mutual ruin of contending parties. None can predict the final outcome of these contests. But it is certain that socialist ideas will return from their post-Soviet exile to the center of national debate. Premonitions have already been seen in the Americas and Europe. For socialist ideas to succeed not only in winning government but in guiding the economy once in power, they will have to coalesce around a set of answers to the problems of this century. Socialist ideas will become practical common sense for the mid-twenty-first century just as they were sixty years ago.

如果不采取迅速而有力的措施限制化石燃料的使用，当代文明将面临可怕的危机。地球没有受到气候变化的威胁；它在过去经历了各种气候变迁。但对于包括我们自己在内的物种来说，这是一个真正的威胁。人类面临着全新规模的饥荒和气候压力。使用各种气候和经济模型都预测粮食产量会下降，世界粮食价格会上涨 [Nelson 等，2014a；2014b]。对许多模型进行平均，预测结果显示，主要粮食作物的平均产量影响是炎热国家产量大幅下降，而寒冷国家（尤其是加拿大和俄罗斯）产量将显著提高 [Rosenzweig 等，2014]。由于炎热国家贫穷，寒冷国家相对富裕，如果二氧化碳继续上升，那些已经挣扎求生的人将受到最严重的打击_。根据所选的气候模型和经济模型，粮食价格上涨的估计范围从 20% 到 100% 不等。这样的价格上涨足以威胁到数亿人的生存。如果生物燃料得到广泛使用，影响只会更加严重，因为生物燃料会将农作物从供人类食用转变为供汽车食用。因此，当今社会主义政治的核心目标必须是迅速减少化石燃料的使用，前提是这一过程中不会牺牲粮食作物。

Unless rapid and drastic steps are taken to limit fossil fuel use contemporary civilization faces a terrible crisis. Earth is not threatened by climate change; it has survived all sorts of vicissitudes of climate in the past. But for species, including our own, it is a real threat. Humanity is faced with famine and climate strains of an entirely new scale. Studies using a variety of climate and economic models all predict falls in food output and rises in world food prices [Nelson et al., 2014a; 2014b]. Averaging across many models, the mean projected effects on key grain crops are for drastic falls in output in hot countries, whereas cold countries, particularly Canada and Russia, will see marked improvements in yields [Rosenzweig et al., 2014]. Since the hot countries are poor and the cool countries tend to be relatively rich, those who are already struggling to survive would be the hardest hit if CO₂ goes on rising. Estimates of food price increases range from 20 to 100 percent depending on the climate model and economic model chosen. Such price rises would be enough to threaten the survival of hundreds of millions. The effects can only be worsened if biofuels become widely used, since these divert crops from feeding people to feeding cars. It follows that a central goal of a socialist politics today has to be to bring about rapid reduction in fossil fuel use, provided that food crops are not sacrificed in the process.

与碳税或排放交易等理念不同，社会主义政策将以对煤炭开采量和石油开采量进行量化限制的形式来表达。碳税往往具有倒退性，其效果也不确定。人们事先并不知道需要征收多少碳税才能实现（例如）减少 20% 的排放量。欧盟使用的排放交易计划通过赋予现有污染者排放权来奖励他们。一家公司的污染量越大，它获得的权利就越多。因此，它们的作用是将租金收入转移给大公司。

Rather than ideas like carbon taxes or emissions trading, a socialist policy would be expressed in terms of quantitative limits to the amount of coal being mined, and oil being pumped. Carbon taxes tend to be regressive and uncertain in their effect. It is not known in advance what level of carbon tax would be needed to produce, for example, a 20 percent reduction in emissions. Emissions trading schemes, as used by the EU, reward existing polluters by giving them property rights in emissions. The greater the pollution a firm starts off with, the more rights it gets. They act, therefore, to transfer rent income to big firms.

社会主义计划经济总是要对总体计划设定各种约束，例如工作日的长度、可用人数，以及在这些约束条件下最大化社会福利的尝试。如果计划过程使用 Kantorovich [1960, 1965] 开发的数学方法进行优化，那么在人口、现有机器库存等设定的约束之外，直接添加环境约束就很简单了。[Cockshott, 2006b]。社会可以将碳使用量减少 20% 作为明确的计划目标。这将限制计划算法选择符合该目标的开发技术。但这只有在已经受指令性计划约束的经济体中才有可能。在像中国这样的混合经济体或纯资本主义经济体中，仍然可以通过明确的配给直接定量控制碳排放。可以使用类似于 1970 年代制定的美国汽油备用配给计划的计划：

A socialist planned economy always has to set various constraints on its overall plan, such as the length of the working day, number of people available, and attempts to maximize some measure of social welfare subject to these constraints. If the planning process uses mathematical methods for this optimization, as developed by Kantorovich [1960, 1965], it is straightforward to add environmental constraints to those being set by population, existing stocks of machinery, etc. [Cockshott, 2006b]. Society could make a 20 percent reduction in carbon use an explicit plan objective. This would constrain the plan algorithm to select technologies for development that would fall within that goal. But that only becomes possible in an economy that is already subject to directive planning. In mixed economies, like the Chinese one, or in purely capitalist ones, direct quantitative control of carbon emissions is still possible by explicit rationing. Something similar to the U.S. Standby Rationing Plan for Gasoline, developed in the 1970s, could be used:

能源部将为不同类型的车辆制定不同的配额。配额将根据各类车辆的年平均燃料消耗量确定，并将每种车辆都有相应的配给政策。给定类别中的所有车辆（例如，所有乘用车）将在给定州获得相同的配给，而不管燃油效率如何。这将为燃油效率高的车辆带来显著优势，并应在配给期间激励人们使用这些车辆……

The Department of Energy will establish different allotments for different types of vehicles. Allotments will be based on an average annual fuel consumption of vehicles in various categories and will be made for each type of vehicle. All vehicles within a given category (for example, all passenger cars) will receive the same ration allotment in a given state regardless of fuel efficiency. This will give a significant advantage to fuel-efficient vehicles and should provide an incentive for their use during a period of rationing….

根据备用计划，尚未兑换的配给券将可以在白市上自由转让。转让价格不受任何管制。因此，那些希望超出配给量的人可以通过从愿意出售的人那里购买优惠券来达到目的。[Crompron and Gitelson，1981，28]

Under the standby plan, ration coupons that have not been redeemed will be freely transferable on a white market. There will be no regulation of the price at which they are transferred. Hence, those who wish to exceed their allocated ration may do so by purchasing coupons from willing sellers. [Crompron and Gitelson, 1981, 28]

这项仅在紧急情况下才生效的美国立法令人惊讶地平等。将可交易配给分配给所有汽车用户，从而分配给整个人口的很大一部分，其效果是均等的。如果富人想驾驶耗油量大的 SUV，他们必须从拥有小型车的人那里购买代币，从而产生净收入转移。

This U.S. legislation, which is only put into effect in time of emergency, is surprisingly egalitarian. The effect of distributing tradeable rations to all car users, thus to a large portion of the whole population, is leveling. If the wealthy want to drive big gas-guzzling SUVs they have to purchase tokens from those with smaller cars, producing net transfer of income.

类似的机制可以应用于碳配给。所有公民都将获得配给书，当他们购买汽车燃料、取暖用石油和天然气等时可以使用。炼油厂和煤矿的政府检查员将确保石油公司交出的优惠券与炼油厂的交货量相匹配。运输公司、航空公司和其他化石燃料的工业用户必须在公开市场上从公民那里购买优惠券。净效应是确保实现环境目标，而不会对收入产生倒退影响。

A similar mechanism could be applied to carbon rationing. All citizens would get ration books which they could use when they buy fuel for cars, oil and gas for heating, etc. Government inspectors at the refineries and coal mines would ensure that coupons handed over by the oil companies matched the deliveries from the refineries. Haulage companies, airlines, and other industrial users of fossil fuel would have to purchase coupons on the open market from citizens. The net effect would be to ensure that the environmental target was met without regressive effects on income.

如果气候变化导致普遍的粮食短缺（这似乎是有可能的），那么某种类似的粮食配给形式可能是必要的。一般来说，社会主义政府应该避免配给。通过充分就业和缩小工资差距来实现平等目标是更好的选择。但如果经济尚未完全社会化，并且仍然存在巨大的收入差距，那么配给就是最不坏的选择。如果要充分发挥配给的平等潜力，美国的原则（配给卡可转让）至关重要。

If, as seems likely, climate change leads to general shortages of food, some similar form of food rationing may be necessary. In general a socialist government should avoid rationing. It is better to meet egalitarian goals by means of full employment and narrowing of pay differentials. But rationing is the least worse option if the economy is not yet fully socialized and if big income differentials still exist. The U.S. principle, that ration cards be transferable, is essential if the full egalitarian potential of rationing is to be achieved.

就工业私有制在历史上所发挥的进步作用而言，它依赖于资本积累过程。正是这一过程使得西方社会得以实现工业化。正如二十世纪的历史所表明的那样，这并不是实现工业化的唯一可能途径。积累过程本身从根本上来说是一种不平衡现象。稳定的积累依赖于人口的稳定增长，或者如马克思所说，资本积累就是无产阶级的增长。

Insofar as private ownership of industry had a historically progressive role it rested on the process of capital accumulation. It was this that allowed Western societies to industrialize. This was not the only possible route to industrialization, as the history of the twentieth century showed. The process of accumulation itself is fundamentally a disequilibrium phenomenon. Steady accumulation is dependent on a steady growth of the population or, as Marx put it, accumulation of capital is growth of the proletariat.

随着这一进程的结束，私有制的可持续性受到破坏。它不再具有客观的经济合理性，而是依靠政治支持的垄断权力。但日益增长的气候控制势在必行，这等于对产权的隐性破坏。限制碳排放意味着废除石油国家的地租——这是最重要的盈余收入来源之一。许多有产阶级对气候控制措施的强烈反对，甚至资助气候变化否认，都是基于这样一种认识：整个过程是对产权的威胁。它假定全人类的普遍利益凌驾于私人权利之上。一项彻底减少化石燃料使用的计划需要在政治上击败化石燃料利益。在中国，整个能源经济都是公有的，实现向非化石燃料经济的过渡进展最快。从中国政府的角度来看，无论是生产化石燃料电力还是使用太阳能、核能或风能，都没有经济上的区别。

With that process coming to an end, the sustainability of private ownership is undermined. It no longer has an objective economic justification, relying instead on politically supported monopoly power. But the growing imperative of climate control amounts to an implicit undermining of property rights. Restricting carbon emissions implies the abolition of the ground rent of the oil states—one of the most important single rivers of surplus revenue. The vituperative opposition of much of the property-owning classes to climate control measures, extending to funding climate change denial, is based on a recognition that the whole process is a threat to property rights. It posits the general interest of humanity as a whole overriding private rights. A thorough program of curtailing fossil fuel use requires the political defeat of fossil fuel interests. The implementation of a transition to a non–fossil fuel economy progresses most rapidly where the entire energy economy is publicly owned, as in China. From the standpoint of the Chinese state it makes no pecuinary difference whether it generates fossil fuel electricity or uses solar, nuclear, or wind power.

我们暂且不论二十一世纪的危机是会走向社会主义结果，还是现有有产阶级利益的胜利，从而导致普遍的气候灾难。让我们看看未来的社会主义经济可能拥有什么样的财产关系。二十五年前，我和艾伦·科特雷尔为此建立了一个模型 [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1995]。此后的发展证实了我们的信念，即我们概述的基本模型仍然有效。它是一种公有和计划的经济观点，使用现代计算机技术来处理大量数据——旧苏联计划体系就是在这种技术下失败的。在这个模型中，劳动价值论占据着至关重要的地位。它回答了米塞斯 [1935] 的旧反对意见，即没有钱就没有比较不同替代品成本的实际方法。此后的实证研究有力地验证了劳动价值论，证实了基本主张的合理性。[Petrovic, 1987; Shaikh，1998；Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1997e，2005；Zachariah，2006；Fröhlich，2013]

Let us set aside for the moment whether the twenty-first-century crisis will progress toward a socialist outcome or instead a victory of existing propertied interests that leads to general climate catastrophe. Let us look at what type of property relations a future socialist economy might have. Allin Cottrell and I set out a model for this twenty-five years ago [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1995]. Developments since then have confirmed our conviction that the basic model we outlined remains valid. It is a view of an economy that is publicly owned and planned using modern computer technology to handle the sheer volume of data—on which the old Soviet planning system foundered. Within this model, the labor theory of value occupies a crucial position. It provides an answer to the old objection of Mises [1935] that without money there was no practical way of comparing the costs of different alternatives. Empirical research since then has strongly validated the labor theory of value, confirming the soundness of the basic proposal. [Petrovic, 1987; Shaikh, 1998; Cockshott and Cottrell, 1997e, 2005; Zachariah, 2006; Fröhlich, 2013]

自 20 世纪 80 年代末以来，计算机化取得了巨大进步，这使得运行控制论无货币经济的任务变得更加切实可行。谷歌解决的日常线性方程组比大陆规模的经济规划所需的线性方程组要大得多 [Widdows，2004]。如今，巨大的带宽互联网使得我们提议用来传播规划信息的 20 世纪 80 年代改良的广播技术变得多余。

There have been big advances in computerization since the end of the 1980s, which make the task of operating a cybernetic moneyless economy even more practical. Google solves everyday systems of linear equations far bigger than those required for continental-scale economic planning [Widdows, 2004]. The huge bandwidth Internet now makes the modified 1980s broadcast technology that we proposed to use for disseminating planning information redundant.

在我们的方案中，人们将不再以金钱的形式获得报酬，而是通过不可转让的电子工作账户获得报酬。人们将像今天一样使用智能卡进行购买，但不同之处在于，人们积累工作积分的唯一方式是通过实际工作。你工作的时间越多，工作越多，获得的积分就越多。商店里的商品将按小时定价，交换原则基本上是一对一。工作一小时，您可以获得花一小时制作的商品。

In our proposal people would be paid not in money but with nontransferable electronic work accounts. Purchases would be made with smart cards as they are today, but with the difference that the only way people could accumulate work credits would be by actually working. The more hours you work the more credits you get. Goods in the shops would then be priced in hours, and the exchange principle is basically one for one. For one hour of work you get goods that took one hour to make.

与未来学家的梦想相反，人类劳动对经济仍然至关重要。146这是人类的基本资源限制。以人类时间为单位进行计算，使公共财政摆脱了金钱带来的拜物教。很明显，有关公共支出的决策实际上^是将有限的劳动人口分配到不同任务的决策。结合现代通信技术，时间决策的非拜物教性质允许广泛的民主参与。公共支出的大标题可以通过参与式共识过程来解决^。147

Contrary to the dreams of futurists, human labor remains essential to the economy.¹⁴⁶ It is humanity’s fundamental resource limit. Calculation in terms of human time allows public finance to be divested of the fetishism that money engenders. It becomes clear that decisions about public spending are in reality decisions to allocate a finite working population to different tasks. In combination with modern communications technology, the unfetishized nature of time decisions allows broad democratic participation. The broad headings of public expenditure can be settled by a process of participatory consensus.¹⁴⁷

在第 6.4 节中，我解释了剩余生产体系在计划经济中是如何运作的，并指出 20 世纪社会主义体系的一大缺陷是它们依赖各种形式的间接税来资助免费公共服务。我展示了这个体系如何系统地使经济决策偏向于不利于社会理性的技术。重要的是，21 世纪的社会主义运动不要重蹈覆辙。迄今为止，最合理、最公平的公共财政方法是依赖所得税。

In Section 6.4 I explained how the system of surplus production operates in a planned economy and argued that one of the big failings of the twentieth-century socialist systems was that they relied on various forms of indirect taxes to fund free public services. I showed how this system systematically biases economic decision-making against socially rational technologies. It is important that the twenty-first-century socialist movement not repeat this mistake. By far the most rational and equitable approach to public finance is to rely on income taxes.

我在第 5.9 节中指出，资本主义盈利能力的根本制约因素是出生率下降。在许多发达国家，出生率已远远低于再生产水平。从短期来看，这可能有利于劳工利益，因为劳动力短缺可能导致劳动力价格上涨。从长远来看，无论何种形式的经济，这都会带来严重问题。人口迅速减少，养老负担更重，在经济基础设施遭受磨损的情况下，难以维持。因此，社会主义家庭政策的目标是人口大致稳定。我讲述了过去的社会主义经济体如何通过提供免费教育、免费托儿服务和向母亲提供大量经济补贴来减轻生育负担。这包括向单身母亲提供全额福利，当代西方社会往往将她们称为“福利女王”等。这些措施在未来是否足够，仍是一个悬而未决的问题。就我个人而言，我认为，一旦父权制的束缚被打破，男女为了寻找不稳定的工作而不得不长途跋涉的持续不稳定影响被消除，我们可能会恢复到早已被遗忘但更自然的母系大家庭形式。

I argued in Section 5.9 that the fundamental constraint on capitalist profitability is the falling birth rate. Across much of the developed world this has sunk well below reproduction levels. In the short run, this may be favorable to the labor interest, since labor shortages could allow the price of labor power to be bid up. In the long term it poses a serious problem in whatever form of economy. A rapidly declining population bears a heavier burden of caring for the old, and will have difficulty sustaining the basic infrastructure of the economy in the face of wear and tear. So socialist family policy aims for a population that is roughly stable. I recounted how socialist economies in the past sought to reduce the burden of having children by providing free education, free childcare, and substantial financial allowances to mothers. This included full benefits to single mothers, who contemporary Western society tends to stigmatize as “welfare queens,” etc. Whether such measures will be enough in the future is an open question. For my part I suspect that once the bonds of patriarchy are loosened, and the constant destabilizing effect of men and women having to move long distances to find insecure jobs has been removed, we may revert to long forgotten, but more natural, forms of matriarchal extended families.

附录 A

APPENDIX A

显示哪些部门富有成效

Showing Which Sectors Are Productive

了解哪些员工可以创造剩余价值的一个有用方法是使用马克思在《资本论》第二卷中提出的再生产方案。

A useful way to understand which employees can produce surplus value is to use the reproduction schemes that Marx developed in volume 2 of Capital.

他将整个经济分为三个部门。部门 I 生产生产资料，即机械、工业燃料和原材料。部门 II 生产实际消费品。他进一步将部门 II 细分为 Iia（生产工人阶级消费的商品）和 IIb（满足资本家阶级的消费需求）。然后，他根据这些部门构建了相当于国民账户的名义表（表 A.1）。

He divides the whole economy into three sectors. Sector I produces means of production, that is, machinery, industrial fuel, and raw materials. Sector II produces actual consumer goods. He further breaks down Sector II into Iia, which produces goods consumed by the working class, and sector IIb, which meets the consumption needs of the capitalist class. He then constructs what amounts to notional tables of national accounts based on these sectors (Table A.1).

我们可以假设此表中的数字为每年十亿英镑。重要的是，部门 I 的产出必须等于所有部门使用的总不变资本 (c)，部门 IIa 的产出必须等于所有部门使用的总工资 (v)，部门 IIb 的产出必须等于所有三个部门的总利润 (s)。

We can assume the numbers in this table are £billion per year. The important thing is that the output of Sector I has to equal the total constant capital (c) used in all sectors, the output of Sector IIa has to equal the total wages (v) used in all sectors, and the output of Sector IIb has to equal the total profits (s) over all three sectors.

表 A.1是使用电子表格生成的，该电子表格包含了马克思在其再生产方案中假设的所有约束。电子表格包含表 A.2中显示的公式。

Table A.1 was produced using a spreadsheet that incorporates all of the constraints that Marx assumes for his reproduction schemes. The spreadsheet contains the formulae shown in Table A.2.

马克思首先假设经济处于稳定状态或只是再生产状态，因此没有剩余积累。重要的一点是，再生产方案以及实体经济的实际再生产是一个受到高度约束的过程。你不能随意写下再生产方案；必须遵守方程约束。如果你看表 A.2，你会发现它实际上只有四个自由度：单元格中有数字。所有其他单元格都有公式。

Marx assumes a steady state or simply reproducing economy at first, so that there is no surplus being accumulated. The important point is that the reproduction schemes, and with them the actual reproduction of a real economy, is a highly constrained process. You cannot simply write down a reproduction scheme willy nilly; the equational constraints have to be observed. If you look at Table A.2 there are actually only four degrees of freedom to it: the cells with numbers in them. All other cells have formulae in them.

表 A.1：起始繁殖表

TABLE A.1: Starting Reproduction Table

表 A.2：用于复制表的电子表格

TABLE A.2: Spreadsheet Used for Reproduction Tables

为执行此四自由度约束而选择的具体方式是任意的。通过一系列代数运算，您可以选择一组不同的 4 个单元格来包含数据，而其余单元格则用公式填充。

The particular way you choose to enforce this four-degrees-of-freedom constraint is arbitrary. By a series of algebraic manipulations you could choose a different set of 4 cells to contain data and have the remaining ones filled with formulae.

在以下示例中，公式保持不变，只有数据单元格发生变化。然后公式强制其余单元格发生变化。附录 B 进一步阐述了作为受限系统的复制特性。

In the examples that follow the formulae are unchanged, and only data cells are altered. The formulae then enforce changes in the remaining cells. This property of reproduction as a constrained system is further developed in Appendix B.

相对剩余价值理论认为，只有通过减少再生产实际工资所需的劳动时间，才能实现更大的剩余价值份额。现在假设部门 IIa 的劳动生产率有所提高，因此可以用一半的活劳动生产出相同的物质产出。让我们假设多余的工人移民，他们的工资不再出现在账户中。然后我们得到表 A.3。

The theory of relative surplus value is that a larger share of surplus value can only come about by reducing the labor time required to reproduce the real wage. Now assume that there is an improvement in labor productivity in Sector IIa so that the same physical output can be produced with half the living labor. Let us assume that the redundant workers emigrate and wages for them no longer appear in the accounts. We then arrive at Table A.3.

其结果是剩余价值率翻倍，因此显然IIa部门可以产生相对剩余价值。

The effect is that the rate of surplus value doubles, so clearly Sector IIa can produce relative surplus value.

现在假设我们对 IIb 部门进行同样的实验，并将生产其产出所需的活劳动量减少一半；我们现在得到表 A.4。

Now suppose we do the same experiment with Sector IIb and reduce the amount of living labor required to produce its output by half; we now get Table A.4.

这样做的结果是将剩余价值率实际上降低了一半。原因相对容易理解，因为部门 IIb 的劳动力节省意味着用于支持上层阶级的劳动力减少，因此总剩余价值和剩余价值率都会下降。部门 IIb 包括奢侈品生产、广告、商法、军备生产、银行业等。

The effect of this is to actually lower the rate of surplus value to half. It is relatively easy to see why, since a saving in labor in Sector IIb means that less labor is being spent to support the upper classes, so both the total mass of surplus value and the rate of surplus value fall. Sector IIb includes luxury goods production, advertising, commercial law, armaments production, banking, etc.

表 A3：IIa 部门使用的劳动力减少

TABLE A3: Less Labor Used in Sector IIa

表 A4：IIb 部门劳动力使用减少

TABLE A4: Less Labor Used in Sector IIb

如果所有这些活动所使用的活劳动量下降一半，就会出现这种情况。由于上层阶级消费上所耗费的社会劳动减少了，剩余价值率也必须降低。

If for all these activities the amount of living labor used fell by half, this is what would happen. The rate of surplus value would have to be lower since less social labor was now being expended on the consumption of the upper classes.

因此，部门IIb劳动生产率提高的结果就是剩余价值率降低，因此该部门无法生产出相对剩余价值，整个部门的生产效率低下。该部门劳动生产率的变化与部门IIa的变化产生相反的影响。

Consequently, the effect of improvements in labor productivity in Sector IIb is to reduce the rate of surplus value, hence no relative surplus value can be produced here, which means the whole sector is unproductive. Changes in labor productivity in this sector have the opposite effect to changes in Sector IIa.

你不能仅通过查看员工与雇主签订的正式合法雇佣合同来判断某一特定员工群体是否有生产力。这取决于他们在社会再生产结构中的地位。相对剩余价值的生产，即资本主义制度下的典型剩余，是在整个社会再生产层面上发生的过程。

You cannot tell whether a given group of employees are productive just by looking at the formal legal contract of employment they have with their employers. It depends on their position within the structure of social reproduction. The production of relative surplus value, the characteristic surplus under capitalism, is a process that takes place at the level of social reproduction as a whole.

现代资本主义有着大量非生产性部门，越来越像斯密所批判的封建主义。

Modern capitalism with its huge unproductive sectors looks more and more like the feudalism that Smith critiqued.

附录 B

APPENDIX B

平均值带来的错觉

Illusions Engendered by Averages

在本附录中，我将探讨如何协调劳动力价格决定与平均利润率存在的问题。在前面的章节中，我使用了简单的劳动价值论来分析商品交换。我忽略了所谓的劳动价值与实际价格之间的“转化问题”。这一直是一个有争议的话题，而我所持的可以简单地忽略它的立场需要一些理由。我的论点不可避免地涉及一定数量的数学论证。因此，最好将其放在您可以随意阅读的附录中，而不是放在书的正文中。

In this appendix I examine the problem of how to reconcile the determination of prices by labor with the existence of an average rate of profit. In previous chapters I have used a simple labor theory of value to analyze commodity exchange. I have ignored what is called the “transformation problem” between labor values and actual prices. This has long been a controversial topic and the position I have taken, that one can simply ignore it, needs some justification. My case inevitably involves a certain amount of mathematical argument. As such it is better in an appendix that you can read at will, rather than being in the main text of the book.

尽管斯密、李嘉图和马克思都坚持劳动价值论，但他们似乎都认为这一理论过于简单。他们对最初的大胆表述进行了修正，以解释他们认为不言而喻的资本主义真理，即所有生产部门的资本都倾向于获得平均利润率。这导致他们制定了修正的价格理论，将利润考虑在内。斯密称之为自然价格，马克思称之为生产价格。

Although Smith, Ricardo, and Marx all hewed to a labor theory of value, they all seem to have thought that this theory was too simple. They introduced amendments to their initial bold statements to account for what they took to be a self-evident truth about capitalism, that capitals in all branches of production would tend to earn an average rate of profit. This led them to formulate modified theories of prices to take profit into account. Smith called these natural prices and Marx termed them production prices.

他们都是在统计学尚未发展起来之前写作的，现在可以看出，他们对简单劳动价值论的疑虑源自一些统计学上的误解。但在解释这些误解之前，让我们先试着理解为什么古典经济学家认为存在问题。

They were all writing before the science of statistics had been developed, and it can now be seen that their misgivings about the simple labor theory of value rested on a couple of statistical misunderstandings. But before I explain these, let us first try to understand why the classical economists thought that there was a problem.

在表 B.1中，我们可以看到两家公司的账目。公司 A 将其预付资本平均分配给零部件成本和工资，但对于公司 B 来说，零部件占其支出的 2/3。如果两家公司都以相同的劳动力成本加价来计算其销售价格，那么公司 A 的预付资本利润率会更高。由于古典经济学家认为这种零部件成本比率的变化很常见，因此价格的含义似乎与存在普遍的平均利润率的常识相矛盾。两家公司赚取不同利润率的情况肯定不会稳定吗？

In Table B.1 we see the accounts of two firms. Firm A splits its advanced capital equally between component costs and wages, but for Firm B components make up 2/3 of its expenditure. If they both compute their selling price with the same markup on labor costs, then Firm A earns a higher rate of profit on its advanced capital. Since the classical economists assumed that this kind of variation in component cost ratios would be common, the implication for prices appeared to contradict the commonsense wisdom that there was a prevailing average rate of profit. Surely a situation with the two firms earning a different rate of profit could not be stable?

表 B.1：不同构成的资本获得不同的利润率

TABLE B.1: Capital of Different Compositions Earns Different Profit Rates

B 公司必须提高加价率，才能获得与 A 公司相同的回报率，或者进行多元化经营，开始生产与 A 公司竞争的产品，以期获得更多利润。唯一稳定的情况是调整工资加价率，使每家公司都获得相同的利润率。

Firm B must either raise its markup to make the same rate of return as Firm A, or diversify and start producing a product that competes with that of A in the hope of earning more. The only stable situation would be one where the markups on wages were adjusted to allow each firm the same rate of profit.

这个论点有何错误？

What is wrong with this argument?

1. 存在平均利润率并不意味着每家公司都有这个平均利润率。欧盟男性有平均身高，但这并不意味着所有男性都是平均身高。

1. The existence of an average profit rate does not imply that every firm will have this average rate. There is an average height for men in the European Union, but that does not mean that all men are of average height.

2. 股票市场的运作促进了资本利润率应该几乎统一的理念。如果我们回到表 B.1，A 公司的股票将以溢价出售，而 B 公司的股票将以折价出售。如果 A 公司的每股 1 美元股票以 1.33 美元的价格出售，而 B 公司的每股 1 美元股票以 0.89 美元的价格出售，那么股东资本的回报率将会相等。盈利公司股票以溢价出售的这一特点是股票市场的核心。股价变动会为投资者带来均等的回报率，但并不要求公司改变其最终售价。

2. The idea that there should be an almost uniform rate of profit on capital is fostered by the operation of the stock market. If we go back to Table B.1, shares in Firm A would sell at a premium and those of Firm B at a discount. If $1 shares in A sold for $1.33 and those of B sold at $0.89 then the rate of return on shareholders’ capital would be equalized. This feature of profitable company shares selling at premium is at the heart of the stock market. Changes in share prices bring about an equal rate of return for investors but do not require that firms alter their final selling prices.

3. 企业可以将资本从利润较低的业务中分散出去的想法往往是错误的。以欧洲隧道公司为例。该公司成立的目的是修建一条从法国到英国的铁路隧道。它筹集的资金耗资 90 亿英镑修建了这条隧道。然而，投资回报率非常低。欧洲隧道公司不可能决定将其资本撤出并转而经营巴黎和伦敦之间的低成本航空公司。资本实际上沉入海底。如果公司的资本是固定的，那么原始股东的处境也不会好到哪里去；他们的股票贬值到发行价的一小部分。资本的流动性是由接近统一的利润率的古典理论所预设的。

3. The idea that firms can diversify their capital out of less profitable lines of business is often false. Consider Eurotunnel Ltd. It was floated to build a railway tunnel from France to England. It raised capital to build the tunnel which cost £9 billion. However, the rate of return on the investment was very low. There was no way that Eurotunnel could decide to take its capital out and shift into running a low-cost airline between Paris and London. The capital was literally sunk under the sea. If the company’s capital was fixed, the original shareholders were in no better position; their shares depreciated to a fraction of their issue price. The mobility of capital was presupposed by the classical theory of a near uniform rate of profit.

4. 最后，也是最严重的一点，实证数据表明，不同行业利润率统一的假设是错误的。图 B.1显示：

4. Finally, and most seriously, the empirical data shows that the assumption of a uniform rate of profit operating accross different industries is false. Figure B.1 shows that:

• 不同行业之间的利润率差别很大。

• The rate of profit is widely divergent between different industries.

• 劳动力成本只占预付资本一小部分的行业，其利润率往往低于劳动力成本占预付资本大部分的行业。这与简单的劳动价值论相一致。这与自然价格或生产价格理论不一致。

• Industries in which labor costs are a small fraction of the advanced capital tend to have a lower rate of profit than those for which labor costs make up most of the advanced capital. This is consistent with the simple labor theory of value. It is inconsistent with the theory of Natural Price or Production Price.

在过去的两百年里，人们花费了大量笔墨来争论如何构建一个一致的理论，将关于劳动是价值源泉的古典观点与假定的均等利润率结合起来。整个争论都证明了马克思主义和李嘉图主义经济学家的教条主义，他们喜欢构建最复杂的数学模型，而不愿费心去研究经验数据。他们与新古典学派一样，喜欢美丽的数学，而不是混乱的现实。他们沉迷于幻想，认为他们的方程式就是现实世界。尽管一些评论家认为生产价格往往会破坏劳动价值和剥削理论[Samuelson，1973；Steedman，1981；Hilferding，1951]，但利润率均等定律的基本假设一直被接受，直到开创性的经济物理学著作《混沌定律》 [Farjoun and Machover，1983]出版。这一论证基于概率论，认为价格分布更可能遵循简单的劳动价值模型，而不是生产价格模型。最近，Greenblatt [2014] 还提出了一个随机模型，其中劳动价值与利润率的分布一起作为一种新兴属性出现。

Over the last two hundred years much ink has been devoted to debating how to construct a consistent theory combining the classical insights about labor being the source of value with an assumed equal rate of profit. The whole debate was a testimony to the dogmatism of Marxist and Ricardian economists who have preferred to construct the most elaborate mathematical models without bothering to look at empirical data. They shared with the neoclassical school a preference for beautiful math over messy reality. They succumb to the illusion that their equations are the real world. Although some commentators argued that prices of production tended to undermine the theory of labor values and exploitation [Samuelson, 1973; Steedman, 1981; Hilferding, 1951], the basic hypothesis of a law of an equal rate of profit was accepted until the publication of the pioneering econophysics work Laws of Chaos [Farjoun and Machover, 1983]. This argued on probabilistic grounds that the distribution of prices was more likely to follow a simple labor value model than a price of production model. More recently Greenblatt [2014] has also proposed a stochastic model in which labor values appear as an emergent property along with a spread of profit rates.

多项实证研究表明，生产价格在预测实际市场价格方面并不比简单的劳动价值更好 [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998a, 1997b; Shaikh, 1998; Zachariah, 2006; Sánchezc and Montibeler, 2015; Fröhlich, 2013]。研究还表明，马克思的基本假设是高有机构成行业和低有机构成行业的利润率相同，但今天这一假设并未得到实证证实 [Zachariah, 2006, 2008]，就像 19 世纪的情况一样。然而，这项实证研究并不能帮助我们判断劳动价值/生产价格与市场价格之间观察到的关系是否接近。表 B.7中重现的研究表明，劳动价值/生产价格与观察到的价格之间的平均绝对误差约为 10%。但 10% 是接近还是远离？

Multiple empirical studies have indicated that production prices are not systematically better at predicting actual market prices than simple labor values [Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998a, 1997b; Shaikh, 1998; Zachariah, 2006; Sánchezc and Montibeler, 2015; Fröhlich, 2013]. It has also been shown that Marx’s basic assumption that the rate of profit is the same in high and low organic composition industries is not borne out empirically today [Zachariah, 2006, 2008], whatever the case had been in the nineteenth century. However, this empirical work does not help us to say whether the observed relationship between labor values/production prices and market prices is close. The studies reproduced in Table B.7 show mean absolute errors of the order of 10 percent between labor values/production prices and observed prices. But is 10 percent close or distant?

我们只能说，如果我们对在没有价值规律或马克思的利润率均等化规律的情况下，市场价格向量与劳动价值/生产价格的接近程度有一个先验估计的话。

We can only say that if we have some a priori estimate of just how close we should expect the market price vector to be to labor values/production prices in the absence of the operation of a law of value, or Marx’s law of the equalization of profit rates.

图 B.1。资本回报率往往与资本与劳动比率成反比。每个菱形代表整个英国产业。横轴测量零件成本/工资成本，用变量 o 表示；纵轴测量利润率 r；虚线表示数据的最佳拟合方程。来源：Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1998b。

Figure B.1. The rate of return on capital tends to vary inversely with the capital-to-labor ratio. Each diamond represents a whole UK industry. Horizontal axis measures Component Cost/Wage Cost, denoted by the variable o; vertical axis measures the rate of profit r; dotted line represents the best-fitting equation for the data. Source: Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998b.

尽管人们通常认为马克思在《资本论》的三卷中提出了两种不同的价格理论，第一卷提出了劳动价值理论，第三卷提出了生产价格理论，但实际上还有第三种理论，隐藏在第二卷的再生产方案中。这一理论并不明确，但可以从他对简单再生产提出的限制中逻辑推导出来。它不是个人价格理论，而是相对部门价格理论。

Although Marx is conventionally taken to have formulated two different theories of price in the three volumes of Capital, labor values in volume 1 and prices of production in volume 3, there is actually a third theory, hidden inside the reproduction schemes of volume 2. This theory is not explicit, but can be logically deduced from the constraints he presents on simple reproduction. It is not a theory of individual prices, but a theory of relative sectoral prices.

这种部门价格理论使我们能够对生产价格或劳动价值在再生产方案层面上发挥作用的相对可能性进行概率论证。《资本论》第二卷第 20 章介绍了再生产方案，即经济要自我再生产就必须出现的商品交叉流动矩阵。

This theory of sectoral prices allows us to make probabilistic arguments about the relative likelihood that either production prices or labor values will operate at the level of reproduction schemes. In chapter 20 of the second volume of Capital Marx introduced reproduction schemes, matrices of intersectional flows of commodities that had to occur if the economy was to reproduce itself.

该矩阵具有四个列向量：

The matrices have four column vectors:

C：不变资本，指的是资本货物和原材料的支出。

C: constant capital, his term for expenditure on capital goods and raw materials.

V：可变资本，他用以表示工资支出的术语。

V: variable capital, his term for expenditure on wages.

S：盈余或利润。

S: surplus or profit.

O：输出

O: output

表 B.2：货币规定的静止状态

TABLE B.2: A Stationary State Specified in Money

我们在表 B.2中给出了一个 2 x 4 矩阵的示例，其中标记为 I 的行表示资本品和原材料的生产，标记为 II 的行表示消费品的生产。在马克思的表格中，所有数量都以货币而不是使用价值来表示^。148

We give an example in Table B.2 of a 2 x 4 matrix, with the row labeled I representing the production of capital goods and raw materials, and row II the production of consumer goods. In Marx’s tables all quantities are in terms of money rather than in terms of use values.¹⁴⁸

由于会计原因，关系 O= C + V + S 必须成立。

For accounting reasons the relation O= C + V + S must hold.

此外，ΣC = O ₁，也就是说，资本品的消费量等于其产量，而 Σ(V+S) = O ₂。综合起来，这意味着经济部门 I 必须用 O ₁ - C _{1 的}资本品来换取部门 II 生产的 C ₂的消费品。因此，我们有一个均衡方程：

Further ΣC = O₁, that is to say, consumption of capital goods equals their production, and Σ(V+S) = O₂. Together this implies that Sector I of the economy must trade O₁ - C₁ in capital goods for C₂ worth of consumer goods produced in Sector II. So we have an equilibrium equation:

C2 = _V1 + _S1

C₂=V₁+S₁

这是经济处于稳定状态的均衡条件，即经济只是自我复制，既不增长也不萎缩。本附录中的基本分析将假设这种稳定状态。实际经济可能会增长或萎缩，但其增长速度通常很小。像美国这样的发达工业经济体可能会经历长期增长率平均仅为每年 3% 或更低的时期，因此对稳定状态下的价格体系进行分析是一种合理的初步近似。

This is the equilibrium condition of an economy in a stationary state where it simply reproduces itself, neither growing nor shrinking. The basic analysis in this appendix will assume this stationary state. Real economies may grow or shrink, but the rate at which they do this is typically quite small. A developed industrial economy like that of the United States can go long periods in which the rate of growth averages only 3 percent a year or less, so analysis of price systems in a stationary state is a reasonable first approximation.

虽然马克思没有这样做，但原则上可以构建一个类似表 B.3 的双表，其中消费品（玉米）吨数和资本品（煤炭）吨数。此表中的第一列代表两个行业生产性消耗的煤炭，接下来是两个部门的工人和雇主消耗的消费品（玉米）。我们再次要求每种商品的总消费量和总产量必须平衡，即 160 吨玉米和 20 吨煤炭。

Although it is not done by Marx, one can in principle construct a dual table like Table B.3 in tons of consumer goods (corn) and tons of capital goods (coal). In this table the first column represents the coal used up productively by the two industries, and next come the consumer goods (corn) consumed by the workers and employers in the two sectors. Again we have the requirement that the total consumption and total production of each good must balance, 160 tons of corn and 20 tons of coal.

从该表格中可以清楚地看出，煤炭行业必须向玉米行业出售 10 吨煤炭，并换回 40 吨玉米，这反过来意味着一吨煤炭的相对价格必须是一吨玉米价格的四倍。回顾第一张表格并将其与第二张表格进行比较，我们发现一吨煤炭的价格确实是 4 英镑，但一吨玉米的价格仅为 2.50 英镑。这里的重要一点是，给定物理表，相对价格必然遵循。

It is clear from this table that the coal industry must sell 10 tons of coal to the corn industry and get back in return 40 tons of corn, which in turn implies that the relative price of a ton of coal must be four times the price of a ton of corn. Referring back to the first table and comparing it with the second we see that indeed the price of a ton of coal was £4 but a ton of corn cost only £2.50. The important point here is that given the physical table, the relative prices necessarily follow.

这个例子是人为的，因为实际上部门 I 和部门 II 各自都会产生一个完整的产出向量，但考虑到这两个向量元素之间的比例常数，它们之间的交换关系就建立了相对的部门价格。

The example is artificial in that in practice Sectors I and II would each produce a whole vector of outputs, but given the constants of proportionality between the elements of these two vectors, the exchange relation between them establishes relative sectoral prices.

表 B.3：以吨物质为单位的静止状态

TABLE B.3: A Stationary State Specified in Tons Matter

马克思后来将这一方案扩展到三个部门，将消费品分为必需品（IIa），假定这些必需品是用工资收入购买的，以及奢侈品（IIb），这些奢侈品是用财产收入购买的。如果我们保留必需品的标签 II，将奢侈品的标签 III 用作标签，那么我们就得到了图 B.2中部门之间的三向贸易。

Marx later extends the scheme to three sectors, by dividing consumer goods into necessities (IIa), which are assumed to be bought out of wage incomes, and luxuries (IIb), which are bought out of property incomes. If we retain the label II for necessities and use III for luxuries, we have the three-way trade between sectors in Figure B.2.

这些表格以货币形式给出，与现代国民账户非常相似，但明确假设这些货币数量与劳动数量成比例 [Marx and Engels，1974，第 21 章，第 7 节]。但原则上，其他定价结构也是可能的，只要它们允许图 B.2中的贸易模式。再生产方案本身意味着一组不同的价格配置，这些价格配置仅与劳动价值或生产价格所预设的价格配置部分重叠。

The tables are given in money terms, much as modern national accounts are, but the assumption explicitly remained that these quantities of money are proportional to quantities of labor [Marx and Engels, 1974, chap. 21, sec. 7]. But in principle other pricing structures are possible so long as they allow the trade pattern in Figure B.2. The reproduction schemes themselves imply a distinct set of price configurations and these price configurations only partially overlap with those presupposed by either labor values or prices of production.

下面介绍一种使用再生产方案的概率技术，用于评估劳动价值与市场价格的已知经验接近度。基本直觉是，人们可以系统地计算出可能的再生产方案中哪些部分与生产价格或劳动价值一致。无需借助再生产方案，就可以演示如何估计此类比例的初始示例。

In what follows a probabilistic technique using reproduction schemes is presented to evaluate the known empirical closeness of labor values to market prices. The basic intuition is that one can systematically count which fraction of possible reproduction schemes is consistent with prices of production or labor values. An initial example of how to estimate such proportions can be demonstrated without recourse to the reproduction schemes.

考虑独立的行业 A 和 B。这些行业的规模可能相差很大，但我们想知道它们是否更有可能具有相同的 s/v，或者它们是否更有可能具有相同的 s/(c+v)。由于这些行业的营业额可能非常不同，让我们通过在每种情况下将其 v 和 c 表示为其各自 s 的百分比来对其进行标准化。

Consider independent industries A and B. These industries may be of very different sizes, but we would like to know whether it is more likely that they both will have the same s/v or whether it is more likely that they will both have the same: s/(c+v). Since the industries may have very different turnovers, let us normalize them by, in each case, expressing their v and c as percentages of their respective s.

进一步假设我们只允许 c 和 v 取 s 的 100% 或 200% 的值。显然，表 B.4中列出了 16 种可能性。

Suppose further that we only allow c and v to take on the values either 100 percent or 200 percent of s. Clearly there are 16 possibilities shown in Table B.4.

对于每种可能性，我列出了每个行业的 c 和 v，并在lv和pp列中指出这种组合是否与劳动价值论假设或生产价格理论假设相容。在 16 个案例中，有 8 个案例的劳动价值论假设在两个行业之间是兼容的，在 6 个案例中，生产价格假设得到满足。因此，这似乎表明，在这个简单案例中，生产价格不太可能发生。

For each possibility I list the c and v for each industry, and in the columns lv and pp indicate if this combination is compatible with the assumptions of the labor theory of value or the assumptions of price of production theory. In 8 cases out of 16 the assumptions of the labor theory of value are compatible between the two industries, and in 6 cases the assumptions of prices of production are met. So this seems to indicate that prices of production are less likely in this simple case.

表 B.4：生产价格和劳动价值相对概率的简单两部门离散模型

TABLE B.4: A Simple Two-Sector Discrete Model of the Relative Probabilities of Prices of Production and Labor Values

如果我们允许 c 和 v 有更大范围的离散值，这种差异会变得更加明显。如果我们允许每个值取三个可能的值，那么就有 81 个案例，其中 27 个符合lv，19 个符合 pp。从这种简单的双行业模型中可以直观地看出，劳动力价值示例占案例的比例更大，因此更有可能。

If we allow a greater range of discrete values for c and v this discrepancy becomes more pronounced. If we allow each to take on three possible values, we have 81 cases, of which 27 meet lv and 19 meet pp. The intuition one gets from this sort of simple two-industry model is that labor value examples make up a larger fraction of cases and are hence more likely.

但这些是独立行业的例子，我们可以自由地改变每个行业的资本构成，而当我们在再生产方案中研究三个工业部门时，情况就不一样了。这些行业对不同部门的资本构成有约束，必须满足这些约束。这些约束使得从表 B.4中的例子进行概括是不安全的。我们将在下面更正式地研究这些约束，并且表明约束本身告诉我们在简单再生产系统中市场价格必须是多少。

But these are examples of independent industries, where we are free to vary the capital components of each industry, which is not the case once we look at the three industrial sectors in a reproduction scheme. These have constraints between capital components in different sectors that have to be met. These constraints make it unsafe to generalize from the sort of example in Table B.4. We will examine these constraints more formally below, and show that the constraints themselves tell us what market prices have to be in a system of simple reproduction.

表 B.2和B.3表明，从部门之间的实物流动可以推算出相对部门价格。此处的目的是展示如何从 3 部门经济的实物流动模式出发，推导出与之相对应的相对部门价格。

Tables B.2 and B.3 show that from the physical flow between sectors one could work out the relative sectoral prices. The aim here is to show how one can start out from a physical flow pattern for a 3-sector economy and deduce the relative sectoral prices that must correspond to it.

我们将使用 G（商品）来代表实物商品流动的 3x3 矩阵，这样第一列对应于马克思用列向量 C 表示的资本商品实物流动；第二列对应于列向量 V 表示的工资商品实物流动；最后一列对应于列向量 S 表示的奢侈品流动。

We will use G, for Goods, to stand for our 3x3 matrix of flows of goods in kind, so that the first column corresponds to the in-kind flows of capital goods that Marx denotes by his C column vector; the second column to the in-kind flows of wage goods corresponding to the column vector V; and the last column to the flows of luxuries denoted by the column vector S.

我们规定所有元素都是正非零，并且 G 的每一列加起来为 1，也就是说，G 中每一列的元素都表示为相应部门总产出的分数。换句话说，我们对列进行了规范化。表 B.5给出了一个具体的例子。为了研究实物流量与部门价格之间的关系，将流量元素表示为 0 到 1 之间的数字是方便的。我们通过规范化实物流量表来实现这一点，将每一列元素除以该列的总数。

We stipulate that all elements are positive non-zero and that each column of G adds up to 1, that is, the elements of each column in G are expressed as fractions of the total output of the coresponding sector. In other words we normalize the columns. A concrete example is given in Table B.5. For the purposes of studying the relation between physical flows on sectoral prices it is convenient to to express the flow elements as numbers between 0 and 1. We do this by normalizing a physical flow table, dividing each column element by the total of the column.

我们将 G 中的元素表示为 g _i j ，其中 i, j:1..3。

We denote the elements of G as g_ij for i, j:1..3.

如果p是资本、工资和奢侈品的三元素价格向量，那么为了在实际上每个部门生产各种商品的情况下只有 3 个价格，我们假设价格是针对资本、工资和奢侈品组合定义的指数价格。考虑到 G 中的实际物理流量，图 B.2中的贸易模式建立了价格约束：

If p is a 3-element price vector for capital, wage, and luxury goods, then in order to have only 3 prices when in fact each sector makes a wide variety of goods, we assume that the prices are index prices defined over bundles of capital, wage and luxury goods. Given the actual physical flows in G then the trade pattern in Figure B.2 establishes price constraints:

表 B.5：物理流量表

TABLE B.5: Physical Flow Table

为了研究物理流量与部门价格的关系，将流量要素表示为 0 到 1 之间的数字很方便。我们可以通过规范化物理流量表来实现这一点，即将每列元素除以该列的总数。

For the purposes of studying the relation between physical flows on sectoral prices, it is convenient to to express the flow elements as numbers between 0 and 1. We can do this by normalizing a physical flow table, dividing each column element by the total of the column.

其中 P 是一个 3 元素价格向量，其元素记为 pi。例如，给定表 B.5中的 G 矩阵，我们可以使用上述方程求解相对价格，得出：

Where P is a 3-element price vector whose elements are written pi. For example, given the G matrix in Table B.5 we can use the above equations to solve for the relative prices deriving:

由此我们可以得出表 B.6中给出的相应货币关系。

from which we can derive the corresponding monetary relations given in Table B.6.

请注意，由于第一个方程固定了比率 p1/p3，下一个方程固定了 p2/p3，那就意味着 p1/p2 也是固定的，所以我们必须将三个等式中的最后一个解释为对什么样的物理流矩阵与部门间贸易兼容的约束。G 矩阵设定的价格约束定义了所有部门都自筹资金的系统的市场清算价格，也就是说，一个部门不会向另一个部门提供信贷。这是马克思在《资本论》第 2 卷分析中的一个隐含假设。但这些再生产约束对 G 矩阵的结构施加了限制。并非所有标准化的 G 矩阵都与自筹资金的简单再生产兼容。

Note that since the first equation fixes the ratio p1/p3 and the next fixes p2/p3 then this implies p1/p2 is also fixed, so we have to interpret the last of the three equalities as a constraint on what kind of physical flow matrix is compatible with inter-sector trade. The price constraints set by the G matrix define market-clearing prices for a system in which all sectors are self-financing, that is, there is no credit provided by one sector to another. This was an implicit assumption of Marx’s analysis in volume 2 of Capital. But these reproduction constraints impose restrictions on the structure of the G matrix. Not all normalized G matrices are compatible with self-financed simple reproduction.

《资本论》第 1、2 和 3 卷实际上提供了三种不同的价格模型，它们部分重叠。图 B.3说明了我们感兴趣的配置空间体积。再生产方案通过方程 B.1 定义了一组市场清算价格配置 - 大圆圈。较小的圆圈表示与生产价格和劳动价值相容的配置空间体积。并非所有与劳动价值或生产价格相容的配置都与简单再生产相容。与生产价格相容的意思是，从方程 B.1 得出的价格导致所有部门的利润率相等或非常接近相等。与劳动价值相容的意思是，上述第一个方程的价格导致每个部门的工资与利润比率几乎相等。

Volumes 1, 2, and 3 of Capital actually provide three distinct price models that partially overlap. Figure B.3 illustrates the volumes of configuration space that we are interested in. Reproduction schemes define, by equation B.1, a set of market-clearing price configurations—the large circle. Smaller circles denote the volumes of configuration space compatible with prices of production and labor values. Not all configurations that are compatible with labor values or prices of production are compatible with simple reproduction. By being compatible with prices of production we mean that the prices derived from Equation B.1 result in rates of profit that are equal, or very nearly equal, in all sectors. By being compatible with labor values we mean that the prices from the first equation above lead to nearly equal ratios of wages to profits in each sector.

表 B.6：静态三部门经济的示例

TABLE B.6: An Example of a Three-Sector Economy in a Stationary State

现在，部门 II 生产工资商品，部门 III 生产奢侈品。这应该与图 B.2一起阅读。请注意表格围绕图中贸易模式对应的对角线的对称性。该货币表是通过求解方程组 B.1从表 B.5得出的。

Sector II now produces wage goods and sector III, luxuries. This should be read in conjunction with figure B.2. Note the symmetry of the table around the diagonal corresponding to the trade pattern in the figure. This monetary table is derived from table B.5 by solving equation set B.1.

图 B.2. 三方部门间贸易。部门 II 向部门 I 出售价值 v1 的工资商品，并回购生产资料 c2。

Figure B.2. Three-way inter-sector trade. Sector II sells sector I wage goods worth v1 and buys back in return means of production c2.

图 B.3. 一组限制于无信贷的市场清算再生产价格的价格体系。

Figure B.3. Set of price systems restricted to market-clearing reproduction prices without credit.

B.1 繁殖方案的限制

B.1 CONSTRAINTS ON REPRODUCTION SCHEMES

让我们首先检查一下 G 矩阵的结构是如何受到再现约束的。

Let us first examine how the structure of the G matrix is constrained by reproduction.

给定 g3,1、g1,3、g2,3、g3,2、g1,2 我们可以推导出 g2, 1 如下：

Given g3,1, g1,3, g2,3, g3,2, g1,2 we can derive g2, 1as follows:

但从原来的贸易关系来看：

But from the original trade relation we have:

所以

和

and

或者，可以用另外两列的元素来表示约束：

Alternatively the constraint can be expressed in terms of elements of the other two columns:

或者

加上我们对 G 的列总和为 1 的约束，我们对矩阵的 9 个元素有 4 个约束，只给复制方案的配置空间留下 5 个自由度。也就是说，简单复制方案是从底层 5 维向量空间中抽取的样本。给定这样的空间，我们可以系统地对其进行采样。

Taken along with our constraint that the columns of G sum to 1, we have 4 constraints on the 9 elements of the matrix leaving only 5 degrees of freedom to the configuration space of reproduction schemes. That is, simple reproduction schemes are samples drawn from an underlying 5-dimensional vector space. Given such a space we can systematically sample it.

B.2 第一次实验

B.2 FIRST EXPERIMENT

开发了一个程序，用于创建复制方案配置空间的连续随机样本。首先，为 G 的元素分配 > 0 和 < 1 的随机值，使得第 2 列上的总数均为 1，并且每个元素的期望值为 1/3。然后使用相等的上述第二至第四个方程中的一个方程的概率被用来覆盖先前对其中一个元素的随机变量分配。然而，这一约束并不能保证满足列之和必须为 1 的条件，但可以通过随后改变矩阵的对角线元素来确保所有列之和为 1 来实现。对角线元素不参与部门间贸易，因此可以改变它们而不会干扰这些方程中建立的关系。

A program was developed that created successive random samples of the configuration space of reproduction schemes. First the elements of G were assigned random values > 0 and < 1 such that the totals on column 2 were each 1, and the expected value of each element was 1/3. Then with equal probability one of the second to fourth equations above was used to override the previous random variable assignment to one of the elements. This constraint, however, is not guaranteed to satisfy the condition that the column must sum to 1, but that is achieved by subsequently altering the diagonal elements of the matrix to ensure that all columns sum to 1. The diagonal elements do not enter into inter-sector trade and hence can be altered without disturbing the relations established in these equations.

120,000 个样本的 G 平均值精确到小数点后两位

The mean of G over 120,000 samples to two decimal places was

这意味着，对于满足第二个方程的再生产方案，资本有机构成的预期值在各个部门之间会有所不同。这意味着我们遇到的并不是预期有机构成的简单统一情况。这可以从图 B.4中相对有机构成的分布中看出。

This implies that the expected values for the organic compositions of capital, for reproduction schemes meeting the second equation, will differ between departments. This means we are not encountering a simple situation of uniform expected organic compositions. This can be seen in the distribution of relative organic compositions in Figure B.4.

对于每个再生产方案配置，市场价格向量由上面第一个方程的约束设定。

For each reproduction scheme configuration the market price vector was set by constraint of the first equation above.

图 B.4. 采用子采样技术整个样品集上的相对有机成分分布。

Figure B.4. Spread of relative organic compositions over the entire sample set with the sub-sampling technique.

图 B.5. 部门有机再生产方案相对构成图，其中市场出清价格在（a）劳动力价值；（b）生产价格的 10% 以内。左侧图的典型“领结”配置也出现在图 B.4 的整体样本中，但尽管此处第一和第三象限为空，但样本存在于图 B.4 中的这些象限中。这表明这些配置空间象限与生产价格或劳动力价值不相容。

Figure B.5. Plot of the relative departmental organic compositions of reproduction schemes in which market-clearing prices were within 10 percent of (a) labor values; (b) prices of production. The characteristic “bow tie” configuration for the left plots also appears in the overall sample in Figure B.4, but though the first and third quadrants are empty here, samples were present in these quadrants in Figure B.4. This indicates that these quadrants of configuration space are incompatible with either prices of production or labor values.

劳动价值计算如下：

Labor values were computed as follows:

即用部门 I 的实际工资除以其净产出。假设每个部门使用的劳动力与所消费的工资品流量成正比。

That is, divide the real wage in Sector I by its net output. The assumption made is that the labor used in each sector is proportional to the flow of wage goods consumed.

最后，我们得到 v，即从工资中得出的垂直整合劳动力系数。

At the end of this we have v as vertically integrated labor coefficients, derived from wages.

最后一项是标准化条件，用于确保所有价格模型下的价格总和相同。如果我们不应用该条件，我们的价值总和将小于 3，实际上忽略了剩余价值。但我们可以自由地将这种线性重新缩放应用于 v，因为马克思的假设是剩余价值率在任何地方都相同。这里隐含的假设是所有部门的实际工资都相同。

The last is a normalization condition used to ensure that under all price models the sum of prices is the same. If we do not apply this, we would have a sum of values < 3, in effect ignoring surplus value. But we are free to apply this linear rescaling to v because the assumption Marx makes is that the rate of surplus value is the same everywhere. The implicit assumption here is that the real wage is the same in all sectors.

生产价格采用迭代估计。我们首先将所有价格设置为 1。然后重复执行以下步骤。将 r 设置为 1 加上利润率：

An iterative estimation is used for prices of production. We first set all prices to 1. Then we repeatedly perform the following steps. Set r to one plus the rate of profit:

这是可行的，因为通过使用标准化的 G，每个行业的物理产出都是统一的。接下来设置价格向量np 的新估计值；

This works because the physical output of each industry is unity by virtue of using a normalized G. Next set a new estimate of the price vector np;

最后我们将价格总和标准化为 3，与之前相同。

Finally we normalize the sum of prices to be 3, the same as before.

试验了多种再生产方案。记录了最终产生的再生产方案的累计总数以及符合劳动价值或生产价格的方案数量。结果如上式所示。

Runs were made with many reproduction schemes. The cumulative total number of resulting reproduction schemes was recorded along with the number of schemes that conformed either to labor values or to prices of production. Results are shown in the above equation.

劳动价值或生产价格的一致性通过测量它们与市场价格的平均绝对偏差 (MAD) 是否低于指定阈值来确定。实验使用了 10% 的阈值，因为这是经验观察到的最佳值的正确顺序。此外，该程序还记录了交换价值和两种定价理论之间的 MAD 平均值。

Conformance of either labor values or prices of production was determined by measuring whether their mean absolute deviation (MAD) from market prices was below a specified threshold. The experiment used a 10 percent threshold since that is of the right order for the best that is observed empirically. In addition the program records the mean of the MADs between exchange-values and the two pricing theories.

B.2.1 结果

B.2.1 Results

从再生产方案的随机抽样来看，生产价格与市场出清价格的平均价差似乎小于劳动价值的平均价差。这与下表中所示的许多实证研究结果不符，在这些研究中，两者的关系正好相反。然而，观察到的价值和生产价格与市场出清价格的价差都低于我们先验估计的价差。这可能是由于实证数据通常使用较长的价格向量，其中包含 30 到 60 个元素，而不是只有 3 个元素，结果回归到均值。这基本上就是 Farjoun [1984] 的论证，即为什么价格与市场价值的实证分散会小于使用再生产方案的玩具示例中获得的分散。

From the random sampling of reproduction schemes it appears that the mean spread of prices of production from market-clearing prices is smaller than the mean spread of labor values. This is incompatible with a number of empirical studies as shown lower in the table where the relationship is the reverse. However, the observed spreads of both values and production prices from market-clearing prices are lower than found in our a priori estimation. This may be a result of the empirical data typically using longer price vectors with 30 to 60 elements rather than just 3, with resultant reversion to a mean. This was essentially Farjoun’s argument [1984] for why empirical dispersions of prices to market values would be smaller than those obtained in toy examples using reproduction schemes.

B.3 讨论

B.3 DISCUSSION

Sraffa [1960] 证明，

Sraffa [1960] showed that given

1. 利润率相等的假设

1. An assumption of an equal rate of profit

2. 技术矩阵

2. A technology matrix

3. 实际工资的具体规定

3. A specification of the real wage

可以推导出一个既能再现物质生产条件又能再现阶级收入分配的价格体系。本附录表明，G 矩阵（马克思再生产方案的使用价值对偶）也可以定义一个既能再现物质生产条件又能再现阶级收入分配的价格体系。

it was possible to deduce a price system that would reproduce both the material conditions of production and the class distribution of income. This appendix shows that the G matrix, a use-value dual of Marx’s reproduction schemes, can also define a price system that will reproduce the material conditions of production and the class distribution of income.

G 矩阵同时扮演着斯拉法技术矩阵和实际工资的角色，但马克思的再生产方案并不需要统一的利润率，也不要求价格与劳动价值成比例。再生产方案可以具有这些属性，但表 B.7显示，劳动价值一致方案和生产价格一致方案都只占可能方案的一小部分。即使对一致的定义非常宽松（在 10% 以内），也只有不到 1/200 的方案符合这一标准。看起来，劳动价值一致的再生产方案与生产价格一致的再生产方案一样常见。如果查看图 B.5，其中显示了一致实例在部门间相对剩余价值平面中出现的位置，则两种情况下的模式几乎相同，两行中都出现了许多相同的数据点。

The G matrix plays both the role of Sraffa’s technology matrix and his real wage, but Marxian reproduction schemes do not necessitate a uniform rate of profit, nor do they require that prices are proportional to labor values. Reproduction schemes can exist with these properties, but Table B.7 shows that both labor-value conforming schemes and price of production conformant schemes make up a small portion of the possible schemes. Even with a very lax definition of conforming, being within 10 percent of, less than 1/200th of all schemes meet this criterion. It would appear that labor-value conforming reproduction schemes are as common as price of production conforming ones. If one looks at Figure B.5 showing where the conforming instances occur in the planes of relative surplus value between sectors, the pattern is almost identical in both cases, with many of the same data points appearing in both rows.

表 B.7：生产价格和劳动价值的相对频率和价差

TABLE B.7: Relative Frequencies and Spreads of Prices of Production and Labor Values

这些数字是根据 100,000 个再现模式样本计算得出的，并与实证研究进行了比较。

Figures are computed from sample of 100,000 reproduction schema and compared with empirical studies.

自保罗·斯威齐以来，马克思主义经济学家一直习惯于提出个别再生产方案，这些方案要么价格与劳动价值成比例，要么价格由相等的利润率决定。此处的统计分析表明，在这样做时，经济学家一直在使用先验基础上的罕见例外来证明规则。

From Paul Sweezy onward it has been conventional for Marxian economists to present individual example reproduction schemes that either have prices proportional to labor values or prices given by an equal rate of profit. The statistical analysis here shows that in doing so economists have been using what are, on a priori grounds, rare exceptions to prove rules.

然而，三部门再生产方案还捕捉到了斯拉法所缺失的额外内容，即不同社会阶层有不同的消费模式。马克思处理的是更普遍的情况，即资本家将他们的支出按固定比例分配给必需品和奢侈品，这在现代术语中被称为里昂蒂夫需求函数。这里的分析采用了更简单的假设，即资本主义的支出完全用于奢侈品。同样，我们忽略了一些商品，例如煤炭，可能是一种生产资料，一种工资商品，资本家购买这些商品是为了取暖。

Three-sector reproduction schemes, however, capture something additional that is missing in Sraffa, which is the fact that different social classes have different consumption patterns. Marx dealt with the more general case where the capitalists divide their expenditure in some fixed proportion between necessities and luxuries, what would in modern terms be called a Leontief demand function. The analysis here has taken the simpler assumption that capitalist expenditure is exclusively on luxuries. Similarly we neglect that some commodities, for instance coal, may have been a means of production, a wage good, and have been bought by capitalists to heat their houses.

这种简化可以说是合理的，因为原则上可以将煤炭行业划分为三个子行业，一个为工厂供应，一个为工人小屋供应，一个为豪宅供应。然后，这些子行业将在统计上汇总为行业 I、II 或 III。但行业间制约因素可能会对实现生产价格的可行性产生影响。

The simplification is arguably valid, since one could in principle divide the coal industry into three sub-industries, one supplying factories, one supplying workers’ cottages, and one supplying mansions. These sub-industries would then be statistically aggregated into Sectors I, II, or III. But the intersectoral constraints may have implications for the feasibility of attaining prices of production.

再生产价格代表一种静态的宏观经济均衡条件。只要生产没有增长、技术没有变化、部门之间没有资本流动，再生产价格就会使经济保持均衡。这些是给定技术和收入分配的市场出清价格。另一方面，《资本论》第 3 卷中出现的另一种均衡概念，在《商品生产》 [Sraffa，1960] 中得到进一步发展，它假设部门之间的资本流动。Borkiewicz 对第 3 卷的批评 [Hilferding，1951] 是基于这样的观点：将劳动价值转化为生产价格的程序在静态上与再生产价格不相容。但动态问题仍然悬而未决。如果你从一个宏观经济均衡开始，再生产价格在起作用，但利润率却存在分歧，如表 B.6所示，资本流动能否产生一种新的均衡，其价格结构既能实现再生产，又能实现利润率均等化？

Reproduction prices represent a static macroeconomic equilibrium condition. So long as there is no growth in production and no change in technology and no movement of capital between sectors, reproduction prices will keep the economy in an equilibrium. These are market-clearing prices given the technology and income distribution. On the other hand, the alternative concept of equilibrium present in volume 3 of Capital and further developed in Production of Commodities [Sraffa, 1960] assumes capital mobility between sectors. Borkiewicz’s criticism [Hilferding, 1951] of volume 3 was based on arguing that the procedure presented for transforming labor values to prices of production was statically incompatible with reproduction prices. But the dynamic question remains open. If you start off in a macroeconomic equilibrium with reproduction prices operating, but with divergent profit rates as shown in Table B.6, can capital movements produce a new equilibrium with a price structure that both achieves reproduction and profit rate equalization?

一方面，再生产结构非常平衡，再生产表各要素之间相互依赖关系错综复杂，资本的任何变动都可能使整个系统陷入灾难性的危机。另一方面，有人可能会说，即使保持技术和劳动力供应以及货币资本不变，该系统在三个部门的相对规模方面仍然有一定的自由度。

On the one hand the structure of reproduction is so finely balanced, with such intricate interdependence between the elements of the reproduction table that perhaps any movement in capital would throw the whole system into a catastrophic crisis. Alternatively, one may argue that even if one keeps technology and labor supply, and money capital constant, the system has still got some degrees of freedom left in terms of the relative sizes of three sectors.

我们可以看到，资本流动很可能会导致收入的阶级分配发生变化。资本流入或流出第二部门意味着实际工资增加或减少，从而减少或增加雇主消费的奢侈品的实际数量。因此，进入表格第 2 行的移动必须伴随着第 2 列和第 3 列的平衡变化，但这些变化是否能够动态实现则很难说。这可能取决于调整过程和表格的初始起始结构。

We can see that capital movement is very likely to result in a change in the class distribution of income. A movement of capital in or out of Sector II means a bigger or smaller real wage, and in consequence reduces or increases the real quantity of luxuries being consumed by employers. So a movement into row 2 of the table must go along with balancing changes in columns 2 and 3, but whether these will be dynamically achievable is harder to say. It may depend both on the adjustment process and on the initial starting structure of the table.

B.4 第二次实验

B.4 SECOND EXPERIMENT

为了研究资本从初始再生产状态流动的动态过程，进行了第二个实验。与第一个实验一样，它使用了一组再生产方案样本，其准备方式与上一个实验相同。它将这些与资本流动规则、价格调整规则、可能的缓冲库存规则和部门产出调整规则相结合。然后对初始再生产方案所代表的经济体的 150 个时间步骤进行了评估。该模型在货币和使用价值方面都具有存量流动一致性。

In order to investigate the dynamic process of capital movement from initial reproduction states, a second experiment was carried out. Like the first experiment it used a sample of reproduction schemes, prepared in the same way as in the previous experiment. It combined these with rules for capital mobility, for price adjustment, possible buffer stocks, and adjustment of sectoral outputs. The time evolution of the economies represented by the initial reproduction schemes was then evaluated for 150 time steps. The model is stock flow consistent both in money and in use values.

初始化。AG矩阵的准备与第一个实验相同。导出初始价格向量，并导出由此得出的初始货币再生产方案。从假设的货币工资 2 英镑导出劳动力分配的初始向量 λ。结合劳动力向量，G 矩阵用于导出每个部门的线性生产函数。每个部门都分配了足够的现金来支付工资并按当前价格和当前生产规模购买生产资料。

Initialization. A G matrix is prepared as in the first experiment. An initial price vector is derived and a resulting initial monetary reproduction scheme is derived. From an assumed money wage of £2 an initial vector of labor allocation λ is derived. In conjunction with the labor vector the G matrix is used to derive a linear production function for each sector. Each sector is allocated sufficient cash to pay wages and buy means of production at current prices and the current scale of production.

模拟周期从生产刚刚完成时开始，因此每个部门的公司的库存等于生产量加上前一时期未售出的库存。持有的商品库存记录在 A（表示可用）矩阵中。

Simulation cycles start at the point where production has just finished, so the firms in each sector have a stock equal to what was produced, plus any unsold stock from the previous period. Stocks of goods held are recorded in the A (for available) matrix.

资本分配规则。假设s是利润率最高的部门。对于每个部门 x ≠ s，如果 x 的利润率比 s 的利润率低 1% 以上，则部门 x 将把其货币资本的 1% 转移到部门 x。每个部门将其货币资本按照与上一期最终分配相同的比例分为不变资本和可变资本。因此，我们得到时间 t 的可变资本和不变资本的新列向量V _t、C _t。工资和劳动规则。然后设定工资率，使得

Capital allocation rule. Let s be the sector with the highest rate of profit. For each sector x ≠ s if the rate of profit in x is more than 1 percent below the rate in s, then sector x will transfer 1 percent of its money capital to sector x. Each sector divides its money capital into constant and variable capital in the same ratio as its final allocation in the previous period. We thus get new column vectors V_t, C_t for variable and constant capital for time t. Wage and labor rule. Wage rates are then set such that

新的工资率和新的 V _t用于重新分配劳动力，以便

and the new wage rate and new V_t is used to reallocate labor so that

行业 I 和行业 II 的价格。给定 λ，每个行业对生产资料的总需求量可利用生产函数确定。如果该需求量超过所有行业持有的生产资料总存量，则生产资料将处于卖方市场，其价格将上升至市场清算水平。

Prices sectors I and II. The total requirement for means of production for each sector given λ is then determined using the production functions. If this exceeds the total stocks of means of production held by all sectors then we have a seller’s market in means of production whose prices rise to a market-clearing level.

否则，如果库存超过需求，我们就有买方市场，生产资料的价格会降低 3%。工资品的价格则设定为

Otherwise if stocks exceed requirements, we have a buyer’s market and the price of means of production is reduced by 3 percent. The price of wage goods is then set as

然后，各部门支付工资，工人用工资购买部门 II 的产出（价格为p _{2 ）}_{。然后，每个部门以价格 p 1}从部门 I 购买其所需的生产资料。

Sectors then pay wages and workers spend their wages on the output of Sector II at the current p₂. Each sector then purchases its requirement of means of production from Sector I at price p₁.

奢侈品需求。对于第一部门和第二部门，我们现在知道了它们的总销售额和总生产成本。通过从销售额中减去购买额，我们得到了它们的利润，这些利润被假定全部花在了奢侈品上。对于第三部门的资本家，我们遇到了一种奇怪的情况，正如马克思指出的那样，利润是自筹资金的。他们在奢侈品上花的钱都会作为额外利润返还给他们。因此，模拟采用了简约的假设，即他们在奢侈品上的支出在货币方面将保持不变。然后，奢侈品的价格被设定为在给定实物库存的情况下清算市场。

Demand for luxuries. For Sectors I and II we now know their total sales and their total cost of production. By subtracting purchases from sales we get their profits, which are assumed to be entirely spent on luxuries. For the capitalists of Sector III we have the odd situation where, as Marx points out, profits are self-financing. Whatever they spend on luxuries will return to them as additional profit. The simulation thus adopts the parsimonious assumption that their expenditure on luxuries will remain constant in money terms. The price of luxuries is then set to clear the market given the physical stocks available.

生产。根据线性生产函数，生产要么受到每个部门可用劳动力的限制，要么受到可用生产资料的限制。如果劳动力是限制因素，则可能导致一些未使用的生产资料存量结转到下一期。

Production. Production takes place constrained either by the available labor in each sector or the available means of production, as per the linear production function. If labor is the limiting factor this may result in some unused stock of means of production that are carried over to the next period.

B.4.1 结果

B.4.1 Results

图 B.6显示了利润率的初始和最终标准差的模拟结果。模拟运行表示为一个点，其 x 位置由其利润率的起始差幅给出，y 位置由其终止利润率差幅给出。45 度对角线上的点表示在模拟过程中未经历利润率收敛的系统。靠近 x 轴的点表示已经历收敛的系统。

Figure B.6 shows the results of the simulation in terms of the initial and final standard deviations of the rate of profit. A simulation run is represented as a point whose x position is given by the starting spread of its profit rate and its y position by its terminating profit rate spread. A point on the 45-degree diagonal represents a system that has undergone no profit rate convergence during the simulation. A point close to the x axis indicates a system that has undergone convergence.

我们可以清楚地看到，模拟系统分为两个不同的集群——一个集群略低于 45 度线，另一个集群接近或低于 1% 线。只要利润率在 1% 以内，它们就被视为趋同，因为只有大于这个差异才会引发资本流动。

One can clearly see that the simulated systems fall into two distinct clusters—one just below the 45-degree line, and one close to or below the 1 percent line. Provided that profit rates are within 1 percent they are taken to have converged, since only discrepancies bigger than this are assumed to trigger capital flows.

对模拟运行的最终部门产出数字进行详细检查后发现，许多模拟经济体的实物产出出现了大幅萎缩。由于流通的货币量在模拟过程中没有变化，因此如果只看货币产出数字，价格上涨会掩盖这一影响。

Detailed examination of the final sectoral output figures for the simulations run showed that many simulated economies had undergone a drastic contraction in terms of physical output. Since the amount of money circulating does not change during the simulation, rises in prices obscure this effect if one looks only at the figures for output in money terms.

如果以时间 t0 的价格衡量的最终产出价值 > 产出起始价值的 98%，我们定义一个经济体在资本流动下是健康的。如果产出低于其起始价值的 50%，我们定义一个经济体已经崩溃。从图 B.6中可以看出，经济健康与利润率趋同之间没有特别的关系。利润率均衡的经济体中，有些是健康的，有些则正在崩溃。相反，一些健康的经济体即使在存在资本流动的情况下仍保持分散的利润率，而根据公认的理论，资本流动应该会导致利润率均衡。

We define an economy to be healthy under capital movement if the final value of output measured in the prices operating at time t0 are >98 percent of the starting value of output. We define an economy as having collapsed if output is less than 50 percent of its starting value. One can see in Figure B.6 that there is no particular relationship between the economy being healthy and its profit rate converging. Some of the economies whose profit rates equalize are healthy and some are collapsing. Conversely, some healthy economies retain dispersed profit rates even in the presence of capital movements that, according to accepted theory, should result in an equalization of the rate of profit.

表 B.8：图 B.6中模拟的经济体按部门和组别划分的初始有机构成的几何平均值

TABLE B.8: Geometric Mean of Initial Organic Compositions by Sector and Group for the Economies Simulated in Figure B.6

然而，表 B.8确实表明，崩溃的经济体往往具有以下特点：各部门有机构成的差异较大，且部门 I 的有机构成较高。利润率未趋同的系统的特点是部门 II 的有机构成特别低。

Table B.8 does show, however, that the collapsing economies tend to be characterized by greater sectoral disparities in organic composition, and higher organic compositions in Sector I. Systems that do not converge their rates of profit are characterized by particularly low organic compositions in Sector II.

图 B.6。在模拟一段时间后，一些再生产方案可以收敛到相等的利润率。方案总体形成两个不同的集群，一个能够收敛，另一个不能收敛。随着时间的推移，没有收敛的方案将位于通过该图原点的 45 度线上。健康模型是 GNP 保持不变或增长的模型；崩溃模型是 GNP 在模拟结束时下降超过 50% 的模型。

Figure B.6. When simulated over time, some reproduction schemes can converge toward an equal rate of profit. The population of schemes forms two distinct clusters, one capable of converging and one that does not converge. Schemes that show no convergence over time would lie on a line at 45 degrees going through the origin of this plot. Healthy models are those in which GNP remains constant or grows; collapse models are those whose GNP has fallen by more than 50 percent at the end of the simulation.

B.5 进一步讨论

B.5 FURTHER DISCUSSION

第一个实验表明，只有极小部分可能的自我再生产资本主义经济具有相等的利润率。同样，只有极小部分可能的再生产方案具有接近劳动价值的价格结构。关于转换问题的现有文献涉及符合价值的再生产方案的小子集与符合生产方案的价格的小子集之间的逻辑或时间转换。

The first experiment shows that only a very small fraction of possible self-reproducing capitalist economies are characterized by equal rates of profit. Similarly, only a very small fraction of possible reproduction schemes have price structures close to labor values. The existing literature on the transformation problem relates to either logical or temporal transition between the small subset of the value-conformant reproduction schemes and the small subset of price of production-conformant schemes.

第二个实验表明，不能简单地假设，应该带来均等利润率的机制总体上会起作用。对于某些起点、技术和收入分配的组合，假设的趋同机制会失效。在这些情况下，系统要么保持健康，利润率继续扩大，要么经济灾难性地萎缩。

The second experiment indicates that one cannot simply assume that the mechanism that is supposed to bring about an equal rate of profit will, in general, work. For some starting points, combinations of technology and distributions of income, the hypothesized convergence mechanism fails. In these cases the system either remains healthy with a continuing spread of profit rates, or the economy shrinks catastrophically.

目前尚不清楚造成这一结果的动态的确切性质，但似乎在灾难性收缩的情况下，问题是由于生产资料不足而产生的，这对所有后续产出都起到了制约作用。如果经济转向劳动力分配，其中劳动力的当前分配将使用比其生产能力更多的生产资料，那么显然它必须经历收缩再生产。

The exact nature of the dynamics that produce this result are at present unclear, but it appears that in the cases of catastrophic contraction, the problem arises due to insufficient means of production being produced, which acts as a constraint on all subsequent output. If the economy moves to a labor distribution where more means of production would be used by the current distribution of the labor force than it can produce, then clearly it must undergo contracted reproduction.

对于未能收敛于统一利润率的模拟经济体，一种假设是，如果第二部门的资本有机构成特别低，那么资本流入第二部门会导致劳动力需求净增加。这会提高工资并增加对第二部门的需求，因此，工资商品的价格可能会上涨，而不是必需品的价格会因资本流入而下降。另一种可能性是利润率的分布可能会出现波动。需要进一步调查各个部门的价格和利润率的详细轨迹，以检验这些假设。

In the case of simulated economies that fail to converge on a uniform rate of profit, one hypothesis is that if Sector II has a particularly low organic composition of capital, then a movement of capital into Sector II leads to a net increase in the demand for labor power. This raises wages and increases demand for Sector II, so rather than the price of necessities falling consequent on inward capital movement, wage goods may rise in price. Another possibility is that the distribution of profit rates may undergo oscillations. Further investigation into detailed trajectories of prices and profit rates of individual sectors would be required to test these hypotheses.

B.6 模型与现实

B.6 MODEL AND REALITY

我们知道，真正的资本主义经济，很少会因为生产资料生产不足而灾难性地崩溃，但前苏联在资本主义体制下工业生产的崩溃，或许就是一个例子。这是为什么呢？

We know that real capitalist economies do not often go into catastrophic collapse due to inadequate production of means of production, though the collapse of industrial production in the former USSR after conversion to capitalism may be an instance of this. Why is this?

可能某种版本的“人择原理”正在发挥作用。我们没有看到这些崩溃，因为崩溃是历史敏感的，一开始就处于会导致崩溃的技术和收入配置中的经济体被淘汰了。这可能适用于突然暴露于利润最大化原则的前社会主义经济体；它们一直萎缩，直到经济的技术结构发生变化。最终结果是，在任何特定时间，资本主义经济体的人口都会被清除掉那些拥有会导致它们在自由资本流动下崩溃的技术结构的经济体。

It may be that some version of the Anthropic Principle is in operation. We do not see these collapses because the collapses are history sensitive, and the economies starting out in technological and income configurations that would result in collapse are eliminated. That may apply to the former socialist economies being suddenly exposed to a profit maximizing principle; they contracted until the technical structure of the economy changed. The end result would be that at any given time, the population of capitalist economies would have been purged of those with technical structures that would lead them to collapse under free capital movement.

表 B.9：平均价格和价值向量

TABLE B.9: Mean Price and Value Vectors

或者说，该模型中使用的基本市场清算价格机制可能并不现实。该模型基本上假设单位弹性，在其他条件相同的情况下，产量下降 1%，价格上涨 1%。也许资本主义经济只有在非线性价格反应下才能稳定下来，避免崩溃。

Alternatively, the basic market-clearing price mechanism used in the model may not be realistic. The model basically assumes unit elasticity, a 1 percent fall in output, other things being equal, raises prices by 1 percent. Perhaps capitalist economies are only stable against collapse given nonlinear price responses.

我们不去研究崩溃问题，而是考虑一下，相当一部分健康模式未能实现均等的利润率。这不是什么大问题，因为它符合我们在现实中观察到的情况。我们知道，典型的资本主义经济体的利润率存在分散性 [Fröhlich，2013]。

Instead of looking at the problem of collapse, consider that a substantial fraction of healthy models fail to attain an equal rate of profit. This is less of a problem since it accords with what we observe in reality. We know that typical capitalist economies have a dispersion of profit rates [Fröhlich, 2013].

所有满足 B.1 节所述约束的再生产方案都会为没有信贷运作的经济体定义一组市场清算价格。实体经济体拥有信贷，因此我们观察到的实际市场价格将比再生产方案所暗示的约束更少。然而，再生产方案确实具有让我们能够生成大量简单经济体和相关价格结构的样本的优点，而无需对经济体的底层价格机制做任何假设。它们使我们能够探索可能的自我再生产经济体的空间及其相关的价格结构。

All reproduction schemes meeting the constraints described in Section B.1 define a set of market-clearing prices for economies with no credit operations. Real economies have credit and therefore the set of actual market prices we observe will be less constrained than is implied by reproduction schemes. However, reproduction schemes do have the virtue of allowing us to generate a large sample of simple economies and associated price structures sans any assumptions about the underlying price mechanism of the economy. They allow us to explore the space of possible self-reproducing economies and the price structures associated with them.

实证研究中使用的投入产出表是对简单再生产系统的近似。它们只是近似值，因为它们描述的是通常处于增长状态但增长率通常较低的经济体，并且与投入产出表的构建相关的惯例施加了与再生产方案中类似的平衡约束。然而，投入产出表中行业间信贷转移的存在将引入简单马克思方案中不存在的复杂性。

The input-output tables used in empirical studies are approximations to systems of simple reproduction. They are only approximations, since they depict economies that are typically growing, but the growth rate is typically small, and the conventions associated with the construction of input-output tables impose similar balance constraints to those seen in reproduction schemes. The existence of credit transfers between industries in the input-output tables will, however, introduce a complication absent in the simple Marxian schemes.

使用来自复制方案空间的无偏样本，我们可以确定不同定价理论的概率。也就是说，如果实际经济分布在配置空间中所有可能的位置上具有相同的概率。实际上，我们假设，如果经济体在配置空间中进行随机游走，则它们从一个宏观状态过渡到另一个宏观状态的概率与这些宏观状态所占的体积成正比。

Using unbiased samples from the space of reproduction schemes we can determine the probability of different pricing theories. That is, the probability that such pricing theories would be true if real economies were distributed with equal probability over all possible positions in configuration space. We are assuming, in effect, that if economies undergo a random walk through configuration space, the probability of their transiting from one macro-state to another is proportional to the volume occupied by these macro-states.

市场价格在劳动价值的 10% 以内定义的宏观状态与市场价格在生产价格的 10% 以内的宏观状态具有相似的规模。先验地，我们应该预期再生产经济与劳动价值一致的配置如此接近，与生产价格一致的配置如此接近。

The macro-state defined by market prices being within 10 percent of labor values has a similar volume to the macro state with market prices with 10 percent of prices of production. A priori, we should expect a reproducing economy to be this close to a labor value–conformant configuration as to a price of production-conformant one.

另一方面，如果随机游走存在某种偏差，以至于经济体最终比预期更接近这两种定价系统中的任何一种，那么这类似于在具有势能定义的空间中演化。观察到的概率分布和先验概率分布之间的差异应该能够使人们通过某种适当的负指数定律来估计势阱的深度。相反，人们可以说势场必须有多强才能产生一个以劳动价值或生产价格为运行定律的世界。然而，即使没有更深入的分析，从这些结果可以看出，将生产价格假设为运行定律意味着有利于它的势阱比劳动价值的势阱更弱。预期的劳动价值先验分散比生产价格的分散更宽。事实并非经验观察到的，这意味着与生产价格相关的势阱比与劳动价值相关的势阱更弱。这可能是劳动力比资本更具流动性的结果。钢铁工人转行从事餐饮业比将钢铁厂改建成餐馆更容易。或者，第二个实验中显示的利润率均等化障碍可能成为一种阻碍因素，从而有效降低了生产价格的潜在收益。

If, on the other hand, there is some bias in the random walk, so that economies end up closer to either of these pricing systems than one would expect, then this is analogous to evolution in a space with a potential defined over it. The discrepancy between observed and a priori probability distributions should then enable one to estimate, via some appropriate negative exponential law, the depth of potential wells. Conversely one could say how strong the potential field would have to be to produce a world in which either labor values or production prices were the operational laws. Even without a deeper analysis, though, it appears from these results that the assumption of prices of production as an operational law implies a weaker potential well favoring it than need be assumed for labor values. The expected a priori dispersions of labor values are wider than those for prices of production. The fact that this is not what is empirically observed implies that the potential well associated with prices of production is weaker than that associated with labor values. Possibly this is an effect of labor being more mobile than capital. It is easier for steel workers to move into catering jobs than to convert steel mills into restaurants. Alternatively, the obstacles to profit-rate equalization shown in the second experiment may act as a frustrating factor effectively reducing the potential well around prices of production.

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笔记

Notes

1. “每个孩子都知道，一个民族如果停止劳动，不说一年，甚至几个星期，就会灭亡。每个孩子也都知道，与不同的需要相适应的产品量，需要社会总劳动的不同和定量的量。社会劳动按一定比例分配的这种必要性，不可能通过某种社会生产形式来消除，而只能改变其表现方式，这是不言而喻的。任何自然规律都不能消除。在不同的历史条件下，唯一能改变的只是这些规律表现的形式。在社会劳动相互联系表现为个别劳动产品的私人交换的社会状态下，这种劳动按比例分配表现的形式，正是这些产品的交换价值。”（马克思和恩格斯，1949年，第418页）

1. “Every child knows a nation which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, but even for a few weeks, would perish. Every child knows, too, that the masses of products corresponding to the different needs required different and quantitatively determined masses of the total labor of society. That this necessity of the distribution of social labor in definite proportions cannot possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but can only change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident. No natural laws can be done away with. What can change in historically different circumstances is only the form in which these laws assert themselves. And the form in which this proportional distribution of labor asserts itself, in the state of society where the interconnection of social labor is manifested in the private exchange of the individual products of labor, is precisely the exchange value of these products.” (Marx and Engels 1949, p. 418.)

2.斯密和马克思的旧政治经济学认识到，这些制度形式只是人类所经历的众多制度形式之一。

2. The older political economy of Smith and Marx recognized that these institutional forms were just one of many that the human race has experienced.

3. “这种劳动的工具，或者说，这个概念中隐含着的身体生产资料，是双手和头部，但绝不是女性的子宫或乳房。因此，不仅男性和女性在与自然的互动中被定义不同，而且人体本身也被划分为真正的‘人类’部分（头部和手）和‘自然’或纯粹的‘动物’部分（生殖器、子宫等）。这种划分不能归因于男性本身的普遍性别歧视，而是资本主义生产方式的结果，这种生产方式只对人体中那些可以直接用作劳动工具或可以成为机器延伸的部分感兴趣。”（Mies 1981，第 4 页）

3. “The instruments of this labor, or the bodily means of production implicitly referred to in this concept, are the hands and the head, but never the womb or the breasts of a woman. Thus, not only are men and women differently defined in their interaction with nature but the human body itself is divided into truly ‘human’ parts (head and hand) and ‘natural’ or purely ‘animal’ parts (genitalia, womb, etc.). This division cannot be attributed to a universal sexism of the men as such, but is a consequence of the capitalist mode of production which is only interested in those parts of the human body which can be directly used as instruments of labor or which can become an extension of the machine.” (Mies 1981, p. 4.)

4 . 雄白蚁是未交配的有翅雌雄白蚁。

4. Alates are unmated winged male and female termites.

5.当然，男人在社会劳动的最重要的两个部门：生育和喂养孩子方面一直被身体所束缚，直到近年来，对喂养的限制才有所放松。

5. Men, of course, have been physically disabled from the two most important branches of social labor: producing and feeding babies, until recent years relaxed the constraint on feeding.

6. “但是，人类的行为与低等动物的许多行为之间存在着巨大的差异，即人类无法通过模仿能力在第一次尝试中制作出例如石斧或独木舟。他必须通过实践来学习他的工作；另一方面，海狸可以筑坝或筑运河，鸟儿可以筑巢，或者几乎可以筑巢，蜘蛛可以结出奇妙的网，就像它第一次尝试时一样好，就像它成熟和有经验时一样好。”（达尔文 1871，第 2 章）

6. “But there is this great difference between his actions and many of those performed by the lower animals, namely, that man cannot, on his first trial, make, for instance, a stone hatchet or a canoe, through his power of imitation. He has to learn his work by practice; a beaver, on the other hand, can make its dam or canal, and a bird its nest, as well, or nearly as well, and a spider its wonderful web, quite as well, the first time it tries as when old and experienced.” (Darwin 1871, chapter 2.)

7. “人们常说，没有动物会使用任何工具；但是，自然状态下的黑猩猩会用石头砸碎当地的水果，有点像核桃。（野蛮人和Wyman 在《波士顿自然史杂志》上发表的文章，第 iv 卷，1843-44 年，第 383 页。）Rengger （Saugethiere von Paraguay，1830 年，第 51-56 页）轻松地教会了一只美洲猴子打开坚硬的棕榈果；之后，它自己用石头打开了其他种类的坚果和盒子。这样，它也能去掉水果上味道不好的软皮。”（达尔文 1871 年，第 2 章）

7. “It has often been said that no animal uses any tool; but the chimpanzee in a state of nature cracks a native fruit, somewhat like a walnut, with a stone. (Savage and Wyman in Boston Journal of Natural History, vol. iv. 1843–44, p. 383.) Rengger (Saugethiere von Paraguay, 1830, s. 51–56.) easily taught an American monkey thus to break open hard palm-nuts; and afterwards of its own accord, it used stones to open other kinds of nuts, as well as boxes. It thus also removed the soft rind of fruit that had a disagreeable flavour.” (Darwin 1871, chapter 2.)

8. “人们在社会生产自己的存在时，必然要进入一定的、不以他们的意志为转移的关系，即适合于他们的物质生产力发展的一定阶段的生产关系。这些生产关系的总和构成社会的经济结构，即法律和政治的上层建筑的现实基础，一定的社会意识形式也与此相适应。物质生活的生产方式决定着社会、政治和精神生活的整个过程。不是人们的意识决定他们的存在，而是他们的社会存在决定他们的意识。在一定的发展阶段，社会的物质生产力与现存的生产关系发生冲突，或者这只不过是用法律术语来表达，与他们迄今在其中活动的财产关系发生冲突。这些关系从生产力的发展形式转变为生产力的桎梏。于是社会革命时代就开始了。经济基础的变化迟早会导致整个庞大的上层建筑的变革。”（马克思等，1978，序言）

8. “In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.” (Marx et al. 1978, Preface.)

9. “考古学证据也支持了这样的观点：农业并不是一个难以发展的概念，事实上农业已经发展了很多次，而阻止人类更早地发展农业的主要原因并不是无知。”（Cohen 1977，第 24 页）

9. “The archeological evidence, such as it is, also supports the contention that agriculture is not a difficult concept to develop, that it has in fact been developed many times, and that it was not primarily ignorance which prevented human populations from becoming agricultural sooner than they did.” (Cohen 1977, p. 24.)

10. Diamond 和 Ordunio (1997) 认为，澳大利亚的野生草类都没有足够大的种子，不值得收集。

10. Diamond and Ordunio (1997) argue that none of the wild grasses of Australia bore large enough seeds to be worth collecting.

11. “关于 Çatalhðyuk 早期和中期男女相对地位的最有力科学证据之一与饮食有关。如果男女生活明显不同，并且其中一方占主导地位，那么我们可能就会发现饮食方面的差异，占主导地位的群体更容易获得某些食物，例如肉类或更好的肉块。因此，我们努力寻找此类证据，但并未发现明显的差异。”（Hodder，2004 年）

11. “Some of our strongest scientific evidence about the relative status of men and women in the early and middle levels of Çatalhðyuk concerns diet. If women and men lived notably different lives, and if one or the other was dominant, then we might expect to uncover disparities in diet, with the dominant group having more access to certain foods, such as meat or better joints of meat. So we have searched hard for such evidence, but we have not uncovered clear differences.” (Hodder, 2004.)

12.我们提出的模型大量借鉴了 Meillassoux (1981) 的观点。

12. The model we present draws heavily on Meillassoux (1981).

13。我们假设的 50% 未成年死亡率是合理的。最早的教区登记册表明了这一水平，一些古代墓地也是如此。虽然其他古代墓地显示婴儿死亡率较低，但这可以合理地归因于半矿化婴儿骨骼保存较差（Guy 等人，1997 年）。

13. The assumption we make of a 50 percent pre-adult mortality is plausible. The earliest parish registers indicate this level, as do some ancient cemeteries. Although other ancient cemeteries show lower levels of infant death this can plausibly be attributed to poorer preservation of semi-mineralized infant bones (Guy et al. 1997).

14.这是基于这样的假设：工作属于粮农组织所称的积极生活类别。他们给出了这类工作的例子：“其他适度活跃生活方式的例子与泥瓦匠和建筑工人等职业有关，或者与欠发达传统村庄的农村妇女有关，她们参与农业杂务或长途跋涉去取水和柴火”（Tontisirin 和 de Haen 2004，第 39 页）。如果工作是农民完全使用手工工具，不使用役畜或机械动力，那么粮农组织的积极生活类别可能适用。他们将其描述为：“非机械化的农业劳动者，每天用砍刀、锄头或斧头工作数小时，在崎岖的地形上长途跋涉，经常背负重物。”在后一种情况下，每个成年工人维持生存所需的热量产量将上升到每年约175万卡路里。

14. This is on the assumption that the work falls into the category the FAO calls an Active Life. They give examples of such work: “Other examples of moderately active lifestyles are associated with occupations such as masons and construction workers, or rural women in less developed traditional villages who participate in agricultural chores or walk long distances to fetch water and fuelwood” (Tontisirin and de Haen 2004, p. 39). If the work is that of farmers working entirely with hand tools, without draft animals or mechanical power, then the FAO category of Vigorous Life might apply. They describe this as: “non-mechanized agricultural laborers who work with a machete, hoe or axe for several hours daily and walk long distances over rugged terrains, often carrying heavy loads.” In the latter case the subsistence calorie production per adult worker would rise to around 1.75 million calories per year.

15. “如果我们假设他们每天从一个地方移动 4 或 5 英里到另一个地方，那么我们就无法限制参加这种远征的人数。如果一个鞑靼部落（例如）在远征中击败了另一个部落，他们必然会拥有之前属于战败者的一切；因为在这种情况下，当他们进行任何此类远征时，妻子、孩子、羊群和所有东西都会随身携带，因此当他们被击败时，他们将失去一切。因此，绝大多数人将追随他们并加入胜利者，尽管有些人可能仍会追随战败的首领。如果这支联合军队以同样的方式成功对抗第二、第三和第四个部落，他们很快就会变得非常强大，并可能及时征服他们周围的所有国家，并以这种方式变得无比强大。” （Smith 1978，第 196 页）

15. “If we suppose them moving from one place to another, 4 or 5 miles every day, we can set no bounds to the number which might enter into such an expedition. If then one clan of Tartars (for instance) should, setting out on an expedition, defeat another, they would necessarily become possessed of every thing which before belonged to the vanquished; for in this state when they make any expedition of this sort wives, children, and flocks and every thing is carried along with them, so that when they are vanquished they will lose their all. The far greater part therefore will follow these and join themselves to the victor, tho some perhaps might still adhere to the vanquishd chief. If this combined army should be in the same manner successfull against a 2nd, a third, [and] a 4th tribe, they would soon become very powerfull, and might in time subdue all the nations of their country about them and become in this means immensely powerfull.” (Smith 1978, p. 196.)

16. “在一个以狩猎和捕鱼为生的国家，很少有人能生活在一起，因为在短时间内，任何数量的人口都会毁掉这个国家的所有猎物，因此缺乏生存手段。最多有二十或三十个家庭可以生活在一起，他们组成一个村庄，但由于他们为了相互防御和相互帮助而生活在一起，他们的村庄彼此之间距离不远。”（Smith，1978 年）

16. “In a nation of hunters and fishers few people can live together, for in a short time any considerable number would destroy all the game in the country, and consequently would want a means of subsistance. Twenty or thirty families are the most that can live together, and these make up a village, but as they live together for their mutual defence and to assist one another, their villages are not far distant from each other.” (Smith, 1978.)

17. “狩猎意味着游牧生活；猎人为了追捕猎物而漫游在广阔的土地上，没有太多机会观察奴隶的动向，因为奴隶随时都有可能逃跑”（Nieboer 1971，第 194 页），后来又说：“狩猎需要最大限度地运用力量和技巧；因此，强制狩猎是不可能存在的”（同上，第 197 页）。

17. “Hunting supposes a nomadic life; and the hunter, who roams over vast tracts of land in pursuit of his game has not much opportunity to watch the movements of his slave who may be apt to run away at any moment” (Nieboer 1971, p. 194), and later: “hunting requires the utmost application of strength and skill; therefore a compulsory hunting cannot exist” (ibid., p. 197).

18.有关罗马帝国存在发达的商品市场体系的证据调查，请参阅 Temin (2001)。

18. For a survey of the evidence for the existence of a well-developed system of commodity markets in the Roman Empire, see Temin (2001).

19 . 例如，从罗马共和时期沉船中打捞出的阿基米德钟表或安提基西拉计算机（de Solla Price，1959 年）、de Solla Price（1974 年）以及 Freeth 等人（2006 年）。

19. For example, the clocks of Archimedes or the Antikythera computer recovered from a shipwreck of the Roman republican era de Solla Price (1959), de Solla Price (1974), and Freeth et al. (2006).

20. Russo（2013）给出了一个双缸压力泵的例子，其曲柄阀和提升阀类似于从罗马井中挖掘出来的 Corliss 蒸汽机（Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 2004）。

20. Russo (2013) gives an example of a two-cylinder pressure pump with crank and poppet valves similar to those of a Corliss steam engine (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 2004) excavated from a Roman well.

21. “所有这些特点似乎都使公元一千年的地中海水手能够同时在逆风和顺风航线上航行……同样，地中海帆索上小型前帆或阿特蒙的发明和使用表明了在逆风航线上航行的能力——阿特蒙在其他航线上的用途有限。

21. “It seems likely that all of these features would have allowed Mediterranean sailors in the first millennium AD to sail on both upwind and downwind courses…. Likewise the invention and use of a small foresail or artemon on the Mediterranean rig is indicative of an ability to sail on an upwind course—the artemon being only of limited use on other sailing courses.

古代世界留存的文字证据进一步证明了罗马帆船具有迎风航行的能力。”（Whitewright 2007，第 84 页）

Textual evidence survives from the ancient world which provides a further indication of the ability of Roman sailing ships to make windward.” (Whitewright 2007, p. 84.)

22。哈珀（Harper，2011，第 1 章）认为，芬利的估计过高，对于罗马来说，更现实的数字是 10% 到 20% 之间，但这个范围对最富有的奴隶主所拥有的奴隶数量高度敏感，因为所有权高度集中。

22. Harper (2011, chapter 1) argues that Finley’s estimate is too high, and that a more realistic figure for Rome is between 10 percent and 20 percent, but this range is highly sensitive to the numbers of slaves held by the richest slave-owners, since ownership was highly concentrated.

23. “从直接生产者身上榨取无偿剩余劳动的特定经济形式，决定了统治者和被统治者之间的关系，因为它直接产生于生产本身，反过来又作为决定因素反作用于生产。然而，整个经济共同体的形成是建立在此基础上的，它产生于生产关系本身，从而同时，它的特定的政治形式也必须如此。生产条件的所有者和直接生产者之间的直接关系，这种关系总是自然地与劳动方法的一定发展阶段相适应，因而也与劳动方法的社会生产力的一定发展阶段相适应，揭示了整个社会结构的最深层的秘密，隐藏的基础，以及主权和依赖关系的政治形式，简言之，与此相适应的国家的特定形式。这并不妨碍同一经济基础——就其主要条件而言是同一的——由于无数不同的经验情况、自然环境、种族关系、外部历史影响等等，在外表上表现出无限的变化和层次，而这些变化和层次只有通过分析经验既定的情况才能确定。”（马克思，1894年）

23. “The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labor is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers—a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labor and thereby its social productivity—which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis—the same from the standpoint of its main conditions—due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc. from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.” (Marx 1894.)

24。至少在大部分情况下并非如此；在罗马，少数奴隶有自己的钱包，可以用它购买一些东西。新大陆的奴隶一般没有。

24. At least in the main they are not; in Rome a minority of slaves had their purse peculium from which some purchases could be made. New World slaves generally did not.

25.海地奴隶起义取得成功，当时黑奴数量是自由白人的十倍，这充分证明了一个缺乏大量自由人口的奴隶国家无法生存。

25. The successful slave revolt in Haiti, where black slaves outnumbered free whites by ten to one, is a striking proof of the inability of a slave state without a substantial free population to survive.

26. “在宪政政府中，战士拥有最高权力，拥有武器的人就是公民。”（亚里士多德 1983 年，第 3 册：7）

26. “In a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.” (Aristotle 1983, Book 3:7.)

27. “无论是寡头政治还是民主政治，统治团体的人数，无论是民主政治中的人数较多，还是寡头政治中的人数较少，都是偶然的，因为到处都是富人少而穷人多。但如果是这样，就误解了两者之间差异的原因。因为民主和寡头政治之间的真正区别在于贫穷和富有。凡是人们凭借财富统治的地方，无论人数是少还是多，那就是寡头政治，而凡是穷人统治的地方，那就是民主政治。但事实上富人少而穷人多；因为富裕的人很少，而自由是人人享有的；财富和自由是寡头政治和民主党派分别在国家中宣称权力的理由。”（亚里士多德 1983 年，第 3 卷：8。）

27. “Whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all; and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.” (Aristotle 1983, Book 3:8.)

28.我们的“仆人”一词源于拉丁语servus，意为奴隶，当翻译古文献时，我们应该从英文单词“servant”中读出奴隶制的含义。

28. Our word servant derives from the Latin servus for slave, and one should read the implication of slavery into the English word servant when used in translations of old texts.

29.联合国禁止性剥削公约草案对性剥削定义如下：

29. The UN Draft Convention against Sexual Exploitation defines sexual exploitation as follows:

第 1 条：性剥削的定义

Article 1: Definition of Sexual Exploitation

性剥削是指一个人通过虐待他人的性行为，剥夺他人享有尊严、平等、自主和身心健康的人权，从而获得性满足、经济利益或晋升的一种行为。

Sexual exploitation is a practice by which person(s) achieve sexual gratification, or financial gain, or advancement, through the abuse of a person’s sexuality by abrogating that person’s human right to dignity, equality, autonomy, and physical and mental well-being.

第二条

Article 2

性剥削的形式包括但不限于：

Sexual exploitation takes the form of, but is not limited to:

• 通过杀害女婴和因性别而杀害妇女（包括谋杀妻子和寡妇）来剥夺生命。

• The denial of life through female infanticide and the murder of women by reason of their gender, including wife and widow murder.

• 通过以下方式遭受残忍、不人道和有辱人格的待遇：殴打、色情、卖淫、生殖器切割、女性隔离、嫁妆和彩礼、强迫绝育和强迫生育、代孕、限制妇女的生殖自由、为第三方使用妇女的生殖能力（为第三方使用妇女的生殖能力）性剥削或商业剥削目的）、性骚扰、强奸、乱伦、性虐待和人口贩卖。

• Subjection to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment through the following: battering, pornography, prostitution, genital mutilation, female seclusion, dowry and bride price, forced sterilization and forced child-bearing, surrogacy, restricting the reproductive freedom of women, the use of women’s reproductivity for third parties (the use of women’s reproductivity for the purpose of sexual or commercial exploitation), sexual harassment, rape, incest, sexual abuse, and human trafficking.

• 遭受国家或非国家行为者明目张胆或隐蔽地实施的性虐待和/或酷刑，包括虐待和残害行为。

• Subjection to sexual abuse and or torture whether perpetrated by State or non-State actors, overt or covert, including sadistic, mutilating practices.

• 临时婚姻、童婚或以性剥削为目的的权宜婚姻。

• Temporary marriage, child marriages, or marriage of convenience for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

• 性别预先决定。

• Sex predetermination.

30. “如果这一切都已经确定，那么还应该知道，一个人所赚取和获得的资本，如果是来自手艺，就是从他的劳动中实现的价值。这就是‘获得（资本）’的含义。这里（最初）除了劳动之外什么也没有，（劳动）本身并不是作为获得的（资本）而被期望的，而是从中实现的价值。

30. “If all this has been established, it should be further known that the capital a person earns and acquires, if resulting from a craft, is the value realized from his labor. This is the meaning of ‘acquired (capital).’ There is nothing here (originally) except the labor, and (the labor) is not desired by itself as acquired (capital, but the value realized from it).

“有些手艺与其他手艺有一定关联。例如，木工和编织与木材和纱线（以及生产它们所需的相应工艺）有关。然而，在（首先提到的）两种手艺中，投入其中的劳动更重要，其价值也更大。

“Some crafts are partly associated with other (crafts). Carpentry and weaving, for instance, are associated with wood and yarn (and the respective crafts needed for their production). However, in the two crafts (first mentioned), the labor (that goes into them) is more important, and its value is greater.

“如果利润不是来自手艺，那么利润和所得（资本）的价值必须（也）包括获得利润的劳动价值。没有劳动，利润就不可能获得。”

“If the profit results from something other than a craft, the value of the resulting profit and acquired (capital) must (also) include the value of the labor by which it was obtained. Without labor, it would not have been acquired.

“在大多数此类情况下，劳动（在利润中的）份额是显而易见的。无论多或少，价值的一部分都来自（劳动）。劳动份额可能被隐藏。例如，食品价格就是这种情况。正如我们之前所说，投入其中的劳动和支出在谷物价格中显现出来。但在农业不需要太多照料和工具的地区，这些（项目）是隐藏的。因此，只有少数农民意识到（投入到他们产品中的劳动成本和支出）。

“In most such cases, the share of labor (in the profit) is obvious. A portion of the value, whether large or small, comes from (the labor). The share of labor may be concealed. This is the case, for instance, with the prices of food stuffs. The labor and expenditures that have gone into them show themselves in the price of grain, as we have stated before. But they are concealed (items) in regions where farming requires little care and few implements. Thus, only a few farmers are conscious of the (costs of labor and expenditures that have gone into their products).

“由此可见，收益和利润，全部或大部分，都是从人类劳动中实现的价值。‘生计’一词的含义已变得清晰。它（利润的一部分）被利用了。因此，‘利润’和‘生计’这两个词的含义已变得清晰。这两个词的含义已得到解释。”（Khaldün 等人，1969 年，第 1 卷，第 5 章，第 1 节。）

“It has thus become clear that gains and profits, in their entirety or for the most part, are value realized from human labor. The meaning of the word ‘Sustenance’ has become clear. It is (the part of the profit) that is utilized. Thus, the meaning of the words ‘profit’ and ‘Sustenance’ has become clear. The meaning of both words has been explained.” (Khaldün et al. 1969, Book 1, chapter 5, section 1.)

31. “如果一个人能从秘鲁的矿藏中把一盎司银带到伦敦，同时他能生产一蒲式耳的谷物，那么一个就是另一个的自然价格；现在，如果由于新的和更容易开采的矿藏，一个人可以像以前一样容易地获得两盎司银，那么谷物在十先令一蒲式耳的价格将和以前五先令一蒲式耳的价格一样便宜，其他价格相同。”（Petty 1679.）

31. “If a man can bring to London an ounce of Silver out of the Earth in Peru, in the same time that he can produce a bushel of Corn, then one is the natural price of the other; now if by reason of new and more easie Mines a man can get two ounces of Silver as easily as formerly he did one, then Corn will be as cheap at ten shillings the bushel, as it was before at five shillings caeteris paribus.” (Petty 1679.)

32. “无论何时何地，难以获得或需要付出大量劳动才能获得的东西都是昂贵的；而容易获得或只需很少劳动就能获得的东西则是便宜的。因此，只有劳动本身的价值永远不会变化，它才是所有商品在任何时候和任何地方都可以评估和比较其价值的最终和真正的标准。这是它们的真实价格；货币只是它们的名义价格。”（Smith 1974，第 136 页）

32. “At all times and places, that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labor to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labor. Labor alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.” (Smith 1974, p. 136.)

33. “由于商品的交换价值只是商品的社会职能，与商品的自然属性毫无关系，因此，我们首先必须问：所有商品的共同社会实质是什么？那就是劳动。要生产一种商品，就必须投入一定量的劳动，或者说，必须使它发挥一定的作用。我说的不仅是劳动，而且是社会劳动。一个人为自己直接使用而生产一种物品，自己消费，他创造的是产品，而不是商品。作为一个自给自足的生产者，他与社会毫无关系。但要生产一种商品，一个人不仅必须生产一种满足某种社会需求的物品，但他的劳动本身必须成为社会劳动总量的一部分。它必须服从社会内部的劳动分工。没有其他劳动分工，它就什么都不是，它需要将这些分工结合起来。

33. “As the exchangeable values of commodities are only social functions of those things, and have nothing at all to do with the natural qualities, we must first ask: What is the common social substance of all commodities? It is labor. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labor must be bestowed upon it, or worked up in it. And I say not only labor, but social labor. A man who produces an article for his own immediate use, to consume it himself, creates a product, but not a commodity. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to do with society. But to produce a commodity, a man must not only produce an article satisfying some social want, but his labor itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of labor expended by society. It must be subordinate to the division of labor within society. It is nothing without the other divisions of labor, and on its part is required to integrate them.

“如果我们把商品看作价值，我们只是从实现的、固定的或结晶的社会劳动这一单一方面来看待它们。在这方面，它们的区别仅在于所代表的劳动量多或少，例如，一块丝手帕比一块砖头所消耗的劳动量要大。但是，劳动量该如何计量呢？按劳动持续时间来计量，即按小时、天等计量。当然，要应用这一计量方法，所有劳动都要归结为平均劳动或简单劳动作为单位。因此，我们得出这样的结论。商品有价值，因为它是社会劳动的结晶。它的价值或相对价值的大小取决于它所包含的社会物质的量，也就是说，取决于生产它所必需的劳动的相对量。因此，商品的相对价值由它们所消耗的、实现的、固定的劳动量或劳动量决定。 “在相同的劳动时间内所能生产的相对商品量是相等的。或者说，一种商品的价值与另一种商品的价值之比，等于一种商品中固定的劳动量与另一种商品中固定的劳动量之比。”（马克思，1910年，第6节）

“If we consider commodities as values, we consider them exclusively under the single aspect of realized, fixed, or, if you like, crystallized social labor. In this respect they can differ only by representing greater or smaller quantities of labor, as, for example, a greater amount of labor may be worked up in a silken handkerchief than in a brick. But how does one measure quantities of labor? By the time the labor lasts, in measuring the labor by the hour, the day, etc. Of course, to apply this measure, all sorts of labor are reduced to average or simple labor as their unit. We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has a value, because it is a crystallization of social labor. The greatness of its value, or its relative value, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labor necessary for its production. The relative values of commodities are, therefore, determined by the respective quantities or amounts of labor, worked up, realized, fixed in them. The correlative quantities of commodities which can be produced in the same time of labor are equal. Or the value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labor fixed in the one is to the quantity of labor fixed in the other.” (Marx 1910, section 6.)

34.米罗夫斯基（1989）认为，它有意借用了当时相对现代的拉格朗日物理场论公式。

34. Mirowski (1989) argues that it deliberately borrowed from the then relatively modern Lagrangian formulations of physical field theory.

35。这些往往意味着，课堂上必须区分图表中所示的短期供需平衡和涉及完全不同的东西的长期过程，即供应线向右移动。这是科学史学家所说的在理论中添加本轮以掩盖令人尴尬的证据冲突的典型例子。

35. These tend to be to the effect that the class must distinguish between the short-term equilibrium of supply and demand shown in the diagram, and long-term processes which involve something quite different, a shift in the supply line to the right. This is a classic example of what historians of science call adding an epicycle to a theory to cover up embarrassing conflicts with evidence.

36. “我们对自然事物的原因不应再加以承认，除非这些原因既真实又足以解释其现象。

36. “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.

“为此，哲学家们说，大自然不会徒劳无功，做得少了，做得再多也是徒劳；因为大自然喜欢简单的事情，不会因多余原因而产生浮夸” (Newton 1999，推理规则 I)。

“To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes” (Newton 1999, Rule of reasoning I).

37.自傅立叶以来，我们就知道任何函数都可以用正弦波的总和来很好地近似。我们现在在数字电视等事物中经常使用这一点。在天文模型中添加本轮的作用是增加额外的谐波分量。由于您可以通过此类谐波分量来近似任何函数，因此，只要有足够的本轮，您就可以根据傅立叶定理对任何视天体运动进行任意良好的近似。有关此内容的讨论，请参阅 Russo (2013)。

37. Since Fourier we have known that any function can be well approximated by a sum of sine waves. We use this routinely now in things like digital TV. What adding epicycles to an astronomical model does is put in additional harmonic components. Since you can approximate any function by such harmonic components, with enough epicycles upon epicycles you can, by Fourier’s theorem, get an arbitrarily good approximation of any apparent celestial motion. For a discussion of this, see Russo (2013).

38 . 如果我们假设直线函数，那么我们有两个方程：需求方程 p = a - dq，供应方程 p = b + sq，其中 d 和 s 是曲线的绝对梯度，a 和 b 是它们与 Y 轴的交点。显然，这些方程有 4 个参数。

38. If we assume straight-line functions then we have two equations: p = a - dq for demand and p = b + sq for supply, where d and s are the absolute gradients of the curves, and a and b the positions where they intercept the Y axis. Clearly these equations have 4 parameters.

39。其中一些人还主张一些系统的、非随机的偏差。我们稍后会讨论这些。

39. Some of them also argued for some systematic, non-random deviations. We will discuss these later.

40.显示劳动价值与市场价格接近程度的研究有：Michaelson 等（1995）、Cockshott 和 Cottrell（1997a）、Cockshott 和 Cottrell（1998a）、Cockshott 和 Cottrell（1997b）、Cockshott 和 Cottrell（2003a）、Fröhlich（2013）、Ochoa（1989）、Petrovic（1987）、Sanchez 和 Nieto Ferrandez（2010）、Sánchez 和 Montibeler（2015）、Tsoulfidis 和 Paitaridis（2016）、Shaikh（1984）、Shaikh（1998）、Tsoulfidis 和 Maniatis（2002）、Valle Baeza（2010）、Zachariah（2004）、Zachariah（2006）。

40. Studies showing the closeness of labor values to market prices are: Michaelson et al. (1995), Cockshott and Cottrell (1997a), Cockshott and Cottrell (1998a), Cockshott and Cottrell (1997b), Cockshott and Cottrell (2003a), Fröhlich (2013), Ochoa (1989), Petrovic (1987), Sanchez and Nieto Ferrandez (2010), Sánchez and Montibeler (2015), Tsoulfidis and Paitaridis (2016), Shaikh (1984), Shaikh (1998), Tsoulfidis and Maniatis (2002), Valle Baeza (2010), Zachariah (2004), Zachariah (2006).

41。除法是四种基本算术运算中最难的。即使在现代计算机上，它的运算速度也比加法慢得多。你在学校学到的纸笔除法依赖于中世纪才为人所知的算法；巴比伦时代的除法是使用复杂的逆表然后乘法来完成的。快速计算机仍然采用这种方法，例如英特尔计算机使用的 RCPSS-Scalar 单精度浮点倒数。

41. Division is the hardest of the four basic arithmetic operations to do. Even on a modern computer it is much slower than addition. The paper and pencil division you learned at school relies on algorithms that were not known until the Middle Ages; division in Babylonian times was done using complicated tables of inverses followed by multiplication. Fast computers still resort to this, for example the RCPSS-Scalar Single-Precision Floating-Point Reciprocal used by Intel computers.

42.在数学中，我们将只有一列数字的表称为向量。如果您最初是在学校物理课上接触到向量的概念，那么这可能会有点令人困惑，因为向量是指空间中的方向。但是，您在学校物理课上学到的这个含义只是数学向量的一个特例。三维空间中的方向（例如，静电场的方向）可以表示为 x、y、z 坐标系中的数字。从原点到位置 [x, y, z] 的线就是我们感兴趣的方向。因此，我们可以将空间中的方向编码为一列三个数字。但是假设我们有一个五十维空间；我们该如何描述方向？

42. In maths we call a table with a single column of numbers a vector. This is slightly confusing if you came across the notion of vectors initially in school physics, where a vector is taken to mean a direction in space. But this meaning you got in school physics is just a special case of the mathematical vector. A direction in three-dimensional space—for instance, the direction of an electrostatic field—can be expressed as numbers in an x, y, z coordinate system. The line from the origin to position [x, y, z] is the direction we are interested in. So we can encode a direction in space as a column of three numbers. But suppose we have a fifty-dimensional space; how would we describe a direction?

显然，通过一列五十个数字来确定这个五十维空间中的位置。如果我们有五十种不同类型的商品，那么我们就有一个潜在的五十维空间。一个装有特定数量的每种商品的篮子定义了这个五十维空间中的一个点。

Clearly, by a column of fifty numbers giving a position in this fifty-dimensional space. If we have fifty distinct types of goods, then we have a potential fifty-dimensional space. A basket containing specific amounts of each of these goods defines a point in this fifty-dimensional space.

因此，高维向量是价值理论的相关工具。价格表是一个高维向量。这样的列表对价值进行编码，而编码所用的单位是什么并不重要。我们显然可以用便士和英镑来表示所有价格，唯一的变化就是我们将向量乘以 100。同样，人们可以使用任何一种商品本身作为价值标准，经济学家称之为计价单位。在我们给出的例子中，我们可以用葡萄酒或鸡蛋。无论如何，计价单位的变化只涉及向量的适当乘法。

So higher dimensional vectors are a relevant tool for the theory of value. A price list is a high dimensional vector. Such a list encodes values and it does not matter what the unit used for the encoding is. We can obviously express all prices in pennies as well as in pounds, all that changes is that we multiply the vector by 100. Similarly, one can use any one of the commodities themselves as the standard of value, what economists call the numeraire. We could use wine or eggs in the example we gave. In any case, a change of numeraire just involves an appropriate multiplication of the vector.

我们说过，向量在多维空间中定义了一个方向。我们在表格 (A) 中给出的罗马硬币中石油、鸡蛋和葡萄酒的价格向量指向这个空间的一个方向，但这意味着什么呢？

We said that a vector defines a direction in a multidimensional space. The price vector in Roman coins for oil, eggs, and wine that we gave in our table (A) points in a direction in this space, but what does that mean?

价格向量指向的方向就是价值的方向。请看下面的图表。它显示了价值空间的两个维度。我们知道两份石油价值十份葡萄酒。连接两份石油和十份葡萄酒的线表明了这一点。与此平行的一组线是等值线。这些线上的所有点都具有相同的价值。价值轴与这些等值线成直角。石油和葡萄酒平面上的任何一点，即一个人拥有的葡萄酒和石油的任何组合，都可以沿着这些平行的等值线之一投射到价值轴上。该图说明了这一点，即十份葡萄酒，五份石油。该图仅适用于二维，但相同的几何原理可以扩展到任意数量的商品，因此可以扩展到任意维度。等值线是超平面，价值轴是通过原点垂直于等值线的线。有关价值形式属性的更详细讨论，请参阅 Cockshott 等人 (2008)，第 11 章。

The direction the price vector points is the direction of value. Consider the diagram below. It shows two dimensions of the value space. We know that two measures of oil are worth ten of wine. The line joining two oil to ten wine indicates this. The set of lines parallel to this are the isovals. All points on these lines have the same value. The axis of value is at right angles to these isovals. Any point on the oil wine plane, i.e., any combination of wine and oil that a person owns can be projected onto the value axis along one of these parallel isovals. The diagram illustrates this for the point ten wine, five oil. The illustration is only for two dimensions, but the same geometric principle extends to arbitrary numbers of goods and thus arbitrary dimensions. The isovals are then hyperplanes and the value axis is the line through the origin perpendicular to the isovals. For a more detailed discussion of the formal properties of value, see Cockshott et al. (2008), chapter 11.

我所说的交换表是由外除运算产生的矩阵。如果 S 是交换表表并且 p 是与其一致的价格向量，则对于 S 中的所有元素 s _ij，我们有 sy= [(pi)/(pj)].

What I have called a swap table is a matrix produced by an outer divide operation. If S is a swap table and p is the price vector that is consistent with it then for all elements s_ij in S we have sy= [(pi)/(pj)].

43.有关美索不达米亚人和罗马人使用的计算技术的更详细讨论，包括后者如何在计算表上进行经济计算，请参阅 Cockshott 等人（2012 年），第 2 章。

43. For a more detailed discussion of the computational techniques used by the Mesopotamians and Romans, including how the latter did economic calculations on reckoning tables, see Cockshott et al. (2012), chapter 2.

44 . 关于货币并非源自易货交易这一点，戴维斯（2010，第 44 页）表示：“在一件事上，原始货币专家们都意见一致，这一重要共识超越了他们之间的细微分歧。他们共同的信念是，易货交易并不是货币起源和最早发展的主要因素，这一信念得到了来自世界各地的原始货币的大量有形证据以及古代世界的考古、文学和语言证据的支持。这与杰文斯、他的前辈（可以追溯到亚里士多德）以及他的追随者（包括主流传统经济学家）形成了鲜明的对比。”

44. On the point that money did not arise from barter exchange, Davies (2010, p. 44) says: “On one thing the experts on primitive money all agree, and this vital agreement transcends their minor differences. Their common belief backed up by the overwhelming tangible evidence of actual types of primitive moneys from all over the world and from the archaeological, literary and linguistic evidence of the ancient world, is that barter was not the main factor in the origins and earliest developments of money. The contrast with Jevons, with his predecessors going back to Aristotle, and with his followers who include the mainstream of conventional economists, is clear-cut.”

45 . 宝贝币一直沿用到二十世纪，英国殖民当局早在 1880 年就试图废除宝贝币，并于 1904 年正式将其废除（Falola 和 Adebayo，2000 年）。从 1902 年开始，人们试图废除马尼拉币，但至少在 1949 年之前，它仍在流通。马尼拉币的起源尚不清楚，但可能可以追溯到腓尼基人与西非的贸易时期（Davies，2010 年）。

45. The cowries persisted in use up until the twentieth century, the British colonial authorities attempted to eliminate them as early as 1880 and officially demonetized them in 1904 (Falola and Adebayo, 2000). Attempts to demonetize the manilla were made from 1902, but remained in circulation until at least 1949. The origins of the manilla are unclear but they may date back as far as Phonecian trade with West Africa (Davies, 2010).

46.中国人拥有带孔的硬币有几个原因。孔既允许将硬币串在一起形成更高价值的块，也有助于制造。一根杆穿过一堆硬币，使它们同时被锉成相同的尺寸。这种带有中央孔的铜币图案也被英国殖民时期的硬币采用。

46. A couple of reasons are given for the Chinese having coins with holes. The hole both allowed coins to be strung together into blocks of higher value, and was an aid to manufacture. A rod was passed through a stack of coins allowing them all to be filed simultaneously to the same size. This pattern of a copper coin with a central hole was also adopted for British colonial coinage.

47.马克思在《资本论》第一章中阐述了关于货币的这一论点（马克思，1954年）。

47. Marx develops this argument about money in the first chapters of Capital (Marx 1954).

48。很容易证实英国硬币并非表面看起来的那样。试着用磁铁吸起一枚一美分硬币。

48. It is easy to verify that British coinage is not what it seems. Try picking a penny up with a magnet.

49。我们发现这种用货币遗迹来解释商品生产的倾向在赫斯特和辛德斯（1975）的著作中有所体现，他们认为罗马晚期黄金向东方的外流导致了货币短缺，从而导致商品生产和货币经济的崩溃。他们声称，这导致了官僚机构对实物收入的依赖，并演变为某种封建贵族。在更复杂的形式中，我们看到巴纳吉强调了金币在帝国晚期的重要性，这与赫斯特的观点相反，即这一时期商品生产实际上重新繁荣。

49. We find this sort of tendency to explain commodity production by its numismatic relics in Hirst and Hindess (1975), who argue that the outflow of gold to the East in the late Roman period led to a shortage of currency and thus to a collapse of commodity production and monetary economy. This, they claim, led to the bureaucracy’s dependence on income in kind and devolution into a sort of feudal aristocracy. In a more sophisticated form, we see it in Banaji’s emphasis on the importance of gold coinage in the late empire as evidence of the opposite of what Hirst argued, that there was in fact a reflorescence of commodity production in this period.

50.从阶级斗争的角度，也许可以更好地理解一种货币是由低内在价值的代币还是纯金币构成的。债权阶级，无论是巴纳吉研究的晚期罗马贵族，还是十九世纪末的美国银行家，都可能倾向于将金币作为唯一可接受的清偿债务的手段。这可以保护他们债务在劳动力方面的实际价值。债务人，无论是现代时期的负债国家，还是历史上负债累累的农民，都会倾向于更容易获得的货币：银币或贬值的硬币，或国家票据。这些使偿还债务变得更容易，如果它们贬值，则会降低债务的实际价值。

50. The question of whether a coinage is made up of low intrinsic value tokens or fine gold coins may be better understood from the standpoint of class struggle. Creditor classes, whether the late Roman aristocracy studied by Banaji, or U.S. bankers in the late nineteenth century, are likely to favor gold coins as the only acceptable means of settling debts. This protects the real value of their debts in terms of labor. Debtors, whether indebted states in the modern period or indebted farmers throughout history, will favor a more readily available currency: silver or debased coins, or state paper. These make the paying off of debt easier, and if they depreciate, reduce the real value of debt obligations.

许多古代主要国家，如雅典、马其顿、罗马或西班牙帝国，确实依赖银币，这一事实表明，国家控制的银矿铸造硬币可以补充税收，也表明制造业持续存在贸易逆差，而逆差只能通过出口硬币来弥补。

The fact that a number of major ancient states, Athens, the Macedonian, Roman, or Spanish empires did rely on a silver coinage indicates both the supplementing of tax revenue by minting of coin from state-controlled silver mines, and to a persistent trade deficit in manufactures that could only be met by the export of specie.

51。迈达斯寓言或亚里士多德·梅克尔 (1997) 的经济理论解决了交换价值和使用价值之间的矛盾。这是为了指出相对世俗的思维层面上的混淆。商业语言中存在更深层次的混淆，即当商品作为货币出售时，价值就“实现”。但这种比喻比迈达斯的愿望更幼稚，用马克思的话来说，更“拜物教”。当一个国家运行一种代币货币系统时，无论是贱金属硬币还是纸币，那么商品的销售最好被视为理想化价值。体现真实劳动的商品，因此是交换价值的真正实质，被交换为一张带有价值符号或概念的纸。实际价值已转入购买者的手中，卖方只剩下国家纸币。如果美国的乔以 100 美元的价格出售一台电视机，他至少可以用它偿还美国的税收债务。如果广东TCL集团以100万美元的价格销售1万台电视机，那么他们所获得的美国信贷从长期来看可能无法实现，无论是使用价值还是劳动价值。

51. The fable of Midas or the economic theory of Aristotle Meikle (1997) address the contradiction between exchange value and use value. This is to point out a confusion at a relatively mundane level of thought. There is a deeper confusion present in commercial language which speaks of value being “realized” when a commodity is sold as money. But this metaphor is even more naive and, in Marx’s terms, “fetishistic” than the desires of Midas. When a state operates a system of token money, either base metal coins of paper notes, then the sale of a commodity is better seen as the idealization value. A commodity embodying real labor, and thus the real substance of exchange value, is exchanged for a mere sheet of paper bearing the symbol or idea of value. The real value has passed into the hands of the purchaser, the seller is left with state paper. If Joe in the United States sells a TV for $100 he can at least settle his U.S. tax debts with it. If TCL Corporation of Guandong sells 10,000 TV sets for $1 million, they are left with a U.S. credit that may in the long term be unrealizable in terms of anything of either use value or labor value.

52.马尔可夫模型以一位俄罗斯数学家的名字命名，他在一项关于文本中字母序列统计的研究（Markov 2006）中提出了这一想法。

52. Markov models are named after the Russian mathematician who introduced the idea in a study (Markov 2006) of the statistics of sequences of letters in text.

53.构建历史唯物主义的参数化马尔可夫模型对某些人来说将是一篇不错的博士论文。

53. Constructing a parameterized Markov model of historical materialism would be a nice PhD thesis for someone.

54 . 用简单的马尔可夫模型来表示，虽然比标准的马克思主义表述方法更先进，但仍然过于简单，因为它抽象了地理和相邻社会之间的相互作用。有一些方法可以扩展马尔可夫模型来表示多个局部系统，这些系统由于其自身的内部动态和相互作用而发生演变。Shaw 和 Cockshott (1994)、Shaw 等人 (1996) 和 Hillston (1995) 的工作可能为此提供了一个起点。她展示了如何组合多个随机演变和相互通信的过程的描述，以得出整个集合的整体马尔可夫模型。这种由组合形成的整体模型在原始状态空间的张量空间上定义。形式化它所需的模型类将是马尔可夫模型的二维扩展，称为马尔可夫随机场 (Kindermann 和 Snell 1980)。在历史唯物主义中，将地理、人口和其他约束条件结合起来的这种模型的应用显然是一个相当大的研究项目。

54. Representation as a simple Markov model, while an advance on the standard Marxist presentation, is still a considerable oversimplification, since it abstracts from geography and the interaction between adjacent societies. There are methods by which one can extend Markov modelling to represent multiple local systems which undergo evolution as a result both of their own internal dynamics and their interaction with one another. The work of Shaw and Cockshott (1994), Shaw et al. (1996), and Hillston (1995) may well provide a starting point for this. She shows how you can compose descriptions of multiple processes evolving stochastically and in communication with one another to derive an overall Markov model of the whole ensemble. Such overall models formed by composition are defined over the tensor space of the original state spaces. The class of models required to formalize this would be the two-dimensional extension of Markov models known as Markov Random Fields (Kindermann and Snell 1980). Application of such models integrating geographical, demographic, and other constraints within historical materialism is obviously a considerable research project.

55.本章的立场与鲁德拉 (1988) 的立场有很多相同之处，即我将中世纪的欧洲和安纳托利亚都归类为封建社会的例子，但我不接受他使用的生产方式定义。这本质上是对赫斯特和欣德斯 (1975) 观点的重复，即生产方式是生产力量和生产关系的结合。鲁德拉批评威克姆等其他历史学家低估了技术的作用。我比鲁德拉走得更远。我认为生产方式不可避免地由技术决定，因此对我而言，资本主义生产方式是机器工业，封建生产方式是农民农业。但并非所有农民农业都是封建的，因为 1812 年的法国或 1955 年的中国仍然是农民经济体，但不是封建的。所以凡是存在封建社会关系的社会，其生产方式都是农民农业，但凡存在农民农业的社会，不一定都是封建社会。

55. The position this chapter takes has a lot in common with that of Rudra (1988) in that I would class both Europe and Anatolia in the Middle Ages as instances of feudal societies, but I do not accept the definition of a mode of production that he uses. It is in essence a repetition of Hirst and Hindess’s (1975) idea that a mode of production is a combination of forces and relations of production. Rudra is critical of other historians like Wickham for underplaying the role played by technology. I go even further than Rudra. I treat a mode of production as being irreducibly determined by technology, so that for me the capitalist mode of production is machine industry, and the feudal mode of production is peasant agriculture. But not all instances of peasant agriculture are feudal, since France in 1812 or China in 1955 were still peasant economies but non-feudal. So the mode of production in all societies with feudal social relations is peasant agriculture, but not all societies with peasant agriculture are feudal.

亨德斯和赫斯特则依赖阿尔都塞，而阿尔都塞又依赖斯大林对生产方式的定义：生产方式是生产力和生产关系的结合：

Hindess and Hirst were in turn relying on Althusser who relied on Stalin for his definition of a mode of production as being a combination of forces and relations of production:

“那么，在社会物质生活条件的复合体中，决定社会面貌、社会制度性质、社会从一个制度向另一个制度的发展的主要力量是什么呢？

“What, then, is the chief force in the complex of conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, the development of society from one system to another?

“历史唯物主义认为，这种力量是获取人类生存所必需的生活资料的方法，是生产社会生活和发展所必需的物质价值（食物、衣服、鞋子、房屋、燃料、生产工具等）的方式。

“This force, historical materialism holds, is the method of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence, the mode of production of material values—food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc.—which are indispensable for the life and development of society.

“人们为了生存，必须有食物、衣服、鞋子、住所、燃料等等；为了获得这些物质价值，人们必须生产它们；而为了生产它们，人们必须有生产食物、衣服、鞋子、住所、燃料等等的生产工具，他们必须善于生产这些工具并且使用它们。

“In order to live, people must have food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc.; in order to have these material values, people must produce them; and in order to produce them, people must have the instruments of production with which food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc., are produced, they must be able to produce these instruments and to use them.

“生产物质价值的生产工具，操作生产工具并凭借一定的生产经验和劳动技能进行物质价值生产的人，共同构成社会的生产力。

“The instruments of production wherewith material values are produced, the people who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certain production experience and labor skill—all these elements jointly constitute the productive forces of society.

“但是，生产力只是生产的一个方面，只是生产方式的一个方面，这个方面表现了人们同他们用来生产物质价值的自然物和自然力之间的关系。生产的另一个方面，生产方式的另一个方面，是生产过程中人们的相互关系，是人们的生产关系。”（斯大林，1943年）

“But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relation of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men’s relations of production.” (Stalin 1943.)

56.《末日审判书》是 1086 年为征税目的对英格兰所有庄园进行的一项非常详细的调查。它列出了每个庄园的人口、面积、牲畜、犁队、磨坊、鱼塘和其他资源。这是任何封建经济中现存最详细的统计资料。

56. The Domesday Book is a very detailed survey carried out in 1086 of all estates in England for tax purposes. It lists population, area, livestock, plow teams, mills, fish-ponds, and other resources of each manor. It is the most detailed statistical account still available of any feudal economy.

57。与封建庄园规模相比，19 世纪 70 年代覆盖英格兰埃塞克斯郡同一地区的数据（如表 4.1 所示）显示，当时平均单个佃农农场的规模与整个庄园相当。Hunt 和 Pam（1995 年）给出了农场规模的一个例子：“例如，Petre 勋爵的 18,000 英亩 Thomdon 庄园在 1860 年有 49 名佃农，1870 年有 47 名佃农。”这意味着埃塞克斯郡维多利亚时代的平均佃农农场相当于整个撒克逊庄园的面积，包括农民地块。

57. By way of comparison with feudal manor sizes, data from the 1870s covering the same part of England, Essex, as table 4.1, shows that by then average individual tenant farms were comparable in size to entire manorial estates. Hunt and Pam (1995) give as an example of farm sizes that: “Lord Petre’s 18,000 acre Thomdon estate, for example, had 49 tenants in 1860 and 47 in I870.” Which implies that an average Victorian tenant farm in Essex was equivalent to the entire area of a median Saxon manorial estate, peasant plots included.

58.苏联关于线性优化技术的原始资料可以翻译为 Kantorovich (1960)、Kantorovich (1965)。Klein (2007) 讲述了法国液压工程师和美国军事后勤专家如何独立开发了类似的技术，然后从 20 世纪 50 年代开始广泛应用于美国工业。有关线性优化如何推翻 von Mises (1949) 的主张的说明，请参阅 Cockshott (2006b)。

58. The original Soviet source for the technique of linear optimization is available in translation as Kantorovich (1960), Kantorovich (1965). Klein (2007) recount how similar techniques were independently developed by French hydraulic engineers and U.S. military logistics experts before being widely applied in U.S. industry from the 1950s. For an account of how linear optimization invalidates the claims of von Mises (1949), see Cockshott (2006b).

59.这里指的是费利克斯·哈伯 (Felix Haber)，他是化学武器和氮催化固定技术的发明者，最初用于制造炸药，后来成为氨肥的主要来源。

59. The reference is to Felix Haber, inventor of both chemical warfare and the catalytic fixation of nitrogen, originally to make explosives, later the main source of ammoniacal fertilizers.

60. “我们可以把社会再生产的基本活动分为两个相互排斥和详尽无遗的类别：生产和非生产。两者之间的区别至关重要：生产会创造新的使用价值（财富），而非生产则会消耗财富而不会创造新的财富。非生产活动又可以分为三个相互排斥和详尽无遗的类别：分配、社会维持和个人消费。分配涉及将使用价值、使用价值所有权或货币从一组经济主体转移到另一组经济主体的活动。社会维护是指所有旨在维护和再生产社会秩序的活动。个人消费包括所有涉及维护和再生产社会秩序中个人的活动。所有经济思想流派都区分生产和消费。此外，他们一致认为，生产创造财富，消费消耗财富。新古典主义和古典马克思主义传统之间的差异源于对分配和社会维护活动的特征描述。对于新古典主义（和凯恩斯主义）传统而言，这些活动只要具有市场价值并且某些实体愿意为该活动付费，就被理解为生产。”（Deepankar 2015）。

60. “We can divide the basic activities of social reproduction into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: production and non production The difference between the two is crucial: while production results in the creation of new use values (wealth), non production uses up wealth without creating new wealth. Non production activities can, in turn, be divided into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: distribution, social maintenance and personal consumption. Distribution involves activities that transfer use values, titles to use values or money from one set of economic agents to another. Social maintenance refers to all activities that are geared toward the maintenance and reproduction of the social order. Personal consumption includes all activities involved in the maintenance and reproduction of individuals within the social order. All schools of economic thought distinguish between production and consumption. Moreover they agree that production creates wealth and consumption uses up wealth. The difference between the neoclassical and classical Marxian traditions arises from the characterization of the activities of distribution and social maintenance. For the neoclassical (and Keynesian) tradition, these activities are understood as production as long they are marketable and some entity is willing to pay for the activity.” (Deepankar 2015.)

61. “这些不同资金之间的比例必然决定每个国家居民的勤劳或懒惰的总体性格。我们比我们的祖先勤劳，因为现在用于维持勤劳的资金与可能用于维持懒惰的资金相比，要多得多。我们的祖先因为缺乏对勤劳的足够鼓励而懒惰。俗话说，宁可无所事事，也不要无所事事。在商业和制造业城市，下层阶级的人主要靠使用资本来维持生活，他们一般都勤劳、朴素、兴旺发达；许多英国城镇和大多数荷兰城镇都是如此。在那些主要靠宫廷的长期或偶尔驻扎来维持生活，下层阶级的人主要靠支出收入来维持生活的城市，他们一般都懒惰、荒唐、贫穷；就像在罗马、凡尔赛、贡比涅和枫丹白露一样。” （史密斯 1974 年，II.3.9。）

61. “The proportion between those different funds necessarily determines in every country the general character of the inhabitants as to industry or idleness. We are more industrious than our forefathers; because in the present times the funds destined for the maintenance of industry are much greater in proportion to those which are likely to be employed in the maintenance of idleness than they were two or three centuries ago. Our ancestors were idle for want of a sufficient encouragement to industry. It is better, says the proverb, to play for nothing than to work for nothing. In mercantile and manufacturing towns, where the inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital, they are in general industrious, sober, and thriving; as in many English, and in most Dutch towns. In those towns which are principally supported by the constant or occasional residence of a court, and in which the inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the spending of revenue, they are in general idle, dissolute, and poor; as at Rome, Versailles, Compiegne, and Fontainebleau.” (Smith 1974, II.3.9.)

62.斯密指出，通过提高资本产出比率，资本积累导致利润率降低，这一观点已经包含了马克思后来关于资本有机构成提高的影响的论证的本质。

62. The point made by Smith that the accumulation of capital leads, via a higher capital to output ratio, to a lower rate of profit already contains the essence of Marx’s later arguments about the effects of a rising organic composition of capital.

63。马克思（1999）在《亚当·斯密工作笔记》中写道，他不同意斯密关于生产性劳动需要产生实物产出的观点。相反，他认为，工人直接受雇于资本而不是收入就足够了。任何从资本中得到报酬的工人都被视为有生产力的，无论他们做什么。

63. In working notes on Adam Smith, Marx (1999) wrote that he disagreed with Smith’s idea that productive labor need produce a physical output. Instead, he then thought, it was sufficient for the workers to be directly employed out of capital rather than revenue. Any worker paid out of capital would then count as productive, whatever they did.

在其他地方，马克思认识到，任何社会形式的转变都不可能将以前的物质非生产性活动转变为生产性活动：

Elsewhere, Marx recognized that no transformation of social form can convert a previously materially unproductive activity into a productive one:

“如果通过劳动分工，一项本身不是生产性的、尽管是再生产的必要因素的功能，从许多人的偶然职业转变为少数人的专属职业，转变为他们的特殊业务，那么这项功能本身的性质并没有改变。

“If by a division of labor a function, unproductive in itself although a necessary element of reproduction, is transformed from an incidental occupation of many into an exclusive occupation of a few, into their special business, the nature of this function itself is not changed.

“一个商人（这里被认为是商品形式变化的纯粹代理人，纯粹的买方和卖方）可以通过他的操作缩短许多生产者的购买和销售时间。在这种情况下，他应该被视为一台减少无用能源消耗或帮助释放生产时间的机器。

“One merchant (here considered a mere agent attending to the change of form of commodities, a mere buyer and seller) may by his operations shorten the time of purchase and sale for many producers. In such case he should be regarded as a machine which reduces useless expenditure of energy or helps to set production time free.

“为了简化问题（因为我们以后才讨论商人作为资本家和商人资本），我们假定这个买卖主体是一个出卖自己劳动力的人。他在C→M和M→C的工序中耗费自己的劳动力和劳动时间。他以这种方式谋生，就像另一个人通过纺纱或制造药丸。他履行着一项必要的职能，因为再生产过程本身包括非生产性职能。他和其他人一样努力工作，但本质上他的劳动既不创造价值也不创造产品。他属于生产的虚假成本。他的用处不在于将非生产性职能转化为生产性职能，也不在于将非生产性劳动转化为生产性劳动。如果这种转变能够通过单纯的职能转移来实现，那将是一个奇迹。他的用处在于，社会劳动力和劳动时间中只有一小部分被束缚在这种非生产性职能中。”（马克思和恩格斯 1974 年，第 6 章）

“In order to simplify the matter (since we shall not discuss the merchant as a capitalist and merchant’s capital until later) we shall assume that this buying and selling agent is a man who sells his labor. He expends his labor power and labor time in the operations C → M and M → C. And he makes his living that way, just as another does by spinning or making pills. He performs a necessary function, because the process of reproduction itself includes unproductive functions. He works as well as the next man, but intrinsically his labor creates neither value nor product. He belongs himself to the faux frais of production. His usefulness does not consist in transforming an unproductive function into a productive one, nor unproductive into productive labor. It would be a miracle if such transformation could be accomplished by the mere transfer of a function. His usefulness consists rather in the fact that a smaller part of society’s labor-power and labor-time is tied up in this unproductive function.” (Marx and Engels 1974, chapter 6)

我在第 5.10 节中指出，要确定某事物是否具有生产力，必须考察整个经济。这更接近史密斯和马克思在《资本论》第二卷中的观点，而不是马克思在《剩余价值理论》中所写的观点。

I argue in section 5.10 that to determine if something is productive one has to look at the whole economy. This is closer to Smith’s position and to that of Marx in Capital, volume 2, than it is to what Marx wrote in Theories of Surplus Value.

64.关于资本主义兴起的因素：“我认为，资本主义从封建社会财产关系中产生，只是领主和农民为实现封建目标而追求封建式经济行为的意外结果”（Brenner 2001）。

64. On the elements of capitalism arising: “I posit that the emergence of capitalist from feudal social-property relations will occur only as an unintended consequence of lords and peasants pursuing feudal type economic behaviour in order to achieve feudal goals” (Brenner 2001).

65.另请参阅 Cockshott (2013b) 中关于这与过程的科学概念的关系的讨论。

65. See also the discussion of how this relates to scientific concepts of process in Cockshott (2013b).

66.加图建议地产所有者做卖家而不是买家，在自己的地产上赚取他们所能赚到的钱。

66. Cato advises estate owners to be sellers not purchasers, to make what they can on their own estate.

67 . 1984 年英国经济中价格与劳动力比率的 CV 测量值实际上约为 10%（Cockshott 和 Cottrell，1998b）。到目前为止，该论点依赖于这样的假设：任何时候只有 1% 的公司会亏损，但由于钟形曲线的形状，如果我假设亏损率为 0.5% 或 2%，结果也不会有太大不同。

67. Measured values for the CV of prices to labor ratios in the UK economy in 1984 were in fact around 10 percent (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1998b). The argument so far has depended on the assumption that only 1 percent of firms will be making a loss at any one time, but because of the shape of the bell curve, the result would not be much different if I assumed it was either 0.5 percent or 2 percent.

68.这种论证形式是由Farjoun和Machover（1983）率先提出的。

68. This form of argument was pioneered by Farjoun and Machover (1983).

69 . 关于表 5.2，如果价格符合简单劳动价值论，我们预计利润率和有机构成的倒数之间存在正线性关系（换句话说，利润率和有机构成之间的关系是反比的，而不是负线性的），因此 s /C 和 v /C 之间的相关系数非常有说服力：在 0.780 时，它的 p 值或边际显着性水平 <0.0001。还要注意利润率的分布和加价的分布非常相似，资本构成的分布也很窄。可以说，资本密集度和利润之间的反比关系将抑制资本密集度的分布。美国资本密集度的这种狭窄分布似乎是强劲而持久的，最近的研究 Torres (2017) 证实了这一点。

69. With respect to table 5.2, if prices corresponded to the simple labor theory of value, we would expect to find a positive linear relationship between profit rate and the inverse of organic composition (in other words, the relationship between profit rate and organic composition would be inverse, rather than negative linear), so the correlation coefficient between s /C and v /C is very telling: at 0.780 it has a p-value or marginal significance level <0.0001. Note also how the spread of profit rates and the spread of markups is very similar, and the narrow dispersion of capital compositions. Arguably the inverse relationship between capital intensity and profit will act to curb the spread of capital intensities. This narrow dispersion of capital intensities in the United States appears to be robust and lasting, and more recent work, Torres (2017) has confirmed it.

70 . Reifferscheidt 和 Cockshott (2014) 表明，一个行业的投入数量与经济中行业数量的对数成正比增长。反转这一关系，可以得出经济中其他行业的数量与平均行业的投入数量呈指数增长。

70. Reifferscheidt and Cockshott (2014) shows that the number of inputs to an industry grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of industries in the economy. Inverting this relation, it follows that the number of other industries in the economy grows exponentially with the number of inputs to the average industry.

71. “正如霍布斯先生所说，财富就是权力。但是，获得或继承巨额财富的人并不一定获得或继承任何政治权力，无论是民事权力还是军事权力。他的财富也许能让他获得这两种权力，但仅仅拥有财富并不一定能让他获得这两种权力。财富直接赋予他的权力是购买力；对当时市场上所有劳动或劳动产品有一定的控制权。他的财富是多是少，完全取决于这种权力的大小；或者取决于其他“一个人的劳动，或者说，其他人的劳动成果，使他能够购买或支配。”（Smith 1974）

71. “Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command over all the labor, or over all the produce of labor, which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to the quantity either of other men’s labor, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men’s labor, which it enables him to purchase or command.” (Smith 1974.)

72 . 这一短语被马克思主义经济学家广泛使用。有些人认为它只是指市场主体之间的契约平等（Bordiga 1975；Bordiga 1954），但更普遍地，他们似乎是指劳动时间决定价格的规律。

72. This phrase is widely used by Marxian economists. Some have taken it to simply mean contractual equality between agents in the market (Bordiga 1975; Bordiga 1954), but more generally they seem to mean the law that labor time determines price.

73.实际的不平等现象当然是巨大的，是在合同执行过程中产生的。

73. Actual inequalities, which are of course massive, arise with contractual enforcement.

74。我在前面的讨论中使用的加价类似于马克思所说的剩余价值率，他用 s/v 表示，其中 s 是财产收入，v 是工资收入。我们的加价并不完全相同，但可以从马克思的剩余价值率中推导出来。第 5.1 节中使用的加价由加价 = 1 +(s/v)给出。

74. The markup I have used in earlier discussion is similar to what Marx called rate of surplus value which he denoted by s/v where s is property income, and v is wage income. Our markup is not exactly the same but it can be derived from Marx’s rate of surplus value. The markup used in section 5.1 is given by markup = 1 +(s/v).

75. “你们这些磨坊女工，别动手去磨坊，即使公鸡啼叫，也要继续睡觉。因为得墨忒耳把你们手上的劳作交给了仙女，她们跳到轮子的最顶端，转动轮轴，用环绕的齿轮转动尼叙里亚磨石的空心重量。如果我们学会不劳而获地享用大地的果实，我们就会再次品尝到黄金时代的滋味。”（塞萨洛尼基的阿尼特帕特。《希腊文选》，第 1 卷。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1960 年，第 63 页。）请注意，这是一个超调磨坊，但直到资本主义早期，这些才成为普遍的设计。

75. “Hold back your hand from the mill, you grinding girls; even if the cock crow heralds the dawn, sleep on. For Demeter has imposed the labors of your hands on the nymphs, who leaping down upon the topmost part of the wheel, rotate its axle; with encircling cogs, it turns the hollow weight of the Nisyrian millstones. If we learn to feast toil-free on the fruits of the earth, we taste again the golden age.” (Anitpater of Thessalonika. The Greek Anthology, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 63.) Note that this was an overshoot mill, but these did not become the general design until the early states of capitalism.

76.纱线越细，重量越轻，因此，以磅为单位的生产率就越低。

76. Finer yarns weigh less, so productivity in pounds is lower.

77.利用蒸汽产生旋转运动的最初解决方案是使用蒸汽机将水泵上来，然后用水来转动水车（Ferguson 1962）。

77. The initial solution to generating rotary motion from steam was to use a steam engine to pump water up which was then used to turn a water wheel (Ferguson 1962).

78 . 瓦特设计正确性的证明很快就出现了。1797 年，法国数学家德普罗尼证明了这一点。德普罗尼在数学分工方面的工作启发了巴贝奇发明计算机。进一步的证据表明，现在看来平凡的改进实际上与当时最先进的理论科学有关。

78. A proof of the correctness of Watt’s design was not long in coming. It was made in 1797 by De Prony, the French mathematician whose work on the division of mathematical labor inspired Babbage to invent the computer. Further evidence that what appears now to be a mundane improvement was actually related to the most advanced theoretical science of the day.

79 . 传统的炼铁方法是将矿石在固态下还原，制成块状铁块；直到高炉出现后，产出的才变成铁水。David 等人 (1989) 描述了一种能够使用单个手动操作炉生产铁水的过渡技术。

79. Traditional iron making reduced the ore in a solid state to produce a bloom; it was not until blast furnaces became available that the output was molten iron. A transitional technology capable of producing molten iron with a single manually operated furnace is described in David et al. (1989).

80.一位名叫菲拉雷特 (Filarete) 的当代工程师对 15 世纪的意大利炼铁厂进行了描述：

80. A description of a fifteenth-century Italian ironworks is given by a contemporary engineer known as Filarete:

“但我要告诉你，我在罗马见过这样的一个，距离罗马约 12 英里，在一个名为格罗塔费拉塔的修道院，那里的僧侣们以希腊方式主持仪式……这个地方很荒凉，森林茂密……这把大锤子的位置在水路的稍外，水从山上不远处流过这个地方……水流经山谷，通过一条运河，可以推动轮子，其中一个轮子吹响风箱，另一个轮子敲击锤子。它的方式不是熔炉的方式（不是高炉），而是一对像铁匠使用的风箱，还有一个炉床……铁在炉床中重新熔化，然后扔进他们想要的碎片，用锤子和水敲打它，它出来的形状几乎和这里看到的一样。” （引自 Williams 2003，第 883 页。）

“But I will tell you how there was one which I saw, being at Rome, the which was about 12 miles from Rome at an abbey called Grottaferrata where there were monks officiating in the Greek manner…. the spot is wild and there are thick woods in it…. the place of this large hammer is a little outside the path of the water, which runs through the site, which comes [from] a little way up the mountain … where this water runs through the valley, adapted by a canal in such a way as to move wheels, one of which blows the bellows and the other makes the hammer beat. The manner of this is not that of the furnace where it is melted [not a blast furnace], but only a pair of bellows like those that smiths use, and there is a hearth … and in this the iron is remelted, and pieces thrown in such as they wish to do, and with that hammer and the water they beat it, and it comes out almost in that form as one sees it here.” (Quoted in Williams 2003, p. 883.)

有趣的是，阿尔都塞（2006）声称，15 世纪的意大利是资本主义几乎所有必要要素都具备的时期之一。现在：工资劳动、货币资本、液压机器，但资本主义仍然没有实现。化石燃料供应的缺乏是否至关重要？

It is interesting to note that Althusser (2006) claims that fifteenth-century Italy was one of the occasions when nearly all the required ingredients of capitalism were present: wage labor, money capital, hydraulic powered machines, but still capitalism did not take. Was the absence of supplies of fossil fuel critical here?

81.制造业和体力劳动者中的“人”一词源于拉丁语“manus”，意为“手”。

81. The man in both manufacture and manual labor derives from the Latin manus, for hand.

82.生产方式的衔接概念由雷伊（1973）提出并推广。尽管雷伊在英语读者中鲜为人知，但他的思想（有时被错误地归于阿尔都塞）至关重要，并对其他思想家产生了影响。

82. The concept of the articulation of modes of production was developed and popularized in Rey (1973). Although Rey is little known to Anglophone readers, his ideas (sometimes misattributed to Althusser) are crucial and have had an influence on other thinkers.

83. “到 19 世纪 30 年代，英国的手工棉织业已基本被工厂里的动力织机所取代，尽管手工织机工人的工资只有工厂工人的一半。然而，170 年后，印度的手工织机行业仍然非常庞大，尤其是棉织业。事实上，自 1900 年首次收集统计数据以来，手工织机行业的产量一直在稳步增长。1997 年，印度手工织机织布的产量大约是 1900 年的 10 倍。1997-8 年，印度 25% 的布料产量仍然来自手工织机。”（Clark 和 Wolcott 2003，第 70-71 页。）

83. “By the 1830s in England hand loom weaving of cottons was largely superseded by power looms in factories, even though the wages of hand loom workers were only about half those of factory workers. Yet 170 years later the hand loom sector in India is still very large, particularly in cottons. Indeed the output of the hand loom sector has grown steadily since 1900 when statistics were first gathered. In 1997, output of woven cloth from hand looms in India was about 10 times as great as in 1900. In 1997–8 25 percent of cloth production in India was still from hand looms.” (Clark and Wolcott 2003, pp. 70–71.)

84. “2000 年 2 月，在德里附近北方邦 Gautam Budha Nagar 的一家砖窑，180 名债役劳工（53 名男性、36 名女性和 91 名儿童）获救。工人的境况被曝光，因为一名女工被强奸，而她的丈夫和一个孩子在反抗时被雇主及其帮凶开枪打死。工人们被威胁和恐吓，无法离开。雇主扣留了他们一半以上的工资，只给他们一小笔生活费。”（Srivastava 2005 年）

84. “At a brick kiln in Gautam Budha Nagar in Uttar Pradesh, near Delhi, 180 bonded laborers (53 men, 36 women and 91 children) were rescued in February 2000. The condition of the workers came to light when one of the women workers was raped, and her husband and a child were killed in gunfire by the employer and his henchmen when they resisted. The workers were prevented from leaving through threat and intimidation. The employer retained more than half their wages and gave them only a small sum for subsistence.” (Srivastava 2005.)

85. Blackmon (2009) 认为，美国在反纳粹战争期间，出于意识形态的原因，有必要实施反对农奴制的立法。

85. Blackmon (2009) argues that the enforcement of legislation against peonage in the United States was made necessary for ideological reasons during the war against the Nazis.

86.强迫人们延长工作时间并非资本主义的专利。19 世纪的阿拉巴马州和 1 世纪的西西里岛的奴隶也同样劳累过度。

86. Forcing people to work longer hours was not unique to capitalism. Slaves in nineteenth-century Alabama or first-century Sicily were similarly overworked.

87. “加拿大性别工资差距的事实”，加拿大妇女基金会，http://canadianwomen.org/facts-about-the-gender-wage-gap-in-canada。

87. “The Facts about the Gender Wage Gap in Canada,” Canadian Women’s Foundation, http://canadianwomen.org/facts-about-the-gender-wage-gap-in-canada.

88 . Dragulescu (2003) 和 Dragulescu 和 Yakovenko (2002) 的理论在 Cottrell 等人 (2009) 和 Shaikh 等人 (2014) 中得到了进一步发展，该理论认为，劳动收入的收入分配将呈现负指数形式，财产收入的收入分配将呈现幂律形式。然而，文献中对这种分配形式的论证在应用于就业劳动力时并不一定令人信服，尽管它们对于小商贩的劳动力来说可能是合理的。目前尚不清楚，例如 Shaikh 等人 (2014) 是否充分排除了分布可能是对数正态分布而不是严格负指数分布的可能性。

88. The theory of Dragulescu (2003) and Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2002), developed further in Cottrell et al. (2009) and Shaikh et al. (2014), is that the distribution of income will have a negative exponential form for labor income, and a power law form for property income. However, the arguments given for this form of distribution in the literature are not necessarily convincing when applied to an employed workforce, though they are perhaps plausible for a workforce of small traders. It is not clear that for instance Shaikh et al. (2014) have adequately excluded the possibility that the distribution may be log normal rather than strictly negative exponential.

89. “劳动力价值的最低限度，是由商品的价值决定的，没有这些商品的每日供应，工人就不能恢复自己的生命力，因而是由身体上不可缺少的生活资料的价值决定的。如果劳动力的价格降到这个最低限度，它就低于它的价值，因为在这种情况下，它只能在残缺的状态下才能维持和发展。但是，任何商品的价值，都由生产出正常质量的商品所必需的劳动时间决定。”（马克思，1887年，第6章）

89. “The minimum limit of the value of labor-power is determined by the value of the commodities, without the daily supply of which the laborer cannot renew his vital energy, consequently by the value of those means of subsistence that are physically indispensable. If the price of labor-power fall to this minimum, it falls below its value, since under such circumstances it can be maintained and developed only in a crippled state. But the value of every commodity is determined by the labor-time requisite to turn it out so as to be of normal quality.” (Marx 1887, chapter 6.)

这里所说的是，工资分布的下端是由一个如此低的工资决定的，以至于一个人只能在因健康不佳而致残的状态下生存，这一水平略高于他们挨饿的水平。但在劳动价值论中，商品的价值不是由其成本的下限决定的，而是由其平均成本决定的。因此，如果一个人的工资达到最低生活保障标准，那么他的工资就低于平均水平，从而也低于劳动力的价值。

What is being said here is that the lower tail of the wage distribution is set by a wage so low that a person can only survive in a state crippled by ill health, a level just above that at which they will starve. But in the labor theory of value, the value of a commodity is determined not by the lower limit of its cost but by its mean cost. So if a person is paid the subsistence limit they are paid below the mean, and thus below the value of labor power.

90.设m(w)和f(w)分别表示男性和女性工资分布概率密度函数。

90. Let m(w) and f(w) represent the male and female wage distribution probability density functions.

m(w)、f(w) 均被约束为对数正态分布。

m(w), f(w) are both constrained to be log-normal.

每个分配的下限由一个人的生存工资设定

Lower bounds of each distribution are set by the survival wage of a single person

稍高一点的是家庭工薪阶层的最低生活工资。

Slightly higher up is the subsistence minimum wage for a family wf.

由于家庭中唯一经济支柱是男性的比例大于女性的比例，因此只有较小比例的男性能够从事家庭最低生活水平以下的工作：

Since a larger portion of men than women are the sole earners in a household, a smaller portion of men can be employed at levels below the family subsistence level:

因此男性工资的标准差am>af。

Thus the standard deviation of the male wage am > af.

因此男性工资分布的平均值也必须更大，|im > |if

Thus the mean of the male wage distribution must also be greater, |im > |if

91. “劳动力的所有者是会死的。因此，如果他在市场上的出现是连续的，而货币不断转化为资本也是以这种连续性为前提的，那么劳动力的卖主就必须通过生育来使自己永生，就像每一个活着的个体通过生育来使自己永生一样。由于磨损和死亡而从市场上撤出的劳动力，必须不断地由至少等量的新劳动力来补充。因此，生产劳动力所必需的生活资料总额必须包括工人的替代者即他的子女所必需的生活资料，以便这一类特殊的商品所有者能够使其在市场上的出现永生。”（马克思，1894年，第6章）

91. “The owner of labor-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the market is to be continuous, and the continuous conversion of money into capital assumes this, the seller of labor-power must perpetuate himself, in the way that every living individual perpetuates himself, by procreation. The labor-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear and death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labor-power. Hence the sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labor-power must include the means necessary for the laborer’s substitutes, i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-owners may perpetuate its appearance in the market.” (Marx 1894, chapter 6.)

92. “用金钱或商品购买的东西，和我们通过自己辛勤劳动获得的东西一样，都是通过劳动购买的。金钱或商品确实为我们节省了这种辛劳。它们包含一定数量劳动的价值，我们用这些劳动来交换当时被认为包含等量价值的东西。劳动是最初的价格，是为所有东西支付的原始购买货币。世界上所有的财富最初不是用金或银购买的，而是用劳动购买的；对那些拥有它并想用它来交换一些新产品的人来说，它的价值恰好等于它能使他们购买或支配的劳动量。”（斯密 1974 年，第 133 页）

92. “What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labor, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labor which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labor was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labor, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labor which it can enable them to purchase or command.” (Smith 1974, p. 133.)

93.这是凯恩斯提出的国民收入应以就业量来衡量的假设：“因此，在处理就业理论时，我建议只使用两个基本数量单位，即货币价值量和就业量……如果E是工资（和薪金）账单，W是工资单位，N是就业量，则E=N×W”（凯恩斯1936年，第35页）。

93. This is the assumption made by Keynes that national income should be measured in employment quantities: “In dealing with the theory of employment I propose, therefore, to make use of only two fundamental units of quantity, namely, quantities of money-value and quantities of employment … if E is the wages (and salaries) bill, W the wage-unit, and N the quantity of employment, E=N×W” (Keynes 1936, p. 35.)

94移民水平与剥削之间的相关性比人口增长与剥削之间的相关性更强。在两种情况下，相关性都是正的，但人口增长的相关性较低，可能是因为人口变化包括了儿童和不竞争工作的退休人员数量的变化。下图（第 361 页）显示了人口与剥削之间的关系。

94. The correlation between immigration levels and exploitation is stronger than that between population growth and exploitation. It is positive in both cases, but the lower correlation for population growth is probably because population changes include changes in the number of children and retired people who do not compete for jobs. The following figure (p. 361) shows the relationship between population and exploitation.

95. “劳动力的再生产，是资本本身再生产的一个要素。劳动力为了资本的增殖，必须不断地重新结合到资本中去，劳动力不能摆脱资本，劳动力对资本的奴役，只是被劳动力出卖给各种资本家所掩盖。劳动力的这种再生产，实际上是资本本身再生产的一个要素。因此，资本的积累就是无产阶级的增长。”（马克思，1887年，第25章）

95. “The reproduction of a mass of labor power, which must incessantly re-incorporate itself with capital for that capital’s self-expansion; which cannot get free from capital, and whose enslavement to capital is only concealed by the variety of individual capitalists to whom it sells itself, this reproduction of labor power forms, in fact, an essential of the reproduction of capital itself. Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat.” (Marx 1887, chapter 25.)

96. “所谓‘高级’劳动者，如国家官员、军人、艺术家、医生、牧师、法官、律师等，其中有些人不仅不具有生产性，而且本质上具有破坏性，他们知道如何通过出售他们的‘非物质’商品和强行将‘非物质’商品强加于他人，从而将‘物质’财富的很大一部分据为己有。他们发现，在经济上被贬低为小丑和仆人，并仅仅被视为消费的参与者，是实际生产者（或更确切地说是生产代理人）的寄生虫，这让他们感到非常不快。这恰恰是对那些迄今为止被光环笼罩并受到迷信崇拜的职能的一种特殊亵渎。古典时期的政治经济学，就像资产阶级本身在其暴发户时期一样，对国家机器等采取了严厉的批判态度。在后来的阶段，它意识到——并且——正如实践所表明的那样——从经验中了解到，所有这些阶级继承的社会联合的必要性，部分是完全非生产性的，是由它自己的组织产生的。”（马克思，1999，第4.5章）

96. “The great mass of so-called ‘higher grade’ workers—such as state officials, military people, artists, doctors, priests, judges, lawyers, etc.—some of whom are not only not productive but in essence destructive, but who know how to appropriate to themselves a very great part of the ‘material’ wealth partly through the sale of their ‘immaterial’ commodities and partly by forcibly imposing the latter on other people—found it not at all pleasant to be relegated economically to the same class as clowns and menial servants and to appear merely as people partaking in the consumption, parasites on the actual producers (or rather agents of production). This was a peculiar profanation precisely of those functions which had hitherto been surrounded with a halo and had enjoyed superstitious veneration. Political economy in its classical period, like the bourgeoisie itself in its parvenu period, adopted a severely critical attitude to the machinery of the State, etc. At a later stage it realized and—as was shown too in practice—learnt from experience that the necessity for the inherited social combination of all these classes, which in part were totally unproductive, arose from its own organization.” (Marx 1999, chapter 4.5.)

97.如果我们把经济分为三个部门：

97. If we divide the economy into 3 sectors:

1.生产生产资料。

1. Produces means of production.

2.生产工人的消费品。

2. Produces workers’ consumption goods.

3.生产资本主义消费品、军队武器等等。

3. Produces articles of capitalist consumption, weapons for the army, etc.

相对容易证明部门 3 中的劳动力不产生相对剩余价值。相对剩余价值生产是指在不改变实际工资或增加劳动力的情况下产生的任何剩余价值增加。我们可以用向量 v = [v1, v2, v3] 来模拟这些行业的总产出，其中 vi 是部门 i 每年每秒执行的劳动人秒数的平均值。因此 vi 的维度为人。

It is relatively easy to demonstrate that labor in department 3 is not productive of relative surplus value. By relative surplus value production is meant any increase in the surplus value brought about without altering real wages or increasing the workforce. We can model the gross product of these industries with the vector v = [v1, v2, v3] where vi is the mean number of person seconds of labor performed in sector i for each second of the year. The vi thus have dimension person.

对于每个部门，总价值由两部分组成，即直接劳动力和间接劳动力，我们将其表示为向量 l 和 c。所有这些都具有每秒人秒的维度。

For each sector the gross value is made up of two components, direct and indirect labor, which we will denote by the vectors l and c. All these have dimension person seconds per second.

我们有v = l+c。

We have v = l+c.

与每个部门相关的是资本存量，我们用向量 k 表示。我们将用相应的大写字母表示整个经济的总量。

Associated with each sector is a capital stock which we denote by the vector k. We will denote economy wide totals by the corresponding capital letters.

我们将每个部门的工资表示为向量 w，利润表示为向量 s，并对应整个经济的总额 W、S。

We will denote wages in each sector by the vector w and profits by the vector s, with corresponding economy-wide totals W, S.

对于整个经济而言，我们认为新创造的价值完全被分为工资和利润，因此L = W + S。我们假设部门产出按其价值出售，因此这个标量方程推广为矢量方程l = w + s，这意味着每个部门的新创造价值被分为该部门的工资和利润。现在让我们假设劳动人口和工作日长度固定，因此dL/dt = 0，但不变资本积累正在发生dK/dt > 0。因此，我们得出部门 1 的总产出等于资本消耗加上积累v ₁ = C + dK/dt。

For the economy as a whole we have it that newly created value is entirely divided between wages and profits, hence L = W + S. We will assume that sectoral outputs sell at their values so this scalar equation generalizes into the vector equation l = w + s, which says that the newly created value in each sector is divided between wages and profits in that sector. Let us for now assume that the working population is fixed as is the length of the working day, hence dL/dt = 0, but that accumulation of constant capital is occurring dK/dt > 0. We thus have that the gross output of sector 1 is equal to capital consumption plus accumulation v₁ = C + dK/dt.

如果我们进一步假设工人不储蓄也不借贷，那么总工资就等于第二部门的总产出：W = v ₂。总利润就等于积累加上资本主义消费 S = v ₃ + dK/dt。

If we further assume that workers do not save or borrow we have the total wage bill equal to the total output of sector two: W = v₂. Total profit is then equal to accumulation plus capitalist consumption S = v₃ + dK/dt.

假设部门 3 的劳动生产率有所提高。这是否有可能增加总剩余价值？不会，因为v ₃保持不变，唯一改变的只是资本家在消费中获得的使用价值数量。因此，这里没有生产相对剩余价值的空间。

Suppose that there is an improvement in labor productivity in sector 3. Does this have the potential to increase total surplus value? No, as v₃ is unaltered, all that changes is the quantity of use values that the capitalists get in their consumption. Thus there is no room for production of relative surplus value here.

98.有关阿姆斯特朗在舰炮发展中所发挥的作用的说明，请参阅

98. For an account of the role of Armstrong in the development of naval guns, see

帕克斯（1966）。

Parkes (1966).

99. “皇家海军可能是当时英国国家预算中最大的单项开支。威廉·格莱斯顿是十九世纪后期大部分时间的自由党首相，他是一位狂热的反帝国主义者，反对海军开支。”（Friedman 2012.）

99. “The Royal Navy was probably the largest single item in the British national budget of the time. William Gladstone, the Liberal prime minister during much of the late nineteenth century, was an ardent anti-imperialist hostile to naval spending.” (Friedman 2012.)

100. “但是，我们必须在他和产业资本直接雇用的雇佣工人之间做出同样的区分，这种区分存在于产业资本和商业资本之间，因而也存在于产业资本家和商人之间。因为商人作为单纯的流通当事人，既不生产价值，也不生产剩余价值（因为他通过自己的费用加到商品上的追加价值，最终归结为先前存在的价值的追加，虽然这里提出了一个问题，即他怎样保存他的不变资本的这个价值？），所以，他雇用的从事这些职能的商业工人不能直接为他创造剩余价值。”（马克思，1971年，第293页）

100. “However, we must make the same distinction between him and the wage-workers directly employed by industrial capital which exists between industrial capital and merchant’s capital, and thus between the industrial capitalist and the merchant. Since the merchant, as a mere agent of circulation, produces neither value nor surplus-value (for the additional value which he adds to the commodities through his expenses resolves itself into an addition of previously existing values, although the question here poses itself, how he preserves this value of his constant capital?) it follows that the mercantile workers employed by him in these same functions cannot directly create surplus-value for him.” (Marx 1971, p. 293.)

101 .“现在让我们谈谈资本主义经济中银行的目的。金融是一种中介商品：你不能吃它、体验它或实际使用它。金融的目的是支持经济中的其他活动。银行旨在将资本（资金）分配到最佳用途。在资本主义经济中，这意味着将资金分配给将为整个社会创造最大财富的人或实体。同时，风险管理应该是银行家的一项基本技能。当资本分配得当并可供创造财富的实体使用时，社会就会繁荣。当资本分配不当时，经济就会崩溃。”（Judson 2012。）

101. “Now let’s turn to the purpose of banks in a capitalist economy. Finance is an intermediary good: You cannot eat it, experience it, or physically use it. The purpose of finance is to support other activities in the economy. Banks are meant to allocate capital (funds) to the best possible use. In a capitalist economy, this means allocating money to the people or entities that will create the greatest wealth for the overall society. At the same time, risk management is supposedly a primary skill for bankers. When capital is allocated well and available to wealth creating entities, societies flourish. When capital is poorly allocated, economies can collapse.” (Judson 2012.)

102. “正如霍布斯先生所说，财富就是权力。但是，获得或继承巨额财富的人并不一定获得或继承任何政治权力，无论是民事权力还是军事权力。他的财富也许能让他获得两者；但仅仅拥有财富并不一定意味着对他来说，财富是不可或缺的。这种占有直接赋予他的权力，是购买当时市场上所有劳动或所有劳动产品的特定控制权的权力。他的财富是多是少，完全取决于这种权力的大小，或取决于他能够购买或控制的其他人劳动的数量，或者换句话说，其他人劳动产品的数量。”（斯密 1974，第 5 章）

102. “Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over all the labor, or over all the produce of labor which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power, or to the quantity either of other mens labor, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other mens labor, which it enables him to purchase or command.” (Smith 1974, chapter 5.)

103. “这种崇拜富人和权贵，甚至崇拜他们，鄙视或至少忽视穷人和下等人的倾向，虽然对于建立和维护社会等级和秩序是必不可少的，但同时也是导致我们道德情感败坏的最重要和最普遍的原因。财富和权贵常常受到只有智慧和美德才应得的尊敬和钦佩；而对贫穷和软弱的蔑视，却往往是最不公平的，因为邪恶和愚蠢才是这种蔑视的唯一适当对象。”（斯密，1790 年，第 53 页）这是历代道德家们的抱怨。

103. “This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages.” (Smith 1790, p. 53.)

104.世界黄金储备的增长速度相对较慢，19 世纪年均增长率低于 1%，20 世纪年均增长率约为 1.5%（Cockshott 等，2008，第 238 页），明显慢于世界经济增长速度。

104. The growth of the world gold stock has been relatively slow, below 1 percent a year in the nineteenth century, and around 1.5 percent a year in the twentieth century (Cockshott et al. 2008, p. 238). This is markedly slower than the growth of the world economy.

105. “因此，银行在贷款过程中创造了自己的资金和存款，而这一交易完全不涉及中介……如果贷款用于实物投资，那么这种新的贷款和货币就是投资的触发因素，因此，根据国民账户中储蓄和投资的恒等式（对于封闭经济体而言），储蓄就是投资的触发因素。因此，储蓄是这种贷款的结果，而不是原因。储蓄不为投资提供资金，融资才为投资提供资金。否则，就会混淆资源（储蓄）和债务货币（融资）各自的宏观经济作用。”（Jakab 和 Kumhof 2015 年。）

105. “The bank therefore creates its own funding, deposits, in the act of lending, in a transaction that involves no intermediation whatsoever…. if the loan is for physical investment purposes, this new lending and money is what triggers investment and therefore, by the national accounts identity of saving and investment (for closed economies), saving. Saving is therefore a consequence, not a cause, of such lending. Saving does not finance investment, financing does. To argue otherwise confuses the respective macroeconomic roles of resources (saving) and debt-based money (financing).” (Jakab and Kumhof 2015.)

106.有关十九世纪利率，请参阅 Barro (1987)。1800 年的 5% 是现实的，尽管这是战时高额借贷带来的峰值。

106. For nineteenth-century interest rates, see Barro (1987). Five percent for 1800 is realistic, though this was a peak brought about by high wartime borrowing.

107. “如果所有土地都具有相同的性质，如果它们的数量是无限的，质量是一致的，那么除非土地具有特殊的地理位置优势，否则就不能对土地的使用收取费用。因此，只有当土地的数量和质量都不是无限的，并且随着人口的增长，质量较差或地理位置较不利的土地被征用时，才需要为使用这些土地支付地租。当社会发展到第二级肥沃的土地被征用时，地租就立即从第一级土地上开始产生，而地租的数量将取决于这两部分土地质量的差别。”（李嘉图，1951年，第2章）

107. “If all land had the same properties, if it were unlimited in quantity, and uniform in quality, no charge could be made for its use, unless where it possessed peculiar advantages of situation. It is only, then, because land is not unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality, and because in the progress of population, land of an inferior quality, or less advantageously situated, is called into cultivation, that rent is ever paid for the use of it. When in the progress of society, land of the second degree of fertility is taken into cultivation, rent immediately commences on that of the first quality, and the amount of that rent will depend on the difference in the quality of these two portions of land.” (Ricardo 1951, chapter 2.)

108马克思（1971，第45章）认为，即使是最差的土地，由于私有制，也会有地租。他把这种适用于最差土地的地租称为“绝对地租”，以区别于李嘉图所确定的级差地租。

108. Marx (1971, chapter 45) argued that even the worst land bears a rent as a consequence of private ownership. He called this rent which applied to the worst land “absolute rent” to distinguish it from the differential rent identified by Ricardo.

109 . scot-free一词最初是指不征税而拥有的土地。其起源于斯堪的纳维亚语词根skat，而非苏格兰语。

109. The term scot-free originally meant land held without a levy. The origin is the Scandinavian root skat rather than a reference to the Scottish.

110 . 显然有大量文献讨论苏联是何种类型的社会以及它是否是阶级社会。Nove (1983a) 提供了很好的概述。

110. There is obviously a vast literature discussing what type of society the USSR was, and whether it was a class society. A good overview is provided in Nove (1983a).

111.例外也许是博尔迪加国际共产党，他们认为金钱的持续存在是阻止苏联等国实现社会主义的决定性因素。

111. Exceptions to this are perhaps the Bordigist International Communist Party, who argue that the continued existence of money was a decisive factor in preventing the USSR, etc. from ever having been socialist.

我的观点是，虽然质疑苏联是否是社会主义是毫无意义的，但这并不意味着必须接受苏联的政治和经济政策。其次是政府。如果人们放弃乌托邦观点，将社会主义视为一种具有自身矛盾发展形式的具体社会形式，那么人们就可以开始问，社会主义国家应该遵循什么样的经济和社会政策。任何现实社会都充满矛盾，要么被矛盾摧毁，要么通过解决矛盾而发展。

My view is that although it is fruitless to question whether the USSR was socialist, it does not follow that one has to accept the political and economic policies followed by its government. If one abandons the utopian viewpoint and sees socialism as a concrete form of society with its own contradictory forms of development, then one can start to ask just what economic and social policies should be followed in a socialist state. Any real society is fraught with contradictions, and is either destroyed by them or develops by resolving them.

112.我们可以将城市化作为生产方式从农民经济向工业社会转变的代表。俄罗斯的城市化率从革命前的14%增长到1939年的34%（Becker 2012）；法国1800年的城市化率为12%，1900年已达到35%（Bairoch 1985）。

112. We can take urbanization as a proxy for the change in the mode of production from a peasant economy to an industrial society. Russian urbanization grew from 14 percent just before the revolution to 34 percent in 1939 (Becker 2012); France was at 12 percent in 1800 and had reached 35 percent in 1900 (Bairoch 1985).

113 . 1913 年，俄罗斯发电量仅为 1300 吉瓦时，不到人均用电量的十分之一。这远远落后于英国和其他西方工业国家的用电量，以至于苏联政府中的一些人怀疑该国能否独立实现社会主义工业化。回想起来，1990 年苏联的发电规模表明，这是对可能实现的目标过于谨慎的估计。

113. In 1913 Russia had generated only 1300GWh of electricity, less than one-tenth of a person power per head. This was so far behind the power usage of Great Britain and other Western industrial nations that some in the Soviet government doubted that the country could carry out an unaided socialist industrialization. The scale of Soviet power output in 1990 shows, in retrospect, that this was an overcautious estimate of what would be possible.

114. 99% 以上的铀是由 U238 同位素构成的，这种同位素不能用作传统反应堆的能源。快中子可以将其转化为 Pu239 燃料。快中子反应堆使用 Pu239 燃料，并且以如此高的能量通量运行，因此需要液态金属冷却。过去，人们使用钠来冷却，而这种金属的泄漏会带来各种火灾隐患。

114. More than 99 percent of uranium is made of the U238 isotope, which cannot be used as an energy source in conventional reactors. Fast neutrons can convert this into Pu239 fuel. Fast neutron reactors use Pu239 fuel and run at such high energy fluxes that they need liquid metal cooling. In the past sodium has been used for cooling with all the attendant fire hazards associated with leaks of this metal.

115.苏联式的单身税可能会解决同性恋经济特权问题。

115. A Soviet-type bachelor tax could potentially address the gay economic privilege.

116 . 图 6.9取自经济和统计局发布的数据，数据来自劳工统计局和中国国家统计局。发布于https://acetool.comerce.gov。

116. Figure 6.9 drawn from data published by Economics and Statistics Administration, using data from Bureau of Labor statistics and National Bureau of Statistics China. Published at https://acetool.comerce.gov.

117.图 6.10取自财新国际（http://caixinglobal.com ）发布的数据，数据来自国际劳工组织全球工资数据库、美国经济分析局和世界银行。发布于http://acetool.comerce.gov/labor-costs。

117. Figure 6.10 drawn from data published at Caixin Global (http://caixinglobal.com) using data from ILO Global Wage Database, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and World Bank. Published at http://acetool.comerce.gov/labor-costs.

118.科技进步，尤其是通过符号技术计算的精确日历的发展，意味着祭司不再需要实际观察天空。教堂建筑对于预测季节几乎没有用处，但定期的教堂节日却有用。随着祭司与天文学的实际距离，意识形态的转变可能会使天体不再是神的化身，而是变成了真实历史人物（通过尤西比乌斯 [Kofsky 2002] 而为人所知的 Sanchuniathon [Kaizer 2014] 的概念）或想象中的皇帝、犹太人的国王等的神化。

118. Advances in technology, in particular the development of accurate calendars that could be worked by symbolic techniques, meant that priesthoods need no longer actually observe the sky. Church buildings were of little use for predicting the seasons, but the regular church festivals were. With the practical distancing of the priesthoods from astronomy could go ideological shifts which dispensed with the heavenly bodies as incarnations of deities, to a system where the gods became apotheoses of either real historical figures (the idea of Sanchuniathon [Kaizer 2014] known through Eusebius [Kofsky 2002]), or imagined emperors, Kings of the Jews, etc.

119.有关哈耶克将价格体系视为通信网络的概念的详细批判，请参阅 Cockshott 和 Cottrell (1997c)。

119. For a detailed critique of Hayek’s conception of the price system as a communications network, see Cockshott and Cottrell (1997c).

120.请注意，对于列宁或毛泽东等正统共产主义者来说，国家资本主义一词指的是私人资本主义企业受国家控制的情况，如英国和德国的战时经济或 1950 年代的中国。它不是指国有企业。

120. Note that for orthodox communists like Lenin or Mao the term state capitalism refers to a situation where private capitalist firms are subjected to state control, as in the British and German war economies or in China in the 1950s. It does not refer to state-owned companies.

121. Friedman 和 Baker (2009) 给出了几个例子，说明第二次世界大战期间，新炮架和滑道尺寸的进度约束影响了英国驱逐舰的建造计划。Friedman (2015) 给出了一个例子，即 1917 年，海军上将级主力舰的建造因造船劳动力不足而推迟，无法同时建造它们和驱逐舰。对于大规模造船计划，即使在和平时期，国家也必须对物理约束进行类似的前瞻性规划（Arena 等人，2005 年）。

121. Friedman and Baker (2009) give several examples of scheduling constraints on new gun mountings, and slip sizes affecting UK destroyer construction plans in the Second World War. Friedman (2015) gives the example of construction of the Admiral class capital ships being postponed due to insufficient shipbuilding labor to build both them and destroyers in 1917. For large scale shipbuilding programs, even in peace, similar forward planning of physical constraints has to be done by the state (Arena et al. 2005).

122.我使用符号D'来表示费尔德曼最初的T，使用D来表示他的ND，使用Du来表示他的ND。

122. I have used the notation D’ for Feldman’s original T and D for his ND, D-u for his ND.

123。有关费尔德曼模型及其与再生产方案分析的关系的一般讨论，请参阅 Clark (1984)。有关费尔德曼模型如何在理论上实现增长最优（假设使用苏联式国民账户）的实例，请参阅 Földvári 等人 (2015)。

123. For a general discussion of the Feldman model and its relation to reproduction scheme analysis, see Clark (1984). For worked examples of how a Feldman model is in theory optimal for growth, provided Soviet-style national accounts are used, see Földvári et al. (2015).

124.为什么货币流量的价值是人数？因为根据劳动理论，货币流量是劳动力流量的表现，而劳动力流量是以 [(人×小时)/年] 来衡量的，而小时和年都是时间度量，因此从维度上讲它们相互抵消。因此，价值流量是以人数来衡量的，即必须投入到生产该价值输出流的人数。

124. Why is a flow of money value a number of persons? Because in terms of the labor theory, a flow of money is the representation of a flow of labor, and a flow of labor is measured in [(persons×hrs)/yr], and hours and years are both time measures, so that in dimensional terms they cancel out. So the flow of value is measured in persons, the number of people having to be devoted to the production of that value flow of output.

125.艾伦的数据受到 Wheatcroft (2009) 的质疑，他对消费增长的估计要悲观得多。但艾伦的观点得到了其他完全独立来源的强烈支持。Hunter 和 Szyrmer (2014) 给出了同一时期非常相似的消费趋势，而 Pelkonen 和 Cockshott (2017) 则表明，儿童增长率与艾伦的消费估计值非常接近。

125. Allen’s data have been questioned by Wheatcroft (2009) who gives much more pessimistic estimates of consumption growth. But Allen is strongly supported by other entirely independent sources. Hunter and Szyrmer (2014) give very similar trends for consumption over the same period and Pelkonen and Cockshott (2017) show that child growth rates correlate very closely with the consumption estimates of Allen.

126 解决这个问题的一种方法是给出两个增长率估计值，一个基于 1975 年的价格，另一个基于 1979 年的价格。计算出 1975 年生产的总物理产出按照 1979 年的价格应该卖多少钱，然后使用 1975 年的价格将其与 1979 年产出的实际售价进行比较，反之亦然。

126 A way around it is to give two estimates of growth rate, one based on prices in 1975 and another based on prices in 1979. You work out what the total physical output produced in 1975 would have sold for in terms of 1979 prices and compare that to what the 1979 output actually sold for, and vice versa using 1975 prices.

127 . “一般来说，在共产主义社会中，货币的废除是不可避免的，因为共产主义社会中没有个人或集体的核算，没有谁拿走什么、拿走多少的核算。然而，社会主义（因为它是社会主义，不是共产主义）却有这种核算，尽管最终它只适用于分配产品的一部分。此外，社会主义并不完全排除那些尚未社会化的经济部门（例如小生产）的市场。诚然，这些部门及其市场在社会主义下逐渐消亡。但是，随着社会主义逐渐转变为共产主义，它们逐渐消亡——因为共产主义本身只是未完成的、未发展的共产主义。最后，在社会主义下，自愿的、业余的工业和艺术发展起来，社会主义国家下的工人在完成义务劳动后从事这些活动，这些活动的产品像现在一样换成货币。但当然，货币在这些条件下的作用与资本主义或商品社会主义制度下的作用完全不同。在后者中，货币充当商品价值的尺度、流通手段和支付手段。它是自发调节生产和交换过程的手段之一。然而，当经济的所有决定性部门都受到计划的约束，因此，当这些部门之间的交换也受到计划的约束，有计划地积累和有计划地分配消费品时，货币就变成了计划分配的单纯辅助工具。它只在非社会化的经济部分保留了它以前的地位，甚至在那里也不是为整个经济，而只是为狭义的市场，即在非社会化的经济部分中进行交换的市场保留了它以前的地位。”（Preobrazhenski 1973，第 11 讲）

127. “In general, the abolition of money is inevitable in Communist society, where there is no individual or group accounting of who takes what and how much. Socialism, however (because it is socialism and not communism), does have this accounting, though eventually it is applied only to a section of the products distributed. Moreover, socialism does not completely exclude the market for those branches of the economy, for example, for petty production—which are not yet socialized. True, these branches, and the market with them, gradually wither away under socialism. But they wither away gradually, as socialism gradually turns into communism—being, as it is, merely unfinished, undeveloped communism. Finally, under socialism voluntary, amateur industry and art develop, activities in which the workers under the socialist state engage after they have fulfilled their obligatory spell of work, and the products of which are exchanged for money, as happens now. But of course the role of money in these conditions is not at all the same as under the capitalist or commodity-socialist systems. In these latter, money served as the yardstick of the value of commodities, the means of circulation and the means of payment. It was one of the means whereby the spontaneous regulation of the process of production and exchange took place. When, however, all decisive branches of the economy became subject to planning, and when, consequently, exchange between these branches also became subject to planning, with planned accumulation and planned distribution of consumer goods, then money was transformed into a mere auxiliary instrument of planned distribution. It retained its former status only for the non-socialized part of the economy, and even there not for the whole but only for its market in the narrow sense of the word, that is, for the market in which exchange within the non-socialized part of the economy took place.” (Preobrazhenski 1973, Lecture 11.)

“目前，我国社会主义生产的基本形式有两种：国家或公有生产，和集体农庄生产，后者不能说是公有的。在国营企业中，生产资料和生产产品是国家所有。在集体农庄中，虽然生产资料（土地、机器）属于国家，但生产产品属于国家所有。是各个集体农场的财产，因为劳动力和种子都是他们自己的，而永久移交给集体农场的土地实际上被他们作为自己的财产，尽管他们不能出售、购买、租赁或抵押它。

“Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly-owned production, and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms, since the labor, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land, which has been turned over to the collective farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

其结果是，国家只支配国营企业的产品，而集体农庄的产品是集体农庄的财产，只能由集体农庄支配。但是集体农庄不愿意以商品形式转让其产品，它们希望用商品交换它们所需要的商品。目前，集体农庄不承认与城市的任何其他经济关系，只承认商品关系，即通过买卖进行交换。因此，商品生产和贸易对于我们今天来说，就像三十年前列宁谈到必须大力发展贸易时一样，是必要的。”（斯大林，1952 年，第 2 章）

The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate their products except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation—exchange through purchase and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were, say, thirty years ago, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost.” (Stalin 1952, chapter 2.)

128. “众所周知，当供需平衡时，任何产品的相对价值都准确地由该产品所包含的劳动量决定，也就是说，这个相对价值恰恰表达了我们刚才赋予它的比例关系。蒲鲁东先生颠倒了事物的顺序。他说，首先用产品所包含的劳动量来衡量产品的相对价值，那么供需就会绝对平衡。生产将与消费相适应，产品将永远可以交换。它的现行价格将准确地反映它的真实价值。他不是像其他人一样说：天气好的时候，会看到很多人出去散步。蒲鲁东先生让他的人出去散步，是为了能够保证他们有好天气。

128. “Everyone knows that when supply and demand are evenly balanced, the relative value of any product is accurately determined by the quantity of labor embodied in it, that is to say, that this relative value expresses the proportional relation precisely in the sense we have just attached to it. M. Proudhon inverts the order of things. Begin, he says, by measuring the relative value of a product by the quantity of labor embodied in it, and supply and demand will infallibly balance one another. Production will correspond to consumption, the product will always be exchangeable. Its current price will express exactly its true value. Instead of saying like everyone else: when the weather is fine, a lot of people are to be seen going out for a walk. M. Proudhon makes his people go out for a walk in order to be able to ensure them fine weather.

蒲鲁东先生所说的由劳动时间先验地决定的市场价值的结果，只能通过大致如下的规律来证明：

What M. Proudhon gives as the consequence of marketable value determined a priori by labor time could be justified only by a law couched more or less in the following terms:

将来，产品将按照它们所耗费的劳动时间的精确比例进行交换。不管供求比例如何，商品的交换总是好像它们是按照需求比例生产的一样。让蒲鲁东先生自己制定和制定这样的规律吧，我们就可以免除他提出证据的必要。另一方面，如果他坚持要证明他的理论，不是作为立法者，而是作为经济学家，那么他就必须证明，生产一种商品所需要的时间恰好表明了这种商品的效用程度，并标志着这种商品与需求的比例关系，从而也标志着财富总量的比例关系。在这种情况下，如果一种产品以等于其生产成本的价格出售，那么供求总是相等的，因为生产成本被认为是供求之间真实关系的表现。”（马克思，1847年）

Products will in future be exchanged in the exact ratio of the labor time they have cost. Whatever may be the proportion of supply to demand, the exchange of commodities will always be made as if they had been produced proportionately to the demand. Let M. Proudhon take it upon himself to formulate and lay down such a law, and we shall relieve him of the necessity of giving proofs. If, on the other hand, he insists on justifying his theory, not as a legislator, but as an economist, he will have to prove that the time needed to create a commodity indicates exactly the degree of its utility and marks its proportional relation to the demand, and in consequence, to the total amount of wealth. In this case, if a product is sold at a price equal to its cost of production, supply and demand will always be evenly balanced; for the cost of production is supposed to express the true relation between supply and demand.” (Marx 1847.)

129.马克思在关于瓦格纳的笔记中，用一行旁注的形式嘲笑了那种认为他可以提出任何社会主义制度的想法（Marx, 1975）。

129. Marx ridiculed the idea that he proposed any system of socialism in a one-line aside in his notes on Wagner (Marx, 1975).

130 . 马克思主义者对于“价值规律”是否仅适用于商品生产存在一些争议；即使是那些将其限制在商品生产范围内的人，通常也认为它与不同生产过程之间劳动时间分配的更普遍规律有关（Littlejohn，1979）。如果后者更普遍的规律也被称为价值规律，那么这个概念表达了社会可用的总劳动时间（在给定的时间段内，比如一年）中用于特定生产过程的比例。因此，该生产过程的每一种产品都体现了一种价值，它是用于该生产过程的比例劳动时间的一小部分。换句话说，如果如果一年生产一千件产品，那么每件产品就体现了该生产过程价值的千分之一。如果生产两千件产品，那么每件产品的价值就会减半。因此，每件产品的价值与与其相关的生产过程的生产力成反比。因此，产品的价值是指生产该产品所必需的劳动时间量（占社会总可用劳动时间的比例）（Hirst 1977；Hindess 1978）。产品的价值是生产该产品所需的社会必要劳动时间的体现，而社会必要劳动时间量取决于特定生产过程的生产力及其与其他生产过程的经济关系。在商品生产的情况下，根据马克思的说法，商品交换的事实会影响不同生产过程之间劳动时间的社会分配，产品中所体现的绝对劳动时间量是无法衡量的。只测量相对劳动时间量，这发生在商品交换过程中，其中相对劳动时间量由商品相互交换的比率表示。如果一磅糖定期交换十磅土豆，那么对马克思来说，这是因为这些产品的物理量都需要相同数量的社会必要劳动时间来生产。劳动时间是一小时还是五天不能直接用一比十的交换比率来衡量，这只表明产品的相对价值。一旦货币成为商品交换不可分割的一部分，这种马克思所说的“交换价值”就构成了商品价格的基础。根据马克思的说法，这是在一种商品成为社会可接受的衡量标准的基础上发生的，所有其他交换比率都是以此为基础确定的（Littlejohn 1981，第 20 页）。

130. There is some dispute amongst Marxists about whether the “law of value” only applies to the production of commodities; even those who limit it to commodity production usually see it as related to a more general law of the distribution of labor-time among different production processes (Littlejohn, 1979). If the latter, more general law is also referred to as the law of value, then the concept expresses the proportion of the total labor-time available to a society (within a given time-period, say a year) which is devoted to a particular production process. Each of the products of that production process thus embodies a value which is a fraction of the proportional labor-time devoted to that production process. In other words, if one thousand products are produced in a year, then each product embodies one-thousandth of the value of that production process. If two thousand products are produced, then the value of each product is halved. Thus the value of each product is inversely proportional to the productivity of the production process associated with it. The value of a product thus refers to the amount of labor time (as a proportion of the total socially available labor-time) which is necessary (Hirst 1977; Hindess 1978). to produce it: the value of a product is the embodiment of the socially necessary labor-time required to produce it, and the socially necessary amount of labor-time depends on the productivity of the particular production process and its economic relation to other production processes. In the case of commodity production, according to Marx, where the fact that commodities are exchanged has an effect on the social distribution of labor-time between different production processes, the absolute amount of labor-time embodied in a product is not measured. Only the relative amount of labor-time is measured, and this occurs in the process of commodity exchange where the relative amount of labor-time is expressed by the ratios in which the commodities exchange for each other. If one pound of sugar regularly exchanges for ten pounds of potatoes, then for Marx this is because these physical quantities of the products each take the same amount of socially necessary labor-time to produce. Whether that labor-time is one hour or five days cannot be directly measured by this exchange ratio of one to ten, which only indicates the relative value of the products. This “exchange value,” as Marx calls it, forms the basis for the price of commodities, once money becomes an integral part of commodity exchange. According to Marx, this occurs on the basis of one commodity becoming a socially acceptable measure in terms of which all the other exchange ratios are established (Littlejohn 1981, p. 20).

131.请注意，欧盟强制征收的增值税在德语中称为mehrwertsteuer，字面意思是“剩余价值税”。

131. Note that the European Union–mandated VAT is called mehrwertsteuer in German, literally “surplus value tax.”

132.我与 Allin Cottrell 合作撰写了大量关于本文简要提及的政策建议的文章。具体请参阅 Cockshott 和 Cottrell (1989)、Cockshott 和 Cottrell (1992) 或 Cottrell 和 Cockshott (1993)。

132. Along with Allin Cottrell I have written extensively on the policy proposals alluded to briefly here. See in particular Cockshott and Cottrell (1989), Cockshott and Cottrell (1992) or Cottrell and Cockshott (1993).

133.原始论文是 Kantorovich (1960)；我在 Cockshott (2006b) 中为现代读者解释了他的技术是如何运作的。

133. The original paper was Kantorovich (1960); I explained for a modern readership how his technique worked in Cockshott (2006b).

134.小说《红色丰饶》（Spufford，2010）为普通人提供了有关苏联计划中使用计算机的良好介绍。

134. You can get a good lay person’s introduction to the use of computers in Soviet planning in the novel Red Plenty (Spufford, 2010).

135. “全球能源模型 TIMER 研究了能源系统的长期趋势。该模型描述了 26 个世界地区对九种最终能源载体和十种主要能源载体的需求和供应。TIMER 的需求子模型根据结构变化、自主和价格引起的能源强度变化（能源节约）以及基于价格的燃料替代，确定五个部门（工业、交通、住宅、服务和其他）对燃料和电力的需求。电力需求由基于化石燃料或生物能源的火力发电、水力发电、核能发电和太阳能或风能满足。”（Van Vuuren 等人，2011 年）

135. “The global energy model TIMER looks into long-term trends in the energy system. The model describes the demand and supply of nine final energy carriers and ten primary energy carriers for 26 world regions. The demand sub-model of TIMER determines demand for fuels and electricity in five sectors (industry, transport, residential, services and other) based on structural change, autonomous and price-induced change in energy intensity (energy conservation) and price-based fuel substitution. The demand for electricity is fulfilled by fossil-fuel or bioenergy based thermal power, hydropower, nuclear power and solar or wind.” (Van Vuuren et al. 2011.)

136.辐射强迫是来自太阳的能量与以红外线形式重新发射到太空的能量之间的差值。任何过量都会导致海洋变暖、冰融化等。

136. Radiative forcing is the difference between energy arriving from the Sun and the energy being re-emitted as infrared to space. Any excess causes warming of the oceans, melting of ice, etc.

137.数据来源于美国能源信息署，《2015 年度能源展望报告》。

137. Data from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook Report 2015.

138. Licht 等人（2012 年）声称，他们提出的 STEP 工艺实际上比目前的水泥生产方法更便宜。但他们的成本取决于在更高的温度下操作该工艺，此时输出将是 CO 和 O ₂而不是元素碳和氧。然后他们提议将一氧化碳作为塑料生产的原料出售。但这一过程不会实现碳中和，因为部分塑料最终会被燃烧并进入空气中。

138. Licht et al. (2012) claim that their proposed STEP process would actually be cheaper than the current method of cement production. But their costings depend on operating the process at a higher temperature at which the outputs would be CO and O₂ rather than elemental carbon and oxygen. They then propose to sell the carbon monoxide as a feedstock for plastic production. But this process would not be carbon neutral, as part of the plastics would eventually end up being burned and entering the air.

139.我记得我祖父在 20 世纪 20 年代向我描述过其中一艘船的景象。当时我不明白它是如何工作的。

139. I recall my grandfather describing to me the sight of one of these ships in the 1920s. At the time I could not understand how it could work.

140 . 对船舶化石燃料的限制可能首先是禁止使用高硫油。单是这一威胁就足以刺激风力发电实验的复苏。

140. Restrictions on fossil fuel for ships may first come as bans on the use of high sulfur oil. The threat of this has alone been enough to spur the revived experimental work on wind power.

141.这与英国1948年铁路和公路运输国有化后不久的运输模式类似：长途运输由铁路运输，最终运输由小型卡车运输。

141. This is similar to the model of delivery that existed in the United Kingdom in the period immediately after nationalization of the railways and road transport in 1948: railways for long distances; small trucks for final delivery.

142.有关 20 世纪 70 年代初对交通运输的预期，请参阅 Ellison 和 Bahmanyar (1974) 和 Ross (1973)。

142. For an idea of what was anticipated for transport in the early 1970s, see Ellison and Bahmanyar (1974) and Ross (1973).

143.仔细研究图7.6可以发现，虽然日本的生产率增长率在20世纪90年代末几乎降至零，但2007年又回升至2%左右。

143. Close examination of figure 7.6 shows that while Japanese productivity growth fell almost to zero in the late 1990s, it recovered to about 2 percent in 2007.

144 . 类似的热力学约束会影响其他热机。不太明显的是，热力学也限制了计算机的性能，正如我们在 Cockshott 等人 (2012) 中所展示的那样。

144. Similar thermodynamic constraints affect other heat engines. Less obviously, thermodynamics also limits the performance of computers, as we showed in Cockshott et al. (2012).

145. “一方面，信息想要变得昂贵，因为它太有价值了。在正确的地方提供正确的信息会改变你的生活。另一方面，信息想要免费，因为传播信息的成本越来越低。所以，这两者是相互竞争的。”（布兰德 1987 年）

145. “On the one hand information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable. The right information in the right place just changes your life. On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting lower and lower all the time. So you have these two fighting against each other.” (Brand 1987.)

146.认为人类劳动力已经过时的想法尤其有害。生产力趋势的所有证据都表明，人类劳动力的淘汰速度比 20 世纪中叶慢得多。

146. The idea that human labor is now obsolete is particularly pernicious. All the evidence from trends in productivity is that human labor is being dispensed with far more slowly than it was in the mid-twentieth century.

147.我们开发的 Handivote 系统（Cockshott 和 Renaud 2010；Cockshott 和 Renaud 2009；Renaud 和 Cockshott 2010）是参与式直接民主的一个可能方案，但肯定还有许多其他方案可供使用，例如 Liquid Democracy（Paulin 2014）。

147. One possible protocol for participatory direct democracy is the Handivote system (Cockshott and Renaud 2010; Cockshott and Renaud 2009; Renaud and Cockshott 2010) that we have developed, but there are certainly many others that could be used, for example Liquid Democracy (Paulin 2014).

148.因此，它们与 Morishima (1973) 的技术矩阵有所不同，但正如我们将看到的，两者之间存在着潜在的关系。

148. They thus differ from the technology matrices of Morishima (1973), though as we shall see, there is an underlying relationship between the two.

指数

Index

本书印刷版中的索引被有意从电子书中删除。请使用电子阅读设备上的搜索功能搜索您感兴趣的术语。为方便您参考，以下列出了印刷版索引中出现的术语。

The index that appeared in the print version of this title was intentionally removed from the eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.

流产

abortion

抽象劳动

abstract labor

气转球

aeolipiles

土地革命

agrarian revolutions

农业社会；阶级形成；生育；战争、父权制和宗教

agricultural societies; class formation in; reproduction in; war, patriarchy, and religion during

农业：生产力提高；创新；机械化，在美国；基于人口增长和粮食生产转移的农民经济；用于奴隶制

agriculture: increased productivity of; innovation in; machination of, in United States; peasant economies based on; population growth and; shifts in production of food; slavery used for

空运

air freight

艾伦，罗伯特 C.

Allen, Robert C.

替代能源

alternative energy sources

路易斯·阿尔都塞

Althusser, Louis

铝

aluminum

安纳托利亚

Anatolia

亚里士多德

Aristotle

军备

armaments

阿姆斯特朗，威廉·乔治

Armstrong, William George

阿什（HB）

Ash, H. B.

雅典（希腊），奥斯汀，简

Athens (Greece), Austen, Jane

澳大利亚

Australia

自动化；信息技术

automation; in information technology

汽车；电动；生产创新；石油配给

automobiles; electric; innovation in production of; oil rationing for

航空业

aviation industry

查尔斯·巴贝奇

Babbage, Charles

银行和银行业务；作为非生产性劳动

banks and banking; as unproductive labor

巴贝加尔磨坊

Barbegal mill

易货经济

barter economy

比安奇，苏珊娜 M.

Bianchi, Suzanne M.

生物燃料

biofuels

出生率；在中国；剥削和；下降；在德国；盈利能力和；在苏联

birth rates; in China; exploitation and; falling; in Germany; profitability and; in Soviet Union

比特曼，迈克尔

Bittman, Michael

黑死病

Black Death

黑人向北迁移

blacks, migration to North by

博尔迪加，阿马德奥

Bordiga, Amadeo

费尔南·布罗代尔

Braudel, Fernand

哺乳

breastfeeding

布伦纳，罗伯特 P.

Brenner, Robert P.

砖

brick

英国（英格兰；大不列颠；联合王国）：人造能源；经济增长；电力生产；移民和剥削；工资水平和工业化；水力发电；小麦进口

Britain (England; Great Britain; United Kingdom): artificial power in; economic growth in; electric generation in; immigration and exploitation in; wage levels and industrialization in; water power in; wheat imported by

青铜时代

Bronze Age

保加利亚

Bulgaria

特雷弗·伯纳德

Burnard, Trevor

伊恩·巴克斯顿

Buxton, Ian

加拿大

Canada

加拿大妇女协会

Canadian Womens’ Association

资本积累

capital accumulation

资本主义：国内经济和；自动化的历史；创新的影响；帆船的运营；农民经济与；人口和；发展所必需的力量；盈利趋势；相对剥削；社会主义国家的恢复；国有资本主义；技术和剩余

capitalism: domestic economy and; history of automation for; impacts of innovation in; in operation of sailing ships; peasant economies compared with; population and; power essential for development of; profitability trends in; relative exploitation in; restoration of, in socialist countries; state-owned capitalism; technology and surplus in

资本主义经济；工资率分配；国内经济；电力生产；增长限制；人口；价格机制；盈利趋势；变化调节；社会主义经济区别于；剩余

capitalist economies; distribution of wage rates in; domestic economy in; electric generation in; limitations on growth of; population in; price mechanisms in; profitability trends in; regulation of change in; socialist economies distinguished from; surplus in

二氧化碳（_CO2）

carbon dioxide (CO₂)

碳配给

carbon rationing

碳税

carbon taxes

汽车，参见汽车

cars, see automobiles

凯斯，安妮

Case, Anne

收银机

cash registers

莱昂内尔·卡森

Casson, Lionel

种姓

castes

恰塔尔赫迪尤克（新石器时代城镇）

Çatalhðyuk (Neolithic town)

卡托

Cato

水泥

cement

儿童；照顾；家庭经济；再生产；苏联社会主义政策

children; care for; in domestic economy; reproduction of; socialist policies on; in Soviet Union

智利

Chile

中国：18 世纪的土地革命；18 世纪的人口出生率；18 世纪的共产党；18 世纪的经济增长；18 世纪的封建领地；18 世纪的化石燃料使用；18 世纪的货币和钱币历史；18 世纪的水力发电；18 世纪的核能；18 世纪的前资本主义农业；18 世纪的铁路；18 世纪的社会主义

China: agrarian revolution in; birth rates in; Communist Party of; economic growth in; feudal estates in; fossil fuels used in; history of coins and money in; hydroelectricity in; nuclear power in; pre-capitalist agriculture in; railroads in; socialism in

氏族社会、奴隶制

clan societies, slavery in

阶级，在农业社会中

class, in agricultural societies

古典经济理论，关于价格

classical economic theory, on prices

气候变化

climate change

衣服

clothing

克洛维斯人

Clovis people

煤；由其生产的焦炭

coal; coke produced from

马克·科恩

Cohen, Mark

硬币

coins

科尔曼·詹森，艾莉莎

Coleman-Jensen, Alisha

殖民

colonate

殖民主义

colonialism

商品：马克思论奴隶经济

commodities: Marx on; in slave economies

共产主义：燃料；列宁；发布信息；社会昆虫社会

communism: fuel for; Lenin on; posting information as; social insect societies as

共产党人和共产党；独立

communists and communist parties; independence of

电脑

computers

具体的

concrete

版权

copyrights

棉花生产

cotton production

科特雷尔，阿林

Cottrell, Allin

克罗姆普隆，约翰 L.

Crompron, John L.

理查德·道金斯

Dawkins, Richard

死亡率

death rates

安格斯·迪顿

Deaton, Angus

德尔菲，克里斯汀

Delphy, Christine

民主社会主义者

democratic socialists

邓小平

Deng Xiaoping

米尔德里德·迪克曼

Dickeman, Mildred

柴油发动机

diesel engines

数字版权管理 (DRM)

Digital Rights Management (DRM)

迪米特洛夫，迪米塔尔

Dimitrov, Dimitar

戴克里先敕令

Diocletian, edict of

歧视，性别工资差距

discrimination, in gender wage gap

疾病，作为死亡原因

disease, as cause of death

分工；农业社会；白蚁；家养；中石器时代；新石器时代；社会主义经济

division of labor; in agricultural societies; among termites; domestic; in Mesolithic Age; in Neolithic period; in socialist economies

Dobe（人）

Dobe (people)

多玛（Evsey D.）

Domar, Evsey D.

家庭经济；资本主义和；劳动分工；家务劳动；消除任务；社会主义经济；妇女

domestic economy; capitalism and; division of labor in; housework in; removing tasks from; in socialist economies; women in

东印度公司

East India Company

经济增长；社会主义经济

economic growth; in socialist economies

经济：计划经济、危机经济、再生产基础经济、战时经济

economy: planned, crisis of; reproduction foundation of; war economy

爱丁堡（苏格兰）

Edinburgh (Scotland)

埃及

Egypt

电力；来自石油；用于铁路；用于运输

electricity; from oil; used for railroads; used for transport

能源；替代能源；资本主义经济；电力；资本主义发展必不可少；航运；社会主义政策；蒸汽动力；蒸汽涡轮机；阳光；水力；木材

energy; alternative sources of; for capitalist economies; electricity for; essential for development of capitalism; for shipping; socialist policies on; steam power for; steam turbines for; sunlight for; water power for; wood for

唐纳德·恩格斯

Engels, Donald

弗里德里希·恩格斯；论家庭

Engels, Friedrich; on family

英格兰，参见英国

England, see Britain

熵

entropy

剥削：出生率和；移民和；相对和绝对

exploitation: birth rates and; immigration and; relative and absolute

工厂生产系统

factory system of production

家庭：恩格斯论苏联人口与社会主义政策

family: Engels on; population and; socialist policies on; in Soviet Union

伊曼纽尔·法尔琼

Farjoun, Emmanuel

农业：资本投资；发明；另见农业

farming: capital investment in; invention of; see also agriculture

乔治亚州费尔德曼

Feldman, G. A.

生育能力

fertility

肥料

fertilizers

封建制度；劳动力和货物的流动；铁厂时期；苏格兰；史密斯时期；生产单位；水力使用时期

feudalism; flow of labor and goods in; iron works during; in Scotland; Smith on; units of production under; water power used during

金融业

finance industry

密歇根州芬利

Finley, M. I.

火

fire

弗莱特纳转子船

Flettner rotor ships

食物：气候变化和价格；粮食不安全；人口、帝国和；人口增长与价格相关；社会主义经济中；农业社会生产；配给；生产转移；另见农业

food: climate change and price of; food insecurity; population, empire, and; population growth tied to; price of, in socialist economies; produced in agricultural societies; rationing of; shifts in production of; see also agriculture

亨利·福特

Ford, Henry

化石燃料；减少使用；依赖；不再使用；用于运输

fossil fuels; curtailing use of; dependence on; shift away from; used for transport

熔炉

furnaces

聚变能（热核能）

fusion power (thermonuclear power)

未来经济；信息技术；材料技术；政治；人口；技术；运输技术

future economics; information technology for; materials technology for; politics in; population in; technology for; transport technology for

赌博

gambling

汽油，参见油

gasoline, see oil

性别：家务劳动分工和；工资差距预期；新石器时代；薪酬不平等；多态性

gender: division of domestic labor and; expectations for wage gap in; in Neolithic period; pay inequality by; polymorphism of

德国

Germany

安东尼奥·吉尔曼

Gilman, Antonio

吉特尔森，理查德 J.

Gitelson, Richard J.

格拉斯哥（苏格兰）

Glasgow (Scotland)

俄罗斯国家经济合作与发展委员会（苏联经济计划机构）

GOELRO (Soviet economic planning body)

金子

gold

瓦迪斯瓦夫·哥穆尔卡

Gomulka, Wladyslaw

谷歌（公司）

Google (firm)

戈尔巴乔夫，米哈伊尔

Gorbachev, Mikhail

希腊，古

Greece, ancient

哈扎人

Hadza (people)

加勒特·哈丁

Hardin, Garrett

哈珀·凯尔

Harper, Kyle

霍克斯，K.

Hawkes, K.

哈耶克，FA

Hayek, F. A.

海尔布伦纳，罗伯特·L.

Heilbroner, Robert L.

英雄的风转球

Hero’s aeolipile

异养生物

heterotrophs

盖德·休曼

Heuman, Gad

历史唯物主义理论

history, materialist theory of

伊恩·霍德

Hodder, Ian

胡珀（WD）

Hooper, W. D.

家庭

households

家务

housework

住房；租金；石材用量

housing; rents for; stone used for

人类生殖：出生率；人口和；奴隶经济；社会主义经济；参见生殖

human reproduction: birth rates for; population and; in slave economies; in socialist economies; see also reproduction

活人祭祀

human sacrifice

饥饿

hunger

狩猎采集社会

hunter-gathering societies

狩猎社团

hunting societies

水力发电

hydroelectric power

氢气，用于发电

hydrogen, for power

移民

immigration

印度；美国相比

India; United States compared with

工业化

Industrialization

工业革命

Industrial Revolution

杀婴

infanticide

婴儿死亡率；农业社会；苏联

infant mortality; in agricultural societies; in Soviet Union

通货膨胀

inflation

信息

information

信息技术

information technology

英厄姆，杰弗里

Ingham, Geoffrey

英厄姆，约翰·M.

Ingham, John M.

创新；初次使用；相对剥削增加；工资水平和

innovation; initial use of; relative exploitation increased by; wage levels and

国际气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

互联网

Internet

钢铁工业

iron industry

ITER（热核动力反应堆）

ITER (thermonuclear power reactor)

日本：与南非相比；经济增长；停滞

Japan: compared with South Africa; economic growth in; stagnation in

杰塔·卡西尔达

Jethá, Cacilda

伊恩·约翰斯顿

Johnston, Ian

卡尔敦，伊本

Kaldun, Ibn

坎托罗维奇，LV

Kantorovich, L.V.

考夫曼，斯图尔特 A.

Kauffman, Stuart A.

凯恩斯、约翰·梅纳德

Keynes, John Maynard

赫鲁晓夫、尼基塔

Khrushchev, Nikita

亚历山德拉·科伦泰

Kollontai, Alexandra

尤尔根·库琴斯基

Kuczynski, Jürgen

劳动力：生产力下降；生产性和非生产性；生产力；奴隶经济

labor: decline in productivity of; productive and unproductive; productivity of; in slave economies

劳动价值论

labor theory of value

劳动代币（信用）

labor tokens (credits)

尼奥斯湖灾难

Lake Nyos disaster

兰登，约翰

Langdon, John

语言、传播

languages, spread of

拉瓦尔，古斯塔夫·德

Laval, Gustaf de

价值规律；交叉关系；交叉约束

law of value; intersectional relations in; intrasectional constraints in

列宁，弗拉基米尔·伊里奇；论电力

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich; on electricity

威廉·李卜克内西

Liebknecht, Wilhelm

液氢

liquid hydrogen

锂电池

lithium batteries

刘少奇

Liu Shaoqi

莫舍·马乔弗

Machover, Moshe

马焦雷，A.

Maggiore, A.

埃斯特班·埃泽奎尔·麦托

Maito, Esteban Ezequiel

马尔萨斯，托马斯·罗伯特

Malthus, Thomas Robert

曼德布洛，伯努瓦

Mandelbrot, Benoit

庄园制度

manorial systems

制造业

manufacturing

市场经济

market economies

马尔可夫模型

Markov models

马尔可夫过程

Markov processes

马奎蒂，阿达尔米尔 A.

Marquetti, Adalmir A.

婚姻

marriage

卡尔·马克思；关于古典价格理论；关于商品拜物教；关于工业与制造业的区别；关于经济史；关于电力；关于劳动单位；关于潜在的劳动后备军；关于欧文；关于生产力的首位；关于生产关系；关于相对和绝对剥削；关于再生产；关于亚当·斯密；关于社会主义；关于社会主义生产方式；关于技术决定论；关于技术发展；关于人类劳动的价值；关于货币价值

Marx, Karl; on classical theory of prices; on commodity fetishism; on distinction between industry and manufacturing; on economic history; on electric power; on labor units; on latent reserve army of labor; on Owen; on primacy of productive forces; on relations of production; on relative and absolute exploitation; on reproduction; on Adam Smith; on socialism; on socialist mode of production; technological determinism in; on technological development; on value of human labor; on value of money

马克思主义：论价值规律；论小农经济；论技术；蒂克汀论

Marxism: on law of value; on peasant economy; on technology; Ticktin on

唯物史观

materialist theory of history

材料、技术

materials, technology of

母系居住

matrilocality

麦当劳，约翰

McDonald, John

肉

meat

克劳德·梅亚苏

Meillassoux, Claude

男性：在游牧社会中；工资不平等

men: in nomadic societies; pay inequality for

梅内盖蒂，U.

Meneghetti, U.

迪利普·梅农

Menon, Dilip

中石器时代

Mesolithic (Middle Stone) Age

美索不达米亚

Mesopotamia

格雷格·迈克尔森

Michaelson, Greg

军费开支

military spending

生产方式；封建制度；农民；社会主义经济

modes of production; under feudalism; peasant; in socialist economies

西奥多·莫迪斯

Modis, Theodore

货币：奴隶经济；亚当·斯密；社会主义经济

money: in slave economies; Adam Smith on; in socialist economies

一夫一妻制

monogamy

雷内·莫里塞特

Morissette, René

机动车，参见汽车

motor vehicles, see automobiles

新古典经济理论，关于价格

neoclassical economic theory, on prices

新石器革命；生育；社会分层

Neolithic Revolution; reproduction in; social stratification during

奥托·诺伊拉特

Neurath, Otto

托马斯·纽科门

Newcomen, Thomas

赫尔曼·杰里米亚斯·尼波尔

Nieboer, Herman Jeremias

聂先生，詹姆斯 C.

Nieh, James C.

尼日利亚

Nigeria

游牧社会

nomadic societies

诺夫，亚历克

Nove, Alec

核能；热核能；用于航运

nuclear power; thermonuclear power; used for shipping

石油；需求和价格；电力；配给

oil (petroleum); demand for and price of; electricity from; rationing of

开源软件

open-source software

埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆

Ostrom, Elinor

欧文·罗伯特

Owen, Robert

迈克尔·帕伦蒂

Parenti, Michael

牧师

Parson

专利

patents

父权制；发展

patriarchy; development of

小农经济；资本主义与小农经济的比较；剩余形式；自然和技术条件；再生产

peasant economies; capitalism compared with; forms of surplus in; natural and technical conditions for; reproduction in

石油，参见oil

petroleum, see oil

海盗

pirates

瘟疫

plagues

计划经济：危机；未来

planned economies: crisis of; future of

波兰

Poland

波兰尼，K.，C.

Polanyi, K., C.

政治、未来

politics, future of

人口；出生率和；资本主义和；未来；盈利趋势和；苏联；农业转型

population; birth rates and; capitalism and; future of; profitability trends and; of Soviet Union; in transition to agriculture

功率，参见能量

power, see energy

阶级前经济，参见农业社会

pre-class economies, see agricultural societies

叶夫根尼·阿列克谢耶维奇·普列奥布拉任斯基

Preobrazhenski, Evgeni Alekseevich

价格：资本主义经济；古典经济学；新古典经济学；奴隶经济

prices: in capitalist economies; classical economics on; neoclassical economics on; in slave economies

盈利趋势

profitability trends

卖淫

prostitution

原始印欧语（语言）

Proto Indo-European (language)

皮埃尔-约瑟夫·蒲鲁东

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph

托勒密

Ptolemy

种族

race

铁路

railroads

相对剥削

relative exploitation

宗教在分层社会的发展中

religion, in development of stratified societies

伦弗鲁，科林

Renfrew, Colin

租金

rents

代表性浓度路径 (RCP)

Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP)

再生产；在农业社会中；妇女交换；作为经济生活的基础；马克思的公式；在农民经济中；在奴隶经济中；在社会主义经济中；另见人类再生产

reproduction; in agricultural societies; exchange of women for; as foundation of economic life; Marx’s formula for; in peasant economies; in slave economies; in socialist economies; see also human reproduction

大卫·李嘉图；论工资法；论租金；论货币价值

Ricardo, David; on law of wages; on rents; on value of money

机器人

robots

罗马帝国：奴隶制；蒸汽动力；妇女统治

Roman Empire: slavery in; steam power in; women under

罗马诺英国水车

Romano British water wheels

迈克尔·罗斯托夫采夫

Rostovtzeff, Michael

俄罗斯，参见苏联

Russia, see Soviet Union

鲁索、卢西奥

Russo, Lucio

瑞恩·克里斯托弗

Ryan, Christopher

萨林斯，马歇尔

Sahlins, Marshall

萨尔维

Salvian

萨弗里，托马斯

Savery, Thomas

约瑟夫·熊彼特

Schumpeter, Joseph

科学：资本主义发展的基本原则；马克思主义和

sciences: development of, essential for capitalism; Marxism and

苏格兰

Scotland

隔离

segregation

农奴制

serfdom

分成制

sharecropping

庇护所

shelter

船舶和航运：未来；军事；技术

ships and shipping: future of; military; technology of

奴隶经济；商品和价格；矛盾；能源成本；封建经济与封建经济的比较；印度的人类再生产；劳动力和价格；货币；不普遍；利润；再生产；美国的技术

slave economies; commodities and prices under; contradictions in; costs of energy in; feudal economies compared with; human reproduction in; in India; labor and price in; money in; not universal; profits in; reproduction in; technology of; in United States

智能手机

smartphones

瓦茨拉夫·斯米尔

Smil, Vaclav

亚当·斯密；论封建主义；论金融业；论货币；论生产性和非生产性劳动；国家进步理论

Smith, Adam; on feudalism; on finance industry; on money; on productive and unproductive labor; progression of states theorized by

史密斯, 凯恩斯

Smith, Cairnes

斯莫特，T.克里斯托弗

Smout, T. Christopher

社会民主党派

Social Democratic parties

社会性昆虫

social insects

社会主义：危机；未来；意义；国有资本主义

socialism: crisis of; future of; meaning of; state-owned capitalism versus

社会主义经济；社会主义危机；经济增长；能源使用；价值规律的应用；增长的限制；社会主义的意义；货币的使用；再生产和分工；国有资本主义与；剩余产品

socialist economies; crisis of socialism in; economic growth in; energy use in; law of value applied to; limitations on growth of; meaning of socialism; money used in; reproduction and division of labor in; state-owned capitalism versus; surplus product in

社会阶层

social stratification

太阳能

solar power

南非

South Africa

苏联；解体；经济增长；早年经济；发电；能源；家庭和婚姻；价值规律；货币使用；社会主义；国有资本主义；热核能发展

Soviet Union (USSR); collapse of; economic growth in; economy during early years of; electric generation in; energy sources for; family and marriage in; law of value in; money used in; socialism in; state-owned capitalism in; thermonuclear power developed in

蜘蛛

spiders

斯大林，约瑟夫

Stalin, Josef

国有资本主义

state-owned capitalism

州：电力生产受管制；货币作为创造物；作为主要购买者；社会主义问题

states: electric generation regulated by; money as creation of; as primary purchaser; question of socialism in

蒸汽动力；与人力相比；限制；取代水力；涡轮机

steam power; compared with human power; limits on; replaces water power; turbines for

钢

steel

石头

stone

供求理论

supply and demand theory

剩余和剩余价值：资本主义经济中的分配；生产资料；农民经济中的盈利趋势和；社会主义经济中的技术和

surplus and surplus value: in capitalist economies; distributions of; means of production of; in peasant economies; profitability trends and; in socialist economies; technology and

坦桑尼亚

Tanzania

税收；碳税；硬币和货币的发明；社会主义经济

taxes; carbon taxes; coins and money invented for; in socialist economies

技术决定论

technological determinism

技术；动物的使用；未来经济；信息技术；最初的用途；铁的生产；在马克思主义理论中；材料；中石器时代；农民经济；发展所必需的动力；航运和运输，; 在奴隶经济中; 在社会主义经济中; 社会转型; 蒸汽动力; 剩余和; 工资水平和创新; 水力发电

technology; animals’ use of; for future economics; information technology; initial use of; iron production for; in Marxist theory; of materials; of Mesolithic Age; of peasant economies; power essential for development of; for shipping and transportation, ; in slave economies; in socialist economies; for social transformation; steam power for; surplus and; wage levels and innovation in; water power for

白蚁

termites

热核能（聚变能）

thermonuclear power (fusion power)

三峡大坝（中国）

Three Gorges Dam (China)

蒂克汀，希勒尔

Ticktin, Hillel

工具：农业；使用

tools: agricultural; use of

拖拉机

tractors

运输技术

transport technology

托洛茨基主义

Trotskyism

涡轮机

turbines

工会、工资差距和

unions, wage gap and

英国，参见英国

United Kingdom, see Britain

美国：家庭劳动分工；发电；奴隶制的结束；收入不平等；与印度的比较；石油配给；相对剥削；向资本主义的过渡

United States: division of domestic labor in; electric generation in; end of slavery in; income inequality in; India compared with; oil rationing in; relative exploitation in; transition to capitalism in

城市化

urbanization

苏联，参见苏联

USSR, see Soviet Union

空想社会主义者

utopian socialists

价值规律，参见价值规律

value, law of, see law of value

价值形式经济学

value form economics

瓦内克，J.

Vanek, J.

范维伦，Detlef P.

Van Vuuren, Detlef P.

副

vice

越南

Vietnam

暴力：在狩猎社会中；作为非生产性劳动

violence: in hunting societies; as unproductive labor

伏特加酒

vodka

路德维希·冯·米塞斯

von Mises, Ludwig

库尔特·冯内古特

Vonnegut, Kurt

工资水平：分配；期望；性别工资不平等和；创新和

wage levels: distribution of; expectations for; gender pay inequality and; innovation and

战争；经济计划；凯恩斯经济；游牧社会；奴隶作为俘虏

wars; economic planning during; Keynes on economy during; in nomadic societies; slaves as captives of

水力；用于纺织工业

water power; used in textile industry

瓦特，詹姆斯

Watt, James

约瑟夫·沃茨

Watts, Joseph

瓦特蒸汽机

Watt steam engine

韦伯，马克斯

Weber, Max

韦伯-布伦纳论题

Weber-Brenner thesis

韦斯多夫，雅各布 L.

Weisdorf, Jacob L.

赫伯特·乔治·韦尔斯

Wells, Herbert George

车轮

wheels

惠特科姆，梅里克

Whitcomb, Merrick

怀特，林恩

White, Lynne

怀特，林恩·汤森

White, Lynn Townsend

朱利安·怀特赖特

Whitewright, Julian

奥卡姆的威廉

William of Ockham

风力发电；用于航运

wind power; for shipping

温斯坦利·杰拉德

Winstanley, Gerrard

女性：家务劳动分工；社区间交换；工资差距预期；家务劳动；母系居住；薪酬不平等；卖淫；罗马帝国；社会主义经济

women: in division of domestic labor; exchanged between communities; expectations for wage gap for; housework done by; matrilocality of; pay inequality for; prostitution by; under Roman Empire; in socialist economies

木材作为能源

wood, as energy source

詹姆斯·伍德伯恩

Woodburn, James

工人阶级

working class

沃雷尔，恩斯特

Worrell, Ernst

雷·兰德尔

Wray, Randall

叶利钦，鲍里斯

Yeltsin, Boris

撒迦利亚，大卫

Zachariah, David

赞比亚

Zambia